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This chapter offers a brief introduction to accountability in the context of the EU’s peacebuilding activities. It first sketches out the institutional and operational scope of EU civilian crisis management (ie peacebuilding activities under the CSDP) and then unveils the central problématique of the book, namely that EU peacebuilding realities no longer correspond to the codified intergovernmental blueprint, so that missions take place in a Europeanized set-up. This de jure–de facto discrepancy, in turn, raises governance issues. From here, the chapter shows, based on insights from peacebuilding practice, that dysfunctional accountability arrangements are not an isolated phenomenon but constitute a common thread across EU civilian crisis management. It argues that the intricate Europeanized governance set-up of civilian CSDP facilitates an accountability deficit. Prior to outlining the structure of the book, the chapter explains how this interdisciplinary study of accountability in civilian CSDP enriches the existing corpus of academic literature.

This chapter brings all the findings of this volume together. The point of departure was the finding of a de jure–de facto discrepancy regarding peacebuilding activities carried out under the CSDP: while the formal institutional and procedural features of EU peacebuilding are fundamentally intergovernmental, its administrative and operational realities have become Europeanized. This development prompts the question to what extent the transfer of powers by Member States to Brussels-based EU civilian crisis management structures has been matched with the establishment of appropriate accountability mechanisms at the European level. With a view to answering this interrogation, the chapter provides a concluding overview of existing accountability arrangements—political, legal, and administrative in nature—from both a de jure and a de facto perspective. The core finding is that while there is a considerable accountability deficit existing in law, this deficit has incrementally been countered by practice. As a result of this de facto readjustment of accountability, checks and balances are stronger at the EU than at Member State level, and individuals have de facto better—even though not perfect—judicial and administrative redress options at the supranational level. The conclusions further sketch out lessons learned, both for theory and practice, and provide an outlook on accountability in (civilian) CSDP.