Gerda Falkner (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596225
- eISBN:
- 9780191729140
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
Fritz W. Scharpf's renowned joint‐decision trap model has suggested that the requirements of (nearly) unanimous decisions in the EU's Council of Ministers, combined with conflicting preferences among ...
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Fritz W. Scharpf's renowned joint‐decision trap model has suggested that the requirements of (nearly) unanimous decisions in the EU's Council of Ministers, combined with conflicting preferences among member governments, will systematically limit the problem-solving effectiveness of European policies. Certain conditions have significantly changed during the 25 years of this theory's existence: the unanimity rule has been replaced by qualified-majority voting in most issue areas, and successive rounds of enlargement have augmented the diversity of member state interests and preferences. This book presents a comparative study on the differential politics in EU policies. Looking at the political dynamics in an array of EU activities, it analyses breakthroughs as well as stalemates and asks why leaps occur in some areas whilst blockades characterize others. The dynamics that allow the EU to escape various forms of decision trap are analysed in depth. Such mechanisms are from both the type expected by ‘rationalist’ theorists (supranational-hierarchical steering, Treaty‐base games and arena shifting) and from the kind acknowledged by ‘constructivist’ approaches (socialization). The downside of the findings is that when the EU is confronted with a high degree of problem pressure in a given issue area, these mechanisms will often not be available because most remain outside politicians' immediate grasp.Less
Fritz W. Scharpf's renowned joint‐decision trap model has suggested that the requirements of (nearly) unanimous decisions in the EU's Council of Ministers, combined with conflicting preferences among member governments, will systematically limit the problem-solving effectiveness of European policies. Certain conditions have significantly changed during the 25 years of this theory's existence: the unanimity rule has been replaced by qualified-majority voting in most issue areas, and successive rounds of enlargement have augmented the diversity of member state interests and preferences. This book presents a comparative study on the differential politics in EU policies. Looking at the political dynamics in an array of EU activities, it analyses breakthroughs as well as stalemates and asks why leaps occur in some areas whilst blockades characterize others. The dynamics that allow the EU to escape various forms of decision trap are analysed in depth. Such mechanisms are from both the type expected by ‘rationalist’ theorists (supranational-hierarchical steering, Treaty‐base games and arena shifting) and from the kind acknowledged by ‘constructivist’ approaches (socialization). The downside of the findings is that when the EU is confronted with a high degree of problem pressure in a given issue area, these mechanisms will often not be available because most remain outside politicians' immediate grasp.
Gerda Falkner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596225
- eISBN:
- 9780191729140
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The introductory chapter outlines the conceptual tools used throughout the volume. It presents, in brief, the original model of the joint-decision trap and the developments that ensued after its ...
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The introductory chapter outlines the conceptual tools used throughout the volume. It presents, in brief, the original model of the joint-decision trap and the developments that ensued after its conception. It extends the realm of the debate by highlighting further forms of EU decision traps, working outside the joint-decision mode under the Community method, such as in intergovernmental negotiations or supranational-hierarchical decisions. As a basis for the subsequent cross-policy study, various mechanisms to exit decision traps or to countervail their effects are discussed in depth. The chapter concludes by highlighting the overall importance of such analyses for European integration theory and outlining the research design and the chapter arrangement of the book.Less
The introductory chapter outlines the conceptual tools used throughout the volume. It presents, in brief, the original model of the joint-decision trap and the developments that ensued after its conception. It extends the realm of the debate by highlighting further forms of EU decision traps, working outside the joint-decision mode under the Community method, such as in intergovernmental negotiations or supranational-hierarchical decisions. As a basis for the subsequent cross-policy study, various mechanisms to exit decision traps or to countervail their effects are discussed in depth. The chapter concludes by highlighting the overall importance of such analyses for European integration theory and outlining the research design and the chapter arrangement of the book.
Zdenek Kudrna
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199596225
- eISBN:
- 9780191729140
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, International Relations and Politics
The joint-decision trap complicates the adoption of financial market regulations in the EU. This chapter examines the capacity of the Lamfalussy procedure to provide an exit from the trap by ...
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The joint-decision trap complicates the adoption of financial market regulations in the EU. This chapter examines the capacity of the Lamfalussy procedure to provide an exit from the trap by supporting complex, yet consistently enforceable, technical compromises. The member states' preferences over key regulatory measures remain divided and tend to split them into two equally sized policy coalitions. In the case of the 1993 Investment Services Directive, the contested compromises proved too ambiguous to be enforced consistently across the EU. In 2001, the EU introduced the Lamfalussy procedure that delegated certain rule-making and monitoring powers to technocratic committees. As a result, the recent regulations, such as the 2004 Market in Financial Instruments Directive, are based on more complex technical compromises that are expensive to implement but can be monitored and enforced consistently, thus supporting EU regulatory integration.Less
The joint-decision trap complicates the adoption of financial market regulations in the EU. This chapter examines the capacity of the Lamfalussy procedure to provide an exit from the trap by supporting complex, yet consistently enforceable, technical compromises. The member states' preferences over key regulatory measures remain divided and tend to split them into two equally sized policy coalitions. In the case of the 1993 Investment Services Directive, the contested compromises proved too ambiguous to be enforced consistently across the EU. In 2001, the EU introduced the Lamfalussy procedure that delegated certain rule-making and monitoring powers to technocratic committees. As a result, the recent regulations, such as the 2004 Market in Financial Instruments Directive, are based on more complex technical compromises that are expensive to implement but can be monitored and enforced consistently, thus supporting EU regulatory integration.
Gerda Falkner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199604104
- eISBN:
- 9780191741531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604104.003.0015
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The EU’s founding fathers had the protection of the EU’s constituent units as a key concern and set up significant hurdles to policy innovation in the absence of unanimous governmental agreement. ...
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The EU’s founding fathers had the protection of the EU’s constituent units as a key concern and set up significant hurdles to policy innovation in the absence of unanimous governmental agreement. Over time, these institutional design features were somewhat eroded but not removed. Nonetheless, the problem of how to innovate has, at times, been overcome through eclectic means. There are indeed some well known and quite visible practices as well as some less expected and more obscure strategies that have propelled the EU’s policy system beyond what has for a long time been expected from a situation of ‘joint-decision trap’. This chapter argues that there are two strategic moves the European Commission and, at times, other actors such as the European Court of Justice can use to actively overcome member state opposition: first, sidelining some or even all national governments; and, second, manipulating relevant policy preferences. These two basic strategies can be seen to interconnect the diverging basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism and classic neofunctionalism as ‘passerelles’.Less
The EU’s founding fathers had the protection of the EU’s constituent units as a key concern and set up significant hurdles to policy innovation in the absence of unanimous governmental agreement. Over time, these institutional design features were somewhat eroded but not removed. Nonetheless, the problem of how to innovate has, at times, been overcome through eclectic means. There are indeed some well known and quite visible practices as well as some less expected and more obscure strategies that have propelled the EU’s policy system beyond what has for a long time been expected from a situation of ‘joint-decision trap’. This chapter argues that there are two strategic moves the European Commission and, at times, other actors such as the European Court of Justice can use to actively overcome member state opposition: first, sidelining some or even all national governments; and, second, manipulating relevant policy preferences. These two basic strategies can be seen to interconnect the diverging basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism and classic neofunctionalism as ‘passerelles’.
Gavin Barrett
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198791621
- eISBN:
- 9780191834004
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791621.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter considers some of the less well-known methods of EU decision-making, namely, comitology and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It examines the ways in which decision-making in these ...
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This chapter considers some of the less well-known methods of EU decision-making, namely, comitology and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It examines the ways in which decision-making in these ‘non-standard’ fields differ from decision-making in the traditional ‘Community’ system, and the implications such differences have for national parliaments’ approach to accountability. It advances two hypotheses. The first is the high probability of strong similarities emerging between, on the one hand, the development of Member State parliaments' perspective regarding such non-standard methods of integration and, on the other hand, the evolution of the approaches of national parliaments towards the traditional ‘Community’ system. The second hypothesis is that earlier Member States’ choices regarding their parliaments' European role should be reviewed and, if necessary, adapted in the light of the proliferation of decision-making methods at EU level, so as to avoid any risk of an appropriate role for national parliaments being circumvented.Less
This chapter considers some of the less well-known methods of EU decision-making, namely, comitology and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It examines the ways in which decision-making in these ‘non-standard’ fields differ from decision-making in the traditional ‘Community’ system, and the implications such differences have for national parliaments’ approach to accountability. It advances two hypotheses. The first is the high probability of strong similarities emerging between, on the one hand, the development of Member State parliaments' perspective regarding such non-standard methods of integration and, on the other hand, the evolution of the approaches of national parliaments towards the traditional ‘Community’ system. The second hypothesis is that earlier Member States’ choices regarding their parliaments' European role should be reviewed and, if necessary, adapted in the light of the proliferation of decision-making methods at EU level, so as to avoid any risk of an appropriate role for national parliaments being circumvented.
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198753391
- eISBN:
- 9780191815027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198753391.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The chapter presents the achievements, dynamics, and challenges of EU social policy. It examines the dynamics of EU social integration, distinguishing between negative and positive integration, and ...
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The chapter presents the achievements, dynamics, and challenges of EU social policy. It examines the dynamics of EU social integration, distinguishing between negative and positive integration, and the open methods of coordination. The chapter sets out the development of EU social policies, including healthcare, despite a weak Treaty mandate and political contestation. After thus presenting the policy area, it analyses the extent to which and conditions under which judicial decisions influence EU social policy outputs. Judicial influence is analysed over time. All social and healthcare proposals, and major amendments, adopted between 1957 and 2014 are compiled and analysed. Variation on judicial influence is identified and the association between key factors, such as time and political disagreements, and the likelihood of political codification of jurisprudence, are examined. The analysis uses qualitative examinations of three decision-making processes leading to different types of judicial influence: codifying, modifying, and overriding the CJEU case law.Less
The chapter presents the achievements, dynamics, and challenges of EU social policy. It examines the dynamics of EU social integration, distinguishing between negative and positive integration, and the open methods of coordination. The chapter sets out the development of EU social policies, including healthcare, despite a weak Treaty mandate and political contestation. After thus presenting the policy area, it analyses the extent to which and conditions under which judicial decisions influence EU social policy outputs. Judicial influence is analysed over time. All social and healthcare proposals, and major amendments, adopted between 1957 and 2014 are compiled and analysed. Variation on judicial influence is identified and the association between key factors, such as time and political disagreements, and the likelihood of political codification of jurisprudence, are examined. The analysis uses qualitative examinations of three decision-making processes leading to different types of judicial influence: codifying, modifying, and overriding the CJEU case law.
Jean-Paul Keppenne
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198793748
- eISBN:
- 9780191927867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793748.003.0033
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides, in its Article 3(4), that ‘[t]he Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro’. This Economic Monetary Union (EMU) ...
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The Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides, in its Article 3(4), that ‘[t]he Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro’. This Economic Monetary Union (EMU) finds its origin in the Treaty of Maastricht of 7 February 1992. As part of this EMU, the core provisions framing the economic policy coordination of the Union are included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) amongst the other internal Union policies. Consequently, the so-called ‘Community method’ fully applies in this field.
Less
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides, in its Article 3(4), that ‘[t]he Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro’. This Economic Monetary Union (EMU) finds its origin in the Treaty of Maastricht of 7 February 1992. As part of this EMU, the core provisions framing the economic policy coordination of the Union are included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) amongst the other internal Union policies. Consequently, the so-called ‘Community method’ fully applies in this field.
Francesco Martucci
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198793748
- eISBN:
- 9780191927867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793748.003.0015
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
‘Another Legal Monster?’ That was the question asked by the Law Department of the European University Institute on 16 February 2012 in a debate about the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and ...
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‘Another Legal Monster?’ That was the question asked by the Law Department of the European University Institute on 16 February 2012 in a debate about the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), also known as the Fiscal Compact Treaty. On 2 March 2012, twenty-five Member States of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic signed the TSCG. A month before, on 2 February 2012, the euro area Member States signed the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), another legal monster. In both cases, the monstrosity lies in the fact that Member States have preferred to conclude an international treaty, rather than to use the European Union (EU) institutional system. Why did the European Commission not propose a legislative act to establish a financial assistance mechanism in the Eurozone and strengthen the fiscal discipline in the EU? Does this mean the end of community method and a victory for the intergovernmental method? As Herman Van Rompuy commented about the crisis; ‘often the choice is not between the community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a co-ordinated European position and nothing at all’. In 2010, Angela Merkel defended her vision of a new ‘Union Method’ in a speech held at the College of Europe. This approach can be defined by the following description: ‘co-ordinated action in a spirit of solidarity–each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal’. Each of us means the European institutions and Member States. The new ‘Euro-international’ treaties (or inter se treaties) raise a number of questions regarding their compatibility with EU law, implications for the Union legal system, institutional balance, national sovereignty and democratic accountability. These questions are all the more important because international treaties raise a number of questions on their compatibility with EU law, implications for the Union legal system and institutional balance.
Less
‘Another Legal Monster?’ That was the question asked by the Law Department of the European University Institute on 16 February 2012 in a debate about the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), also known as the Fiscal Compact Treaty. On 2 March 2012, twenty-five Member States of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic signed the TSCG. A month before, on 2 February 2012, the euro area Member States signed the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), another legal monster. In both cases, the monstrosity lies in the fact that Member States have preferred to conclude an international treaty, rather than to use the European Union (EU) institutional system. Why did the European Commission not propose a legislative act to establish a financial assistance mechanism in the Eurozone and strengthen the fiscal discipline in the EU? Does this mean the end of community method and a victory for the intergovernmental method? As Herman Van Rompuy commented about the crisis; ‘often the choice is not between the community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a co-ordinated European position and nothing at all’. In 2010, Angela Merkel defended her vision of a new ‘Union Method’ in a speech held at the College of Europe. This approach can be defined by the following description: ‘co-ordinated action in a spirit of solidarity–each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal’. Each of us means the European institutions and Member States. The new ‘Euro-international’ treaties (or inter se treaties) raise a number of questions regarding their compatibility with EU law, implications for the Union legal system, institutional balance, national sovereignty and democratic accountability. These questions are all the more important because international treaties raise a number of questions on their compatibility with EU law, implications for the Union legal system and institutional balance.
Christine Quittkat
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199674596
- eISBN:
- 9780191756221
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674596.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Drawing from a comprehensive data base, this chapter offers a longitudinal analysis of those policy fields which are especially of interest for a broad range of civil societal actors (Social Affairs ...
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Drawing from a comprehensive data base, this chapter offers a longitudinal analysis of those policy fields which are especially of interest for a broad range of civil societal actors (Social Affairs and Inclusion; Health and Consumers). It investigates which consultation instruments are used, which groups are reached with different consultation instruments, and if biased and unbalanced consultation of specific groups is discernible. It is shown that in the beginning of the policy process, civil society is more involved in online consultations, as there is a low threshold of participation. In the later stages of the policy process, however, stakeholder and expert involvement is dominant. In terms of the participative quality, the analysis shows that despite an extension of consultation instruments, this has not alleviated or eradicated imbalances in the participation of different actors.Less
Drawing from a comprehensive data base, this chapter offers a longitudinal analysis of those policy fields which are especially of interest for a broad range of civil societal actors (Social Affairs and Inclusion; Health and Consumers). It investigates which consultation instruments are used, which groups are reached with different consultation instruments, and if biased and unbalanced consultation of specific groups is discernible. It is shown that in the beginning of the policy process, civil society is more involved in online consultations, as there is a low threshold of participation. In the later stages of the policy process, however, stakeholder and expert involvement is dominant. In terms of the participative quality, the analysis shows that despite an extension of consultation instruments, this has not alleviated or eradicated imbalances in the participation of different actors.
Bernd-Roland Killmann
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198794561
- eISBN:
- 9780191927874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198759393.003.477
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
Article 279 EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt by means of ...
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Article 279 EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt by means of regulations:
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Article 279 EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt by means of regulations:
Bernd-Roland Killmann
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198794561
- eISBN:
- 9780191927874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198759393.003.467
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
Article 272(2) to (10) EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall establish the Union’s annual budget in accordance with the ...
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Article 272(2) to (10) EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall establish the Union’s annual budget in accordance with the following provisions.
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Article 272(2) to (10) EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall establish the Union’s annual budget in accordance with the following provisions.
Bernd-Roland Killmann
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198794561
- eISBN:
- 9780191927874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198759393.003.464
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
The ToL introduced Article 312 TFEU in order to incorporate the MFF into the Treaties. Previously, multiannual financial planning resulted from an interinstitutional agreement.
The ToL introduced Article 312 TFEU in order to incorporate the MFF into the Treaties. Previously, multiannual financial planning resulted from an interinstitutional agreement.
