Andrew P. N. Eardmann
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any ...
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For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.Less
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.
Kerry E. Irish
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813174723
- eISBN:
- 9780813174778
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813174723.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly ...
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This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly two decades of preparation. Serving overseas during the interwar period under generals such as Fox Conner and Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower came to appreciate both the need for truly unified allied commands and the leadership behaviors essential for their effectiveness. He recognized the importance of flexibility, accountability, humility, consultation, patience, and trust in his relationships with fellow officers and foreign leaders. During the war, Ike proved especially deft at working with political leaders like Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, with Allied military commanders like Bernard Montgomery and Charles de Gaulle, and with his senior military subordinates like George Patton.Less
This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly two decades of preparation. Serving overseas during the interwar period under generals such as Fox Conner and Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower came to appreciate both the need for truly unified allied commands and the leadership behaviors essential for their effectiveness. He recognized the importance of flexibility, accountability, humility, consultation, patience, and trust in his relationships with fellow officers and foreign leaders. During the war, Ike proved especially deft at working with political leaders like Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, with Allied military commanders like Bernard Montgomery and Charles de Gaulle, and with his senior military subordinates like George Patton.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
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This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
Michael Bowen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813036847
- eISBN:
- 9780813043999
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813036847.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil ...
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This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil rights, taxation, welfare, and affirmative action. Backlash implies that the South's move from the Democrats to the GOP was reactionary, but this chapter argues that angst over civil rights alone did not guarantee a Republican realignment. Instead it stresses the building of Republican organization in the South—resources, field workers, communications infrastructure, and leadership—beginning with the 1944 campaign of Thomas Dewey, and culminating in Herbert Brownell's mastery of such organization on behalf of Dwight Eisenhower that shook the southern GOP out of its “post office politician” mentality. Unlike the presidential campaign of 1968, in which Richard Nixon amassed a “silent majority” around the concept of law and order, this chapter argues, the Republicans' first southern strategy was not based on race.Less
This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil rights, taxation, welfare, and affirmative action. Backlash implies that the South's move from the Democrats to the GOP was reactionary, but this chapter argues that angst over civil rights alone did not guarantee a Republican realignment. Instead it stresses the building of Republican organization in the South—resources, field workers, communications infrastructure, and leadership—beginning with the 1944 campaign of Thomas Dewey, and culminating in Herbert Brownell's mastery of such organization on behalf of Dwight Eisenhower that shook the southern GOP out of its “post office politician” mentality. Unlike the presidential campaign of 1968, in which Richard Nixon amassed a “silent majority” around the concept of law and order, this chapter argues, the Republicans' first southern strategy was not based on race.
Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151169
- eISBN:
- 9780199833917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515116X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Analyzes The Far Eastern Commission's objection to MacArthur's arbitrary approval of the March 6 draft and his plan to elect a new Diet in April to approve it. The FEC challenge threatened ...
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Analyzes The Far Eastern Commission's objection to MacArthur's arbitrary approval of the March 6 draft and his plan to elect a new Diet in April to approve it. The FEC challenge threatened MacArthur's intricate plot to preserve the imperial institution in Japan's new constitutional order. The Army's Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, and the State Department defended MacArthur, contending that his actions were consistent with the Moscow Agreement of December 26, 1945, because the draft was the product of a process initiated by the Japanese government in the fall of 1945. The FEC continued to spar with MacArthur during the summer of 1946 and eventually persuaded him to order minor amendments to the draft.Less
Analyzes The Far Eastern Commission's objection to MacArthur's arbitrary approval of the March 6 draft and his plan to elect a new Diet in April to approve it. The FEC challenge threatened MacArthur's intricate plot to preserve the imperial institution in Japan's new constitutional order. The Army's Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, and the State Department defended MacArthur, contending that his actions were consistent with the Moscow Agreement of December 26, 1945, because the draft was the product of a process initiated by the Japanese government in the fall of 1945. The FEC continued to spar with MacArthur during the summer of 1946 and eventually persuaded him to order minor amendments to the draft.
Tony Smith
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154923
- eISBN:
- 9781400842025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154923.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a ...
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This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a Wilsonian advocacy of democracy and a Rooseveltian preference for nonintervention. A third option had emerged since then: intervention for dictatorships, even against indigenous political forces that might be seeking to create constitutional, democratic regimes. The chapter first provides an overview of American realism and mass politics in the twentieth century, with emphasis on the modernity of fascism, communism, and democracy, before discussing American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years. In particular, it considers the Eisenhower administration's policy decisions with respect to Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. It also explores the geopolitical realism of American support for democratic governments abroad.Less
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a Wilsonian advocacy of democracy and a Rooseveltian preference for nonintervention. A third option had emerged since then: intervention for dictatorships, even against indigenous political forces that might be seeking to create constitutional, democratic regimes. The chapter first provides an overview of American realism and mass politics in the twentieth century, with emphasis on the modernity of fascism, communism, and democracy, before discussing American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years. In particular, it considers the Eisenhower administration's policy decisions with respect to Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. It also explores the geopolitical realism of American support for democratic governments abroad.
Robert Wuthnow
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691150550
- eISBN:
- 9781400839759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691150550.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state ...
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This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state with such a long Republican history. The conservatism of the period included rare hints of the more aggressive political and religious movements that were to brand the region as part of the red state Middle West in later decades. The chapter first considers the increasing feeling of political isolation in Kansas that was evident by the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. It then looks at the rise of Harry S. Truman as U.S. president after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, along with Kansans' renewed emphasis on homes, hometowns, and hometown religion as the essential ingredients of Middle West life. It also discusses the religious situation in Kansas during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.Less
This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state with such a long Republican history. The conservatism of the period included rare hints of the more aggressive political and religious movements that were to brand the region as part of the red state Middle West in later decades. The chapter first considers the increasing feeling of political isolation in Kansas that was evident by the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. It then looks at the rise of Harry S. Truman as U.S. president after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, along with Kansans' renewed emphasis on homes, hometowns, and hometown religion as the essential ingredients of Middle West life. It also discusses the religious situation in Kansas during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Dennis C. Dickerson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781604734270
- eISBN:
- 9781621030874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781604734270.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle ...
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The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle for advancing the civil rights of African Americans. He remained steadfast in his conviction that clergy should be involved in electoral politics to push policies and initiatives that would benefit the disadvantaged. To achieve this objective, Carey forged a close alliance with Illinois senator Everett M. Dirksen and became an enthusiastic supporter of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. He was rewarded with political favors and appointments that satisfied his political aspirations and helped him advance black civil rights. Under the Eisenhower administration, Carey served on various United Nations committees and as a spokesman for American foreign policy. However, he would later defect to the Democratic Party.Less
The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle for advancing the civil rights of African Americans. He remained steadfast in his conviction that clergy should be involved in electoral politics to push policies and initiatives that would benefit the disadvantaged. To achieve this objective, Carey forged a close alliance with Illinois senator Everett M. Dirksen and became an enthusiastic supporter of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. He was rewarded with political favors and appointments that satisfied his political aspirations and helped him advance black civil rights. Under the Eisenhower administration, Carey served on various United Nations committees and as a spokesman for American foreign policy. However, he would later defect to the Democratic Party.
Andrew L. Johns and Kenneth Osgood (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813034669
- eISBN:
- 9780813038742
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813034669.003.0007
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare ...
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This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare strategy that used the language of peace to sell the Cold War and convince the world that the Soviet “peace offensive” was nothing more than propaganda and maskirovka originating from the Kremlin. He demonstrated to the world that the United States earnestly sought peace, but that Soviet hostility and intransigence thwarted American peacemaking and compelled the United States to adopt policies of strength. Eisenhower maneuvered his policy and rhetoric so that he met expectations at home and abroad for progress toward peace while avoiding any conciliation in actual policy.Less
This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare strategy that used the language of peace to sell the Cold War and convince the world that the Soviet “peace offensive” was nothing more than propaganda and maskirovka originating from the Kremlin. He demonstrated to the world that the United States earnestly sought peace, but that Soviet hostility and intransigence thwarted American peacemaking and compelled the United States to adopt policies of strength. Eisenhower maneuvered his policy and rhetoric so that he met expectations at home and abroad for progress toward peace while avoiding any conciliation in actual policy.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0013
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision ...
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Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, while leaving Ike free to decide precisely what—and, crucially, while also ensuring that he kept his distance from MacArthur and the Republican right. On becoming president, Eisenhower therefore retained a good deal of freedom. But in terms of public relations, he swiftly made many of the same mistakes that had plagued Truman's early efforts. And only Stalin's death, which in turn led to a thawing of the communist position, revived the armistice negotiations and resulted in an end to this long and costly war.Less
Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, while leaving Ike free to decide precisely what—and, crucially, while also ensuring that he kept his distance from MacArthur and the Republican right. On becoming president, Eisenhower therefore retained a good deal of freedom. But in terms of public relations, he swiftly made many of the same mistakes that had plagued Truman's early efforts. And only Stalin's death, which in turn led to a thawing of the communist position, revived the armistice negotiations and resulted in an end to this long and costly war.
Elizabeth N. Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801449222
- eISBN:
- 9780801460999
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801449222.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the ...
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This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the nature of other states' regimes in a broad sense. His World War II experience was dedicated to defeating Germany, and he was a committed anticommunist. But in terms of immediate American foreign policy, Eisenhower focused on the external foreign and security policies of other states, and if these policies were satisfactory, he was willing to largely ignore domestic issues in those states. Thus, it is not that Eisenhower did not care at all about internal issues, but rather that he saw them as relatively insignificant, in terms of how the United States should prioritize threats.Less
This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the nature of other states' regimes in a broad sense. His World War II experience was dedicated to defeating Germany, and he was a committed anticommunist. But in terms of immediate American foreign policy, Eisenhower focused on the external foreign and security policies of other states, and if these policies were satisfactory, he was willing to largely ignore domestic issues in those states. Thus, it is not that Eisenhower did not care at all about internal issues, but rather that he saw them as relatively insignificant, in terms of how the United States should prioritize threats.
Larry Blomstedt
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813166117
- eISBN:
- 9780813166391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813166117.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The 1952 presidential election presented a host of issues for the Democratic Party. After considering running for another term, Truman helped a reluctant Adlai Stevenson secure the party’s nomination ...
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The 1952 presidential election presented a host of issues for the Democratic Party. After considering running for another term, Truman helped a reluctant Adlai Stevenson secure the party’s nomination to face Republican Dwight Eisenhower. Unlike the 1948 contest, foreign policy was now fair game for debate in presidential politics, thanks to the end of any meaningful semblance of bipartisanship in international affairs. Eisenhower used the “K1C2” formula in the campaign, focusing on Korea, communism, and corruption. Surprisingly, Joseph McCarthy’s assault on the Truman administration for being soft on communism had relatively little effect on the election. In the end, the Korean War was the deciding factor as the American people concluded that Eisenhower was the candidate best suited to end a frustrating stalemated war.Less
The 1952 presidential election presented a host of issues for the Democratic Party. After considering running for another term, Truman helped a reluctant Adlai Stevenson secure the party’s nomination to face Republican Dwight Eisenhower. Unlike the 1948 contest, foreign policy was now fair game for debate in presidential politics, thanks to the end of any meaningful semblance of bipartisanship in international affairs. Eisenhower used the “K1C2” formula in the campaign, focusing on Korea, communism, and corruption. Surprisingly, Joseph McCarthy’s assault on the Truman administration for being soft on communism had relatively little effect on the election. In the end, the Korean War was the deciding factor as the American people concluded that Eisenhower was the candidate best suited to end a frustrating stalemated war.
Scott Lucas
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813169057
- eISBN:
- 9780813177267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169057.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the ...
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President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the events of 1956 are examined through public and private records, the president’s response to these crises appears to confirm his claim that he would not allow policy making to be hostage to the wishes of the public. Instead, he made clear time and again that he would proceed with what he thought was the “right” course for US interests, irrespective of the American public’s reaction to the policy or to his reelection campaign. At the same time, he was ready to invoke public opinion in the United States and throughout the world to try and bend other statesmen to his will.Less
President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the events of 1956 are examined through public and private records, the president’s response to these crises appears to confirm his claim that he would not allow policy making to be hostage to the wishes of the public. Instead, he made clear time and again that he would proceed with what he thought was the “right” course for US interests, irrespective of the American public’s reaction to the policy or to his reelection campaign. At the same time, he was ready to invoke public opinion in the United States and throughout the world to try and bend other statesmen to his will.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756662
- eISBN:
- 9780804770965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756662.003.0017
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter discusses the U.S. defense policy under the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower's belief in the importance of organization and the planning process led to major changes in ...
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This chapter discusses the U.S. defense policy under the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower's belief in the importance of organization and the planning process led to major changes in the way in which the new administration handled its business. The dramatic reinvigoration of the National Security Council and the White House staff brought immediate benefits in how information on national security policy (and other vital issues) was analyzed and processed within the executive branch. The initiation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 brought the country's senior military leadership more closely under the control of the Secretary of Defense and strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body.Less
This chapter discusses the U.S. defense policy under the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower's belief in the importance of organization and the planning process led to major changes in the way in which the new administration handled its business. The dramatic reinvigoration of the National Security Council and the White House staff brought immediate benefits in how information on national security policy (and other vital issues) was analyzed and processed within the executive branch. The initiation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 brought the country's senior military leadership more closely under the control of the Secretary of Defense and strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body.
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0023
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
The rich, deep, difficult, and tumultuous, but always amicable relationship between Winston Churchill of Britain and Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States had a major impact on how the Second ...
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The rich, deep, difficult, and tumultuous, but always amicable relationship between Winston Churchill of Britain and Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States had a major impact on how the Second World War was fought and won. The friendship stretched from the beginning of 1942 to Churchill's death in 1965. They came from different backgrounds, Eisenhower, a Kansas boy, born in a shack beside the railroad tracks in rural Texas, and Churchill, a British aristocrat, born in Blenheim Palace. They disagreed, usually loudly and often violently, about issues of the most fundamental importance, from a proper strategy to implement against Germany in 1942 to the question of taking Berlin in 1945. Yet they had unbounded affection and admiration for each other. One area in which they co-operated from beginning to end was in dealing with Charles de Gaulle, president of France. The two men entered into a conspiracy to undercut Franklin D. Roosevelt's anti-de Gaulle policy.Less
The rich, deep, difficult, and tumultuous, but always amicable relationship between Winston Churchill of Britain and Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States had a major impact on how the Second World War was fought and won. The friendship stretched from the beginning of 1942 to Churchill's death in 1965. They came from different backgrounds, Eisenhower, a Kansas boy, born in a shack beside the railroad tracks in rural Texas, and Churchill, a British aristocrat, born in Blenheim Palace. They disagreed, usually loudly and often violently, about issues of the most fundamental importance, from a proper strategy to implement against Germany in 1942 to the question of taking Berlin in 1945. Yet they had unbounded affection and admiration for each other. One area in which they co-operated from beginning to end was in dealing with Charles de Gaulle, president of France. The two men entered into a conspiracy to undercut Franklin D. Roosevelt's anti-de Gaulle policy.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first ...
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How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.Less
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.
Gareth Porter
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520239487
- eISBN:
- 9780520940406
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520239487.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created ...
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This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created the opportunity and therefore the incentive for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to ignore and effectively undermine the Geneva framework for a settlement through free elections. The chapter also argues that both Eisenhower and Dulles were determined from the start to avoid actual military intervention to save the French. Dulles and Eisenhower rejected both of the proposals from the national security bureaucracy. The Geneva Accords consisted of a cease-fire agreement and a “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.” Dulles and Eisenhower had been prepared to let South Vietnam go if Diem could not handle a domestic insurgency and both had assumed that an overt invasion by North Vietnam would be met with a swift U.S. military response under SEATO.Less
This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created the opportunity and therefore the incentive for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to ignore and effectively undermine the Geneva framework for a settlement through free elections. The chapter also argues that both Eisenhower and Dulles were determined from the start to avoid actual military intervention to save the French. Dulles and Eisenhower rejected both of the proposals from the national security bureaucracy. The Geneva Accords consisted of a cease-fire agreement and a “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.” Dulles and Eisenhower had been prepared to let South Vietnam go if Diem could not handle a domestic insurgency and both had assumed that an overt invasion by North Vietnam would be met with a swift U.S. military response under SEATO.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813169057
- eISBN:
- 9780813177267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169057.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over ...
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A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over America’s Cold War foreign policy, providing the voters with a real choice on key questions such as the geographic extent, economic cost, and military emphasis of containment. By the time of the two party conventions, however, the Democrats and Republicans had opted for candidates who essentially agreed with Truman’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Dwight Eisenhower’s victory was therefore important, not because it marked a key moment of change in the direction of US policy, but for the exact opposite: it sustained the Cold War consensus, ensuring that a Republican administration would continue with the central thrust of its Democratic predecessor.Less
A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over America’s Cold War foreign policy, providing the voters with a real choice on key questions such as the geographic extent, economic cost, and military emphasis of containment. By the time of the two party conventions, however, the Democrats and Republicans had opted for candidates who essentially agreed with Truman’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Dwight Eisenhower’s victory was therefore important, not because it marked a key moment of change in the direction of US policy, but for the exact opposite: it sustained the Cold War consensus, ensuring that a Republican administration would continue with the central thrust of its Democratic predecessor.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231159241
- eISBN:
- 9780231528191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231159241.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy on foreign affairs during his tenure as president of the United States, especially his agenda regarding the fight against Communism. Eisenhower's ...
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This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy on foreign affairs during his tenure as president of the United States, especially his agenda regarding the fight against Communism. Eisenhower's views on international relations and his attitude toward Asia debunk the story that he threatened John F. Kennedy about opening diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. He never seriously considered challenging Mao Zedong's hold on power in China. Eisenhower gave precedence to Europe, and saw his most serious challenge as coming from the Soviet Union. His time on the battlefield in World War II had reinforced his conviction that America's critical disputes and opportunities would arise in Europe. The people he gathered around him—those with whom he argued and to whom he listened, both military and political—strongly agreed with that European bias. This was true of his personal circle and his key foreign policy adviser and executer John Foster Dulles.Less
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy on foreign affairs during his tenure as president of the United States, especially his agenda regarding the fight against Communism. Eisenhower's views on international relations and his attitude toward Asia debunk the story that he threatened John F. Kennedy about opening diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. He never seriously considered challenging Mao Zedong's hold on power in China. Eisenhower gave precedence to Europe, and saw his most serious challenge as coming from the Soviet Union. His time on the battlefield in World War II had reinforced his conviction that America's critical disputes and opportunities would arise in Europe. The people he gathered around him—those with whom he argued and to whom he listened, both military and political—strongly agreed with that European bias. This was true of his personal circle and his key foreign policy adviser and executer John Foster Dulles.
Gareth Porter
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520239487
- eISBN:
- 9780520940406
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520239487.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter addresses the asymmetry in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1953–1965, and the perceptions of that power relationship on the part of Dwight ...
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This chapter addresses the asymmetry in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1953–1965, and the perceptions of that power relationship on the part of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong. The new imbalance of power altered the incoming Eisenhower administration's definition of its diplomatic objectives. It was only in 1966 that the USSR acquired a credible minimum deterrent force in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles that were reasonably well protected from a U.S. first strike. Khrushchev apparently had very accurate intelligence on the Kennedy administration's strategic force deployments and future plans. Mao wanted the USSR to act as though it represented a strong military counterweight, regardless of the truth. There are two distinct formative periods in which U.S. perceptions were undergoing major changes: first, from 1953 through mid-1955; and second, from 1961 through 1964.Less
This chapter addresses the asymmetry in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1953–1965, and the perceptions of that power relationship on the part of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong. The new imbalance of power altered the incoming Eisenhower administration's definition of its diplomatic objectives. It was only in 1966 that the USSR acquired a credible minimum deterrent force in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles that were reasonably well protected from a U.S. first strike. Khrushchev apparently had very accurate intelligence on the Kennedy administration's strategic force deployments and future plans. Mao wanted the USSR to act as though it represented a strong military counterweight, regardless of the truth. There are two distinct formative periods in which U.S. perceptions were undergoing major changes: first, from 1953 through mid-1955; and second, from 1961 through 1964.
