Search Results

‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution

Andrew P. N. Eardmann

in Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945

For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any ... More

For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.Less

Cross-Cultural Leadership: Dwight D. Eisenhower

Kerry E. Irish

in The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell

This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly ... More

This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly two decades of preparation. Serving overseas during the interwar period under generals such as Fox Conner and Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower came to appreciate both the need for truly unified allied commands and the leadership behaviors essential for their effectiveness. He recognized the importance of flexibility, accountability, humility, consultation, patience, and trust in his relationships with fellow officers and foreign leaders. During the war, Ike proved especially deft at working with political leaders like Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, with Allied military commanders like Bernard Montgomery and Charles de Gaulle, and with his senior military subordinates like George Patton.Less

The First Southern Strategy: The Taft and the Dewey/Eisenhower Factions in the GOP

Michael Bowen

in Painting Dixie Red: When, Where, Why, and How the South Became Republican

This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil ... More

This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil rights, taxation, welfare, and affirmative action. Backlash implies that the South's move from the Democrats to the GOP was reactionary, but this chapter argues that angst over civil rights alone did not guarantee a Republican realignment. Instead it stresses the building of Republican organization in the South—resources, field workers, communications infrastructure, and leadership—beginning with the 1944 campaign of Thomas Dewey, and culminating in Herbert Brownell's mastery of such organization on behalf of Dwight Eisenhower that shook the southern GOP out of its “post office politician” mentality. Unlike the presidential campaign of 1968, in which Richard Nixon amassed a “silent majority” around the concept of law and order, this chapter argues, the Republicans' first southern strategy was not based on race.Less

“Grave Danger”: The Allies Challenge MacArthur

Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson

in Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State Under MacArthur

Analyzes The Far Eastern Commission's objection to MacArthur's arbitrary approval of the March 6 draft and his plan to elect a new Diet in April to approve it. The FEC challenge threatened ... More

Analyzes The Far Eastern Commission's objection to MacArthur's arbitrary approval of the March 6 draft and his plan to elect a new Diet in April to approve it. The FEC challenge threatened MacArthur's intricate plot to preserve the imperial institution in Japan's new constitutional order. The Army's Chief of Staff, Dwight Eisenhower, and the State Department defended MacArthur, contending that his actions were consistent with the Moscow Agreement of December 26, 1945, because the draft was the product of a process initiated by the Japanese government in the fall of 1945. The FEC continued to spar with MacArthur during the summer of 1946 and eventually persuaded him to order minor amendments to the draft.Less

The Advent of Eisenhower

Steven Casey

in Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953

Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision ... More

Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, while leaving Ike free to decide precisely what—and, crucially, while also ensuring that he kept his distance from MacArthur and the Republican right. On becoming president, Eisenhower therefore retained a good deal of freedom. But in terms of public relations, he swiftly made many of the same mistakes that had plagued Truman's early efforts. And only Stalin's death, which in turn led to a thawing of the communist position, revived the armistice negotiations and resulted in an end to this long and costly war.Less

Plant My Feet on Higher Ground: Archibald J. Carey Jr. And the National GOP

Dennis C. Dickerson

in African American Preachers and Politics: The Careys of Chicago

The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle ... More

The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle for advancing the civil rights of African Americans. He remained steadfast in his conviction that clergy should be involved in electoral politics to push policies and initiatives that would benefit the disadvantaged. To achieve this objective, Carey forged a close alliance with Illinois senator Everett M. Dirksen and became an enthusiastic supporter of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. He was rewarded with political favors and appointments that satisfied his political aspirations and helped him advance black civil rights. Under the Eisenhower administration, Carey served on various United Nations committees and as a spokesman for American foreign policy. However, he would later defect to the Democratic Party.Less

Eisenhower's Dilemma: Talking Peace and Waging Cold War

Andrew L. Johns and Kenneth Osgood (eds)

in Selling War in a Media Age: The Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century

This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare ... More

This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare strategy that used the language of peace to sell the Cold War and convince the world that the Soviet “peace offensive” was nothing more than propaganda and maskirovka originating from the Kremlin. He demonstrated to the world that the United States earnestly sought peace, but that Soviet hostility and intransigence thwarted American peacemaking and compelled the United States to adopt policies of strength. Eisenhower maneuvered his policy and rhetoric so that he met expectations at home and abroad for progress toward peace while avoiding any conciliation in actual policy.Less

Eisenhower and His Legacy, 1953–1977

Tony Smith

in America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy

This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a ... More

This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a Wilsonian advocacy of democracy and a Rooseveltian preference for nonintervention. A third option had emerged since then: intervention for dictatorships, even against indigenous political forces that might be seeking to create constitutional, democratic regimes. The chapter first provides an overview of American realism and mass politics in the twentieth century, with emphasis on the modernity of fascism, communism, and democracy, before discussing American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years. In particular, it considers the Eisenhower administration's policy decisions with respect to Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. It also explores the geopolitical realism of American support for democratic governments abroad.Less

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Elizabeth N. Saunders

in Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions

This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the ... More

This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the nature of other states' regimes in a broad sense. His World War II experience was dedicated to defeating Germany, and he was a committed anticommunist. But in terms of immediate American foreign policy, Eisenhower focused on the external foreign and security policies of other states, and if these policies were satisfactory, he was willing to largely ignore domestic issues in those states. Thus, it is not that Eisenhower did not care at all about internal issues, but rather that he saw them as relatively insignificant, in terms of how the United States should prioritize threats.Less

Quiet Conservatism

Robert Wuthnow

in Red State Religion: Faith and Politics in America's Heartland

This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state ... More

This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state with such a long Republican history. The conservatism of the period included rare hints of the more aggressive political and religious movements that were to brand the region as part of the red state Middle West in later decades. The chapter first considers the increasing feeling of political isolation in Kansas that was evident by the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. It then looks at the rise of Harry S. Truman as U.S. president after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, along with Kansans' renewed emphasis on homes, hometowns, and hometown religion as the essential ingredients of Middle West life. It also discusses the religious situation in Kansas during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.Less

The Fall of the Trumanites

Larry Blomstedt

in Truman, Congress, and Korea: The Politics of America's First Undeclared War

The 1952 presidential election presented a host of issues for the Democratic Party. After considering running for another term, Truman helped a reluctant Adlai Stevenson secure the party’s nomination ... More

The 1952 presidential election presented a host of issues for the Democratic Party. After considering running for another term, Truman helped a reluctant Adlai Stevenson secure the party’s nomination to face Republican Dwight Eisenhower. Unlike the 1948 contest, foreign policy was now fair game for debate in presidential politics, thanks to the end of any meaningful semblance of bipartisanship in international affairs. Eisenhower used the “K1C2” formula in the campaign, focusing on Korea, communism, and corruption. Surprisingly, Joseph McCarthy’s assault on the Truman administration for being soft on communism had relatively little effect on the election. In the end, the Korean War was the deciding factor as the American people concluded that Eisenhower was the candidate best suited to end a frustrating stalemated war.Less

The Eisenhower National Security Structure

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the U.S. defense policy under the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower's belief in the importance of organization and the planning process led to major changes in ... More

This chapter discusses the U.S. defense policy under the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower's belief in the importance of organization and the planning process led to major changes in the way in which the new administration handled its business. The dramatic reinvigoration of the National Security Council and the White House staff brought immediate benefits in how information on national security policy (and other vital issues) was analyzed and processed within the executive branch. The initiation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 brought the country's senior military leadership more closely under the control of the Secretary of Defense and strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body.Less

When Public Opinion Does Not Shape Foreign Policy: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower in the 1956 Presidential Election

Scott Lucas

in US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton

President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the ... More

President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the events of 1956 are examined through public and private records, the president’s response to these crises appears to confirm his claim that he would not allow policy making to be hostage to the wishes of the public. Instead, he made clear time and again that he would proceed with what he thought was the “right” course for US interests, irrespective of the American public’s reaction to the policy or to his reelection campaign. At the same time, he was ready to invoke public opinion in the United States and throughout the world to try and bend other statesmen to his will.Less

A Reputation for Resolute Action: Eisenhower and Berlin

Danielle L. Lupton

in Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics

This chapter explores how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, considering Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the 1958 Berlin Crisis. The ... More

This chapter explores how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, considering Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the 1958 Berlin Crisis. The historical record shows that Eisenhower's early statements were particularly influential to the formation of his reputation, as they created expectations of how he would behave in the future. However, Eisenhower was unable to solidify his reputation for resolve at the 1955 Geneva Summit, as Khrushchev perceived Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rather than President Eisenhower as being in direct control of negotiations at the summit. Yet, in the year leading up to the 1958 Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev's perception of who was in control of U.S. foreign policy shifted to emphasize the importance of Eisenhower to America's Berlin policy. And the president's statements leading up to the Berlin Crisis led Khrushchev to believe Eisenhower was unlikely to make major concessions on the issue. Eisenhower's subsequent firm response to the Berlin Crisis then confirmed Khrushchev's expectations of the president's resolve. Accordingly, Eisenhower established a reputation for resolute action that would last until the end of his presidency. Further evidence suggests that Eisenhower's actions as a general during World War II were influential to Khrushchev's early perceptions of the president.Less

Eisenhower and Dulles Exploit U.S. Dominance in Vietnam

Gareth Porter

in Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam

This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created ... More

This chapter provides a reinterpretation of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's policy toward Vietnam before and after the Geneva Accords of 1954. It illustrates how the imbalance of power created the opportunity and therefore the incentive for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to ignore and effectively undermine the Geneva framework for a settlement through free elections. The chapter also argues that both Eisenhower and Dulles were determined from the start to avoid actual military intervention to save the French. Dulles and Eisenhower rejected both of the proposals from the national security bureaucracy. The Geneva Accords consisted of a cease-fire agreement and a “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.” Dulles and Eisenhower had been prepared to let South Vietnam go if Diem could not handle a domestic insurgency and both had assumed that an overt invasion by North Vietnam would be met with a swift U.S. military response under SEATO.Less

Confirming the Cold War Consensus: Eisenhower and the 1952 Election

Steven Casey

in US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton

A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over ... More

A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over America’s Cold War foreign policy, providing the voters with a real choice on key questions such as the geographic extent, economic cost, and military emphasis of containment. By the time of the two party conventions, however, the Democrats and Republicans had opted for candidates who essentially agreed with Truman’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Dwight Eisenhower’s victory was therefore important, not because it marked a key moment of change in the direction of US policy, but for the exact opposite: it sustained the Cold War consensus, ensuring that a Republican administration would continue with the central thrust of its Democratic predecessor.Less