Andrew P. N. Eardmann
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any ...
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For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.Less
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.
Kerry E. Irish
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813174723
- eISBN:
- 9780813174778
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813174723.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly ...
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This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly two decades of preparation. Serving overseas during the interwar period under generals such as Fox Conner and Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower came to appreciate both the need for truly unified allied commands and the leadership behaviors essential for their effectiveness. He recognized the importance of flexibility, accountability, humility, consultation, patience, and trust in his relationships with fellow officers and foreign leaders. During the war, Ike proved especially deft at working with political leaders like Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, with Allied military commanders like Bernard Montgomery and Charles de Gaulle, and with his senior military subordinates like George Patton.Less
This chapter examines the idea of cross-cultural leadership through the military career of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s successful leadership as the supreme Allied commander stemmed from nearly two decades of preparation. Serving overseas during the interwar period under generals such as Fox Conner and Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower came to appreciate both the need for truly unified allied commands and the leadership behaviors essential for their effectiveness. He recognized the importance of flexibility, accountability, humility, consultation, patience, and trust in his relationships with fellow officers and foreign leaders. During the war, Ike proved especially deft at working with political leaders like Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, with Allied military commanders like Bernard Montgomery and Charles de Gaulle, and with his senior military subordinates like George Patton.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
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This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
Dennis C. Dickerson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781604734270
- eISBN:
- 9781621030874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781604734270.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle ...
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The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle for advancing the civil rights of African Americans. He remained steadfast in his conviction that clergy should be involved in electoral politics to push policies and initiatives that would benefit the disadvantaged. To achieve this objective, Carey forged a close alliance with Illinois senator Everett M. Dirksen and became an enthusiastic supporter of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. He was rewarded with political favors and appointments that satisfied his political aspirations and helped him advance black civil rights. Under the Eisenhower administration, Carey served on various United Nations committees and as a spokesman for American foreign policy. However, he would later defect to the Democratic Party.Less
The rough-and-tumble of Chicago politics did not deter Archibald J. Carey Jr., who maintained his strong commitment to public theology and his belief in the Republican Party as an effective vehicle for advancing the civil rights of African Americans. He remained steadfast in his conviction that clergy should be involved in electoral politics to push policies and initiatives that would benefit the disadvantaged. To achieve this objective, Carey forged a close alliance with Illinois senator Everett M. Dirksen and became an enthusiastic supporter of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. He was rewarded with political favors and appointments that satisfied his political aspirations and helped him advance black civil rights. Under the Eisenhower administration, Carey served on various United Nations committees and as a spokesman for American foreign policy. However, he would later defect to the Democratic Party.
Andrew L. Johns and Kenneth Osgood (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813034669
- eISBN:
- 9780813038742
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813034669.003.0007
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare ...
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This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare strategy that used the language of peace to sell the Cold War and convince the world that the Soviet “peace offensive” was nothing more than propaganda and maskirovka originating from the Kremlin. He demonstrated to the world that the United States earnestly sought peace, but that Soviet hostility and intransigence thwarted American peacemaking and compelled the United States to adopt policies of strength. Eisenhower maneuvered his policy and rhetoric so that he met expectations at home and abroad for progress toward peace while avoiding any conciliation in actual policy.Less
This chapter points out that Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to market foreign policies using the rhetoric of peace. It contends that the Eisenhower administration incorporated a psychological warfare strategy that used the language of peace to sell the Cold War and convince the world that the Soviet “peace offensive” was nothing more than propaganda and maskirovka originating from the Kremlin. He demonstrated to the world that the United States earnestly sought peace, but that Soviet hostility and intransigence thwarted American peacemaking and compelled the United States to adopt policies of strength. Eisenhower maneuvered his policy and rhetoric so that he met expectations at home and abroad for progress toward peace while avoiding any conciliation in actual policy.
Elizabeth N. Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801449222
- eISBN:
- 9780801460999
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801449222.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the ...
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This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the nature of other states' regimes in a broad sense. His World War II experience was dedicated to defeating Germany, and he was a committed anticommunist. But in terms of immediate American foreign policy, Eisenhower focused on the external foreign and security policies of other states, and if these policies were satisfactory, he was willing to largely ignore domestic issues in those states. Thus, it is not that Eisenhower did not care at all about internal issues, but rather that he saw them as relatively insignificant, in terms of how the United States should prioritize threats.Less
This chapter argues that President Dwight D. Eisenhower's externally focused beliefs about the origin of threats shaped his intervention decisions. Eisenhower was, of course, concerned about the nature of other states' regimes in a broad sense. His World War II experience was dedicated to defeating Germany, and he was a committed anticommunist. But in terms of immediate American foreign policy, Eisenhower focused on the external foreign and security policies of other states, and if these policies were satisfactory, he was willing to largely ignore domestic issues in those states. Thus, it is not that Eisenhower did not care at all about internal issues, but rather that he saw them as relatively insignificant, in terms of how the United States should prioritize threats.
Robert Wuthnow
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691150550
- eISBN:
- 9781400839759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691150550.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state ...
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This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state with such a long Republican history. The conservatism of the period included rare hints of the more aggressive political and religious movements that were to brand the region as part of the red state Middle West in later decades. The chapter first considers the increasing feeling of political isolation in Kansas that was evident by the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. It then looks at the rise of Harry S. Truman as U.S. president after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, along with Kansans' renewed emphasis on homes, hometowns, and hometown religion as the essential ingredients of Middle West life. It also discusses the religious situation in Kansas during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.Less
This chapter examines how the people of Kansas retreated into a quiet centrist conservatism that was relatively more bipartisan and apolitical than would have been expected, especially in a state with such a long Republican history. The conservatism of the period included rare hints of the more aggressive political and religious movements that were to brand the region as part of the red state Middle West in later decades. The chapter first considers the increasing feeling of political isolation in Kansas that was evident by the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. It then looks at the rise of Harry S. Truman as U.S. president after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, along with Kansans' renewed emphasis on homes, hometowns, and hometown religion as the essential ingredients of Middle West life. It also discusses the religious situation in Kansas during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Scott Lucas
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813169057
- eISBN:
- 9780813177267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169057.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the ...
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President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the events of 1956 are examined through public and private records, the president’s response to these crises appears to confirm his claim that he would not allow policy making to be hostage to the wishes of the public. Instead, he made clear time and again that he would proceed with what he thought was the “right” course for US interests, irrespective of the American public’s reaction to the policy or to his reelection campaign. At the same time, he was ready to invoke public opinion in the United States and throughout the world to try and bend other statesmen to his will.Less
President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the events of 1956 are examined through public and private records, the president’s response to these crises appears to confirm his claim that he would not allow policy making to be hostage to the wishes of the public. Instead, he made clear time and again that he would proceed with what he thought was the “right” course for US interests, irrespective of the American public’s reaction to the policy or to his reelection campaign. At the same time, he was ready to invoke public opinion in the United States and throughout the world to try and bend other statesmen to his will.
Tony Smith
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154923
- eISBN:
- 9781400842025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154923.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a ...
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This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a Wilsonian advocacy of democracy and a Rooseveltian preference for nonintervention. A third option had emerged since then: intervention for dictatorships, even against indigenous political forces that might be seeking to create constitutional, democratic regimes. The chapter first provides an overview of American realism and mass politics in the twentieth century, with emphasis on the modernity of fascism, communism, and democracy, before discussing American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years. In particular, it considers the Eisenhower administration's policy decisions with respect to Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. It also explores the geopolitical realism of American support for democratic governments abroad.Less
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy in the area of liberal democratic internationalism during the period 1953–1977. Until 1947, the American foreign policy choice had been between a Wilsonian advocacy of democracy and a Rooseveltian preference for nonintervention. A third option had emerged since then: intervention for dictatorships, even against indigenous political forces that might be seeking to create constitutional, democratic regimes. The chapter first provides an overview of American realism and mass politics in the twentieth century, with emphasis on the modernity of fascism, communism, and democracy, before discussing American foreign policy during the Eisenhower years. In particular, it considers the Eisenhower administration's policy decisions with respect to Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. It also explores the geopolitical realism of American support for democratic governments abroad.
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0023
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
The rich, deep, difficult, and tumultuous, but always amicable relationship between Winston Churchill of Britain and Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States had a major impact on how the Second ...
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The rich, deep, difficult, and tumultuous, but always amicable relationship between Winston Churchill of Britain and Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States had a major impact on how the Second World War was fought and won. The friendship stretched from the beginning of 1942 to Churchill's death in 1965. They came from different backgrounds, Eisenhower, a Kansas boy, born in a shack beside the railroad tracks in rural Texas, and Churchill, a British aristocrat, born in Blenheim Palace. They disagreed, usually loudly and often violently, about issues of the most fundamental importance, from a proper strategy to implement against Germany in 1942 to the question of taking Berlin in 1945. Yet they had unbounded affection and admiration for each other. One area in which they co-operated from beginning to end was in dealing with Charles de Gaulle, president of France. The two men entered into a conspiracy to undercut Franklin D. Roosevelt's anti-de Gaulle policy.Less
The rich, deep, difficult, and tumultuous, but always amicable relationship between Winston Churchill of Britain and Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States had a major impact on how the Second World War was fought and won. The friendship stretched from the beginning of 1942 to Churchill's death in 1965. They came from different backgrounds, Eisenhower, a Kansas boy, born in a shack beside the railroad tracks in rural Texas, and Churchill, a British aristocrat, born in Blenheim Palace. They disagreed, usually loudly and often violently, about issues of the most fundamental importance, from a proper strategy to implement against Germany in 1942 to the question of taking Berlin in 1945. Yet they had unbounded affection and admiration for each other. One area in which they co-operated from beginning to end was in dealing with Charles de Gaulle, president of France. The two men entered into a conspiracy to undercut Franklin D. Roosevelt's anti-de Gaulle policy.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813169057
- eISBN:
- 9780813177267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169057.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over ...
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A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over America’s Cold War foreign policy, providing the voters with a real choice on key questions such as the geographic extent, economic cost, and military emphasis of containment. By the time of the two party conventions, however, the Democrats and Republicans had opted for candidates who essentially agreed with Truman’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Dwight Eisenhower’s victory was therefore important, not because it marked a key moment of change in the direction of US policy, but for the exact opposite: it sustained the Cold War consensus, ensuring that a Republican administration would continue with the central thrust of its Democratic predecessor.Less
A year before Americans went to the polls, the 1952 election promised to be a “critical” election. The leading potential candidates were positioning themselves to continue the “great debate” over America’s Cold War foreign policy, providing the voters with a real choice on key questions such as the geographic extent, economic cost, and military emphasis of containment. By the time of the two party conventions, however, the Democrats and Republicans had opted for candidates who essentially agreed with Truman’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Dwight Eisenhower’s victory was therefore important, not because it marked a key moment of change in the direction of US policy, but for the exact opposite: it sustained the Cold War consensus, ensuring that a Republican administration would continue with the central thrust of its Democratic predecessor.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231159241
- eISBN:
- 9780231528191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231159241.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy on foreign affairs during his tenure as president of the United States, especially his agenda regarding the fight against Communism. Eisenhower's ...
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This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy on foreign affairs during his tenure as president of the United States, especially his agenda regarding the fight against Communism. Eisenhower's views on international relations and his attitude toward Asia debunk the story that he threatened John F. Kennedy about opening diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. He never seriously considered challenging Mao Zedong's hold on power in China. Eisenhower gave precedence to Europe, and saw his most serious challenge as coming from the Soviet Union. His time on the battlefield in World War II had reinforced his conviction that America's critical disputes and opportunities would arise in Europe. The people he gathered around him—those with whom he argued and to whom he listened, both military and political—strongly agreed with that European bias. This was true of his personal circle and his key foreign policy adviser and executer John Foster Dulles.Less
This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy on foreign affairs during his tenure as president of the United States, especially his agenda regarding the fight against Communism. Eisenhower's views on international relations and his attitude toward Asia debunk the story that he threatened John F. Kennedy about opening diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. He never seriously considered challenging Mao Zedong's hold on power in China. Eisenhower gave precedence to Europe, and saw his most serious challenge as coming from the Soviet Union. His time on the battlefield in World War II had reinforced his conviction that America's critical disputes and opportunities would arise in Europe. The people he gathered around him—those with whom he argued and to whom he listened, both military and political—strongly agreed with that European bias. This was true of his personal circle and his key foreign policy adviser and executer John Foster Dulles.
Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300121261
- eISBN:
- 9780300145380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300121261.003.0041
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter focuses on Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, in stark contrast with FDR and Harry S Truman, did not aspire to be an activist president. As a career soldier, Eisenhower considered it his duty to ...
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This chapter focuses on Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, in stark contrast with FDR and Harry S Truman, did not aspire to be an activist president. As a career soldier, Eisenhower considered it his duty to remain above politics, and consistently strove to operate behind the scenes when guiding national policy. The general consensus of historians, however, is that he “only appeared to be a passive chief executive.” One of the reasons why people believed Eisenhower was not in control of his administration was that he would sometimes deliberately duck questions at press conferences by pretending to garble his syntax. His penchant for behind-the-scenes management of his administration has led political scientist Fred I. Greenstein to label this method of governing as “hidden-hand leadership.”Less
This chapter focuses on Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, in stark contrast with FDR and Harry S Truman, did not aspire to be an activist president. As a career soldier, Eisenhower considered it his duty to remain above politics, and consistently strove to operate behind the scenes when guiding national policy. The general consensus of historians, however, is that he “only appeared to be a passive chief executive.” One of the reasons why people believed Eisenhower was not in control of his administration was that he would sometimes deliberately duck questions at press conferences by pretending to garble his syntax. His penchant for behind-the-scenes management of his administration has led political scientist Fred I. Greenstein to label this method of governing as “hidden-hand leadership.”
Robert R. Bowie
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198202417
- eISBN:
- 9780191675348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202417.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Middle East History
This chapter sets the record straight not merely about the reasons for the American response to the crisis but also about the relationship between the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his ...
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This chapter sets the record straight not merely about the reasons for the American response to the crisis but also about the relationship between the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. It views that Eisenhower was a strong President served by a strong Secretary of State. Nevertheless, Dulles in every sense was the executor of policy set by Eisenhower. Eisenhower himself took command during the Suez crisis, but Dulles's racy language and strong statements in press conferences gave the impression, especially to the British, that he rather than the President often took the lead. This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the Aswan Dam negotiations and Dulles's attempt to create an international authority to take the place of the Suez Canal Company.Less
This chapter sets the record straight not merely about the reasons for the American response to the crisis but also about the relationship between the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. It views that Eisenhower was a strong President served by a strong Secretary of State. Nevertheless, Dulles in every sense was the executor of policy set by Eisenhower. Eisenhower himself took command during the Suez crisis, but Dulles's racy language and strong statements in press conferences gave the impression, especially to the British, that he rather than the President often took the lead. This chapter contains a detailed analysis of the Aswan Dam negotiations and Dulles's attempt to create an international authority to take the place of the Suez Canal Company.
Ingo Trauschweizer
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813177007
- eISBN:
- 9780813177038
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813177007.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Military History
In the third chapter I discuss Taylor’s leadership of the army (1955-1959) and his opposition to massive retaliation. Taylor attempted to reform the army by installing new combat divisions for the ...
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In the third chapter I discuss Taylor’s leadership of the army (1955-1959) and his opposition to massive retaliation. Taylor attempted to reform the army by installing new combat divisions for the atomic battlefield, and he argued forcefully for the buildup of conventional as well as tactical nuclear capabilities for limited war. Taylor used congressional hearings and talks at war colleges and the Council on Foreign Relations for pointed critiques of national strategic priorities. Some of his colleagues in the armed forces thought him untrustworthy, but a closer reading of the record shows that they objected to his 1960 memoir more than to his actions in office. President Eisenhower still respected Taylor in 1959 and offered him the position as NATO’s supreme military commander.Less
In the third chapter I discuss Taylor’s leadership of the army (1955-1959) and his opposition to massive retaliation. Taylor attempted to reform the army by installing new combat divisions for the atomic battlefield, and he argued forcefully for the buildup of conventional as well as tactical nuclear capabilities for limited war. Taylor used congressional hearings and talks at war colleges and the Council on Foreign Relations for pointed critiques of national strategic priorities. Some of his colleagues in the armed forces thought him untrustworthy, but a closer reading of the record shows that they objected to his 1960 memoir more than to his actions in office. President Eisenhower still respected Taylor in 1959 and offered him the position as NATO’s supreme military commander.
Yanek Mieczkowski
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451508
- eISBN:
- 9780801467936
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451508.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
In a critical Cold War moment, Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency suddenly changed when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world's first satellite. What Ike called “a small ball” became a source ...
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In a critical Cold War moment, Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency suddenly changed when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world's first satellite. What Ike called “a small ball” became a source of Russian pride and propaganda, and it wounded him politically, as critics charged that he responded sluggishly to the challenge of space exploration. Yet Eisenhower refused to panic after Sputnik. He helped to guide the United States into the Space Age, even though Americans have given greater credit to John F. Kennedy for that achievement. This book examines the early history of America's space program. It details how Eisenhower approved breakthrough satellites, supported a new civilian space agency, signed a landmark science education law, and fostered improved relations with scientists. These feats made Eisenhower's post-Sputnik a time of remarkable progress, even as he endured the setbacks of recession, medical illness, and a humiliating first U.S. attempt to launch a satellite. Eisenhower's principled stands enabled him to resist pressure to boost federal spending, and he instead pursued his priorities—a balanced budget, prosperous economy, and sturdy national defense. Yet Sputnik also altered the world's power dynamics, sweeping Eisenhower in directions that were new to him, and he misjudged the importance of space in the Cold War's “prestige race.” By contrast, Kennedy capitalized on the issue in the 1960 election, and after taking office he urged a manned mission to the moon. This book demonstrates that Eisenhower built an impressive record in space and on earth, all the while offering warnings about America's stature and strengths that still hold true today.Less
In a critical Cold War moment, Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency suddenly changed when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world's first satellite. What Ike called “a small ball” became a source of Russian pride and propaganda, and it wounded him politically, as critics charged that he responded sluggishly to the challenge of space exploration. Yet Eisenhower refused to panic after Sputnik. He helped to guide the United States into the Space Age, even though Americans have given greater credit to John F. Kennedy for that achievement. This book examines the early history of America's space program. It details how Eisenhower approved breakthrough satellites, supported a new civilian space agency, signed a landmark science education law, and fostered improved relations with scientists. These feats made Eisenhower's post-Sputnik a time of remarkable progress, even as he endured the setbacks of recession, medical illness, and a humiliating first U.S. attempt to launch a satellite. Eisenhower's principled stands enabled him to resist pressure to boost federal spending, and he instead pursued his priorities—a balanced budget, prosperous economy, and sturdy national defense. Yet Sputnik also altered the world's power dynamics, sweeping Eisenhower in directions that were new to him, and he misjudged the importance of space in the Cold War's “prestige race.” By contrast, Kennedy capitalized on the issue in the 1960 election, and after taking office he urged a manned mission to the moon. This book demonstrates that Eisenhower built an impressive record in space and on earth, all the while offering warnings about America's stature and strengths that still hold true today.
Eugene Ford
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300218565
- eISBN:
- 9780300231281
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300218565.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter looks at how the comprehensive strategy for Southeast Asian Buddhism that would eventually emerge did not represent an entirely new direction for U.S. officials. Rather, it was an ...
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This chapter looks at how the comprehensive strategy for Southeast Asian Buddhism that would eventually emerge did not represent an entirely new direction for U.S. officials. Rather, it was an approach that found numerous, if fragmentary, precedents in earlier efforts to marshal faith, often through the use of religious rhetoric, against what was perceived as an atheistic Soviet menace. The Sixth Great Buddhist Synod that Burma's government held during 1954–56 coincided with intensified efforts within the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration to formulate a coherent policy toward religion. Religion's bearing on the Cold War had emerged as the main preoccupation of the president.Less
This chapter looks at how the comprehensive strategy for Southeast Asian Buddhism that would eventually emerge did not represent an entirely new direction for U.S. officials. Rather, it was an approach that found numerous, if fragmentary, precedents in earlier efforts to marshal faith, often through the use of religious rhetoric, against what was perceived as an atheistic Soviet menace. The Sixth Great Buddhist Synod that Burma's government held during 1954–56 coincided with intensified efforts within the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration to formulate a coherent policy toward religion. Religion's bearing on the Cold War had emerged as the main preoccupation of the president.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231159241
- eISBN:
- 9780231528191
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231159241.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower ...
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This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower administration's policy toward China. It convincingly portrays Dwight D. Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. The book argues that the Eisenhower administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. It explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. The most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the book finds that Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage Congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.Less
This book confronts the coldest period of the Cold War—the moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower administration's policy toward China. It convincingly portrays Dwight D. Eisenhower's private belief that close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. The book argues that the Eisenhower administration's hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the president's actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to China's specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. It explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisors' public and private positions. The most powerful chapter centers on Eisenhower's recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the book finds that Eisenhower's strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage Congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.
Ingo Trauschweizer
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813177007
- eISBN:
- 9780813177038
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813177007.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
In the opening chapter I introduce Maxwell Taylor as superintendent of the US Military Academy (1945-1949), where he placed greater emphasis on the humanities for a more balanced liberal education of ...
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In the opening chapter I introduce Maxwell Taylor as superintendent of the US Military Academy (1945-1949), where he placed greater emphasis on the humanities for a more balanced liberal education of army officers. This was to prepare them for leadership of a mass army made up of a mix of volunteers and draftees, which depended on one’s ability to communicate clearly and compellingly. At West Point, Taylor also began to formulate lessons of World War II, pondered the changing nature of strategy, which now had to encompass the full mobilization potential of the nation, and considered the effects of atomic weapons. Curiously, he concluded that limited war remained both possible and likely.Less
In the opening chapter I introduce Maxwell Taylor as superintendent of the US Military Academy (1945-1949), where he placed greater emphasis on the humanities for a more balanced liberal education of army officers. This was to prepare them for leadership of a mass army made up of a mix of volunteers and draftees, which depended on one’s ability to communicate clearly and compellingly. At West Point, Taylor also began to formulate lessons of World War II, pondered the changing nature of strategy, which now had to encompass the full mobilization potential of the nation, and considered the effects of atomic weapons. Curiously, he concluded that limited war remained both possible and likely.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231159241
- eISBN:
- 9780231528191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231159241.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter examines how the end of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis which affected China and the United States. For Dwight D. Eisenhower and Mao Zedong, the 1958 Strait confrontation—which arose when ...
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This chapter examines how the end of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis which affected China and the United States. For Dwight D. Eisenhower and Mao Zedong, the 1958 Strait confrontation—which arose when China shelled the islands of Kinmen and the nearby Matsu Islands along the mainland's east coast (in the Taiwan Strait)—reflected different definitions of security, trouble with domestic constituencies, and clashing cultural assumptions, even as both sought to avoid a military collision. The crisis evolved slowly from the inconclusive outcome of the earlier Taiwan Strait confrontation in 1954. Eisenhower viewed the crisis as a clarion call to defend the free world and to wage peace. He believed he must prevent the expansion of Communism but also avert military exchanges with China and the Soviet Union. For Mao, the decision to instigate the conflict most importantly served the goal of domestic reform. The end of the 1958 Strait crisis did not satisfy China's yearning for unification, Chiang Kai-shek's plans to return to the mainland, or Washington's desire to end the risk of war in the area.Less
This chapter examines how the end of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis which affected China and the United States. For Dwight D. Eisenhower and Mao Zedong, the 1958 Strait confrontation—which arose when China shelled the islands of Kinmen and the nearby Matsu Islands along the mainland's east coast (in the Taiwan Strait)—reflected different definitions of security, trouble with domestic constituencies, and clashing cultural assumptions, even as both sought to avoid a military collision. The crisis evolved slowly from the inconclusive outcome of the earlier Taiwan Strait confrontation in 1954. Eisenhower viewed the crisis as a clarion call to defend the free world and to wage peace. He believed he must prevent the expansion of Communism but also avert military exchanges with China and the Soviet Union. For Mao, the decision to instigate the conflict most importantly served the goal of domestic reform. The end of the 1958 Strait crisis did not satisfy China's yearning for unification, Chiang Kai-shek's plans to return to the mainland, or Washington's desire to end the risk of war in the area.
