Brian Davies
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198267539
- eISBN:
- 9780191600500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198267533.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, ...
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Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.Less
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.
Cyriel M. A. Pennartz
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029315
- eISBN:
- 9780262330121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029315.003.0011
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical ...
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Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical positions such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism. We discuss dualist arguments such as the case of philosophical 'zombies'. However, while these seem conceivable, they are argued not to be realizable: the construction of neural machinery appropriate for zombies would inevitably give rise to consciousness. Following a discussion of Jackson’s argument on “Mary the Color Scientist”, the reality of phenomenal experience is acknowledged as much as the reality of neural levels of processing, placing the theory away from eliminative materialism and classic functionalism. This characterizes the theory as a non-reductive, multilevel, neurobiological form of representationalism ('neurorepresentationalism'). Although representationalists have not been typically concerned with the problem of how neural aggregates give rise to consciousness, the “externalist” stream in this school is much more distant from the current view than the “narrow” stream emphasizing that representations are generated in and by the brain. Finally, we discuss consciousness in animals and in human-made inventions such as computers and robots, and on future treatment of disorders of consciousness.Less
Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical positions such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism. We discuss dualist arguments such as the case of philosophical 'zombies'. However, while these seem conceivable, they are argued not to be realizable: the construction of neural machinery appropriate for zombies would inevitably give rise to consciousness. Following a discussion of Jackson’s argument on “Mary the Color Scientist”, the reality of phenomenal experience is acknowledged as much as the reality of neural levels of processing, placing the theory away from eliminative materialism and classic functionalism. This characterizes the theory as a non-reductive, multilevel, neurobiological form of representationalism ('neurorepresentationalism'). Although representationalists have not been typically concerned with the problem of how neural aggregates give rise to consciousness, the “externalist” stream in this school is much more distant from the current view than the “narrow” stream emphasizing that representations are generated in and by the brain. Finally, we discuss consciousness in animals and in human-made inventions such as computers and robots, and on future treatment of disorders of consciousness.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues that an absolute conception of reality, starting from a minimal, absolute framework, is needed in order to investigate whether colour belongs to it or is due to human subjectivity. Examines ...
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Argues that an absolute conception of reality, starting from a minimal, absolute framework, is needed in order to investigate whether colour belongs to it or is due to human subjectivity. Examines ideas about the physical world, from Descartes's dualism to the question of what physical facts are in science, and assesses the translational reductionism of 1940s positivistic physicalists, who tried to reduce subjective reality to observable scientific phenomena. Argues against Berkeley's support of the objective existence of colour by stating that things in an independent, physical world have only the properties of physical truths, and therefore no colour. Concludes that physical truths do not consider colour, and therefore the question remains of how to conclude that objects have no colour.Less
Argues that an absolute conception of reality, starting from a minimal, absolute framework, is needed in order to investigate whether colour belongs to it or is due to human subjectivity. Examines ideas about the physical world, from Descartes's dualism to the question of what physical facts are in science, and assesses the translational reductionism of 1940s positivistic physicalists, who tried to reduce subjective reality to observable scientific phenomena. Argues against Berkeley's support of the objective existence of colour by stating that things in an independent, physical world have only the properties of physical truths, and therefore no colour. Concludes that physical truths do not consider colour, and therefore the question remains of how to conclude that objects have no colour.
Barry Allen
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231172721
- eISBN:
- 9780231539340
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231172721.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, World Religions
Canonical Western philosophers tend to acknowledge no value for the body. However, not all are contemptuous of the body; some of them invented materialism, the theory that everything in nature is ...
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Canonical Western philosophers tend to acknowledge no value for the body. However, not all are contemptuous of the body; some of them invented materialism, the theory that everything in nature is body. Philosophy in the wake of Darwin has begun to create new ways of thinking about the body that martial arts train. Among these the chapter discusses work on somaesthetics, body phenomenology, and embodied cognition.Less
Canonical Western philosophers tend to acknowledge no value for the body. However, not all are contemptuous of the body; some of them invented materialism, the theory that everything in nature is body. Philosophy in the wake of Darwin has begun to create new ways of thinking about the body that martial arts train. Among these the chapter discusses work on somaesthetics, body phenomenology, and embodied cognition.
James Miller
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780231175869
- eISBN:
- 9780231544535
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231175869.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Daoism proposes a radical reversal of the way that modern human beings think about the natural world. Rather than understanding human beings as “subject” who observe the “objective” world of nature, ...
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Daoism proposes a radical reversal of the way that modern human beings think about the natural world. Rather than understanding human beings as “subject” who observe the “objective” world of nature, Daoism proposes that subjectivity is grounded in the Dao or Way, understood as the wellspring of cosmic creativity for a world of constant transformation. As a result the Daoist goal of “obtaining the Dao” offers insights into the ecological quest to transcend the modern, Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object, self and world. From this follows an ideal of human action not as the projection of agency onto an neutral, objective backdrop but as a transaction or mediation between self and world.Less
Daoism proposes a radical reversal of the way that modern human beings think about the natural world. Rather than understanding human beings as “subject” who observe the “objective” world of nature, Daoism proposes that subjectivity is grounded in the Dao or Way, understood as the wellspring of cosmic creativity for a world of constant transformation. As a result the Daoist goal of “obtaining the Dao” offers insights into the ecological quest to transcend the modern, Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object, self and world. From this follows an ideal of human action not as the projection of agency onto an neutral, objective backdrop but as a transaction or mediation between self and world.
Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199812134
- eISBN:
- 9780199368594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812134.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Medical Law
This chapter examines issues that illustrate the importance of conceptions of “mind” in the debates over how to think about the role of neuroscience in law. It discusses the explanatory strategy of ...
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This chapter examines issues that illustrate the importance of conceptions of “mind” in the debates over how to think about the role of neuroscience in law. It discusses the explanatory strategy of “reductionism,” of which neuro-reductionism is one particular form. It illustrates the neuro-reductionist conception of mind that underlies much neuroscientific research and the proposals for its increased use in law with an example of a prominent neuro-reductive approach: “eliminative materialism.” It discuss two examples of how this reductionist conception is employed in claims about the relationship between neuroscience and law. This conception of mind is contrasted with two other alternatives: Cartesian Dualism and an Aristotelian conception of mind as an array of powers, abilities, and capacities.Less
This chapter examines issues that illustrate the importance of conceptions of “mind” in the debates over how to think about the role of neuroscience in law. It discusses the explanatory strategy of “reductionism,” of which neuro-reductionism is one particular form. It illustrates the neuro-reductionist conception of mind that underlies much neuroscientific research and the proposals for its increased use in law with an example of a prominent neuro-reductive approach: “eliminative materialism.” It discuss two examples of how this reductionist conception is employed in claims about the relationship between neuroscience and law. This conception of mind is contrasted with two other alternatives: Cartesian Dualism and an Aristotelian conception of mind as an array of powers, abilities, and capacities.
Gavin Shatkin
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781501709906
- eISBN:
- 9781501709715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501709906.003.0007
- Subject:
- Sociology, Urban and Rural Studies
This chapter concludes by assessing the implications of the analysis in the preceding chapters for contemporary urban theory and urban planning and policy practice. The analysis focuses on four ...
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This chapter concludes by assessing the implications of the analysis in the preceding chapters for contemporary urban theory and urban planning and policy practice. The analysis focuses on four common themes that emerge across the case studies: the political challenges that states face in managing the land value increment; the contestations that emerge around state efforts to destabilize non-state and non-freehold claims to land; the state strategies that emerge to delegitimize the claims and complaints of those dispossessed through urban real estate megaproject development; and the dynamics of economic and social exclusion that emerge with urban real estate megaproject development.Less
This chapter concludes by assessing the implications of the analysis in the preceding chapters for contemporary urban theory and urban planning and policy practice. The analysis focuses on four common themes that emerge across the case studies: the political challenges that states face in managing the land value increment; the contestations that emerge around state efforts to destabilize non-state and non-freehold claims to land; the state strategies that emerge to delegitimize the claims and complaints of those dispossessed through urban real estate megaproject development; and the dynamics of economic and social exclusion that emerge with urban real estate megaproject development.
Alastair V. Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719096235
- eISBN:
- 9781781708392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719096235.003.0012
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Ethical Issues and Debates
This chapter critically evaluates John Harris's arguments for the procurement of organs and tissues from the living and the dead. Harris regards objections to the use of material from dead bodies for ...
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This chapter critically evaluates John Harris's arguments for the procurement of organs and tissues from the living and the dead. Harris regards objections to the use of material from dead bodies for life-saving purposes as “implausible to the point of wickedness”, sharing the view of Emson that cadavers should be regarded as a national resource to be put at the disposal of the state. In the case of tissue and organs from the living he is in favour of an “ethical market” to ensure an adequate supply for transplantation and other medical purposes. Against these views it is argued that we need to escape from a Cartesian dualistic view of mind and body, which commits us to an overly restrictive account of rationality, a neglect of morally relevant human emotions, and a failure to see the centrality of our embodiment in our understanding of ourselves and others as persons of worth.Less
This chapter critically evaluates John Harris's arguments for the procurement of organs and tissues from the living and the dead. Harris regards objections to the use of material from dead bodies for life-saving purposes as “implausible to the point of wickedness”, sharing the view of Emson that cadavers should be regarded as a national resource to be put at the disposal of the state. In the case of tissue and organs from the living he is in favour of an “ethical market” to ensure an adequate supply for transplantation and other medical purposes. Against these views it is argued that we need to escape from a Cartesian dualistic view of mind and body, which commits us to an overly restrictive account of rationality, a neglect of morally relevant human emotions, and a failure to see the centrality of our embodiment in our understanding of ourselves and others as persons of worth.
Jennie Chapman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781617039034
- eISBN:
- 9781621039891
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781617039034.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 20th Century Literature
This chapter examines the mode of interpretive practice that the Left Behind series encourages in its readership, contending that the worldview conveyed in the novels exhibits many features of the ...
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This chapter examines the mode of interpretive practice that the Left Behind series encourages in its readership, contending that the worldview conveyed in the novels exhibits many features of the ‘paranoid style’ outlined by the political theorist Richard Hofstadter. Firstly, the series delineates a dualistic perspective which organises human experience into a series of binary oppositions: evangelical versus nonbeliever; good versus evil, saved versus damned; secondly, the characters are depicted as the bearers of ‘stigmatized knowledge’ that separates them from society at large but also marks them out as special or chosen; finally, the characters collude in a ‘myth of victimhood’ that further entrenches their sense of separation but also affirms their evangelical identity. Despite the apparently negative connotations of this mode of conspiracy thinking, the chapter shows that these positions have a positive effect in helping to inscribe and maintain a strong sense of evangelical difference.Less
This chapter examines the mode of interpretive practice that the Left Behind series encourages in its readership, contending that the worldview conveyed in the novels exhibits many features of the ‘paranoid style’ outlined by the political theorist Richard Hofstadter. Firstly, the series delineates a dualistic perspective which organises human experience into a series of binary oppositions: evangelical versus nonbeliever; good versus evil, saved versus damned; secondly, the characters are depicted as the bearers of ‘stigmatized knowledge’ that separates them from society at large but also marks them out as special or chosen; finally, the characters collude in a ‘myth of victimhood’ that further entrenches their sense of separation but also affirms their evangelical identity. Despite the apparently negative connotations of this mode of conspiracy thinking, the chapter shows that these positions have a positive effect in helping to inscribe and maintain a strong sense of evangelical difference.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions ...
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Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.Less
Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.
Yitzhak Y. Melamed
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195394054
- eISBN:
- 9780199347476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394054.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
In the third chapter I address Michael Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to the identification of the relations of inherence, ...
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In the third chapter I address Michael Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conception. I argue that (a) we have no textual support indicating that Spinoza endorsed such an identity, and (b) that Della Rocca's suggestion cannot be considered a legitimate reconstruction of or friendly amendment to Spinoza's system because it creates several acute and irresolvable problems in the system. At the end of the chapter, I present my own view of the relation among inherence, causation, and conception. I offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza. I show which of the aforementioned relations are in time, and which are not, and finally I defend the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very centre of Spinoza's system.Less
In the third chapter I address Michael Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conception. I argue that (a) we have no textual support indicating that Spinoza endorsed such an identity, and (b) that Della Rocca's suggestion cannot be considered a legitimate reconstruction of or friendly amendment to Spinoza's system because it creates several acute and irresolvable problems in the system. At the end of the chapter, I present my own view of the relation among inherence, causation, and conception. I offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza. I show which of the aforementioned relations are in time, and which are not, and finally I defend the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very centre of Spinoza's system.
Yitzhak Y. Melamed
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195394054
- eISBN:
- 9780199347476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394054.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
The clarification and setting apart of the two doctrines of parallelism (see Chapter Five) puts me in a position to present my second major thesis and address one of the most interesting and ...
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The clarification and setting apart of the two doctrines of parallelism (see Chapter Five) puts me in a position to present my second major thesis and address one of the most interesting and enduring problems in Spinoza's metaphysics: How can the attribute of Thought be isomorphic with any other attribute and also with God himself, who has infinitely many attributes? In chapter 6 I present Spinoza's solution to this problem. I argue that the number and order of modes is the same in all attributes. Yet, modes of Thought, unlike modes of any other attribute, have an infinitely faceted internal structure so that one and the same idea represents infinitely many modes by having infinitely many facets (or aspects). This new understanding of the inner structure of ideas in Spinoza leads to my third thesis, which solves another old riddle in Spinoza's metaphysics: his insistence that the human mind cannot know any of God's infinitely many attributes other than Thought and Extension. Following a discussion of the major ramifications of my new interpretation and of some important objections, I turn, in conclusion, to the philosophical significance of my reading. I explain why Spinoza could not embrace reductive idealism in spite of the preeminence he grants to the attribute of Thought. I argue that Spinoza is a dualist--not a mind-body dualist, as he is commonly conceived to be, but rather a dualist of Thought and Being. I suggest that Spinoza's position on the mind-body issue breaks with the traditional categories and ways of addressing the subject insofar as he grants clear primacy to Thought without embracing the idealist reduction of bodies to Thought.Less
The clarification and setting apart of the two doctrines of parallelism (see Chapter Five) puts me in a position to present my second major thesis and address one of the most interesting and enduring problems in Spinoza's metaphysics: How can the attribute of Thought be isomorphic with any other attribute and also with God himself, who has infinitely many attributes? In chapter 6 I present Spinoza's solution to this problem. I argue that the number and order of modes is the same in all attributes. Yet, modes of Thought, unlike modes of any other attribute, have an infinitely faceted internal structure so that one and the same idea represents infinitely many modes by having infinitely many facets (or aspects). This new understanding of the inner structure of ideas in Spinoza leads to my third thesis, which solves another old riddle in Spinoza's metaphysics: his insistence that the human mind cannot know any of God's infinitely many attributes other than Thought and Extension. Following a discussion of the major ramifications of my new interpretation and of some important objections, I turn, in conclusion, to the philosophical significance of my reading. I explain why Spinoza could not embrace reductive idealism in spite of the preeminence he grants to the attribute of Thought. I argue that Spinoza is a dualist--not a mind-body dualist, as he is commonly conceived to be, but rather a dualist of Thought and Being. I suggest that Spinoza's position on the mind-body issue breaks with the traditional categories and ways of addressing the subject insofar as he grants clear primacy to Thought without embracing the idealist reduction of bodies to Thought.
Erin Sullivan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719090783
- eISBN:
- 9781781708866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719090783.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter examines the central role Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601) has played in the historiography of early modern emotion, particularly in relation to humoral ...
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This chapter examines the central role Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601) has played in the historiography of early modern emotion, particularly in relation to humoral theory. By reading Wright’s book within the context of his life as a Jesuit priest and his other, much more polemical religious writings (including two treatises on the Eucharist and a pamphlet on the ‘notorious errors’ of Protestantism), this chapter shows how Wright’s approach to affective experience was part of a larger intellectual project addressing the complex relationship between the physical and the spiritual, the body and the soul, in both the private and public domains. Such an analysis illustrates how Wright’s understanding of the passions was both more particular and more complicated than has often been acknowledged, highlighting the importance of accounting for both local contexts and the influence of multiple intellectual frameworks (medical, religious, political, and philosophical) in the study of early modern emotion.Less
This chapter examines the central role Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601) has played in the historiography of early modern emotion, particularly in relation to humoral theory. By reading Wright’s book within the context of his life as a Jesuit priest and his other, much more polemical religious writings (including two treatises on the Eucharist and a pamphlet on the ‘notorious errors’ of Protestantism), this chapter shows how Wright’s approach to affective experience was part of a larger intellectual project addressing the complex relationship between the physical and the spiritual, the body and the soul, in both the private and public domains. Such an analysis illustrates how Wright’s understanding of the passions was both more particular and more complicated than has often been acknowledged, highlighting the importance of accounting for both local contexts and the influence of multiple intellectual frameworks (medical, religious, political, and philosophical) in the study of early modern emotion.
Paul M. Bova and Paul M. Livingston
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474412094
- eISBN:
- 9781474434966
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474412094.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
John Bova and Paul M. Livingston’s “Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato” elaborates an unorthodox yet powerful dualism in the writings of Plato. This dualism accounts for the ...
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John Bova and Paul M. Livingston’s “Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato” elaborates an unorthodox yet powerful dualism in the writings of Plato. This dualism accounts for the structural origin of both supersensible ideas and the sensible particulars which participate in them. Further, this duality extends to the reflexive level of theory itself, recognizable in the incompatible metalogical demands for consistency and completeness. Bova and Livingston connect this formal dualism to Deleuze’s discussions of ideal genesis and the paradoxes of becoming. They show a presence of a proper “Platonism” of the Idea in Deleuze, and establish thereby the potential for a recuperation of Platonic dualism in the context of the Deleuzian univocity of being.Less
John Bova and Paul M. Livingston’s “Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato” elaborates an unorthodox yet powerful dualism in the writings of Plato. This dualism accounts for the structural origin of both supersensible ideas and the sensible particulars which participate in them. Further, this duality extends to the reflexive level of theory itself, recognizable in the incompatible metalogical demands for consistency and completeness. Bova and Livingston connect this formal dualism to Deleuze’s discussions of ideal genesis and the paradoxes of becoming. They show a presence of a proper “Platonism” of the Idea in Deleuze, and establish thereby the potential for a recuperation of Platonic dualism in the context of the Deleuzian univocity of being.
L. Stephanie Cobb
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780520293359
- eISBN:
- 9780520966642
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520293359.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Chapter Three surveys narrative techniques for rejecting pain as a locus of meaning in martyrdom. A number of texts explicitly deny the experience of pain altogether by employing the language of ...
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Chapter Three surveys narrative techniques for rejecting pain as a locus of meaning in martyrdom. A number of texts explicitly deny the experience of pain altogether by employing the language of analgesia or anesthesia in their descriptions of the martyrs’ experiences of torture; other texts employ typical terms for pain but negate them; some narratives differentiate the experiences of the martyrs’ bodies from those of their spirits. Often texts attribute Christian impassibility to the presence and support of the divine. Finally, many texts thwart the audience’s visual imagination by preparing listeners to envision a grotesque murder, but then unexpectedly describing, instead, a beautiful body unharmed by torture. In these stories, torture does not harm Christians but, rather, it heals them.Less
Chapter Three surveys narrative techniques for rejecting pain as a locus of meaning in martyrdom. A number of texts explicitly deny the experience of pain altogether by employing the language of analgesia or anesthesia in their descriptions of the martyrs’ experiences of torture; other texts employ typical terms for pain but negate them; some narratives differentiate the experiences of the martyrs’ bodies from those of their spirits. Often texts attribute Christian impassibility to the presence and support of the divine. Finally, many texts thwart the audience’s visual imagination by preparing listeners to envision a grotesque murder, but then unexpectedly describing, instead, a beautiful body unharmed by torture. In these stories, torture does not harm Christians but, rather, it heals them.
Chris Pak
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781781382844
- eISBN:
- 9781786945426
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781781382844.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Terraforming and its destructive ecological impact began to receive greater attention in the light of environmentalism in the 1960s-1970s. This chapter draws attention to the links between the ...
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Terraforming and its destructive ecological impact began to receive greater attention in the light of environmentalism in the 1960s-1970s. This chapter draws attention to the links between the utopian imagination, the pastoral, and the notion of the communard, a concept that was re-voiced in “New Age” environmentalist discourse. The first section compares and contrasts several significant proto-Gaian works while the second explores terraforming narratives that re-work the 1950s tradition. Citing Val Plumwood’s analysis of dualistic operations in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, the conflict between colonising forces and indigenous populations is considered. This section argues that the popular ecological image of connection and the theme of love is a symbolic attempt to bridge the hyperseparation between dualised concepts; between coloniser and colonised, nature and culture.Less
Terraforming and its destructive ecological impact began to receive greater attention in the light of environmentalism in the 1960s-1970s. This chapter draws attention to the links between the utopian imagination, the pastoral, and the notion of the communard, a concept that was re-voiced in “New Age” environmentalist discourse. The first section compares and contrasts several significant proto-Gaian works while the second explores terraforming narratives that re-work the 1950s tradition. Citing Val Plumwood’s analysis of dualistic operations in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, the conflict between colonising forces and indigenous populations is considered. This section argues that the popular ecological image of connection and the theme of love is a symbolic attempt to bridge the hyperseparation between dualised concepts; between coloniser and colonised, nature and culture.
Emma Simone
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474421676
- eISBN:
- 9781474434638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474421676.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
In Chapter 1 a comprehensive overview of the Heideggerian understanding of Being-in-the-world is presented, placing particular emphasis upon the ways in which this notion relates to Woolf’s writings. ...
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In Chapter 1 a comprehensive overview of the Heideggerian understanding of Being-in-the-world is presented, placing particular emphasis upon the ways in which this notion relates to Woolf’s writings. Providing a foundation and context for the discussions that are to follow in the remaining chapters, key Heideggerian concepts relating to Being-in-the-world are defined and discussed, including ‘Being-with-Others’; the average everyday mode of ‘theyness’; and ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ modes of Being. Emphasised throughout this chapter are the ways in which Woolf and Heidegger’s understandings of the relationship between self and world lie in sharp contrast to the Cartesian dualism that separates subject and object, and self and Other.Less
In Chapter 1 a comprehensive overview of the Heideggerian understanding of Being-in-the-world is presented, placing particular emphasis upon the ways in which this notion relates to Woolf’s writings. Providing a foundation and context for the discussions that are to follow in the remaining chapters, key Heideggerian concepts relating to Being-in-the-world are defined and discussed, including ‘Being-with-Others’; the average everyday mode of ‘theyness’; and ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ modes of Being. Emphasised throughout this chapter are the ways in which Woolf and Heidegger’s understandings of the relationship between self and world lie in sharp contrast to the Cartesian dualism that separates subject and object, and self and Other.
Annamaria Carusi
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474400046
- eISBN:
- 9781474422178
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474400046.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
At a conference on developing the capacity of systems biology to transform itself in systems biomedicine, several of the scientists’ presentations showcase the computational modelling methods they ...
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At a conference on developing the capacity of systems biology to transform itself in systems biomedicine, several of the scientists’ presentations showcase the computational modelling methods they are developing. Drawing towards the end of his presentation, an experienced pharmacologist admonishes the audience to bear in mind that, despite the progress in modelling techniques that he has been discussing, a model is always just a representation and never reality. At this point, there is a PowerPoint slide showing Magritte’s painting, This is not a Pipe, and chuckling from the audience. It will not have been the first time that they have seen it, as the painting is by now a trope running through these events, rivalled only by the quotation from George Box: ‘Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful.’ Indeed, I have taken up this trope myself, but find that I need to judge my audience carefully when choosing what to move on with. ‘On Exactitude in Science’, but more problematic is to follow up with Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein, together with the quotation attributed to Picasso: ‘Everybody says that she does not look like it but that does not make any difference, she will.’Less
At a conference on developing the capacity of systems biology to transform itself in systems biomedicine, several of the scientists’ presentations showcase the computational modelling methods they are developing. Drawing towards the end of his presentation, an experienced pharmacologist admonishes the audience to bear in mind that, despite the progress in modelling techniques that he has been discussing, a model is always just a representation and never reality. At this point, there is a PowerPoint slide showing Magritte’s painting, This is not a Pipe, and chuckling from the audience. It will not have been the first time that they have seen it, as the painting is by now a trope running through these events, rivalled only by the quotation from George Box: ‘Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful.’ Indeed, I have taken up this trope myself, but find that I need to judge my audience carefully when choosing what to move on with. ‘On Exactitude in Science’, but more problematic is to follow up with Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein, together with the quotation attributed to Picasso: ‘Everybody says that she does not look like it but that does not make any difference, she will.’
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199330812
- eISBN:
- 9780199378524
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199330812.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter presents several promising examples of concretely substantial metaphysical theses and compares them to Scientiphicalism, the view widely accepted by contemporary philosophers. Various ...
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This chapter presents several promising examples of concretely substantial metaphysical theses and compares them to Scientiphicalism, the view widely accepted by contemporary philosophers. Various specifications of and departures from Scientiphicalism are considered.Less
This chapter presents several promising examples of concretely substantial metaphysical theses and compares them to Scientiphicalism, the view widely accepted by contemporary philosophers. Various specifications of and departures from Scientiphicalism are considered.
Nathaniel Jason Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780190215385
- eISBN:
- 9780190215408
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215385.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter One begins by discussing the very idea of Kantian conceptual geography and explaining why engaging in it is of the utmost importance to analytic philosophy. It then introduces Empirical ...
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Chapter One begins by discussing the very idea of Kantian conceptual geography and explaining why engaging in it is of the utmost importance to analytic philosophy. It then introduces Empirical Dualism, Subjective Principlism, and Kantianism—three theses central to this work. Next it shows that all three theses can be drawn from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Afterward the chapter considers views that contrast with Kantianism. These include Platonic and Aristotelian realism, Berkeleian idealism, Lockean hybridism, and Hegelian pragmatism. After that it provides a plan for subsequent chapters of the book. Finally the chapter addresses the worry that Kantian conceptual geography is inconsistent with naturalism.Less
Chapter One begins by discussing the very idea of Kantian conceptual geography and explaining why engaging in it is of the utmost importance to analytic philosophy. It then introduces Empirical Dualism, Subjective Principlism, and Kantianism—three theses central to this work. Next it shows that all three theses can be drawn from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Afterward the chapter considers views that contrast with Kantianism. These include Platonic and Aristotelian realism, Berkeleian idealism, Lockean hybridism, and Hegelian pragmatism. After that it provides a plan for subsequent chapters of the book. Finally the chapter addresses the worry that Kantian conceptual geography is inconsistent with naturalism.
