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Here we review the philosophical implications of the theory presented in previous chapters, and its consequences for future research. This leads us to demarcate the current theory from classical positions such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism. We discuss dualist arguments such as the case of philosophical 'zombies'. However, while these seem conceivable, they are argued not to be realizable: the construction of neural machinery appropriate for zombies would inevitably give rise to consciousness. Following a discussion of Jackson’s argument on “Mary the Color Scientist”, the reality of phenomenal experience is acknowledged as much as the reality of neural levels of processing, placing the theory away from eliminative materialism and classic functionalism. This characterizes the theory as a non-reductive, multilevel, neurobiological form of representationalism ('neurorepresentationalism'). Although representationalists have not been typically concerned with the problem of how neural aggregates give rise to consciousness, the “externalist” stream in this school is much more distant from the current view than the “narrow” stream emphasizing that representations are generated in and by the brain. Finally, we discuss consciousness in animals and in human-made inventions such as computers and robots, and on future treatment of disorders of consciousness.

This chapter presents an overview of the historical circumstances leading to a division of competence between “making” private international law in foreign affairs terms; and giving effect to (“doing”) private international law domestically. Drawing on this dichotomy, the chapter reflects on a Scottish experience of judicial cooperation in practice. Using an anthropological lens this chapter reflects on identifying the required “Other” for cooperation - a binary requiring some aspect of “foreignness” of another law. This is considered both in the context of the UK as a multi-jurisdictional state; and as part of a nascent field within attempts to create a European area of freedom, security and justice. These reflections provide a practical overview of an era which seems certain to see some change in the near future.

This chapter explores the ways in which Sterne in Tristram Shandy may have anticipatedaspects of the concepts of 4E cognition. It sets Sterne into his historical-philosophic milieu, especially in the dualist traditions of Locke and Hume, and seeks to understand how Sterne’s narrative and its protagonist are living systems embodying cognitive worlds. Autopoiesis, the term used to describe systems capable of maintaining and reproducing themselves, is shown to be applicable to Sterne’s creation of a protagonist who cannot figure out who he is or how he got to be where he is. The chapter particularly emphasizes the runaway digressive loops driving Tristram’s cognitive mindset and demonstrates how the continual perturbations he experiences whenever he tries to get outside his own head disturb his self-organization. It shows that when Tristram aims to traverse the autopoietic borders he has set for himself, as he often does, he becomes progressively disturbed.

Canonical Western philosophers tend to acknowledge no value for the body. However, not all are contemptuous of the body; some of them invented materialism, the theory that everything in nature is body. Philosophy in the wake of Darwin has begun to create new ways of thinking about the body that martial arts train. Among these the chapter discusses work on somaesthetics, body phenomenology, and embodied cognition.

Daoism proposes a radical reversal of the way that modern human beings think about the natural world. Rather than understanding human beings as “subject” who observe the “objective” world of nature, Daoism proposes that subjectivity is grounded in the Dao or Way, understood as the wellspring of cosmic creativity for a world of constant transformation. As a result the Daoist goal of “obtaining the Dao” offers insights into the ecological quest to transcend the modern, Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object, self and world. From this follows an ideal of human action not as the projection of agency onto an neutral, objective backdrop but as a transaction or mediation between self and world.

This contribution addresses Hempel’s well-known “The Theoretician’s Dilemma” from the viewpoint of philosophy of chemistry. While from the viewpoint of mainstream philosophy of science it might appear that the issues raised by this paper, published in 1958, are well settled, philosophy of chemistry has the potential to reopen the debate on theoretical terms in an interesting way. In this contribution I will reopen the debate and approach the problem of theoretical terms in a fashion which may be instructive to the wider philosophy of science. In “The Theoretician’s Dilemma” the argument hinges on the purpose of theoretical terms. Theoretical terms either serve their purpose (that is, they form part of a deductive chain that establishes definite connections between observables), or they don’t. Hempel then mounts an argument to show that if theoretical terms serve their purpose, they can be dispensed with. On the other hand, of course, if the theoretical terms don’t serve their purpose, they should be dispensed with. Hence the dilemma shows that theoretical terms are unnecessary. Hempel’s way out of the dilemma is to attack its premise. Hempel argues that theoretical terms do more than just establish a convenient shorthand to describe observations. Theoretical terms, argues Hempel, serve an ontological function in addition to theoretical systematization. Theoretical terms pick out some essential feature of nature such that they allow theories to “track truth” (in the words of Psillos 1999). From the viewpoint of philosophy of chemistry, the issue is this. Chemical theories frequently refer to entities, such as “atoms,” “chemical elements,” “electrons,” and “orbitals” that have some counterpart of the same name in theories of physics. Such chemical theories, as per the quote from Nagel above, are generally formulated with great care, as are their counterparts in physics. Yet is also the case that the use of such terms in the theories of chemistry is in many cases inconsistent with how these same terms are conceived in physics.

This chapter examines issues that illustrate the importance of conceptions of “mind” in the debates over how to think about the role of neuroscience in law. It discusses the explanatory strategy of “reductionism,” of which neuro-reductionism is one particular form. It illustrates the neuro-reductionist conception of mind that underlies much neuroscientific research and the proposals for its increased use in law with an example of a prominent neuro-reductive approach: “eliminative materialism.” It discuss two examples of how this reductionist conception is employed in claims about the relationship between neuroscience and law. This conception of mind is contrasted with two other alternatives: Cartesian Dualism and an Aristotelian conception of mind as an array of powers, abilities, and capacities.

This chapter concludes by assessing the implications of the analysis in the preceding chapters for contemporary urban theory and urban planning and policy practice. The analysis focuses on four common themes that emerge across the case studies: the political challenges that states face in managing the land value increment; the contestations that emerge around state efforts to destabilize non-state and non-freehold claims to land; the state strategies that emerge to delegitimize the claims and complaints of those dispossessed through urban real estate megaproject development; and the dynamics of economic and social exclusion that emerge with urban real estate megaproject development.

This chapter critically evaluates John Harris's arguments for the procurement of organs and tissues from the living and the dead. Harris regards objections to the use of material from dead bodies for life-saving purposes as “implausible to the point of wickedness”, sharing the view of Emson that cadavers should be regarded as a national resource to be put at the disposal of the state. In the case of tissue and organs from the living he is in favour of an “ethical market” to ensure an adequate supply for transplantation and other medical purposes. Against these views it is argued that we need to escape from a Cartesian dualistic view of mind and body, which commits us to an overly restrictive account of rationality, a neglect of morally relevant human emotions, and a failure to see the centrality of our embodiment in our understanding of ourselves and others as persons of worth.

This chapter examines the mode of interpretive practice that the Left Behind series encourages in its readership, contending that the worldview conveyed in the novels exhibits many features of the ‘paranoid style’ outlined by the political theorist Richard Hofstadter. Firstly, the series delineates a dualistic perspective which organises human experience into a series of binary oppositions: evangelical versus nonbeliever; good versus evil, saved versus damned; secondly, the characters are depicted as the bearers of ‘stigmatized knowledge’ that separates them from society at large but also marks them out as special or chosen; finally, the characters collude in a ‘myth of victimhood’ that further entrenches their sense of separation but also affirms their evangelical identity. Despite the apparently negative connotations of this mode of conspiracy thinking, the chapter shows that these positions have a positive effect in helping to inscribe and maintain a strong sense of evangelical difference.

Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.

Early modern folk typecast according to humoral temperaments made manifest by hair colour, facial features, skin-tone, and bodily proportion. Neither the doctrine of monogenesis, nor uncertainty regarding the mechanisms of variation’s inheritance across generations, precluded an embodied inequality. In fact, the very existence of human diversity was testimony of the divine. Yet God’s providence was also believed to bestow immortal, immaterial souls on people’s variously complexioned flesh. When it comes to the perpetration of racism, this belief should have been the saving grace for all early modern English men and women. Unlike the Ancients, who (allegedly) thought that human souls were determined by their bodies’ elemental composition, and that the cosmos was eternal and random, Christian orthodoxy assumed an ordered Creation, and that humans’ rational souls would ultimately bridle the bodily inclinations to which people’s humours otherwise disposed them. However, early modern bodily prejudice became entirely racist among those who denied this dualism and instead favoured a form of organicism; when they assumed that they themselves were wholly the product of an autonomous Nature which was not God’s handmaiden.

This chapter examines the central role Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601) has played in the historiography of early modern emotion, particularly in relation to humoral theory. By reading Wright’s book within the context of his life as a Jesuit priest and his other, much more polemical religious writings (including two treatises on the Eucharist and a pamphlet on the ‘notorious errors’ of Protestantism), this chapter shows how Wright’s approach to affective experience was part of a larger intellectual project addressing the complex relationship between the physical and the spiritual, the body and the soul, in both the private and public domains. Such an analysis illustrates how Wright’s understanding of the passions was both more particular and more complicated than has often been acknowledged, highlighting the importance of accounting for both local contexts and the influence of multiple intellectual frameworks (medical, religious, political, and philosophical) in the study of early modern emotion.

Chapter Three surveys narrative techniques for rejecting pain as a locus of meaning in martyrdom. A number of texts explicitly deny the experience of pain altogether by employing the language of analgesia or anesthesia in their descriptions of the martyrs’ experiences of torture; other texts employ typical terms for pain but negate them; some narratives differentiate the experiences of the martyrs’ bodies from those of their spirits. Often texts attribute Christian impassibility to the presence and support of the divine. Finally, many texts thwart the audience’s visual imagination by preparing listeners to envision a grotesque murder, but then unexpectedly describing, instead, a beautiful body unharmed by torture. In these stories, torture does not harm Christians but, rather, it heals them.

In the third chapter I address Michael Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the Principle of Sufficient Reason leads to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conception. I argue that (a) we have no textual support indicating that Spinoza endorsed such an identity, and (b) that Della Rocca's suggestion cannot be considered a legitimate reconstruction of or friendly amendment to Spinoza's system because it creates several acute and irresolvable problems in the system. At the end of the chapter, I present my own view of the relation among inherence, causation, and conception. I offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza. I show which of the aforementioned relations are in time, and which are not, and finally I defend the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very centre of Spinoza's system.

The clarification and setting apart of the two doctrines of parallelism (see Chapter Five) puts me in a position to present my second major thesis and address one of the most interesting and enduring problems in Spinoza's metaphysics: How can the attribute of Thought be isomorphic with any other attribute and also with God himself, who has infinitely many attributes? In chapter 6 I present Spinoza's solution to this problem. I argue that the number and order of modes is the same in all attributes. Yet, modes of Thought, unlike modes of any other attribute, have an infinitely faceted internal structure so that one and the same idea represents infinitely many modes by having infinitely many facets (or aspects). This new understanding of the inner structure of ideas in Spinoza leads to my third thesis, which solves another old riddle in Spinoza's metaphysics: his insistence that the human mind cannot know any of God's infinitely many attributes other than Thought and Extension. Following a discussion of the major ramifications of my new interpretation and of some important objections, I turn, in conclusion, to the philosophical significance of my reading. I explain why Spinoza could not embrace reductive idealism in spite of the preeminence he grants to the attribute of Thought. I argue that Spinoza is a dualist--not a mind-body dualist, as he is commonly conceived to be, but rather a dualist of Thought and Being. I suggest that Spinoza's position on the mind-body issue breaks with the traditional categories and ways of addressing the subject insofar as he grants clear primacy to Thought without embracing the idealist reduction of bodies to Thought.

John Bova and Paul M. Livingston’s “Univocity, Duality, and Ideal Genesis: Deleuze and Plato” elaborates an unorthodox yet powerful dualism in the writings of Plato. This dualism accounts for the structural origin of both supersensible ideas and the sensible particulars which participate in them. Further, this duality extends to the reflexive level of theory itself, recognizable in the incompatible metalogical demands for consistency and completeness. Bova and Livingston connect this formal dualism to Deleuze’s discussions of ideal genesis and the paradoxes of becoming. They show a presence of a proper “Platonism” of the Idea in Deleuze, and establish thereby the potential for a recuperation of Platonic dualism in the context of the Deleuzian univocity of being.