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Rules for the Knowledge Operator

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in The Knowability Paradox

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199282593
eISBN:
9780191603587
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282595.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies ... More


Against Etiological Semantics

Joseph Mendola

in Anti-Externalism

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199534999
eISBN:
9780191715969
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses externalist theories of mental content that do not involve the mediation of thought by language but in which history is crucial. It argues that the etiological teleosemantics ... More


Knowledge of Perception

Daniel Stoljar

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

According to Fred Dretske’ evidence argument I cannot know that that I am seeing my son (and other simple first-personal present tense psychological facts). However, since I can and do know these ... More


Knowing What I See

Alex Byrne

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199744794
eISBN:
9780199933396
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I know that a pig is present by seeing it, but how do I know that I see a pig? Surprisingly little attention has been paid to this difficult question. (Evans and Dretske are notable exceptions.) The ... More


Self‐Representation, Objectivity, and Intentionality

J.T. Ismael

in The Situated Self

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195174366
eISBN:
9780199872121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195174366.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that the formal requirements on self-describing media shed light on two elusive questions in the philosophy of mind. The first is a question that Dretske raised in Naturalizing ... More


Laws of Nature

David M. Armstrong

in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199590612
eISBN:
9780191723391
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all ... More


Skepticism and Epistemic Closure

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0027
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter gives the first extended discussion of a gamut of positions on closure.


Klein on Closure and Skepticism

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0031
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines Peter Klein's ingenious defense of closure and raises a number of problems for it.


Sensory Concepts

Mohan Matthen

in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199268504
eISBN:
9780191602283
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199268509.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

A number of influential positions in the philosophy of perception are grounded in the idea that the sensory image is raw and unprocessed. Dretske holds that sensation is analogue: he neglects ... More


The Regularity Theory II: Laws and Accidental Generalizations

Bernard Berofsky

in Nature's Challenge to Free Will

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199640010
eISBN:
9780191738197
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

The critiques of the regularity theory by Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and D. M. Armstrong are shown to fail. A categorization of “accidental generalizations” is offered. The failures of the best ... More


Natural Theories of Consciousness

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199277360
eISBN:
9780191602597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199277362.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of ... More


More and Different Information

David Hodgson

in The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World

Published in print:
1993
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198240686
eISBN:
9780191680236
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240686.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It is sometimes asserted that computers with consciousness may be developed, or even that they exist now; but, whether or not this is so, it is clear that existing computers operate by performing ... More


The Information-Processing Approach

William Lyons

in Approaches to Intentionality

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198752226
eISBN:
9780191695087
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198752226.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

This chapter deals with the information-processing account of Fred Dretske, an account that combines the representational aspect of mental content and the teleological interpretation of its cognitive ... More


Dretske's Drinker

C. A. J. Coady

in Testimony: A Philosophical Study

Published in print:
1994
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198235514
eISBN:
9780191597220
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198235518.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Fred Dretske has raised an amusing counter‐example to a plausible epistemic principle of testimonial transmission—namely, that if someone knows something then, given that certain simple conditions ... More


Subjunctivism and Subjunctivitis

Robert J. Fogelin

in Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification

Published in print:
1994
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195089875
eISBN:
9780199833238
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195089871.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins with an examination of Dretske's important article “Conclusive Reasons.” Dretske's key move is to offer a subjunctive analysis of his notion of a conclusive reason: “R is a ... More


The Concept of Knowledge

Colin McGinn

in Knowledge and Reality: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251582
eISBN:
9780191598012
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251584.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of reliabilism, contending that a belief counts as knowledge just in case ‘it is produced by a method capable of yielding true beliefs in a range of ... More


Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice

Edward Craig

in Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238799
eISBN:
9780191597237
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238797.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Argues that the core of the concept of knowledge is true belief plus some property indicative of true belief and that there is no detailed answer to the query ‘and what property is that?’ The ... More


Universals: Laws Grounded in Nature

Bas C. van Fraassen

in Laws and Symmetry

Published in print:
1989
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198248606
eISBN:
9780191597459
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198248601.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Universals accounts of laws of nature begin with a robust anti‐nominalism: there are real properties and relations that are to be distinguished from sets or arbitrary classifications. Those real ... More


Inference to the Best Explanation: Salvation by Laws?

Bas C. van Fraassen

in Laws and Symmetry

Published in print:
1989
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198248606
eISBN:
9780191597459
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198248601.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Induction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of ... More


Reliabilism

Alvin Plantinga

in Warrant: The Current Debate

Published in print:
1993
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195078626
eISBN:
9780199833559
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195078624.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged ... More


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