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Quine's ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ and ‘The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics’ treated meaning in a sceptical, dismissive fashion, in very much the same way that analytic philosophers themselves had relied on the notion of meaning to dispel the pretensions of metaphysics. In ‘Two Dogmas’ the topic of meaning is approached indirectly, by way of criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in the first instance. Analytic truths are those that can be reduced with the aid of definitions to truths of logic. What, Quine enquired, are the criteria of synonymy implied by the claim of such definitions to correctness? In ‘Meaning in Linguistics’ the thesis of ‘Two Dogmas’ that ‘meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned’ is developed further. This chapter raises a number of questions about details in the complex fabric of Quine's arguments in order to draw attention to what seems to be unfinished business or holes that need to be stopped.

This chapter responds to the most important considerations adduced against traditional conceptual analysis (TCA): (1) the denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths; (2) recent research on the fallibility of ordinary intuitions; (3) the idea that all claims are revisable in the face of recalcitrant experience; and (4) the claim that even putatively conceptual claims are contingent in character. It argues that the most influential arguments for abandoning metaphysics and conceptual analysis are unsuccessful. For instance, the Quinean circle-of-terms argument, does not even get off the ground because his claim we should give up the concept of meaning because of its obscurity cannot bear the weight Quine places on it. Likewise, sociological arguments about the unreliability of intuition fail because they neither distinguish various forms of intuition nor consider the possibility that some forms are more reliable than others.

In his article ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Professor Quine advances a number of criticisms of the supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and of other associated notions. It is, he says, a distinction which he rejects. This chapter shows that his criticisms of the distinction do not justify his rejection of it.

The chapter begins by emphasizing three dogmas: the specificity of the favela seems particularly resistant; the favela as the space of poverty is also resistant but less so; and the unity of the favela is also being partly shattered. This chapter then focuses on graduate education in Brazil during that late 19^th century. It describes the rise of social sciences as the area of study for many students. With that came more focus on urban poverty and public policies, such as the Policy of Removal. Once again, the author emphasizes the need to see favelas not as a problem to be removed but a problem to be improved. Finally, the chapter’s last pages focus on Survey Research with regard to favela and favela residents.

Chapter 4 concludes by pointing out the current way favelas are now seen, thanks to the three dogmas introduced in the previous chapter. Researchers through their census have seen that, contrary to popular belief, there are high levels of heterogeneity in the favela communities. Favelas do not just house one type of person but a diverse group. Yet, favelas continue to be categorized as for “the poor” by International NGOs and governments. Social Tourism is also spoken of in the concluding chapter. Favelas such as the Rocinha give paid tours to tourists, but they also aim to show the favelas’ good aspects in order to eliminate their negative connotation.

The epilogue emphasizes the time this book was written (1990s-2000s) and the 30 years of research needed to complete the book. It also discusses the favelas’ expansion throughout the last century or so. Other items of note include NGOs and their involvement with favelas, as well as public policies that aim to get rid of favelas instead of aiding them. Violence is also mentioned along with the UPP (Pacifying Police Unit) and its inconsistent presence to eliminate violence in the favelas. The book concludes that while the stigmatization of favelas is still present, there is being work done to better the favelas’ reputation.

Although Quine was always a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the mid-1950s. This chapter examines the evolution of Quine’s epistemology and metaphysics in the first twenty years of his career. Whereas Quine’s published work in the 1930s and 1940s was primarily technical, the Quine archives reveal that he was already working on a philosophical book during the Second World War, a project entitled Sign and Object. This chapter argues that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine’s ideas. Not only does Quine’s book project show that his views were already fairly naturalistic in the early 1940s, Sign and Object also unearths the steps Quine had to take in maturing his perspective.

This chapter examines Quine’s evolving views on the analytic-synthetic distinction. Following Quine’s two-tiered argument in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” it answers three questions: (1) When did Quine start demanding a behavioristically acceptable definition of analyticity? (2) When did he stop searching for such a definition? and (3) When did he reject the dogma of reductionism, concluding that there is no need for an analytic-synthetic distinction in the first place? This chapter argues that it is impossible to identify a specific moment at which Quine definitively rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction; from a developmental perspective, all three questions require an independent answer. The second part of this chapter reconstructs Quine’s evolving views on the analytic-synthetic distinction after 1951 and challenges the common misconception that he changed his mind about logic, holism, and analyticity in the later stages of his career.

The goal of this and subsequent chapters is to convince the reader that there is a significant analogy between biological entities like species, clades, and population lineages and linguistic and semantic ones such as words, meanings, concepts, and languages. This chapter’s first sections review some obvious facts about language communities and speakers and some elementary facts about the ways biology thinks about species, and points out that there is indeed a prima facie case for thinking that things like word meanings are analogous to species. The chapter’s later sections argue that if we take the analogy at face value, we can embrace Quine’s conclusion in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’—that there is no theoretically interesting notion of analytic truth, no sort of synonymy that can do epistemological work—while still thinking that the notion of meaning can carry a real theoretical load.