David P. Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813176703
- eISBN:
- 9780813176727
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813176703.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere during counterterrorism ...
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Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere during counterterrorism operations. Although the global war on terrorism provided a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late 1980s and 1990s that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned, policy makers made military support the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response, the CIA and DoD instituted changes that altered their relationship. While congressional debates over the Intelligence Community’s future were occurring, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship during operations. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening long-term analysis. Despite concerns, no major changes to intelligence organization or priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers fixated on terrorism. The DoD/CIA operational relationship has led to successes, but the CIA’s counterterrorism and military support requirements place a significant burden on the organization. As the sole independent US intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate intelligence collection from the institutions that develop and execute policy. Its increased focus on support to military operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD. The CIA and DoD are the ones affected by this evolving relationship, but policy makers’ preference for military force and the militarization of foreign policy has led both organizations down this path.Less
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere during counterterrorism operations. Although the global war on terrorism provided a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late 1980s and 1990s that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned, policy makers made military support the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response, the CIA and DoD instituted changes that altered their relationship. While congressional debates over the Intelligence Community’s future were occurring, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship during operations. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening long-term analysis. Despite concerns, no major changes to intelligence organization or priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers fixated on terrorism. The DoD/CIA operational relationship has led to successes, but the CIA’s counterterrorism and military support requirements place a significant burden on the organization. As the sole independent US intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate intelligence collection from the institutions that develop and execute policy. Its increased focus on support to military operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD. The CIA and DoD are the ones affected by this evolving relationship, but policy makers’ preference for military force and the militarization of foreign policy has led both organizations down this path.
Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780231180788
- eISBN:
- 9780231543255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231180788.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment ...
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This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.Less
This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.
James E. David
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813049991
- eISBN:
- 9780813050430
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049991.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
NASA's public image through the years is of an organization that has engaged only in civilian and open activities. Although this is true in many cases, there is another side to NASA's history. This ...
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NASA's public image through the years is of an organization that has engaged only in civilian and open activities. Although this is true in many cases, there is another side to NASA's history. This book examines for the first time the hidden and frequently classified interactions between NASA and the national security community in spaceflight and related fields from the time of NASA's establishment through the final classified Shuttle mission in 1992. Although the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 mandated that the two groups operate separate and distinct space programs and that NASA only engage in peaceful, scientific, and open activities, NASA did not and could not always comply. This was due to several factors, including common interests in a wide range of technologies and the practical need of NASA, the CIA, and the DoD to employ each other's hardware, facilities, and expertise to accomplish their missions. As author James E. David points out, NASA was frequently an active contributor to the meeting of national security requirements, received considerable support from the defense and intelligence agencies, and because of national security concerns at times was subject to restrictions on the technologies it could use or the scientific data it could acquire or disseminate. Conflicts occasionally arose over these restrictions, but in almost every case the defense and intelligence agencies prevailed.Less
NASA's public image through the years is of an organization that has engaged only in civilian and open activities. Although this is true in many cases, there is another side to NASA's history. This book examines for the first time the hidden and frequently classified interactions between NASA and the national security community in spaceflight and related fields from the time of NASA's establishment through the final classified Shuttle mission in 1992. Although the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 mandated that the two groups operate separate and distinct space programs and that NASA only engage in peaceful, scientific, and open activities, NASA did not and could not always comply. This was due to several factors, including common interests in a wide range of technologies and the practical need of NASA, the CIA, and the DoD to employ each other's hardware, facilities, and expertise to accomplish their missions. As author James E. David points out, NASA was frequently an active contributor to the meeting of national security requirements, received considerable support from the defense and intelligence agencies, and because of national security concerns at times was subject to restrictions on the technologies it could use or the scientific data it could acquire or disseminate. Conflicts occasionally arose over these restrictions, but in almost every case the defense and intelligence agencies prevailed.
James E. David
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813049991
- eISBN:
- 9780813050430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049991.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
The extensive open literature on NASA covers its overt and unclassified relationships with the national security community in spaceflight and related fields. Only a few works have started to explore ...
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The extensive open literature on NASA covers its overt and unclassified relationships with the national security community in spaceflight and related fields. Only a few works have started to explore the hidden and largely classified interactions among NASA and key national security agencies in these areas. Recently declassified records reveal that these interactions went further and deeper than previously known and involved virtually all of NASA's programs through the years: human spaceflight, application satellites, astronomy, ground support. The reasons are varied: shared interest in many technologies; interreliance on hardware, facilities, and expertise to accomplish missions; a need to restrict certain NASA activities to protect national security; and the extensive national security experience of NASA's leaders.Less
The extensive open literature on NASA covers its overt and unclassified relationships with the national security community in spaceflight and related fields. Only a few works have started to explore the hidden and largely classified interactions among NASA and key national security agencies in these areas. Recently declassified records reveal that these interactions went further and deeper than previously known and involved virtually all of NASA's programs through the years: human spaceflight, application satellites, astronomy, ground support. The reasons are varied: shared interest in many technologies; interreliance on hardware, facilities, and expertise to accomplish missions; a need to restrict certain NASA activities to protect national security; and the extensive national security experience of NASA's leaders.
James E. David
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813049991
- eISBN:
- 9780813050430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049991.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
NASA developed extremely close ties with the national security community in several areas during its early years. It played an active and public role in the U-2 cover story until the shoot down of ...
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NASA developed extremely close ties with the national security community in several areas during its early years. It played an active and public role in the U-2 cover story until the shoot down of Gary Powers’ aircraft in May 1960. NASA cooperated closely with the DoD in establishing separate command and control networks for satellites and in acquiring and disseminating space surveillance data. It regularly received intelligence on the Soviet space program from the CIA and discussed but did not implement measures to share its expertise with the intelligence agencies in analyzing the program. In the first case of national security affecting a NASA program, the CIA and other agencies unsuccessfully attempted to delay the launch of the Tiros weather satellites and to prohibit imaging of the Sino-Soviet bloc. As a solution, for a short time several security agencies previewed the satellite photographs before authorizing their public release by NASA.Less
NASA developed extremely close ties with the national security community in several areas during its early years. It played an active and public role in the U-2 cover story until the shoot down of Gary Powers’ aircraft in May 1960. NASA cooperated closely with the DoD in establishing separate command and control networks for satellites and in acquiring and disseminating space surveillance data. It regularly received intelligence on the Soviet space program from the CIA and discussed but did not implement measures to share its expertise with the intelligence agencies in analyzing the program. In the first case of national security affecting a NASA program, the CIA and other agencies unsuccessfully attempted to delay the launch of the Tiros weather satellites and to prohibit imaging of the Sino-Soviet bloc. As a solution, for a short time several security agencies previewed the satellite photographs before authorizing their public release by NASA.
James E. David
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813049991
- eISBN:
- 9780813050430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049991.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
NASA forged an unprecedented and unequal partnership with the defense and intelligence agencies to obtain their critical political support for the Shuttle. Their requirements dictated a larger ...
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NASA forged an unprecedented and unequal partnership with the defense and intelligence agencies to obtain their critical political support for the Shuttle. Their requirements dictated a larger orbiter and performance specifications greater than what NASA needed. For the first time ever, NASA would routinely and openly fly classified missions, institute a secure command and control system, and withhold mission information from the public. Although NASA would pay the vast majority of the program's costs, the DoD agreed to build a West Coast launch complex, install a secure command and control system, and develop an upper stage. There was considerable opposition to transitioning national security payloads to the unproven Shuttle as its financial and technical problems mounted, but key DoD leaders provided critical political support during the Carter Administration and saved the Shuttle from drastic cuts or cancellation. President Carter directed that the Shuttle become the exclusive launch vehicle for all U.S. government payloads, that this transition occur quickly, and that national security missions receive priority. As the complex and expensive redesign of national security payloads for launch on the Shuttle finally began, the DoD continued to modify its backup expendable launch vehicle (ELV) policy in the uncertain environment.Less
NASA forged an unprecedented and unequal partnership with the defense and intelligence agencies to obtain their critical political support for the Shuttle. Their requirements dictated a larger orbiter and performance specifications greater than what NASA needed. For the first time ever, NASA would routinely and openly fly classified missions, institute a secure command and control system, and withhold mission information from the public. Although NASA would pay the vast majority of the program's costs, the DoD agreed to build a West Coast launch complex, install a secure command and control system, and develop an upper stage. There was considerable opposition to transitioning national security payloads to the unproven Shuttle as its financial and technical problems mounted, but key DoD leaders provided critical political support during the Carter Administration and saved the Shuttle from drastic cuts or cancellation. President Carter directed that the Shuttle become the exclusive launch vehicle for all U.S. government payloads, that this transition occur quickly, and that national security missions receive priority. As the complex and expensive redesign of national security payloads for launch on the Shuttle finally began, the DoD continued to modify its backup expendable launch vehicle (ELV) policy in the uncertain environment.
James E. David
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813049991
- eISBN:
- 9780813050430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049991.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
It soon became evident after the Shuttle's long-delayed first flight in 1981 that it could neither meet the estimated flight schedule nor achieve the original performance specifications needed for ...
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It soon became evident after the Shuttle's long-delayed first flight in 1981 that it could neither meet the estimated flight schedule nor achieve the original performance specifications needed for the heaviest national security payloads. Other problems plagued the program as well. The DoD abandoned its policy during the first two years of Shuttle operations of having backup expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) for all payloads and assigned the few remaining ones to launch specific satellites. Over the strenuous objections of NASA, it obtained permission in 1984 to build ten new launch vehicles for the heaviest payloads that the Shuttle could not carry. After the secure command and control system and the upper stage became operational, the DoD flew unclassified and classified payloads until the Challenger accident in 1986. The Challenger accident seriously disrupted the DoD's launch schedule, and it quickly began acquisition of several new classes of ELVs. Because performance-enhancing measures for the Shuttle were soon cancelled, the unused West Coast launch complex was mothballed. The DoD flew its last Shuttle missions from 1988 to 1992, presumably with payloads that could not fly on ELVs or that were too expensive to reconfigure to permit this. Its participation in the Shuttle program came to a premature end at an immense cost and with few benefits to show for it.Less
It soon became evident after the Shuttle's long-delayed first flight in 1981 that it could neither meet the estimated flight schedule nor achieve the original performance specifications needed for the heaviest national security payloads. Other problems plagued the program as well. The DoD abandoned its policy during the first two years of Shuttle operations of having backup expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) for all payloads and assigned the few remaining ones to launch specific satellites. Over the strenuous objections of NASA, it obtained permission in 1984 to build ten new launch vehicles for the heaviest payloads that the Shuttle could not carry. After the secure command and control system and the upper stage became operational, the DoD flew unclassified and classified payloads until the Challenger accident in 1986. The Challenger accident seriously disrupted the DoD's launch schedule, and it quickly began acquisition of several new classes of ELVs. Because performance-enhancing measures for the Shuttle were soon cancelled, the unused West Coast launch complex was mothballed. The DoD flew its last Shuttle missions from 1988 to 1992, presumably with payloads that could not fly on ELVs or that were too expensive to reconfigure to permit this. Its participation in the Shuttle program came to a premature end at an immense cost and with few benefits to show for it.
James E. David
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780813049991
- eISBN:
- 9780813050430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049991.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Contrary to the image that NASA has been involved only in in open and peaceful activities, it has a long history of hidden and frequently classified interaction with the national security agencies in ...
More
Contrary to the image that NASA has been involved only in in open and peaceful activities, it has a long history of hidden and frequently classified interaction with the national security agencies in the spaceflight and related fields. These relationships were often mutually beneficial, but at times restrictions were imposed on NASA's activities to protect national security. NASA often objected to these restrictions, but in most instances national security interests prevailed. The existence of NASA's close ties and relationships with the CIA and DoD in certain areas and the details of others are still shrouded in secrecy, even from NASA's earliest days. As more information is declassified, the world will gain a fuller history of this remarkable organization.Less
Contrary to the image that NASA has been involved only in in open and peaceful activities, it has a long history of hidden and frequently classified interaction with the national security agencies in the spaceflight and related fields. These relationships were often mutually beneficial, but at times restrictions were imposed on NASA's activities to protect national security. NASA often objected to these restrictions, but in most instances national security interests prevailed. The existence of NASA's close ties and relationships with the CIA and DoD in certain areas and the details of others are still shrouded in secrecy, even from NASA's earliest days. As more information is declassified, the world will gain a fuller history of this remarkable organization.
Mark P. Nevitt
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199328574
- eISBN:
- 9780199363193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328574.003.0013
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter provides an operational environmental law overview and toolkit for use by military commanders and their lawyers in identifying and addressing environmental issues within the geographic ...
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This chapter provides an operational environmental law overview and toolkit for use by military commanders and their lawyers in identifying and addressing environmental issues within the geographic locations and operational contexts in which they are likely to arise. This chapter addresses three different areas where myriad environmental laws and policies could feasibly apply to military operations. First, it briefly provides an overview of the Title 10 “man, train and equip” missions at U.S. installations within the jurisdiction of the United States. Second, it addresses military activities outside the United States at established and enduring DoD installations. Third, this chapter addresses military activities and operations outside the United States where DoD directives and domestic environmental law have only limited application. This includes operations that take place in both international and non-international armed conflict, contingency operations, and the large swath of other DoD activities abroad where DoD policies do not clearly apply.Less
This chapter provides an operational environmental law overview and toolkit for use by military commanders and their lawyers in identifying and addressing environmental issues within the geographic locations and operational contexts in which they are likely to arise. This chapter addresses three different areas where myriad environmental laws and policies could feasibly apply to military operations. First, it briefly provides an overview of the Title 10 “man, train and equip” missions at U.S. installations within the jurisdiction of the United States. Second, it addresses military activities outside the United States at established and enduring DoD installations. Third, this chapter addresses military activities and operations outside the United States where DoD directives and domestic environmental law have only limited application. This includes operations that take place in both international and non-international armed conflict, contingency operations, and the large swath of other DoD activities abroad where DoD policies do not clearly apply.
Robert L. Kane and C. Munro Cullum
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190234737
- eISBN:
- 9780197559543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190234737.003.0010
- Subject:
- Computer Science, Virtual Reality
The growth of telemedicine has been rapid. Initially, telemedicine was seen as a way to bring services to remote areas that lacked access to aspects of healthcare delivered through traditional ...
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The growth of telemedicine has been rapid. Initially, telemedicine was seen as a way to bring services to remote areas that lacked access to aspects of healthcare delivered through traditional means. This view of telemedicine has changed. Current views toward telemedicine have broadened, with telemedicine now viewed as an effective way to deliver various health services and to bring together patients and providers to increase access to care in various locations and communities. Reimbursement has been a challenge for some aspects of telemedicine development. Initially, Medicare limited reimbursement for telehealth to designated underserved areas. This approach to telehealth reimbursement has lagged behind developments in the field and has been challenged by various groups and legislative initiatives. In April 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released its Managed Care Final Rule (Federal Register, 2016) with wording that potentially will permit reimbursement for expanded telemedicine-based services. The revised standards, in attempting to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have reasonable access to care, acknowledge a role for technology and telemedicine. The impact the new standards will have on the development of telemedicine throughout the United States will become evident with time. Tele-mental health has grown along with other aspects of remote healthcare delivery. Extant literature supports the use of remotely delivered telehealth for a variety of conditions and services, including remote psychiatric consultation, diagnosis, and various therapies (Myers & Turvey, 2012; Shore, 2013). However, the idea that one can provide an adequate neuropsychological evaluation remotely is newer and less intuitive, and would appear to have obvious challenges. Neuropsychological examinations frequently require the use of test stimuli that the examinee has to handle and manage, such as blocks, pencils, or other manipulatives. Some tests, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 2003), have been adapted for computer but not for Internet-based or remote administration. In some approaches to neuropsychological assessment, the examiner takes careful note of the specific strategies examinees employ when attempting to perform tasks. Hence, performing an examination when the examiner and the patient are in different locations can seem daunting.
Less
The growth of telemedicine has been rapid. Initially, telemedicine was seen as a way to bring services to remote areas that lacked access to aspects of healthcare delivered through traditional means. This view of telemedicine has changed. Current views toward telemedicine have broadened, with telemedicine now viewed as an effective way to deliver various health services and to bring together patients and providers to increase access to care in various locations and communities. Reimbursement has been a challenge for some aspects of telemedicine development. Initially, Medicare limited reimbursement for telehealth to designated underserved areas. This approach to telehealth reimbursement has lagged behind developments in the field and has been challenged by various groups and legislative initiatives. In April 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released its Managed Care Final Rule (Federal Register, 2016) with wording that potentially will permit reimbursement for expanded telemedicine-based services. The revised standards, in attempting to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have reasonable access to care, acknowledge a role for technology and telemedicine. The impact the new standards will have on the development of telemedicine throughout the United States will become evident with time. Tele-mental health has grown along with other aspects of remote healthcare delivery. Extant literature supports the use of remotely delivered telehealth for a variety of conditions and services, including remote psychiatric consultation, diagnosis, and various therapies (Myers & Turvey, 2012; Shore, 2013). However, the idea that one can provide an adequate neuropsychological evaluation remotely is newer and less intuitive, and would appear to have obvious challenges. Neuropsychological examinations frequently require the use of test stimuli that the examinee has to handle and manage, such as blocks, pencils, or other manipulatives. Some tests, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 2003), have been adapted for computer but not for Internet-based or remote administration. In some approaches to neuropsychological assessment, the examiner takes careful note of the specific strategies examinees employ when attempting to perform tasks. Hence, performing an examination when the examiner and the patient are in different locations can seem daunting.