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This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.

The extensive open literature on NASA covers its overt and unclassified relationships with the national security community in spaceflight and related fields. Only a few works have started to explore the hidden and largely classified interactions among NASA and key national security agencies in these areas. Recently declassified records reveal that these interactions went further and deeper than previously known and involved virtually all of NASA's programs through the years: human spaceflight, application satellites, astronomy, ground support. The reasons are varied: shared interest in many technologies; interreliance on hardware, facilities, and expertise to accomplish missions; a need to restrict certain NASA activities to protect national security; and the extensive national security experience of NASA's leaders.

NASA developed extremely close ties with the national security community in several areas during its early years. It played an active and public role in the U-2 cover story until the shoot down of Gary Powers’ aircraft in May 1960. NASA cooperated closely with the DoD in establishing separate command and control networks for satellites and in acquiring and disseminating space surveillance data. It regularly received intelligence on the Soviet space program from the CIA and discussed but did not implement measures to share its expertise with the intelligence agencies in analyzing the program. In the first case of national security affecting a NASA program, the CIA and other agencies unsuccessfully attempted to delay the launch of the Tiros weather satellites and to prohibit imaging of the Sino-Soviet bloc. As a solution, for a short time several security agencies previewed the satellite photographs before authorizing their public release by NASA.

NASA forged an unprecedented and unequal partnership with the defense and intelligence agencies to obtain their critical political support for the Shuttle. Their requirements dictated a larger orbiter and performance specifications greater than what NASA needed. For the first time ever, NASA would routinely and openly fly classified missions, institute a secure command and control system, and withhold mission information from the public. Although NASA would pay the vast majority of the program's costs, the DoD agreed to build a West Coast launch complex, install a secure command and control system, and develop an upper stage. There was considerable opposition to transitioning national security payloads to the unproven Shuttle as its financial and technical problems mounted, but key DoD leaders provided critical political support during the Carter Administration and saved the Shuttle from drastic cuts or cancellation. President Carter directed that the Shuttle become the exclusive launch vehicle for all U.S. government payloads, that this transition occur quickly, and that national security missions receive priority. As the complex and expensive redesign of national security payloads for launch on the Shuttle finally began, the DoD continued to modify its backup expendable launch vehicle (ELV) policy in the uncertain environment.

It soon became evident after the Shuttle's long-delayed first flight in 1981 that it could neither meet the estimated flight schedule nor achieve the original performance specifications needed for the heaviest national security payloads. Other problems plagued the program as well. The DoD abandoned its policy during the first two years of Shuttle operations of having backup expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) for all payloads and assigned the few remaining ones to launch specific satellites. Over the strenuous objections of NASA, it obtained permission in 1984 to build ten new launch vehicles for the heaviest payloads that the Shuttle could not carry. After the secure command and control system and the upper stage became operational, the DoD flew unclassified and classified payloads until the Challenger accident in 1986. The Challenger accident seriously disrupted the DoD's launch schedule, and it quickly began acquisition of several new classes of ELVs. Because performance-enhancing measures for the Shuttle were soon cancelled, the unused West Coast launch complex was mothballed. The DoD flew its last Shuttle missions from 1988 to 1992, presumably with payloads that could not fly on ELVs or that were too expensive to reconfigure to permit this. Its participation in the Shuttle program came to a premature end at an immense cost and with few benefits to show for it.

Contrary to the image that NASA has been involved only in in open and peaceful activities, it has a long history of hidden and frequently classified interaction with the national security agencies in the spaceflight and related fields. These relationships were often mutually beneficial, but at times restrictions were imposed on NASA's activities to protect national security. NASA often objected to these restrictions, but in most instances national security interests prevailed. The existence of NASA's close ties and relationships with the CIA and DoD in certain areas and the details of others are still shrouded in secrecy, even from NASA's earliest days. As more information is declassified, the world will gain a fuller history of this remarkable organization.

This chapter provides an operational environmental law overview and toolkit for use by military commanders and their lawyers in identifying and addressing environmental issues within the geographic locations and operational contexts in which they are likely to arise. This chapter addresses three different areas where myriad environmental laws and policies could feasibly apply to military operations. First, it briefly provides an overview of the Title 10 “man, train and equip” missions at U.S. installations within the jurisdiction of the United States. Second, it addresses military activities outside the United States at established and enduring DoD installations. Third, this chapter addresses military activities and operations outside the United States where DoD directives and domestic environmental law have only limited application. This includes operations that take place in both international and non-international armed conflict, contingency operations, and the large swath of other DoD activities abroad where DoD policies do not clearly apply.

The growth of telemedicine has been rapid. Initially, telemedicine was seen as a way to bring services to remote areas that lacked access to aspects of health­care delivered through traditional means. This view of telemedicine has changed. Current views toward telemedicine have broadened, with telemedicine now viewed as an effective way to deliver various health services and to bring together patients and providers to increase access to care in various locations and communities. Reimbursement has been a challenge for some aspects of telemedicine development. Initially, Medicare limited reimbursement for telehealth to designated underserved areas. This approach to telehealth reimbursement has lagged behind developments in the field and has been challenged by various groups and legislative initiatives. In April 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released its Managed Care Final Rule (Federal Register, 2016) with wording that potentially will permit reimbursement for expanded telemedicine-based services. The revised standards, in attempting to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have reasonable access to care, acknowledge a role for technology and telemedicine. The impact the new standards will have on the development of telemedicine throughout the United States will become evident with time. Tele-mental health has grown along with other aspects of remote healthcare delivery. Extant literature supports the use of remotely delivered telehealth for a variety of conditions and services, including remote psychiatric consultation, diagnosis, and various therapies (Myers & Turvey, 2012; Shore, 2013). However, the idea that one can provide an adequate neuropsychological evaluation remotely is newer and less intuitive, and would appear to have obvious challenges. Neuropsychological examinations frequently require the use of test stimuli that the examinee has to handle and manage, such as blocks, pencils, or other manipulatives. Some tests, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 2003), have been adapted for computer but not for Internet-based or remote administration. In some approaches to neuropsychological assessment, the examiner takes careful note of the specific strategies examinees employ when attempting to perform tasks. Hence, performing an examination when the examiner and the patient are in different locations can seem daunting.