Jakob Hohwy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and ...
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Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely, the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition which is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception. Furthermore, Hohwy argues that this theory can unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for the selection of representational content into consciousness.Less
Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely, the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition which is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception. Furthermore, Hohwy argues that this theory can unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for the selection of representational content into consciousness.
