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The federal government's approach to enforcement in the biomedical industry—emphasizing massive fines and restrictive corporate integrity agreements—has proven ineffective as a deterrent to misconduct. While one way to bridge this deterrence gap is by holding individual corporate officers accountable, it is vital that the agencies doing so use their authority responsibly, consistently, and in accordance with common principles emphasizing, above all, the public-health mission that justifies such authority in the first place.

This chapter engages with the puzzle presented by the apparent sustainability of an asymmetric rivalry. Across most material parameters Azerbaijan is significantly larger than Armenia, establishing an asymmetric dynamic between a larger challenger and a smaller status quo power. The chapter explains how Armenia ‘truncates’ this asymmetry through local parity, a strategy of deterrence and balancing with Russia. Pushing back against the realist logic permeating much of the policy discourse about Armenian-Azerbaijani rivalry, this chapter argues that it is precisely its asymmetric nature that makes this rivalry both enduring and dangerous.

Turns from contract to tort, exploring the significance of insurance in determining the existence and ambit of tort duties. Explains the perceived differences between contract and tort duties and explores the significance of party risk allocation arrangements, including insurance arrangements, in relation to tort. Explains that attention to insurance arrangements is not inconsistent with the idea of ‘duty’. Explores the role of insurance arrangements in relation to tort duties in a variety of cases, beginning with ‘contractual matrix’ cases including construction cases; then turning to cases of ‘advice’ between parties and other cases beyond the contractual matrix; to public authority liability; and to employers’ duties to employees. Explains how insurance issues, and particularly risk allocation issues, have influenced the most significant developments in the law relating to negligence duties in particular.

If we think about the use of the military for offense, defense, and deterrence, preventive warfare is an offensive action intended to have both a deterrent and defensive effect. It loses the efficient inaction of deterrence, since it requires actual engagement and not just the threat of retaliation; it loses the legitimacy of defense, since it is offensive in the absence of an imminent threat. It presumably has the advantage of removing an anticipated threat entirely, cauterizing it, thus destroying a potentially costly pathway of extended conflict. It was ostensibly this logic that led the United States into Iraq; it was this logic that led Israel to bomb Osirak; it would be this logic that would lead Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear development facilities. The question is, under what conditions will preventive operations be successful enough to balance the costs of military action and international disapprobrium? In other words, preventive attacks should only take place when deterrence is anticipated to fail and when enough is at stake. This chapter will examine what threats meet these criteria, what means may be available to eliminate them, and under what conditions these two categories will overlap.

A large literature in economics and criminology has established that hiring more police officers will reduce crime. Using variation in police employment generated by the COPS grant program, this paper investigates the relative contribution of the two mechanisms by which this crime reduction may occur – deterrence and incapacitation. The main finding is that hiring more police officers does not necessarily result in more arrests for serious crimes, and does not appear to have resulted in higher levels of incapacitation overall.

This chapter extends the standard tax analysis to accommodate two sets of important behavioural response margins that taxes affect, but are not emphasized in the usual treatments. One is tax evasion, where the deterrence model is laid out formally and non-deterrence approaches are discussed and assessed. Alternative approaches to the empirical analysis of the nature and magnitude of tax evasion and its determinants are critically evaluated. The other is tax avoidance, defined as taxpayer efforts to reduce their tax liability that do not alter their consumption basket other than due to income effects. A wide range of examples of tax avoidance are presented, including altering the characteristics of goods, time shifting of tax liability, and income base shifting.

This chapter submits the defensibility of the British Isles to a detailed analysis, showing how throughout the period under review, early warning radar cover was inadequate to secure US bases against surprise attack. US commanders continuously urged greater investment in these defences, which had been accepted as a British responsibility. So too was fighter interceptor provision, but the RAF aircraft were outmoded and would be ineffective against the likely Soviet assault. American aircraft were provided to augment British defences but this provided little incentive to the British to invest. In the early post-war years, a greater emphasis was placed on trade with the Soviet Union than defence, leading to the provision of the latest jet engine technology to power Soviet fighter and light bomber aircraft, to the despair of US authorities. In the later period, the assumption of indefensibility led to a major policy shift from active defence to nuclear deterrence, a shift strongly disapproved by the US.

British culture struggled to understand the threat of nuclear war during the Cold War. This difficulty in fully ‘imagining’ the destruction a future war would bring had important consequences for how the Cold War was understood and fought in Britain. In the years after Hiroshima, atomic war was understood primarily through the prism of the memory of the 1939-45 war. Atomic destruction was downplayed as people elided future destruction with that experienced in the Blitz. From 1954, however, the hydrogen bomb ensured that the opposite was true: its city destroying power making any sort of survival difficult to imagine. This vision of the Apocalyptic nuclear war drove both the peace campaign and the Government’s deterrent policy. As such, Britain’s nuclear culture from 1945 onwards rested on how nuclear war was – and could be – imagined.

Strategy constitutes an ‘intellectual system’, where actions and expectations are interrelated. Ideas and actions have meaning and effect in a wider context in which other related parts need to be taken into consideration. Following Freedman, the importance of the social settings must be emphasized to illuminate how deterrence works and what it means. Strategy is about human choices, in given situations, rather than about fate and predestination. And for this reason, the strategist has to assess their own options, as well as those of others, and how these influence one another. This analysis suggests that strategy is an inherently social activity that can never be separated from its social context. It shows the importance of understanding social context in the iterative and interactive world of strategy, and also the relationship between ideas and empirical realities.

This chapter focuses on the social aspects of strategy, arguing for the importance of relationships in strategy and, in particular, in understanding of deterrence. Deterrence, in its essence, is predicated upon a social relationship – the one deterring and the one to be deterred. Alliance and cooperation are important in generating the means for actively managing international security. Following Freedman’s work on deterrence in the post-Cold War context, ever greater interaction and interdependence might instill a stronger sense of international community, in which more traditional and ‘relatively primitive’ notions of deterrence can be developed. However, this strategic aspiration relies on international, especially transatlantic, social cohesion, a property that weakened in the twenty-first century, triggering new threats from new kinds of opponent. The need for a sophisticated and social strategy for managing international security is made all the more necessary.

This chapter examines strategy and deterrence and traces the shift from deterrence by ‘punishment’ to deterrence by ‘denial’ in Washington’s conduct of the Global War on Terror. The former rested on an assumption that the consequences of an action would serve as deterrents. The latter may carry messages of possible consequences, but these are delivered by taking action that removes the capabilities available to opponents – in the given context, the Islamist terrorists challenging the US. Both approaches rest on credibility, but are more complex in the realm of counter-terrorism, where the US authorities have no obvious ‘return to sender’ address and threats to punish have questionable credibility. In this context, denial offers a more realistic way of preventing terrorist attacks. Yet, the advanced means available to the US are deeply ethically problematic in liberal democratic societies. However, there would likely be even bigger questions if governments failed to act.

The importance of classical sources and a social approach to understanding questions of international security is developed in this chapter, alongside the concepts of trust and deterrence, all important in Freedman’s scholarly world, especially his Strategy: A History. The study begins with Sophocles and Plato, linking trust to friendship, and viewing both trust and society as co-constitutive phenomena. While deterrence and realist models of international relations assume that trust is in short supply, following the great figures of ancient Greece, in reality, trust will be more widespread the more robust the society is. The chapter explores the importance of honor and reputation. It concludes, after Plato, that trust comes the demonstrable willingness to do things for friends that have nothing to do with one’s own goals. Treating others as friends builds security through co-constitutive interaction. This applies to societies and states, as well as individuals.

“Punishment” concentrates on specific questions about what the law should provide. It explores a number of bases claimed to justify criminal penalties. A notable division exists between the idea that violators simply deserve punishment, a theory of retribution, and various utilitarian notions that punishment can deter criminal actions, isolate those who might again commit crimes and help to reform them, and also assist those who have suffered to feel better. Neither approach works in isolation. People should not be criminally punished unless that will help to accomplish some goal, but even if it would be useful, innocent persons should not be punished; and no one should be punished with a severity out of proportion to any crime he committed. Although some nuances in authorized punishment are questionable, notably strict liability that can carry a serious penalty, most major features of the substantive law are consistent with the underlying justifications.

The introduction sets to explain why it is important to look at the question of attribution: in short, it is central to defense and deterrence strategies. Furthermore, the introduction presents the different nuances of sponsorships to distinguish: from writing code without being aware of its intended malicious use, to states refusing to cooperate in investigations. The chapter goes on with exposing three common misconceptions that have permeated the debate on attribution: that it is a technical problem; that it is unsolvable; and that it is unique. These misconceptions will be debunked in turns throughout the remaining chapters. Finally, the chapter summarizes the argument and key terms such as "attribution" and cyber attacks.

Given Pakistan's strategic commitments and the risk aversion of policy-makers in the United States and India, what options exist for these states to deal with LeT specifically, or more generally, the problem of Pakistan's reliance upon terrorism as a key foreign policy tool? Admittedly, the options are few and not without risk. In this chapter, I lay out three broad sets of options: maintain the status quo; manage the narrow problem of LeT through enhanced counter-terrorism efforts and leadership decapitation; and develop a new complement of compellent policies to undermine Pakistan's heretofore successful nuclear coercion strategy. India cannot compel Pakistan to cease and desist from using terrorism as a tool of policy on its own; rather, the United States will have to assume the heaviest burden in this effort. However, there is important--if limited--space for Indian action even if the United States, per its historical record, declines to pursue this course of action