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This chapter discusses to do with the presidency that were not debated on the floor of the Convention, but instead were hashed out in a series of committees, in deliberations that were not recorded. It describes the Committee of Detail, which gave the office of the president its name, its structure, and most of its powers. It also cites Elbridge Gerry, who moved that the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a national government be referred to a committee to prepare a report of a conformable constitution. The chapter recounts how the Convention voted down a motion that the committee be composed of a delegate from every state, which was the usual procedure when committees were used to work out disputed questions of substance. It identifies the five members that were given by the Convention to the Committee of Detail to engage in innovative draftsmanship.

This chapter examines the convention that proceeded to debate the Committee of Detail draft clause by clause, as a great dissensus remained over the mode of selection of the president. It details the basic structure of the powers of the presidency as set forth by the Committee of Detail, which went unquestioned but there was disagreement about involving peace and war, and administrative organization. It also cites that the Committee of Detail gave Congress the power to make war and the Senate the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. The chapter discusses how the Convention narrowed Congress's war power by substituting “to declare war” for “to make war.” It explains that the purpose of reducing the scope of congressional war powers was to increase the scope of presidential war powers to repel sudden attacks.

This chapter describes the leading players that thought about the executive branch in light of the royal prerogatives claimed by prior monarchs but repudiated by statutes or judicial decisions, and those still possessed by George III. It talks about the delegates' decision to confine the executive to the three enumerated powers of law execution, some appointments, and veto as they were fearful that the Virginia Plan had unintentionally created an “elective monarchy.” It points out that the executive was not even given the powers to conduct foreign affairs or command the troops, let alone to play an affirmative role in setting domestic policy. The chapter explains how the Committee of Detail took an entirely different approach on dividing the powers between Congress and the president by working from a mental list of royal prerogative powers largely taken from Sir William Blackstone. It details the way framers explicitly dealt with every prerogative power identified in Blackstone.

This chapter focuses on the Convention and the Committee of Detail that addressed and allocated every prerogative power of the Crown to the president or to Congress or denied the power to the national government altogether. It looks at the significant categories of prerogative power and emphasizes that the framers' treatment of lesser powers is often interesting and revealing. It also mentions the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 1679 that effectively ended the practice of early monarchs asserting authority to imprison subjects without legal redress by guaranteeing judicial review. The chapter reviews the substantial prerogative powers of the king in his capacity as the supreme governor of the “Church by Law Established.” It identifies the prerogative powers that devolved upon the United States and eventually became nongovernmental.

This chapter recalls the fundamental structural decisions made by the Committee of Detail about the powers of the executive, such as allocating the established prerogative powers of the British executive to Congress or to the president. It examines the important changes by the Convention in parceling out prerogative powers, which subjected some of them to senatorial advice and consent. It also talks about the Committee beginning of Article II with a sentence vesting the “Executive Power” in a single person — the president. The chapter investigates the Executive Vesting Clause that has engendered lively debate since the earliest years of the republic and caused the Supreme Court to grapple with the two possible meanings for it. It argues that the Vesting Clause vests all national powers of an executive nature in the president, except for that portion of the executive power that is vested elsewhere.

This chapter examines the events that led Hal Ashby to direct the film The Last Detail. During the pre-production of Three Cornered Circle, actor Jack Nicholson told Ashby about his upcoming film The Last Detail. Nicholson recommended to producer Gerry Ayres to bring in Ashby to direct the film. This film was a clear step up for Ashby. He had his biggest budget yet at $2.6 million and salary of $95,000.

This chapter examines Hal Ashby's directorial job for the film The Last Detail. It describes Ashby's directorial style, his relationship with the cast including Jack Nicholson and Randy Quaid and the cast's observations about Ashby's work attitude. The film grossed $4 million at the box office but everyone knew it could have earned more. This chapter also mentions the death of Ashby's mother on November 9, 1973.

This chapter presents an illustrated catalogue of types of invention in ancient historiography (the sub-title echoes the famous ‘seven types of ambiguity’ of the literary critic Empson); these types cover a spectrum of cases from modest elaboration of fact to outright, even flagrant, lying. Although modern historiography also involves some creative or inventive presentation, it is claimed that the ancient genre goes much further in this respect, and often produces what we would regard as virtually historical novels. The seven types of mendacity reviewed are (1) tendentiousness, (2) myth (the miraculous or remarkable story told for its own pleasure), (3) travellers’ tales, presented as fact (4) the pervasive influence of rhetoric and drama, (5) aphegesis, story-telling for its own sake, (6) elaboration of detail to achieve vividness, (7) spareness of detail, also designed for effect.

The delegates initially seemed to accept the wide-ranging national authority the broad nationalists sought. But as the complexity of the new governing institutions took shape, the narrow nationalists gained ground with their arguments that the national government be granted only a limited range of additional policy tools, leaving most of the nation's policy authority in the states. The delegates defeated Madison's national veto of state laws, instead inserting the supremacy clause. They accepted the previously inconceivable notion that the national and state governments could share sovereignty, and they institutionalized this distinction when they defined “treason.” The Committee of Detail enumerated the powers of the national government and shifted the onus for exercising government authority from the state governments to the national government. The “necessary and proper” and the “general welfare” clauses added ambiguity to the division of authority.

Chapter 5 takes a close look at the signatures of Bihzad in the paintings of the Cairo Bustan. Each signature was concealed as a pictorial detail, taking a different form in each painting. Signatures, moreover, were unusual in Persian painting. This chapter argues that through concealment, variety, ambiguity and uniqueness, Bihzad’s signatures were designed to elicit a feeling of wonder, emphasising the painter’s virtuosity and creativity. Through excessive minuteness, they mythicized the painter and described artistic authority as transcendent, while also obscuring the participation of many other artists and artisans. Signature was thus as much a step toward visibility as it was an instrument of self-praise, and an act of appropriation.