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Desert Storm: Execution

Brian D. Laslie

in The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam

Chapter 7 demonstrates that Desert Storm ushered in a new form of aerial warfare based upon the revolution in training that exploited the new advanced technologies of the 1970s and 1980s. This ... More

Chapter 7 demonstrates that Desert Storm ushered in a new form of aerial warfare based upon the revolution in training that exploited the new advanced technologies of the 1970s and 1980s. This “theater air war” was revolutionary not because of new technologies but because the air force specifically trained for this type of combat. Due to Iraq’s heavy integrated air defense system, Strategic Air Command was forced into more of a supporting role during the early stages of the air campaign.Less

The Gulf War

David P. Oakley

in Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship

The attention given General Norman Schwarzkopf’s comments on intelligence shortfalls and the concepts developed to support military operations resulted in Operation Desert Storm being a catalyst for ... More

The attention given General Norman Schwarzkopf’s comments on intelligence shortfalls and the concepts developed to support military operations resulted in Operation Desert Storm being a catalyst for changes in the DoD/CIA relationship. Although similar critiques of intelligence were heard following Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, the Desert Storm critiques received more attention and resulted in significant policy and organizational changes. Desert Storm also introduced technologies and concepts that became prominent following 9/11. Concepts such as “fusion center” and “operationalization of intelligence” surfaced during Desert Storm. These concepts matured following 9/11, when the length and type of operations made them necessary and technology made them possible. Desert Storm–era professionals deserve credit for strengthening the intelligence and operations link while also weakening service and interagency parochialism. Intelligence support to military operations during Desert Storm was not error free, but intelligence professionals deserve credit for their effort, ingenuity, teamwork, and support.Less

George H. W. Bush: “One Nation under God”

Gary Scott Smith

in Religion in the Oval Office: The Religious Lives of American Presidents

George H. W. Bush was raised in a devout Episcopalian family and remained affiliated with this denomination for almost all his life. However, Bush’s theology and social policies had more in common ... More

George H. W. Bush was raised in a devout Episcopalian family and remained affiliated with this denomination for almost all his life. However, Bush’s theology and social policies had more in common with evangelicals than with more liberal Protestants. Bush’s faith was very important to him and helped shape a number of his presidential policies. He continually exhorted Americans to seek God’s aid to deal with the nation’s challenges and problems. No other chief executive argued as often as Bush that the United States was “one nation under God” and was accountable to Him. Bush frequently accentuated faith, morality, service, and family values. He maintained generally cordial relations with many leading evangelicals by supporting the sanctity of life, voluntary school prayer, religiously based child care, and parental control of education. Bush’s faith substantially influenced his policy in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991, most notably Operation Desert Storm’s liberation of Kuwait.Less

Iraq: The Twenty Years’ War

John Tirman

in The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in America's Wars

This chapter examines the consequences of America's invasion of Iraq in 2003, particularly the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and the displacement of millions of others. It considers the ... More

This chapter examines the consequences of America's invasion of Iraq in 2003, particularly the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and the displacement of millions of others. It considers the rationale for the Iraq War, including America's attempt to eradicate Islamic militancy and terrorism, to protect friends and allies in the region, and to stop Iraq from producing weapons of mass destruction. It argues that oil was the primary motivation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It also discusses Operation Desert Storm that was launched by America in 1991 to free Kuwait from Iraq. In addition, the chapter assesses other measures adopted by the United States and its allies to bring down Saddam Hussein, such as sanctions, no-fly zones, and political isolation. Finally, it looks at U.S. President George W. Bush's launch of a “war on terrorism” in response to the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda and the American public's attitude toward the Iraq War.Less

War and Its Aftermath

Michael F. Cairo

in The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle East

Continuing from the previous chapter, this chapter examines George H.W. Bush’s and George W. Bush’s decisions related to the course and conclusion of the Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. ... More

Continuing from the previous chapter, this chapter examines George H.W. Bush’s and George W. Bush’s decisions related to the course and conclusion of the Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. It begins by focusing on George H.W. Bush’s decision to launch Operation Desert Storm. Discussing the challenges posed by possible Israeli retaliation and Soviet diplomacy, the chapter illustrates George H.W. Bush’s skilful use of diplomacy. Next, the chapter turns to Operation Iraqi Freedom and George W. Bush. Emphasizing the challenges posed by events in Iraq, the chapter demonstrates the “cowboy” liberal approach of George W. Bush. The chapter ends by comparing George H.W. Bush’s decision to stop short of Baghdad with George W. Bush’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Throughout, the chapter emphasizes the role of each president’s worldview in contributing to these decisions and policies.Less

Enemies Abroad

in Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion

This chapter, which investigates whether ethnocentrism predisposes Americans to lend their support to policies of confrontation and violence against outside enemies, analyzes ethnocentrism in the ... More

This chapter, which investigates whether ethnocentrism predisposes Americans to lend their support to policies of confrontation and violence against outside enemies, analyzes ethnocentrism in the current and ongoing war on terrorism, the Cold War during the second half of the twentieth century, and Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The analysis provides evidence that ethnocentrism is a primary ingredient in the American public's support for forcefully confronting adversaries abroad.Less

Preparing for a Storm: Operation Desert Shield

Brian D. Laslie

in The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam

Chapter 6 focuses on the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm, arguing that the belief that stealth and other technologies were the primary factors that led to speedy victory is not an ... More

Chapter 6 focuses on the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm, arguing that the belief that stealth and other technologies were the primary factors that led to speedy victory is not an entirely accurate one. The planning efforts, initially led by Colonel John Warden, used the lessons learned from fifteen years of realistic training exercises to build an operational air campaign. This chapter also reexamines the threat posed by the Iraqi military. The Iraqi military, especially its air force, was not beaten because it was technologically inferior or because it was inept, as has so often been written. The primary reason for its defeat was that the Iraqi military was simply not as well trained as the American and allied forces.Less

The Rise of Military Transformation

Frans Osinga

in A Transformation Gap?: American Innovations and European Military Change

This chapter describes the rise of military transformation in detail. It specifically reviews the rise of Military Transformation in both the United States and European contexts. Desert Storm can be ... More

This chapter describes the rise of military transformation in detail. It specifically reviews the rise of Military Transformation in both the United States and European contexts. Desert Storm can be regarded as the spark plug of much of the debate on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It was taken to represent a new age of warfare. It also showed that advanced air power capabilities present the option to open a flank in a third dimension. The ability to plan and conduct effects-based operations is implied on a task force operating along the principles of the Network-Centric Warfare concept. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Transformation has achieved a specific political content. It called for expeditionary capabilities. In addition, US “Transformation” developed from a series of interconnected conceptual and technological growths over the past twenty years, displaying the interaction of experience, debate, technological developments, and policy development.Less

‘The Lawyers’ War’: Slow Violence in Iraq

Craig Jones

in The War Lawyers: The United States, Israel, and Juridical Warfare

This chapter analyses the involvement of military lawyers in the planning and conduct of the US-led First Gulf War in 1990–1991. Contrary to representations of the First Gulf War as one of the ... More

This chapter analyses the involvement of military lawyers in the planning and conduct of the US-led First Gulf War in 1990–1991. Contrary to representations of the First Gulf War as one of the cleanest, most precise, and limited wars the US military has ever fought, this chapter outlines the planning process and rationale behind the US military’s destruction of Iraq’s key infrastructure. The laws of war and military lawyers played no small part in the patterning of violence as key legal interpretations turned ‘dual use’ infrastructures into legitimate military targets—with cascading collateral consequences for civilian life in Iraq. The chapter considers how calculations of proportionality failed to properly consider the ‘slow violence’ of targeting, which enabled and legitimized forms of infrastructural violence and military destruction that might otherwise be considered impermissible.Less

The Last War Syndrome: How the United States and Iraq Learned the Wrong Lessons from Desert Storm

Michael R. Gordon

in Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War

This chapter assesses the 1991 Desert Storm campaign initiated by President George H. W. Bush to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, its aftermath, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. It discusses how ... More

This chapter assesses the 1991 Desert Storm campaign initiated by President George H. W. Bush to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, its aftermath, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. It discusses how both the US and Saddam Hussein misread the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War.Less

Invading Iraq

Wallace J. Thies

in Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War

This chapter evaluates the positions taken and the arguments made by observers of Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the decade-long interval between the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the start ... More

This chapter evaluates the positions taken and the arguments made by observers of Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the decade-long interval between the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the US invasion of Iraq) in 2003. It focuses on the clash of views between those who believed that Hussein's Iraq could not be contained at a reasonable cost as long as Saddam himself remained on the scene (containment pessimists), and those who believed that containment was both feasible and sustainable, because the great disparity in resources between the United States and Iraq meant that the United States could pressure Iraq for years to come, if need be, without resorting to drastic methods, such as withdrawal or a resort to open warfare (containment optimists). To buttress their case, containment pessimists argued that containment could not be counted on to last indefinitely because of the asymmetry between what was at stake for Saddam and his regime, and for the United States and its allies, in the years after Iraq's defeat in the first Persian Gulf War (1990–91). For Saddam Hussein and the rest of his repressive apparatus, the stakes were nothing less than survival. Optimists, on the other hand, conceded that containment was not perfect, but in their view perfection was not needed to bring down Saddam and his regime.Less

Air and Space Warfare

Christian F. Anrig

in The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces

Through the prism of post-cold-war air campaigns, differing national positions of contributing European air forces, as well as their relative weights and evolving capabilities, are gauged. Since ... More

Through the prism of post-cold-war air campaigns, differing national positions of contributing European air forces, as well as their relative weights and evolving capabilities, are gauged. Since major Western air campaigns have occurred only with substantial US involvement, American capabilities offer natural benchmarks. The issue of breadth versus depth has affected all European air forces. Maintaining a coherent set of aerospace capabilities has proven a challenge even for larger European countries. Smaller countries can pursue only limited ambitions and maintain segments of aerospace power. Nonetheless, selected smaller air forces with the right equipment, training, and attitude have managed to make visible contributions to multinational air campaigns. Air campaigns also spurred Europe’s military space ambitions. Space assets have become indispensable enablers of modern warfare, and selected European countries have deployed important capabilities into orbit.Less

Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ... More

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less

Introductory Essay

General Donn A. Starry

in Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry

This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the ... More

This chapter concerns the mechanization of cavalry in the U.S. Army after World War I. It discusses the early mechanization experiments, the mechanization of horse cavalry units for service, and the merger of the cavalry and armor divisions in 1950. The chapter also explores the history of the development of mechanized forces in the whole of the U.S. Army, from the advent of tanks in battle in the 1914–1918 war to the end of Desert Storm in 1991.Less

Iraq: Fighting for Market Power

Stephen E. Gent and Mark J. C. Crescenzi

in Market Power Politics: War, Institutions, and Strategic Delay in World Politics

This chapter examines how the motivation to establish market power in the oil export market influenced Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the costly Iran-Iraq war, ... More

This chapter examines how the motivation to establish market power in the oil export market influenced Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the costly Iran-Iraq war, Hussein desperately needed access to new resources. By controlling Kuwait’s oil production, Iraq could both augment its own oil resources and prevent Kuwait from overproducing and putting downward pressure on the price of oil. Relatively unconstrained by low levels of economic dependence and a lack of acceptable institutional solutions, Hussein turned to violence to pursue his market power goals. A subsequent invasion of Saudi Arabia would have given Iraq a sufficient market share to be able to control the global output and price of oil. To prevent such a shift in market power, a coalition of forces led by the United States intervened militarily and drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.Less

From Korea to Kuwait: Britain and Coalitions of the Willing

Nigel D. White

in Democracy goes to War: British Military Deployments under International Law

The deployment of large numbers of British troops to both Korea in 1950 and to Kuwait in 1990 followed similar domestic and international legal paths, though the political contexts were quite ... More

The deployment of large numbers of British troops to both Korea in 1950 and to Kuwait in 1990 followed similar domestic and international legal paths, though the political contexts were quite different, one occurring at the outset of the Cold War and the other at its end. Britain was instrumental in shaping the idea of coalitions acting under the authority of the UN as an alternative to the more centralized application of military force envisaged under the UN Charter. This chapter traces the Parliamentary and international political debates that led to the development of this as a form of lawful military action. In particular, it concentrates on why it was necessary to obtain UN authority for these actions when they could readily be justified as exercise of the right of collective defence.Less

The Future of Covert Regime Change

Michael Poznansky

in In the Shadow of International Law: Secrecy and Regime Change in the Postwar World

This chapter summarizes the central argument and empirical findings of the book. It begins by demonstrating that the legal theory developed here outperformed alternative explanations centered on ... More

This chapter summarizes the central argument and empirical findings of the book. It begins by demonstrating that the legal theory developed here outperformed alternative explanations centered on escalation control, domestic politics, and nationalism. It also shows that the argument travels beyond the Cold War and outside of Latin America by exploring America’s various interventions in Iraq from 1991 to 2003 and Obama’s varied responses to civil wars in Libya and Syria during the Arab Spring. The chapter concludes by suggesting avenues for future research and highlighting the book’s scholarly and practical implications.Less