Search Results

Digital Applications in Defense of the Nation

James W. Cortada

in The Digital Hand, Vol 3: How Computers Changed the Work of American Public Sector Industries

The US Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the largest users of computers and telecommunications in the world and the largest within the federal government. The story of how the DoD promoted the ... More

The US Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the largest users of computers and telecommunications in the world and the largest within the federal government. The story of how the DoD promoted the development of new computing technologies from the 1940s through the 1990s has been studied by historians. This chapter focuses on the use of computers and telecommunications in order to demonstrate the extent to which this department relied on computing to do its work, and the degree to which its uses of the technology changed how the DoD evolved over time. The organization of the DoD, patterns of research and development, inventory control and logistics, weapons systems and ordnance, training, combat and non-combat applications, information age warfare, and IT deployment are discussed.Less

To Close or not to Close, that is the Question: BRAC, 1988–2005

Jasmine Farrier

in Congressional Ambivalence: The Political Burdens of Constitutional Authority

This chapter focuses on the cycle of institutional ambivalence of Congress as seen in the past two decades of the base realignment and closure process. From 1988 to 2005, the House and the Senate ... More

This chapter focuses on the cycle of institutional ambivalence of Congress as seen in the past two decades of the base realignment and closure process. From 1988 to 2005, the House and the Senate organized and supported five rounds of bipartisan BRAC commissions, which gave the Department of Defense and civilian panelists extraordinary power to enact national military policy almost unilaterally while attempting to insulate members from the painful decision to shut down local installations. Over the same time period, however, presidents, the branch services of the DoD, and even the BRAC commissions have been themselves accused of playing politics with base closings, proving that conceptions of the national interest in military policy are quite subjective. Members of the House and the Senate have repeatedly tried to thwart these commissions in various ways, including delaying the commissions' work, lobbying the DoD directly on behalf of a base, and introducing bills to ensure that the federal government compensates the affected districts.Less

Defense Budgeting and Resource Allocation

Michael E. O’Hanlon

in Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow

This chapter dissects the US defense budget, as well as various matters in the broader field of defense economics. It provides methodologies for understanding how different defense strategies and ... More

This chapter dissects the US defense budget, as well as various matters in the broader field of defense economics. It provides methodologies for understanding how different defense strategies and military force postures affect that budget. The chapter also explores various ways the defense budget can be categorized, broken down, and defined. It examines issues like military readiness — how the Department of Defense ensures that its forces are ready-to-go for crises that may emerge quickly. The chapter then looks into the economics of military bases, at home and abroad. It discusses military acquisition, modernization, and innovation. The chapter then shifts to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) figures, and analyses how they provide the backbone of the cost estimates. It highlights the core of this section — understanding the costs of US Department of Defense's (DoD) force structure by type of unit. This is probably the core of defense budgeting methodology for those seeking to understand the fiscal implications of a given defense strategy and force structure. Ultimately, the chapter investigates how two different concepts of grand strategy and/or military policy might be translated into force structure, weapons acquisition, and budget plans.Less

Reforming National Security Oversight in the Senate

Linda L. Fowler

in Watchdogs on the Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of U.S. Foreign Relations

This chapter challenges the efficacy of reform proposals currently circulating in Washington and makes practical recommendations for improving the capacity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign ... More

This chapter challenges the efficacy of reform proposals currently circulating in Washington and makes practical recommendations for improving the capacity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees in terms of oversight of national security. These recommendations look beyond consultation about the initiation of conflicts to generate a more robust review of the implementation of administration policies over time. The focus is on the underlying incentives that drive committee inquiries into the performance of the Department of Defense and the State Department, with an eye to the self-correcting mechanisms at the heart of the Constitution that balance relations between the branches. The chapter argues that well-functioning committees that promote the rule of law in foreign affairs through regular, predictable, and public deliberation make a revised war powers act unnecessary; in the absence of such regular order, new rules for consultation seem likely to fail.Less

Introduction: A Primer on the US Military Machine

Michael E. O’Hanlon

in Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow

This chapter sketches out the characteristics of today's global security environment in a broad brush by describing the US Department of Defense. It focuses on the science of war, a subdiscipline of ... More

This chapter sketches out the characteristics of today's global security environment in a broad brush by describing the US Department of Defense. It focuses on the science of war, a subdiscipline of defense analysis that, beginning with a foundation of basic facts and figures about military organizations and operations, uses analytical methods to tackle key questions in the national security field. With this context, the chapter illustrates the analytical methods including simple computational algorithms for assessing military effectiveness and predicting combat outcomes. It also includes the study of defense budgets and economics, as well as efforts to understand the physics and technology of military weapons and operations today. The chapter then discusses many of the ABCs of the US armed forces. It explains the evolution of American grand strategy — the theory of the case for how the nation should ensure its safety, prosperity, and survival — that these forces are designed to undergird.Less

Inside the Beltway, 1985

Lawrence Badash

in A Nuclear Winter's Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s

Through 1983 and well into 1984, research on nuclear winter was primarily financed by “discretionary” funds from various government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of ... More

Through 1983 and well into 1984, research on nuclear winter was primarily financed by “discretionary” funds from various government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. As revealed by the private Natural Resources Defense Council, however, the government’s response to nuclear winter remained largely ad hoc. This prompted Congress to call for an organized response, which actually began in February 1984, when John Byrne and Alan Hecht, administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and director of NOAA’s National Climate Project Office, respectively, received orders from George Keyworth, the presidential science advisor, to formulate a plan. The following year, the DoD released a report which emphasized the significant uncertainties in estimates of climatic responses to nuclear explosions. Congressional hearings were held to discuss the DoD report, first in the House in March 1985, then in the Senate in October 1985.Less

Diffusion of Computing Starts in the United States

James W. Cortada

in The Digital Flood: The Diffusion of Information Technology Across the U.S., Europe, and Asia

Wide adoption of computing began in the United States in the early 1940s and this chapter takes that story to the massive adoption of the Internet in the 1990s. The chapter explains the role of ... More

Wide adoption of computing began in the United States in the early 1940s and this chapter takes that story to the massive adoption of the Internet in the 1990s. The chapter explains the role of government, the Cold War, technological innovations, and economic preconditions that made rapid diffusion of IT possible in North America. The chapter describes the diffusion of information about computing around the country and how that propelled innovations and adoptions of the technology. The chapter argues that the American economy made the first and most aggressive investments in IT because it had the knowledge and need for this kind of technology, a perfect match in a capitalist economy that proved prosperous over the course of the second half of the twentieth century.Less

Getting to the Postwar Planning Table

in The Rape of Mesopotamia: Behind the Looting of the Iraq Museum

This chapter discusses the postwar planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It suggests that neither Tommy Franks of the Central Command nor the U.S. Department of Defense wanted anything to do with ... More

This chapter discusses the postwar planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It suggests that neither Tommy Franks of the Central Command nor the U.S. Department of Defense wanted anything to do with the State Department's postcombat plans called the Future of Iraq Project. The chapter contends that the coordination of planning for the post-combat phase was certainly hobbled by sheer antagonism between the Pentagon, the uniformed military, and the State Department. It argues that direct consultations between American or British government, war planners, and archaeological groups would have prevented the looting of the National Museum and the depredation of Iraq's archaeological sites.Less

Strategic Vision: National Security, Defense Policy, and the Geopolitics of Military Pre-Eminence

Georg Löfflmann

in American Grand Strategy under Obama: Competing Discourses

This chapter explores how the US Department of Defense has acted as key producer of practical grand strategy discourse, regularly translating geopolitical imaginations, threat assessments and ... More

This chapter explores how the US Department of Defense has acted as key producer of practical grand strategy discourse, regularly translating geopolitical imaginations, threat assessments and strategic narratives into concrete policy outcomes and security practices, from defense policy planning documents to the stationing of US troops and the conducting of military operations. High-level strategic documents published under the Obama presidency, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review reports or the Defense Strategic Guidance are examined in this chapter as key political outputs in providing the ‘big picture’ of national security. The chapter examines how several practical issues in defense policymaking and military planning were, at the same time, indicating are careful shift in the conceptualization and operation of American hegemony. The chapter details how budget sequestration had a lasting impact on the overall size of the US military while Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ shifted its geopolitical and operational focus. This limitation, recalibration and downsizing challenged a status quo of American primacy and global military supremacy that politicians, policy experts and military officials had largely taken for granted since the end of the Cold War.Less

Instruments of Change: Contract Regulations as a Source of Flexibility in Defense Procurement, 1942–72

Glen Asner

in The Emergence of Routines: Entrepreneurship, Organization, and Business History

Procurement regulations and the details of the contracting process receive only passing mention, if any at all, in histories of the development of military technologies. Congressional politics ... More

Procurement regulations and the details of the contracting process receive only passing mention, if any at all, in histories of the development of military technologies. Congressional politics struggles to overcome technical challenges, and the actions and decisions of program managers, corporate representatives, and government leaders often take center stage. Yet attention to regulations, how they are implemented, and how they are incorporated into practice across the defense industry promises to add a layer of understanding to our knowledge of the government–industry partnership that has characterized U.S. weapons development and production since World War II. Focusing on changes in how contractors charged research costs to defense contracts, this chapter sheds light on the creation of organizational routines, their incorporation into formal government regulations, and the manner in which they were modified or displaced by competing regulations and routines throughout the early 1970s.Less

Practical Adjustments to Achieve Doctrinal Requirements

Jennifer Morrison Taw

in Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations

This chapter provides an overview of the adjustments to military services since the adoption of stability operations. The first of these adjustments is the introduction of a modular force structure ... More

This chapter provides an overview of the adjustments to military services since the adoption of stability operations. The first of these adjustments is the introduction of a modular force structure in response to the experiences from the wars in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. It involves forming a brigade combat team focused on simultaneous combat and stability operations. There are also adjustments on trainings and education as troops who learned battlefield techniques will need to be trained down for peacekeeping. In terms of procurement, the U.S. Department of Defense prioritizes some extraordinarily expensive weapon systems while acquiring technologies with more utility in stability operations. The question, however, is how best to leverage these technologies to cope with different war conditions.Less

Threats to the CBW Prohibition Regimes: Biodefense Pushed Too Far

in Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race

This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other ... More

This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.Less

Operation Switchback

Thomas L. Ahern

in Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency

The first and largest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary programs in Vietnam, the Citizens' (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups, was only six months old when Washington ... More

The first and largest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary programs in Vietnam, the Citizens' (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups, was only six months old when Washington decided to transfer U.S. management from CIA to General Paul Harkins's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John A. McCone suggested that it may be advisable for the Department of Defense (DOD) to take the lead in CIA counterinsurgency programs, with CIA in support, rather than the reverse situation which now obtains. Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, concurred, and the DCI asked the station to identify paramilitary assets appropriate for transfer. Secretary Robert McNamara approved transferring DOD funds to the agency at a meeting in July 1962. The same meeting coined the term Operation Switchback, a misnomer that implied previous DOD custody of the affected programs.Less

Extraterritorial Law Enforcement or Transnational Counterterrorist Military Operations: The Stakes of Two Legal Models

Geoffrey S. Corn

in New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare

This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional ... More

This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional opinion that military operations against transnational terrorists which do not fall neatly within the state-centric conflict categories derived from the Geneva Conventions should be treated as extraterritorial law enforcement activities. It argues that the humanitarian law framework must be extended to counterterrorist military operations by appealing to core historical principles of humanitarian law and to military protocol, namely, the mandate in the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Program to “comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations.” It contends that it is invalid and disingenuous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power under a “deadly force as a first resort” authority as extraterritorial law enforcement. The chapter also considers the underlying nature and purpose of the existing law-triggering paradigm, the different nature of the authority derived from the law of armed conflict compared to the law enforcement framework, and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.Less

Disengagement

Thomas L. Ahern

in Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency

In preparation since late 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) disengagement had begun when the Department of Defense assumed funding responsibility for the Revolutionary Development Cadre ... More

In preparation since late 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) disengagement had begun when the Department of Defense assumed funding responsibility for the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) program on April 1, 1968. At Robert Komer's insistence, the responsibility for operational management remained with the agency for the time being, with the station running the program on behalf of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). As early as February, only a month after the Tet offensive, the chief of Vietnam operations at headquarters, Douglas Blaufarb, was anticipating instructions to reduce the hiring of contract employees for pacification. However, Komer still resisted any suggestion of a diminished CIA role in pacification, and military personnel detailed to the station continued for the moment to supplement rather than replace agency officers. Ironically, just as the CIA abandoned its insistence on the political essence of pacification, President Nguyen Van Thieu seemed, however hesitantly, to be moving toward accepting it.Less

Politics and Policy

Lawrence Badash

in A Nuclear Winter's Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s

In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: ... More

In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: Uncertainties surround the long-term effects of nuclear war,” the report was drafted by a committee headed by Alan Hecht of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and comprised of several scientists. The GAO report was reviewed by other government agencies involved with nuclear winter, including the Defense Nuclear Agency. In May 1986, the Department of Defense issued its own report to Congress. Five years later, nuclear winter theory gave way to experiment when most of Kuwait’s 1,250 oil wells were torched in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. This chapter examines the politics and policy issues surrounding the nuclear winter debate.Less

Modern U.S. Military Operations and the International Committee of the Red Cross: The Department of Defense’s Unique Relationship with the Guardian of International Humanitarian Law

Rachel E. VanLandingham

in U.S. Military Operations: Law, Policy, and Practice

This chapter dissects the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s current relationship with the Department of Defense, a relationship which centers on the adherence by the United States to ... More

This chapter dissects the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s current relationship with the Department of Defense, a relationship which centers on the adherence by the United States to its law of armed conflict obligations. This analysis begins with an overview of the ICRC’s history, institutional structure, and operating modalities, highlighting the roles given to it by both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. This chapter then outlines both the formal and informal interactions between the ICRC and the DoD, both on the civilian side of the house in the Pentagon and on the uniformed military side, with an emphasis on the operational components. It exposes the ICRC’s extra-legal agenda, and places it within the larger evolution of the modern law of armed conflict itself.Less