James W. Cortada
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195165869
- eISBN:
- 9780199868025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195165869.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the largest users of computers and telecommunications in the world and the largest within the federal government. The story of how the DoD promoted the ...
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The US Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the largest users of computers and telecommunications in the world and the largest within the federal government. The story of how the DoD promoted the development of new computing technologies from the 1940s through the 1990s has been studied by historians. This chapter focuses on the use of computers and telecommunications in order to demonstrate the extent to which this department relied on computing to do its work, and the degree to which its uses of the technology changed how the DoD evolved over time. The organization of the DoD, patterns of research and development, inventory control and logistics, weapons systems and ordnance, training, combat and non-combat applications, information age warfare, and IT deployment are discussed.Less
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the largest users of computers and telecommunications in the world and the largest within the federal government. The story of how the DoD promoted the development of new computing technologies from the 1940s through the 1990s has been studied by historians. This chapter focuses on the use of computers and telecommunications in order to demonstrate the extent to which this department relied on computing to do its work, and the degree to which its uses of the technology changed how the DoD evolved over time. The organization of the DoD, patterns of research and development, inventory control and logistics, weapons systems and ordnance, training, combat and non-combat applications, information age warfare, and IT deployment are discussed.
Stephen G. Craft
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813166353
- eISBN:
- 9780813166629
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813166353.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
On May 23, 1957, U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Reynolds was acquitted of murdering Chinese officer Liu Ziran in Taiwan. Reynolds did not deny shooting Liu but claimed self-defense and, like all members ...
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On May 23, 1957, U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Reynolds was acquitted of murdering Chinese officer Liu Ziran in Taiwan. Reynolds did not deny shooting Liu but claimed self-defense and, like all members of U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, was protected under diplomatic immunity. Reynolds's acquittal sparked a series of riots across Taiwan that became an international crisis for the Eisenhower administration and raised serious questions about the legal status of U.S. military forces positioned around the world. In American Justice in Taiwan, Stephen G. Craft provides the first comprehensive study of the causes and consequences of the Reynolds trial and the ensuing protests. After a century of unfair treaties imposed by Western nations, the Taiwanese regarded the special legal status of resident American personnel with extreme distrust. While Eisenhower and his advisers considered Taiwan to be a vital ally against China, the United States believed that the Taiwanese government had instigated the unrest to protest the verdict and demand legal jurisdiction over GIs. The events that transpired exposed the enormous difficulty of applying the U.S. military's Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) across cultures. Employing meticulous research in both Western and Chinese archives, Craft demonstrates that the riots were only anti-American in that the Taiwanese rejected the UCMJ, the affording of diplomatic immunity to occupying U.S. forces, and the military courts' interpretation of self-defense. His compelling study provides a new lens through which to examine U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1950s, U.S. policy in Asia, and the charged and complex question of the legal status of U.S. troops on foreign soil.Less
On May 23, 1957, U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Reynolds was acquitted of murdering Chinese officer Liu Ziran in Taiwan. Reynolds did not deny shooting Liu but claimed self-defense and, like all members of U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, was protected under diplomatic immunity. Reynolds's acquittal sparked a series of riots across Taiwan that became an international crisis for the Eisenhower administration and raised serious questions about the legal status of U.S. military forces positioned around the world. In American Justice in Taiwan, Stephen G. Craft provides the first comprehensive study of the causes and consequences of the Reynolds trial and the ensuing protests. After a century of unfair treaties imposed by Western nations, the Taiwanese regarded the special legal status of resident American personnel with extreme distrust. While Eisenhower and his advisers considered Taiwan to be a vital ally against China, the United States believed that the Taiwanese government had instigated the unrest to protest the verdict and demand legal jurisdiction over GIs. The events that transpired exposed the enormous difficulty of applying the U.S. military's Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) across cultures. Employing meticulous research in both Western and Chinese archives, Craft demonstrates that the riots were only anti-American in that the Taiwanese rejected the UCMJ, the affording of diplomatic immunity to occupying U.S. forces, and the military courts' interpretation of self-defense. His compelling study provides a new lens through which to examine U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1950s, U.S. policy in Asia, and the charged and complex question of the legal status of U.S. troops on foreign soil.
Jasmine Farrier
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813192628
- eISBN:
- 9780813135496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813192628.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the cycle of institutional ambivalence of Congress as seen in the past two decades of the base realignment and closure process. From 1988 to 2005, the House and the Senate ...
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This chapter focuses on the cycle of institutional ambivalence of Congress as seen in the past two decades of the base realignment and closure process. From 1988 to 2005, the House and the Senate organized and supported five rounds of bipartisan BRAC commissions, which gave the Department of Defense and civilian panelists extraordinary power to enact national military policy almost unilaterally while attempting to insulate members from the painful decision to shut down local installations. Over the same time period, however, presidents, the branch services of the DoD, and even the BRAC commissions have been themselves accused of playing politics with base closings, proving that conceptions of the national interest in military policy are quite subjective. Members of the House and the Senate have repeatedly tried to thwart these commissions in various ways, including delaying the commissions' work, lobbying the DoD directly on behalf of a base, and introducing bills to ensure that the federal government compensates the affected districts.Less
This chapter focuses on the cycle of institutional ambivalence of Congress as seen in the past two decades of the base realignment and closure process. From 1988 to 2005, the House and the Senate organized and supported five rounds of bipartisan BRAC commissions, which gave the Department of Defense and civilian panelists extraordinary power to enact national military policy almost unilaterally while attempting to insulate members from the painful decision to shut down local installations. Over the same time period, however, presidents, the branch services of the DoD, and even the BRAC commissions have been themselves accused of playing politics with base closings, proving that conceptions of the national interest in military policy are quite subjective. Members of the House and the Senate have repeatedly tried to thwart these commissions in various ways, including delaying the commissions' work, lobbying the DoD directly on behalf of a base, and introducing bills to ensure that the federal government compensates the affected districts.
Lawrence Badash
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012720
- eISBN:
- 9780262258531
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012720.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
The nuclear winter phenomenon burst upon the public’s consciousness in 1983. Added to the horror of a nuclear war’s immediate effects was the fear that the smoke from fires ignited by the explosions ...
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The nuclear winter phenomenon burst upon the public’s consciousness in 1983. Added to the horror of a nuclear war’s immediate effects was the fear that the smoke from fires ignited by the explosions would block the sun, creating an extended “winter” that might kill more people worldwide than the initial nuclear strikes. This book maps the rise and fall of the science of nuclear winter, examining research activity, the popularization of the concept, and the Reagan-era politics that combined to influence policy and public opinion. It traces the several sciences (including studies of volcanic eruptions, ozone depletion, and dinosaur extinction) that merged to allow computer modeling of nuclear winter and its development as a scientific specialty. It places this in the political context of the Reagan years, discussing congressional interest, media attention, the administration’s plans for a research program, and the Department of Defense’s claims that the arms buildup underway would prevent nuclear war, and thus nuclear winter. The book provides an illustration of the complex relationship between science and society. It examines the behavior of scientists in the public arena and in the scientific community, and raises questions about the problems faced by scientific Cassandras, the implications when scientists go public with worst-case scenarios, and the timing of government reaction to startling scientific findings.Less
The nuclear winter phenomenon burst upon the public’s consciousness in 1983. Added to the horror of a nuclear war’s immediate effects was the fear that the smoke from fires ignited by the explosions would block the sun, creating an extended “winter” that might kill more people worldwide than the initial nuclear strikes. This book maps the rise and fall of the science of nuclear winter, examining research activity, the popularization of the concept, and the Reagan-era politics that combined to influence policy and public opinion. It traces the several sciences (including studies of volcanic eruptions, ozone depletion, and dinosaur extinction) that merged to allow computer modeling of nuclear winter and its development as a scientific specialty. It places this in the political context of the Reagan years, discussing congressional interest, media attention, the administration’s plans for a research program, and the Department of Defense’s claims that the arms buildup underway would prevent nuclear war, and thus nuclear winter. The book provides an illustration of the complex relationship between science and society. It examines the behavior of scientists in the public arena and in the scientific community, and raises questions about the problems faced by scientific Cassandras, the implications when scientists go public with worst-case scenarios, and the timing of government reaction to startling scientific findings.
Linda L. Fowler
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151618
- eISBN:
- 9781400866465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151618.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter challenges the efficacy of reform proposals currently circulating in Washington and makes practical recommendations for improving the capacity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign ...
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This chapter challenges the efficacy of reform proposals currently circulating in Washington and makes practical recommendations for improving the capacity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees in terms of oversight of national security. These recommendations look beyond consultation about the initiation of conflicts to generate a more robust review of the implementation of administration policies over time. The focus is on the underlying incentives that drive committee inquiries into the performance of the Department of Defense and the State Department, with an eye to the self-correcting mechanisms at the heart of the Constitution that balance relations between the branches. The chapter argues that well-functioning committees that promote the rule of law in foreign affairs through regular, predictable, and public deliberation make a revised war powers act unnecessary; in the absence of such regular order, new rules for consultation seem likely to fail.Less
This chapter challenges the efficacy of reform proposals currently circulating in Washington and makes practical recommendations for improving the capacity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees in terms of oversight of national security. These recommendations look beyond consultation about the initiation of conflicts to generate a more robust review of the implementation of administration policies over time. The focus is on the underlying incentives that drive committee inquiries into the performance of the Department of Defense and the State Department, with an eye to the self-correcting mechanisms at the heart of the Constitution that balance relations between the branches. The chapter argues that well-functioning committees that promote the rule of law in foreign affairs through regular, predictable, and public deliberation make a revised war powers act unnecessary; in the absence of such regular order, new rules for consultation seem likely to fail.
Gerald Kutcher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226465319
- eISBN:
- 9780226465333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226465333.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
In the 1960s, University of Cincinnati radiologist Eugene Saenger infamously conducted human experiments on patients with advanced cancer to examine how total body radiation could treat the disease. ...
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In the 1960s, University of Cincinnati radiologist Eugene Saenger infamously conducted human experiments on patients with advanced cancer to examine how total body radiation could treat the disease. But, under contract with the Department of Defense, Saenger also used those same patients as proxies for soldiers to answer questions about combat effectiveness on a nuclear battlefield. Using the Saenger case as a means to reconsider Cold War medical trials, this book examines the inherent tensions at the heart of clinical studies of the time. Emphasizing the deeply intertwined and mutually supportive relationship between cancer therapy with radiation and military medicine, the book explores post-World War II cancer trials, the efforts of the government to manage clinical ethics, and the important role of military investigations in the development of an effective treatment for childhood leukemia. Whereas most histories of human experimentation judge research such as Saenger's against idealized practices, this book eschews such an approach and considers why Saenger's peers and later critics had so much difficulty reaching an unambiguous ethical assessment. This investigation offers an approach to clinical ethics and research imperatives that lays bare many of the conflicts and tensions of the postwar period.Less
In the 1960s, University of Cincinnati radiologist Eugene Saenger infamously conducted human experiments on patients with advanced cancer to examine how total body radiation could treat the disease. But, under contract with the Department of Defense, Saenger also used those same patients as proxies for soldiers to answer questions about combat effectiveness on a nuclear battlefield. Using the Saenger case as a means to reconsider Cold War medical trials, this book examines the inherent tensions at the heart of clinical studies of the time. Emphasizing the deeply intertwined and mutually supportive relationship between cancer therapy with radiation and military medicine, the book explores post-World War II cancer trials, the efforts of the government to manage clinical ethics, and the important role of military investigations in the development of an effective treatment for childhood leukemia. Whereas most histories of human experimentation judge research such as Saenger's against idealized practices, this book eschews such an approach and considers why Saenger's peers and later critics had so much difficulty reaching an unambiguous ethical assessment. This investigation offers an approach to clinical ethics and research imperatives that lays bare many of the conflicts and tensions of the postwar period.
Lawrence Badash
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012720
- eISBN:
- 9780262258531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012720.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
Through 1983 and well into 1984, research on nuclear winter was primarily financed by “discretionary” funds from various government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of ...
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Through 1983 and well into 1984, research on nuclear winter was primarily financed by “discretionary” funds from various government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. As revealed by the private Natural Resources Defense Council, however, the government’s response to nuclear winter remained largely ad hoc. This prompted Congress to call for an organized response, which actually began in February 1984, when John Byrne and Alan Hecht, administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and director of NOAA’s National Climate Project Office, respectively, received orders from George Keyworth, the presidential science advisor, to formulate a plan. The following year, the DoD released a report which emphasized the significant uncertainties in estimates of climatic responses to nuclear explosions. Congressional hearings were held to discuss the DoD report, first in the House in March 1985, then in the Senate in October 1985.Less
Through 1983 and well into 1984, research on nuclear winter was primarily financed by “discretionary” funds from various government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. As revealed by the private Natural Resources Defense Council, however, the government’s response to nuclear winter remained largely ad hoc. This prompted Congress to call for an organized response, which actually began in February 1984, when John Byrne and Alan Hecht, administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and director of NOAA’s National Climate Project Office, respectively, received orders from George Keyworth, the presidential science advisor, to formulate a plan. The following year, the DoD released a report which emphasized the significant uncertainties in estimates of climatic responses to nuclear explosions. Congressional hearings were held to discuss the DoD report, first in the House in March 1985, then in the Senate in October 1985.
James W. Cortada
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199921553
- eISBN:
- 9780199980406
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199921553.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Wide adoption of computing began in the United States in the early 1940s and this chapter takes that story to the massive adoption of the Internet in the 1990s. The chapter explains the role of ...
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Wide adoption of computing began in the United States in the early 1940s and this chapter takes that story to the massive adoption of the Internet in the 1990s. The chapter explains the role of government, the Cold War, technological innovations, and economic preconditions that made rapid diffusion of IT possible in North America. The chapter describes the diffusion of information about computing around the country and how that propelled innovations and adoptions of the technology. The chapter argues that the American economy made the first and most aggressive investments in IT because it had the knowledge and need for this kind of technology, a perfect match in a capitalist economy that proved prosperous over the course of the second half of the twentieth century.Less
Wide adoption of computing began in the United States in the early 1940s and this chapter takes that story to the massive adoption of the Internet in the 1990s. The chapter explains the role of government, the Cold War, technological innovations, and economic preconditions that made rapid diffusion of IT possible in North America. The chapter describes the diffusion of information about computing around the country and how that propelled innovations and adoptions of the technology. The chapter argues that the American economy made the first and most aggressive investments in IT because it had the knowledge and need for this kind of technology, a perfect match in a capitalist economy that proved prosperous over the course of the second half of the twentieth century.
Glen Asner
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198787761
- eISBN:
- 9780191829857
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198787761.003.0009
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies
Procurement regulations and the details of the contracting process receive only passing mention, if any at all, in histories of the development of military technologies. Congressional politics ...
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Procurement regulations and the details of the contracting process receive only passing mention, if any at all, in histories of the development of military technologies. Congressional politics struggles to overcome technical challenges, and the actions and decisions of program managers, corporate representatives, and government leaders often take center stage. Yet attention to regulations, how they are implemented, and how they are incorporated into practice across the defense industry promises to add a layer of understanding to our knowledge of the government–industry partnership that has characterized U.S. weapons development and production since World War II. Focusing on changes in how contractors charged research costs to defense contracts, this chapter sheds light on the creation of organizational routines, their incorporation into formal government regulations, and the manner in which they were modified or displaced by competing regulations and routines throughout the early 1970s.Less
Procurement regulations and the details of the contracting process receive only passing mention, if any at all, in histories of the development of military technologies. Congressional politics struggles to overcome technical challenges, and the actions and decisions of program managers, corporate representatives, and government leaders often take center stage. Yet attention to regulations, how they are implemented, and how they are incorporated into practice across the defense industry promises to add a layer of understanding to our knowledge of the government–industry partnership that has characterized U.S. weapons development and production since World War II. Focusing on changes in how contractors charged research costs to defense contracts, this chapter sheds light on the creation of organizational routines, their incorporation into formal government regulations, and the manner in which they were modified or displaced by competing regulations and routines throughout the early 1970s.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226729459
- eISBN:
- 9780226729435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226729435.003.0004
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Middle Eastern Studies
This chapter discusses the postwar planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It suggests that neither Tommy Franks of the Central Command nor the U.S. Department of Defense wanted anything to do with ...
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This chapter discusses the postwar planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It suggests that neither Tommy Franks of the Central Command nor the U.S. Department of Defense wanted anything to do with the State Department's postcombat plans called the Future of Iraq Project. The chapter contends that the coordination of planning for the post-combat phase was certainly hobbled by sheer antagonism between the Pentagon, the uniformed military, and the State Department. It argues that direct consultations between American or British government, war planners, and archaeological groups would have prevented the looting of the National Museum and the depredation of Iraq's archaeological sites.Less
This chapter discusses the postwar planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It suggests that neither Tommy Franks of the Central Command nor the U.S. Department of Defense wanted anything to do with the State Department's postcombat plans called the Future of Iraq Project. The chapter contends that the coordination of planning for the post-combat phase was certainly hobbled by sheer antagonism between the Pentagon, the uniformed military, and the State Department. It argues that direct consultations between American or British government, war planners, and archaeological groups would have prevented the looting of the National Museum and the depredation of Iraq's archaeological sites.
Georg Löfflmann
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474419765
- eISBN:
- 9781474435192
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474419765.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter explores how the US Department of Defense has acted as key producer of practical grand strategy discourse, regularly translating geopolitical imaginations, threat assessments and ...
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This chapter explores how the US Department of Defense has acted as key producer of practical grand strategy discourse, regularly translating geopolitical imaginations, threat assessments and strategic narratives into concrete policy outcomes and security practices, from defense policy planning documents to the stationing of US troops and the conducting of military operations. High-level strategic documents published under the Obama presidency, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review reports or the Defense Strategic Guidance are examined in this chapter as key political outputs in providing the ‘big picture’ of national security. The chapter examines how several practical issues in defense policymaking and military planning were, at the same time, indicating are careful shift in the conceptualization and operation of American hegemony. The chapter details how budget sequestration had a lasting impact on the overall size of the US military while Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ shifted its geopolitical and operational focus. This limitation, recalibration and downsizing challenged a status quo of American primacy and global military supremacy that politicians, policy experts and military officials had largely taken for granted since the end of the Cold War.Less
This chapter explores how the US Department of Defense has acted as key producer of practical grand strategy discourse, regularly translating geopolitical imaginations, threat assessments and strategic narratives into concrete policy outcomes and security practices, from defense policy planning documents to the stationing of US troops and the conducting of military operations. High-level strategic documents published under the Obama presidency, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review reports or the Defense Strategic Guidance are examined in this chapter as key political outputs in providing the ‘big picture’ of national security. The chapter examines how several practical issues in defense policymaking and military planning were, at the same time, indicating are careful shift in the conceptualization and operation of American hegemony. The chapter details how budget sequestration had a lasting impact on the overall size of the US military while Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ shifted its geopolitical and operational focus. This limitation, recalibration and downsizing challenged a status quo of American primacy and global military supremacy that politicians, policy experts and military officials had largely taken for granted since the end of the Cold War.
Jennifer Morrison Taw
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231153256
- eISBN:
- 9780231526821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231153256.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter provides an overview of the adjustments to military services since the adoption of stability operations. The first of these adjustments is the introduction of a modular force structure ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the adjustments to military services since the adoption of stability operations. The first of these adjustments is the introduction of a modular force structure in response to the experiences from the wars in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. It involves forming a brigade combat team focused on simultaneous combat and stability operations. There are also adjustments on trainings and education as troops who learned battlefield techniques will need to be trained down for peacekeeping. In terms of procurement, the U.S. Department of Defense prioritizes some extraordinarily expensive weapon systems while acquiring technologies with more utility in stability operations. The question, however, is how best to leverage these technologies to cope with different war conditions.Less
This chapter provides an overview of the adjustments to military services since the adoption of stability operations. The first of these adjustments is the introduction of a modular force structure in response to the experiences from the wars in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. It involves forming a brigade combat team focused on simultaneous combat and stability operations. There are also adjustments on trainings and education as troops who learned battlefield techniques will need to be trained down for peacekeeping. In terms of procurement, the U.S. Department of Defense prioritizes some extraordinarily expensive weapon systems while acquiring technologies with more utility in stability operations. The question, however, is how best to leverage these technologies to cope with different war conditions.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804782753
- eISBN:
- 9780804786157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804782753.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other ...
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This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.Less
This chapter discusses the promotion of biodefense. If biodefense is pushed too far, the question naturally arises whether this can cause problems that threaten the regimes or undermine other elements of the wider web of responses and lead to an arms dynamic that might deteriorate into a biochemical arms race. The buildup of biodefense is criticized. The Department of Defense (DoD) funded some U.S. biodefense activities. It has a special responsibility in regard to the activities of other states. In addition, the DoD's money released from planning for force-on-force warfare needs to be allocated to chemical and biological defense. It is noted that the United States should take vigorous action to lead international efforts with the aim of making real progress in strengthening the prohibition against chemical and biological warfare and terrorism.
Thomas L. Ahern
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125619
- eISBN:
- 9780813135342
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125619.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The first and largest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary programs in Vietnam, the Citizens' (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups, was only six months old when Washington ...
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The first and largest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary programs in Vietnam, the Citizens' (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups, was only six months old when Washington decided to transfer U.S. management from CIA to General Paul Harkins's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John A. McCone suggested that it may be advisable for the Department of Defense (DOD) to take the lead in CIA counterinsurgency programs, with CIA in support, rather than the reverse situation which now obtains. Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, concurred, and the DCI asked the station to identify paramilitary assets appropriate for transfer. Secretary Robert McNamara approved transferring DOD funds to the agency at a meeting in July 1962. The same meeting coined the term Operation Switchback, a misnomer that implied previous DOD custody of the affected programs.Less
The first and largest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary programs in Vietnam, the Citizens' (later Civilian) Irregular Defense Groups, was only six months old when Washington decided to transfer U.S. management from CIA to General Paul Harkins's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John A. McCone suggested that it may be advisable for the Department of Defense (DOD) to take the lead in CIA counterinsurgency programs, with CIA in support, rather than the reverse situation which now obtains. Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, concurred, and the DCI asked the station to identify paramilitary assets appropriate for transfer. Secretary Robert McNamara approved transferring DOD funds to the agency at a meeting in July 1962. The same meeting coined the term Operation Switchback, a misnomer that implied previous DOD custody of the affected programs.
Geoffrey S. Corn
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231152358
- eISBN:
- 9780231526562
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231152358.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional ...
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This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional opinion that military operations against transnational terrorists which do not fall neatly within the state-centric conflict categories derived from the Geneva Conventions should be treated as extraterritorial law enforcement activities. It argues that the humanitarian law framework must be extended to counterterrorist military operations by appealing to core historical principles of humanitarian law and to military protocol, namely, the mandate in the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Program to “comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations.” It contends that it is invalid and disingenuous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power under a “deadly force as a first resort” authority as extraterritorial law enforcement. The chapter also considers the underlying nature and purpose of the existing law-triggering paradigm, the different nature of the authority derived from the law of armed conflict compared to the law enforcement framework, and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.Less
This chapter examines two legal models for combating transnational terrorism: extraterritorial law enforcement and transnational counterterrorist military operations. It challenges conventional opinion that military operations against transnational terrorists which do not fall neatly within the state-centric conflict categories derived from the Geneva Conventions should be treated as extraterritorial law enforcement activities. It argues that the humanitarian law framework must be extended to counterterrorist military operations by appealing to core historical principles of humanitarian law and to military protocol, namely, the mandate in the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Program to “comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations.” It contends that it is invalid and disingenuous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power under a “deadly force as a first resort” authority as extraterritorial law enforcement. The chapter also considers the underlying nature and purpose of the existing law-triggering paradigm, the different nature of the authority derived from the law of armed conflict compared to the law enforcement framework, and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Thomas L. Ahern
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125619
- eISBN:
- 9780813135342
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125619.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, Military History
In preparation since late 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) disengagement had begun when the Department of Defense assumed funding responsibility for the Revolutionary Development Cadre ...
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In preparation since late 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) disengagement had begun when the Department of Defense assumed funding responsibility for the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) program on April 1, 1968. At Robert Komer's insistence, the responsibility for operational management remained with the agency for the time being, with the station running the program on behalf of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). As early as February, only a month after the Tet offensive, the chief of Vietnam operations at headquarters, Douglas Blaufarb, was anticipating instructions to reduce the hiring of contract employees for pacification. However, Komer still resisted any suggestion of a diminished CIA role in pacification, and military personnel detailed to the station continued for the moment to supplement rather than replace agency officers. Ironically, just as the CIA abandoned its insistence on the political essence of pacification, President Nguyen Van Thieu seemed, however hesitantly, to be moving toward accepting it.Less
In preparation since late 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) disengagement had begun when the Department of Defense assumed funding responsibility for the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) program on April 1, 1968. At Robert Komer's insistence, the responsibility for operational management remained with the agency for the time being, with the station running the program on behalf of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). As early as February, only a month after the Tet offensive, the chief of Vietnam operations at headquarters, Douglas Blaufarb, was anticipating instructions to reduce the hiring of contract employees for pacification. However, Komer still resisted any suggestion of a diminished CIA role in pacification, and military personnel detailed to the station continued for the moment to supplement rather than replace agency officers. Ironically, just as the CIA abandoned its insistence on the political essence of pacification, President Nguyen Van Thieu seemed, however hesitantly, to be moving toward accepting it.
William Rankin
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226339368
- eISBN:
- 9780226339535
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226339535.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
The sponsorship of the Global Positioning System by the US Department of Defense in the early 1970s seems perfectly obvious – why wouldn’t the US military want an amazingly precise global navigation ...
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The sponsorship of the Global Positioning System by the US Department of Defense in the early 1970s seems perfectly obvious – why wouldn’t the US military want an amazingly precise global navigation system? But at the time, GPS was opposed by nearly every group that was supposed to benefit from it, both military and civilian. It also departed sharply from the precedents of the US Navy’s global radionavigation systems and the proposals for civilian satellite navigation from NASA. This chapter frames the radicality of GPS as largely an administrative problem of enforcing coordination within the US military, rather than as a self-evident technological improvement. It then explores the geographic and experiential changes brought by GPS in the decades since it first came online in the early 1990s. It was often described as an entirely new kind of infrastructure, and its pointillist logic has had profound implications for everything from surveying and war to national territory and everyday life. The chapter ends by confronting common reactions to GPS, arguing that it should not be seen in moral terms as either good or bad – or even as neutral. Instead, its impact is largely about facilitating new forms of geographic intervention.Less
The sponsorship of the Global Positioning System by the US Department of Defense in the early 1970s seems perfectly obvious – why wouldn’t the US military want an amazingly precise global navigation system? But at the time, GPS was opposed by nearly every group that was supposed to benefit from it, both military and civilian. It also departed sharply from the precedents of the US Navy’s global radionavigation systems and the proposals for civilian satellite navigation from NASA. This chapter frames the radicality of GPS as largely an administrative problem of enforcing coordination within the US military, rather than as a self-evident technological improvement. It then explores the geographic and experiential changes brought by GPS in the decades since it first came online in the early 1990s. It was often described as an entirely new kind of infrastructure, and its pointillist logic has had profound implications for everything from surveying and war to national territory and everyday life. The chapter ends by confronting common reactions to GPS, arguing that it should not be seen in moral terms as either good or bad – or even as neutral. Instead, its impact is largely about facilitating new forms of geographic intervention.
Lawrence Badash
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012720
- eISBN:
- 9780262258531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012720.003.0020
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: ...
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In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: Uncertainties surround the long-term effects of nuclear war,” the report was drafted by a committee headed by Alan Hecht of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and comprised of several scientists. The GAO report was reviewed by other government agencies involved with nuclear winter, including the Defense Nuclear Agency. In May 1986, the Department of Defense issued its own report to Congress. Five years later, nuclear winter theory gave way to experiment when most of Kuwait’s 1,250 oil wells were torched in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. This chapter examines the politics and policy issues surrounding the nuclear winter debate.Less
In March 1986, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress detailing the technical uncertainties surrounding the long-term effects of nuclear war. Titled “Nuclear winter: Uncertainties surround the long-term effects of nuclear war,” the report was drafted by a committee headed by Alan Hecht of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and comprised of several scientists. The GAO report was reviewed by other government agencies involved with nuclear winter, including the Defense Nuclear Agency. In May 1986, the Department of Defense issued its own report to Congress. Five years later, nuclear winter theory gave way to experiment when most of Kuwait’s 1,250 oil wells were torched in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. This chapter examines the politics and policy issues surrounding the nuclear winter debate.
Rachel E. VanLandingham
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199328574
- eISBN:
- 9780199363193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328574.003.0012
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter dissects the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s current relationship with the Department of Defense, a relationship which centers on the adherence by the United States to ...
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This chapter dissects the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s current relationship with the Department of Defense, a relationship which centers on the adherence by the United States to its law of armed conflict obligations. This analysis begins with an overview of the ICRC’s history, institutional structure, and operating modalities, highlighting the roles given to it by both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. This chapter then outlines both the formal and informal interactions between the ICRC and the DoD, both on the civilian side of the house in the Pentagon and on the uniformed military side, with an emphasis on the operational components. It exposes the ICRC’s extra-legal agenda, and places it within the larger evolution of the modern law of armed conflict itself.Less
This chapter dissects the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s current relationship with the Department of Defense, a relationship which centers on the adherence by the United States to its law of armed conflict obligations. This analysis begins with an overview of the ICRC’s history, institutional structure, and operating modalities, highlighting the roles given to it by both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. This chapter then outlines both the formal and informal interactions between the ICRC and the DoD, both on the civilian side of the house in the Pentagon and on the uniformed military side, with an emphasis on the operational components. It exposes the ICRC’s extra-legal agenda, and places it within the larger evolution of the modern law of armed conflict itself.
Lawrence Badash
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012720
- eISBN:
- 9780262258531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012720.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
Freeman Dyson disagreed with the notion that the research goal was to narrow the range of possibilities for the many ingredients of nuclear winter. While he believed in the evils of nuclear war, ...
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Freeman Dyson disagreed with the notion that the research goal was to narrow the range of possibilities for the many ingredients of nuclear winter. While he believed in the evils of nuclear war, Dyson argued that there was a need for greater precision. The nuclear winter predictions made by the TTAPS team (comprised of Richard Turco, Owen Brian Toon, Thomas Ackerman, James Pollack, and Carl Sagan) and others had spurred a flurry of scientific activity. In late 1982, the National Academy of Sciences’s (NAS) National Research Council submitted a proposal for research on nuclear winter to the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). The DNA expressed concern that results of both the NAS and the TTAPS studies would be “unrealistically pessimistic.” This chapter examines the bureaucracy and bickering related to the research on nuclear winter, focusing on the reactions of conservative and liberal critics as well as government agencies such as the Department of Defense.Less
Freeman Dyson disagreed with the notion that the research goal was to narrow the range of possibilities for the many ingredients of nuclear winter. While he believed in the evils of nuclear war, Dyson argued that there was a need for greater precision. The nuclear winter predictions made by the TTAPS team (comprised of Richard Turco, Owen Brian Toon, Thomas Ackerman, James Pollack, and Carl Sagan) and others had spurred a flurry of scientific activity. In late 1982, the National Academy of Sciences’s (NAS) National Research Council submitted a proposal for research on nuclear winter to the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). The DNA expressed concern that results of both the NAS and the TTAPS studies would be “unrealistically pessimistic.” This chapter examines the bureaucracy and bickering related to the research on nuclear winter, focusing on the reactions of conservative and liberal critics as well as government agencies such as the Department of Defense.
