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The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War caused ructions in the WP; the party split in 1992 when ‘reformers’ broke away to create Democratic Left. The ‘reformers’ contended that the WP should become ‘a reconstituted party affirming its adherence to the rule of law’. The ‘reformers’, or ‘liquidators’, who included six of its seven parliamentary deputies, were accused of attempting to destroy the WP. What was left of the ‘revolutionary’ party retained its Cold War assumptions, pointing the finger at the CIA, no less, claiming that it might have had a role in fomenting the split. Drawing a global picture, the WP highlighted the ‘counter-revolutionary’ role of the US in such countries as Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and Grenada. The reformers highlighted the WP’s ‘historical baggage’ and association with ‘criminality’ – the Official IRA.

This chapter investigates how the Hindenburg myth managed to survive Germany's worsening military and domestic situation in the second half of the war, eventually leading to military defeat and the collapse of the monarchies. Nevertheless, the Hindenburg myth still expressed the expectations of German society: to recreate order and recapture tranquility after the disruption of wartime, and to retrieve something positive from war. It is argued that the government of Max von Baden, as well as the democratic Left, relied on Hindenburg's mythical authority to ease the transition from monarchy to republic; the Hindenburg myth provided the symbolic backbone of the Ebert–Groener pact. Instead of turning against the Field Marshal, the Left vilified Ludendorff, and the Right found its scapegoat in the stab-in-the-back legend, blaming Socialists and Jews for German defeat. It is argued that while initially helping to expedite the transition to democracy, the Hindenburg myth soon turned into a burden for the young republic.

This chapter analyzes the rise of new state-based parties and growing regional demands during the 1980s. The Congress’ return to power in 1980, and its massive electoral victory following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, suggested renewed dominance. Rajiv Gandhi declared his ambition to modernize the state, castigating bureaucratic corruption and promoting economic liberalization. Yet the growth of various opposition forces—the Left Democratic Front of the communists, regional parties such as the Telugu Desam Party, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham and Asom Gana Parishad in the center, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party on the right—intensified electoral competition in the states. The failure of the Congress to grasp the nature of these developments, and its cynical tactical mishandling of federal demands in Assam and Punjab and of secular anxieties stoked by the Ramjanmabhoomi movement and the Shah Bano case, worsened communal polarization and Centre-state relations. Perceptions of high political corruption, general economic mismanagement and mounting opposition unity led to the formation of the Janata Dal and National Front, sealing the demise of the Congress in the 1989 general election.