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This chapter focuses on the ‘long war’ between the competing ideologies of democracy, communism and fascism that defined the twentieth century. Only decades after World War One, democracy’s existence was threatened. The Allied countries would fight in democracy’s name, but it was a war for survival against the vicious imperialism of the Axis powers. The grand alliance between the democratic powers and the Soviet Union defeated fascism, but this was due in large part to force of numbers and the self-destructiveness of the Nazis. Contestation continued between the two remaining ideologies of democracy and communism until the end of the Cold War. In 1989 the ideological contestation that had defined so much of the twentieth century was replaced by a remarkable consensus around liberal democracy. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the liberal zeitgeist of the post-Cold War era.

This chapter offers further qualitative evidence on the link between new democracies and IO formation and demonstrates the broader applicability of our theory. The chapter begins by describing the experiences of the Caribbean states, primarily Barbados, in forming CARIFTA and of the Southern Cone states, primarily Uruguay, in forming Mercosur. Both cases are clear examples of the mechanism highlighted throughout the book: democratizing states creating brand-new IOs. Moreover, both cases continue to illustrate how this process is assisted by established democracies. Canada, the United States, and Britain assisted CARIFTA, while the established democracies of the EU supported Mercosur. Next, the chapter moves to a case of remodeling and a case of reforming. Remodeling will be illustrated by the South African Development Community, while reforming will be illustrated by the OAS and its Unit for Democracy Promotion. Overall, these cases show how the IOs offered technical and material assistance in the provision of public goods. IO membership is not a panacea, but IOs do increase the odds of democratic consolidation.

The majority of elections held around the world today are marked by systematic government interference and manipulation. But what consequences do governments face for engaging in electoral misconduct? Do international actors punish countries that violate democratic norms? Do these efforts make a difference? The goals of this book are two-fold: first, to explain variation in norm enforcement; second, to explain the impact of enforcement—when it is applied—on electoral conduct and outcomes. This chapter introduces the argument and research design of the study, and situates the book within the broader literatures on democratization, electoral misconduct, international institutions and international norms.

Departing from professionalization explanations, this chapter demonstrates how the level of inclusiveness of the political settlement in each case shaped the impact of donor assistance on the women’s sectors. The chapter examines how the women’s sector was reconstituted in each case, focusing on the relationships that transpired with grassroots constituencies, as well as between the different tendencies of the women’s sectors. It also assesses the women sector’s engagement with legislative and local bodies of government in each case. It concludes with illustrations of donor-funded programs in each case.

This chapter provides an introduction to the central arguments and themes of the book. It considers the standing of democracy following the end of the Cold War, noting that liberal democracy still remains ideationally in the ascent a quarter of a century later. It is suggested that there is a strong need to understand the history of democracy in order to comprehend the challenges and problems it currently faces. The historical approach the book takes is outlined, proposing that there is a need to explore democracy’s development in relation to the emergence of modern international society.

This chapter argues that the EU’s response(s) to the Arab Spring can be best described as hybrid and is (are) closely reflective of the very hybridity of the EU’s international identity. On the one hand, despite genuine normative impetuses, a largely realist approach and exclusive identities and roles prevailed in crisis management and short-term reactions driven by intergovernmental decision-making. The EU’s crisis management responses are examined in the cases of three different groups of Arab countries – those having witnessed regime change, civil conflict and regime resilience. On the other hand, a more liberal outlook and inclusive identities and roles were embodied in strategic or long-term responses in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, although the latter’s inherent contradictions and lack of innovation in relation to past policies eventually deprived them of the value-based and progressive effect envisaged on paper. Finally, the EU returned to crisis mode in managing the Syrian refugee inflow that was framed as a ‘crisis’ and took the ‘fortress Europe’ identity to its utmost degree from 2015 onwards.

This chapter concludes the study by summarizing its findings, highlighting its pressing relevance for developing countries, and discussing its implications for elections, democracy promotion, and international organizations and norms. Citizens around the world are clamoring for more meaningful, free and fair elections. When international actors choose to engage with and pressure norm-violating regimes, they can make a real difference, promoting improved electoral quality and increasing the odds that cheating incumbents will be replaced. Regional international organizations prove to play a particularly important role in the defense of international democratic norms. Although norm enforcement cannot be taken for granted—it is imposed only selectively and rarely across countries—it does have the potential to exert powerful effects by empowering the domestic opposition and increasing incentives for institutional reform.

This chapter covers Iraq policy from June 2004 until mid-2006 from the standpoint of security and of politics, analyzing Bush and Rumsfeld's conceptions of what was necessary and the conflict between these two visions. Paradoxically, Bush and Rumsfeld's worldviews led them to very different conclusions as to what was required, but their styles meant that they did not have a direct debate about these differences. The puzzling U.S. behavior during this period – describing Iraq as central to the war on terror and the spread of democracy, yet simultaneously drawing down forces and planning to leave – is revealed here as a product of the conflict between the visions of Bush and Rumsfeld.