Peter Adamson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195181425
- eISBN:
- 9780199785087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181425.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Al-Kindī wrote a well-known treatise On Intellect, which was the first Arabic treatise to give a taxonomy of the types of intellect (following Greek sources, especially Philoponus, in interpreting ...
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Al-Kindī wrote a well-known treatise On Intellect, which was the first Arabic treatise to give a taxonomy of the types of intellect (following Greek sources, especially Philoponus, in interpreting Aristotle’s De Anima). The chapter argues that the epistemology implied by this treatise implies that al-Kindī makes a sharp divide between intellect, which knows, and the senses, which experience particulars. This is parallel to his strongly dualist account of soul. The chapter concludes by considering the difficulties this raises for “mediating” psychological phenomena such as imagination, which is explored most fully by al-Kindī in a discussion of prophetic dreams.Less
Al-Kindī wrote a well-known treatise On Intellect, which was the first Arabic treatise to give a taxonomy of the types of intellect (following Greek sources, especially Philoponus, in interpreting Aristotle’s De Anima). The chapter argues that the epistemology implied by this treatise implies that al-Kindī makes a sharp divide between intellect, which knows, and the senses, which experience particulars. This is parallel to his strongly dualist account of soul. The chapter concludes by considering the difficulties this raises for “mediating” psychological phenomena such as imagination, which is explored most fully by al-Kindī in a discussion of prophetic dreams.
Martha C. Nussbaum
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This introduction provides a description of the manuscripts of the De Anima; commentaries on the De Anima; and its links with other works such as Metaphysics, Physics, the biological treatises, and ...
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This introduction provides a description of the manuscripts of the De Anima; commentaries on the De Anima; and its links with other works such as Metaphysics, Physics, the biological treatises, and the ethical works. The agenda of the De Anima is discussed, and three general positions concerning the materiality of the psuchē are identified. Recent interpretations of the De Anima are then considered.Less
This introduction provides a description of the manuscripts of the De Anima; commentaries on the De Anima; and its links with other works such as Metaphysics, Physics, the biological treatises, and the ethical works. The agenda of the De Anima is discussed, and three general positions concerning the materiality of the psuchē are identified. Recent interpretations of the De Anima are then considered.
W.F.R. Hardie
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246329
- eISBN:
- 9780191680953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246329.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
According to the EN, the ‘good one is seeking’ when trying to define happiness as students of political science, is the ‘human good’, the good for man. For Aristotle, human virtue is the virtue ‘not ...
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According to the EN, the ‘good one is seeking’ when trying to define happiness as students of political science, is the ‘human good’, the good for man. For Aristotle, human virtue is the virtue ‘not of the body but of the soul’, and happiness has been defined as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Man is ‘composite’ and the elements in the composition are body and soul. At the beginning of the De Anima, Aristotle finds fault with earlier psychologists for confining their attention to the human soul. Soul is a genus of which the souls of plants, non-human animals, and men are species, and each of these kinds of soul has its own definition.Less
According to the EN, the ‘good one is seeking’ when trying to define happiness as students of political science, is the ‘human good’, the good for man. For Aristotle, human virtue is the virtue ‘not of the body but of the soul’, and happiness has been defined as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Man is ‘composite’ and the elements in the composition are body and soul. At the beginning of the De Anima, Aristotle finds fault with earlier psychologists for confining their attention to the human soul. Soul is a genus of which the souls of plants, non-human animals, and men are species, and each of these kinds of soul has its own definition.
David Charles
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256730
- eISBN:
- 9780191597183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925673X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In De Anima, Aristotle develops an analogy between perception and thought. This is based, I argue, on his account of what causally determines the object (or content) of the relevant perception or ...
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In De Anima, Aristotle develops an analogy between perception and thought. This is based, I argue, on his account of what causally determines the object (or content) of the relevant perception or thought. I examine (1) how his account accommodates visual error and erroneous thoughts and (2) the analogy between the role of light in colour perception and the Active Intellect in the case of thought. Aristotle's account of the object of thought in De Anima supports his account of the signification of names in De Interpretatione. This supports claim (1) in Ch. 4.Less
In De Anima, Aristotle develops an analogy between perception and thought. This is based, I argue, on his account of what causally determines the object (or content) of the relevant perception or thought. I examine (1) how his account accommodates visual error and erroneous thoughts and (2) the analogy between the role of light in colour perception and the Active Intellect in the case of thought. Aristotle's account of the object of thought in De Anima supports his account of the signification of names in De Interpretatione. This supports claim (1) in Ch. 4.
W.F.R. Hardie
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246329
- eISBN:
- 9780191680953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246329.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The doctrine of the EN is that ‘the activity of reason which is contemplative’ is ‘superior in serious worth’. However, the statement of the doctrine in the EN is brief and unexplanatory. The De ...
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The doctrine of the EN is that ‘the activity of reason which is contemplative’ is ‘superior in serious worth’. However, the statement of the doctrine in the EN is brief and unexplanatory. The De Anima offers a fuller account of reason as man's highest faculty, and a celebrated passage seems to imply that the godlike and imperishable element in the soul of man is rather the cause of his contemplative activity than itself contemplative. In the hope of making the doctrine of the EN more intelligible, this chapter considers some of the questions raised by the discussion in the De Anima about the differences between reason and other faculties of men.Less
The doctrine of the EN is that ‘the activity of reason which is contemplative’ is ‘superior in serious worth’. However, the statement of the doctrine in the EN is brief and unexplanatory. The De Anima offers a fuller account of reason as man's highest faculty, and a celebrated passage seems to imply that the godlike and imperishable element in the soul of man is rather the cause of his contemplative activity than itself contemplative. In the hope of making the doctrine of the EN more intelligible, this chapter considers some of the questions raised by the discussion in the De Anima about the differences between reason and other faculties of men.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an ...
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One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an argument in which he concludes for the common perceptibles — such as change, shape, or magnitude — ‘we have an aisthesin koinen’. This is usually taken to imply that the common perceptibles are perceived by the common sense. The logic and the terminology of Aristotle's argument is analysed in this chapter, and it is shown that the phrase does not in fact refer to any higher-order perceptual capacity, but rather it describes an aspect of properly functioning individual senses, namely their sensitivity to the common perceptibles. This interpretation respects the logic of Aristotle's argument and accommodates the facts that the key phrase occurs without the definite article and in reverse word order.Less
One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an argument in which he concludes for the common perceptibles — such as change, shape, or magnitude — ‘we have an aisthesin koinen’. This is usually taken to imply that the common perceptibles are perceived by the common sense. The logic and the terminology of Aristotle's argument is analysed in this chapter, and it is shown that the phrase does not in fact refer to any higher-order perceptual capacity, but rather it describes an aspect of properly functioning individual senses, namely their sensitivity to the common perceptibles. This interpretation respects the logic of Aristotle's argument and accommodates the facts that the key phrase occurs without the definite article and in reverse word order.
Thomas Johansen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199289974
- eISBN:
- 9780191711008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289974.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines Aristotle's claim that the soul is an inner principle of change, against the background of his account in the Physics of nature as an inner principle of change. That for ...
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This chapter examines Aristotle's claim that the soul is an inner principle of change, against the background of his account in the Physics of nature as an inner principle of change. That for Aristotle, the study of the soul is part of the study of nature is clear already from the opening lines of the De anima, where he announces that ‘knowledge of the soul seems to contribute greatly to all truth but most of all the truth in relation to nature: for the soul is such a thing as a principle of animals’. The study of the soul is valued, then, for its contribution to our knowledge of nature. The reason for that claim is in turn that the soul is such a thing as ‘a principle of animals’. Aristotle thinks that the soul really is a principle of animals. The ‘such as’ here serves rather to put epistemic distance to the claim: we do not yet know what it means for the soul to be a principle, so the vagueness is appropriate. The chapter seeks to overcome some of that vagueness.Less
This chapter examines Aristotle's claim that the soul is an inner principle of change, against the background of his account in the Physics of nature as an inner principle of change. That for Aristotle, the study of the soul is part of the study of nature is clear already from the opening lines of the De anima, where he announces that ‘knowledge of the soul seems to contribute greatly to all truth but most of all the truth in relation to nature: for the soul is such a thing as a principle of animals’. The study of the soul is valued, then, for its contribution to our knowledge of nature. The reason for that claim is in turn that the soul is such a thing as ‘a principle of animals’. Aristotle thinks that the soul really is a principle of animals. The ‘such as’ here serves rather to put epistemic distance to the claim: we do not yet know what it means for the soul to be a principle, so the vagueness is appropriate. The chapter seeks to overcome some of that vagueness.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines whether De Anima 431 b 5 contains an elliptical occurrence of the phrase ‘common sense’, and if so, what is its exact reference. As a starting point, it is assumed that the ...
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This chapter examines whether De Anima 431 b 5 contains an elliptical occurrence of the phrase ‘common sense’, and if so, what is its exact reference. As a starting point, it is assumed that the main purpose of the passage is to show that the thinking capacity of the soul can determine what is to be pursued and avoided both in the presence and in the absence of perception. In the presence of perception, the thinking capacity determines what is to be pursued and avoided with respect to things that are given to us by perception. There are good reasons to take the phrase ‘ommon sense’ with reference to a non-rational cognitive ability by which accidental perceptibles, such as alarm signals, are grasped, and this should be identified with the sensory capacity of the soul. Less
This chapter examines whether De Anima 431 b 5 contains an elliptical occurrence of the phrase ‘common sense’, and if so, what is its exact reference. As a starting point, it is assumed that the main purpose of the passage is to show that the thinking capacity of the soul can determine what is to be pursued and avoided both in the presence and in the absence of perception. In the presence of perception, the thinking capacity determines what is to be pursued and avoided with respect to things that are given to us by perception. There are good reasons to take the phrase ‘ommon sense’ with reference to a non-rational cognitive ability by which accidental perceptibles, such as alarm signals, are grasped, and this should be identified with the sensory capacity of the soul.
Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book presents twenty essays on various aspects of Aristotle’s De Anima. These cover topics such as the relation between the body and soul, functionalism, sense-perception, imagination, memory, ...
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This book presents twenty essays on various aspects of Aristotle’s De Anima. These cover topics such as the relation between the body and soul, functionalism, sense-perception, imagination, memory, intellect, and desire. It includes an introduction that provides a description of the manuscripts of the De Anima, commentaries, and its links with other works.Less
This book presents twenty essays on various aspects of Aristotle’s De Anima. These cover topics such as the relation between the body and soul, functionalism, sense-perception, imagination, memory, intellect, and desire. It includes an introduction that provides a description of the manuscripts of the De Anima, commentaries, and its links with other works.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines Aristotle's notion of perceptual discrimination, which he discusses in De Anima III.2 (426 b 8-427 a 16) and III.7 (431 a 20 b 1). In the first of these passages the ...
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This chapter examines Aristotle's notion of perceptual discrimination, which he discusses in De Anima III.2 (426 b 8-427 a 16) and III.7 (431 a 20 b 1). In the first of these passages the solution from De Sensu 7 seems to be rejected because it cannot account for perceptual discrimination of two or more homogeneous special perceptibles, e.g. black and white. That solution is supplanted by another one in which Aristotle compares the discriminating capacity to the geometrical point. This analogy is closely examined and an interpretation of its application to the case of perceptual discrimination of homogeneous special perceptibles is proposed. This interpretation is then supported, if only tentatively, by an analysis of a notoriously difficult passage from De Anima III.7. It is concluded that Aristotle's explanation of simultaneous perception and perceptual discrimination of two or more homogeneous special perceptibles is rather unsatisfactory. Less
This chapter examines Aristotle's notion of perceptual discrimination, which he discusses in De Anima III.2 (426 b 8-427 a 16) and III.7 (431 a 20 b 1). In the first of these passages the solution from De Sensu 7 seems to be rejected because it cannot account for perceptual discrimination of two or more homogeneous special perceptibles, e.g. black and white. That solution is supplanted by another one in which Aristotle compares the discriminating capacity to the geometrical point. This analogy is closely examined and an interpretation of its application to the case of perceptual discrimination of homogeneous special perceptibles is proposed. This interpretation is then supported, if only tentatively, by an analysis of a notoriously difficult passage from De Anima III.7. It is concluded that Aristotle's explanation of simultaneous perception and perceptual discrimination of two or more homogeneous special perceptibles is rather unsatisfactory.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The conclusion discusses the common sense as envisioned by Aristotle, particularly what he himself designates with the phrase and what we should designate as the Aristotelian notion of the common ...
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The conclusion discusses the common sense as envisioned by Aristotle, particularly what he himself designates with the phrase and what we should designate as the Aristotelian notion of the common sense. Aristotle designates three different things with the phrase ‘common sense’ and its variants. An individual sense, namely touch, is called a ‘common sense’ in Historia Animalium I.3 489 a 17. It is so called because it is shared by all animals, for the sense of touch is found in every individual animal of every species. Similarly, all the individual senses indiscriminately are called ‘common senses’ in Metaphysics I.1 I.1 981. In De Anima III.1 Aristotle distinguishes an aspect of the properly functioning individual senses according to types of features perceived, and calls it ‘aisthesis koine’, which is often wrongly interpreted as the ‘common sense’. Finally, the phrase ‘common sense’ is used in De Partibus Animalium IV.10 686 a 31, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1 450 a 10, and De Anima III.7 431 b 5 consistently as a proper name for the sensory capacity of the soul which comprises the perceptual and the imaginative capacities. Paradoxically, Aristotle never uses the phrase ‘common sense’ to refer to the higher-order perceptual power which emerges from the unity of the perceptual capacity of the soul, which is how the common sense tends to be understood in later tradition. However, he does refer to it as a ‘common power which accompanies the individual senses’ in the De Somno et Vigilia 2. Four distinct functions of the common sense have been identified and discussed: simultaneous perception, perceptual discrimination, control of the senses in waking and sleep, and monitoring of the senses. Less
The conclusion discusses the common sense as envisioned by Aristotle, particularly what he himself designates with the phrase and what we should designate as the Aristotelian notion of the common sense. Aristotle designates three different things with the phrase ‘common sense’ and its variants. An individual sense, namely touch, is called a ‘common sense’ in Historia Animalium I.3 489 a 17. It is so called because it is shared by all animals, for the sense of touch is found in every individual animal of every species. Similarly, all the individual senses indiscriminately are called ‘common senses’ in Metaphysics I.1 I.1 981. In De Anima III.1 Aristotle distinguishes an aspect of the properly functioning individual senses according to types of features perceived, and calls it ‘aisthesis koine’, which is often wrongly interpreted as the ‘common sense’. Finally, the phrase ‘common sense’ is used in De Partibus Animalium IV.10 686 a 31, De Memoria et Reminiscentia 1 450 a 10, and De Anima III.7 431 b 5 consistently as a proper name for the sensory capacity of the soul which comprises the perceptual and the imaginative capacities. Paradoxically, Aristotle never uses the phrase ‘common sense’ to refer to the higher-order perceptual power which emerges from the unity of the perceptual capacity of the soul, which is how the common sense tends to be understood in later tradition. However, he does refer to it as a ‘common power which accompanies the individual senses’ in the De Somno et Vigilia 2. Four distinct functions of the common sense have been identified and discussed: simultaneous perception, perceptual discrimination, control of the senses in waking and sleep, and monitoring of the senses.
Charlotte Witt
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Book 1 of Aristotle’s De Anima extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The ...
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Book 1 of Aristotle’s De Anima extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The following conclusions are drawn on the nature and function of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material; it is a substance and not an attribute; it is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity. The soul is the origin of perception and motion, and of psychological processes such as emotions and desires. An adequate account of how the soul causes perception, motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul.Less
Book 1 of Aristotle’s De Anima extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The following conclusions are drawn on the nature and function of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material; it is a substance and not an attribute; it is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity. The soul is the origin of perception and motion, and of psychological processes such as emotions and desires. An adequate account of how the soul causes perception, motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul.
Cynthia Freeland
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay explores the central place of Aristotle’s views of the sense of touch within his empiricist epistemology and general physical theory. It argues that Aristotle was not committed to a ...
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This essay explores the central place of Aristotle’s views of the sense of touch within his empiricist epistemology and general physical theory. It argues that Aristotle was not committed to a ‘literalist’ view of the nature of sensory representation, according to which an organ literally becomes ‘like’ the said object. It suggests an interpretation of Aristotle’s defence of the objectivity of tactile representation, which shows a deep and complex link between his theory of sense-knowledge and his project of scientific explanation.Less
This essay explores the central place of Aristotle’s views of the sense of touch within his empiricist epistemology and general physical theory. It argues that Aristotle was not committed to a ‘literalist’ view of the nature of sensory representation, according to which an organ literally becomes ‘like’ the said object. It suggests an interpretation of Aristotle’s defence of the objectivity of tactile representation, which shows a deep and complex link between his theory of sense-knowledge and his project of scientific explanation.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter looks at Aristotle's account of the perceptual capacity of the soul as delineated in the treatise De Anima. Like the soul as a whole, the perceptual part of the soul is divided ...
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This chapter looks at Aristotle's account of the perceptual capacity of the soul as delineated in the treatise De Anima. Like the soul as a whole, the perceptual part of the soul is divided conceptually into the individual senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Each of these senses receives a separate treatment in the second book of the De Anima. In the third book Aristotle deals with certain issues concerning perception in such a way that it becomes clear that the perceptual capacity of the soul is not an aggregate of the individual senses, but a unified whole. That is, Aristotle's conceptual division of the perceptual part of the soul permits it to be differentiated into distinct sense-modalities while at the same time remaining a unity. Less
This chapter looks at Aristotle's account of the perceptual capacity of the soul as delineated in the treatise De Anima. Like the soul as a whole, the perceptual part of the soul is divided conceptually into the individual senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Each of these senses receives a separate treatment in the second book of the De Anima. In the third book Aristotle deals with certain issues concerning perception in such a way that it becomes clear that the perceptual capacity of the soul is not an aggregate of the individual senses, but a unified whole. That is, Aristotle's conceptual division of the perceptual part of the soul permits it to be differentiated into distinct sense-modalities while at the same time remaining a unity.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter continues the investigation of the phenomenon that Aristotle describes as ‘perceiving that we see and hear’ by analysing the much discussed passage from the beginning of De Anima III.2 ...
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This chapter continues the investigation of the phenomenon that Aristotle describes as ‘perceiving that we see and hear’ by analysing the much discussed passage from the beginning of De Anima III.2 in which Aristotle seems to maintain that we perceive that we see by sight, without even mentioning the possibility that we do so by a higher-order capacity. This appears to be in flat contradiction with what he says in De Somno et Vigilia 2, discussed in the preceding chapter. It is argued that the De Anima III.2 is an aporetic passage in which Aristotle replies to a challenge posed by Plato in the Charmides. It is important to note that Aristotle meets the challenge on Plato's own terms, which is why he does not introduce any higher-order capacities. Because this passage is dialectical, we should not take its conclusion to be Aristotle's considered view. In the course of his argument Aristotle mentions that it is by sight that we perceive darkness. However, it is argued that sight as such cannot achieve the perception of darkness. What is required is a higher-order capacity which registers inactivity of the sense of sight. Since the awareness of the activity of an individual sense is the work of the common sense, it is natural to suppose that awareness of an individual sense's inactivity is the work of the common sense. So the common sense provides us with the awareness of both the activity and inactivity of the individual senses. This monitoring function of the common sense is comparable with certain modern conceptions of consciousness. Less
This chapter continues the investigation of the phenomenon that Aristotle describes as ‘perceiving that we see and hear’ by analysing the much discussed passage from the beginning of De Anima III.2 in which Aristotle seems to maintain that we perceive that we see by sight, without even mentioning the possibility that we do so by a higher-order capacity. This appears to be in flat contradiction with what he says in De Somno et Vigilia 2, discussed in the preceding chapter. It is argued that the De Anima III.2 is an aporetic passage in which Aristotle replies to a challenge posed by Plato in the Charmides. It is important to note that Aristotle meets the challenge on Plato's own terms, which is why he does not introduce any higher-order capacities. Because this passage is dialectical, we should not take its conclusion to be Aristotle's considered view. In the course of his argument Aristotle mentions that it is by sight that we perceive darkness. However, it is argued that sight as such cannot achieve the perception of darkness. What is required is a higher-order capacity which registers inactivity of the sense of sight. Since the awareness of the activity of an individual sense is the work of the common sense, it is natural to suppose that awareness of an individual sense's inactivity is the work of the common sense. So the common sense provides us with the awareness of both the activity and inactivity of the individual senses. This monitoring function of the common sense is comparable with certain modern conceptions of consciousness.
Mark A. Johnstone
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199666164
- eISBN:
- 9780191751936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666164.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The sense of smell occupies a peculiar intermediate position in Aristotle's theory of sense perception: odours, like colours and sounds, are perceived at a distance through an external medium; yet in ...
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The sense of smell occupies a peculiar intermediate position in Aristotle's theory of sense perception: odours, like colours and sounds, are perceived at a distance through an external medium; yet in their nature they are intimately related to flavours, the proper objects of taste, which for Aristotle is a form of touch. This paper examines Aristotle's claims about odour and smell, especially in De Anima II.9 and De Sensu 5, to see what light they shed on his theory of sense perception more generally. First, it is argued that neither of the two most influential recent ways of understanding Aristotle's theory of perception can adequately account for what he says about the sense of smell. Then the paper offers a new, positive account, resolving various puzzles raised by Aristotle's claims about the nature of odour and its relation to flavour. Finally, it is concluded that Aristotle's discussions of odour and smell suggest a plausible way of understanding the relationship, on his view, between ordinary, material changes in the sense organs and the activation of the capacity to perceive, considered as such.Less
The sense of smell occupies a peculiar intermediate position in Aristotle's theory of sense perception: odours, like colours and sounds, are perceived at a distance through an external medium; yet in their nature they are intimately related to flavours, the proper objects of taste, which for Aristotle is a form of touch. This paper examines Aristotle's claims about odour and smell, especially in De Anima II.9 and De Sensu 5, to see what light they shed on his theory of sense perception more generally. First, it is argued that neither of the two most influential recent ways of understanding Aristotle's theory of perception can adequately account for what he says about the sense of smell. Then the paper offers a new, positive account, resolving various puzzles raised by Aristotle's claims about the nature of odour and its relation to flavour. Finally, it is concluded that Aristotle's discussions of odour and smell suggest a plausible way of understanding the relationship, on his view, between ordinary, material changes in the sense organs and the activation of the capacity to perceive, considered as such.
Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of ...
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This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s motivating problems. An interpretation is defended against Burnyeat, which distinguishes Aristotle from both materialist reductionism, and from the Burnyeat interpretation that perceiving etc. does not require concomitant material change, and that awareness is primitive. Aristotle’s position is then defended as tenable, even in the context of a modern theory of matter.Less
This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s motivating problems. An interpretation is defended against Burnyeat, which distinguishes Aristotle from both materialist reductionism, and from the Burnyeat interpretation that perceiving etc. does not require concomitant material change, and that awareness is primitive. Aristotle’s position is then defended as tenable, even in the context of a modern theory of matter.
Malcolm Schofield
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay explores Aristotle’s treatment of imagination. It argues that Aristotle need not be charged with the radical inconsistency in his treatment of phantasia diagnosed by Hamlyn. Although a ...
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This essay explores Aristotle’s treatment of imagination. It argues that Aristotle need not be charged with the radical inconsistency in his treatment of phantasia diagnosed by Hamlyn. Although a conceptual link can be made between imagination and a use of ‘appears’, the link is not as close as the connection between phantasia and phainesthai, nor does ‘appears’ provide the natural entree to the study of imagination which phainetai provides to that of phantasia. A little lexicography will show that the syntactic behaviour and semantic range of phantasia are different from those of imagination.Less
This essay explores Aristotle’s treatment of imagination. It argues that Aristotle need not be charged with the radical inconsistency in his treatment of phantasia diagnosed by Hamlyn. Although a conceptual link can be made between imagination and a use of ‘appears’, the link is not as close as the connection between phantasia and phainesthai, nor does ‘appears’ provide the natural entree to the study of imagination which phainetai provides to that of phantasia. A little lexicography will show that the syntactic behaviour and semantic range of phantasia are different from those of imagination.
Henry S. Richardson
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236009
- eISBN:
- 9780191598104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823600X.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay presents an interpretation of the theory of animal movement that emphasizes the place Aristotle accords the good as the object of desire and the coordinate importance he assigns to desire ...
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This essay presents an interpretation of the theory of animal movement that emphasizes the place Aristotle accords the good as the object of desire and the coordinate importance he assigns to desire and discernment. This interpretation is based on two competing models: the desire-based model, where the shape of the account of any action is based on some one occurrent desire; and the good-based model, where the account starts from some object aimed at as good. It is argued that the texts of De Anima 3. 9-11 better fit the good-based model of animal motion than the desire-based model.Less
This essay presents an interpretation of the theory of animal movement that emphasizes the place Aristotle accords the good as the object of desire and the coordinate importance he assigns to desire and discernment. This interpretation is based on two competing models: the desire-based model, where the shape of the account of any action is based on some one occurrent desire; and the good-based model, where the account starts from some object aimed at as good. It is argued that the texts of De Anima 3. 9-11 better fit the good-based model of animal motion than the desire-based model.
Terence Irwin
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198242901
- eISBN:
- 9780191597770
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198242905.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle identifies soul with form, and body with matter. He assumes that to have a soul is to have the functional properties that are the form, and the relation of the soul to the body is the ...
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Aristotle identifies soul with form, and body with matter. He assumes that to have a soul is to have the functional properties that are the form, and the relation of the soul to the body is the relation of the form to matter, and of actuality of potentiality. The De Anima not only discusses general questions about the relation of soul and body, but also describes the different states of the soul: perception, imagination, thought, and desire. If we examine this aspect of the De Anima, we should be able to see whether Aristotle uses his general theory, and whether the theory is responsible for the better or worse of his account.Less
Aristotle identifies soul with form, and body with matter. He assumes that to have a soul is to have the functional properties that are the form, and the relation of the soul to the body is the relation of the form to matter, and of actuality of potentiality. The De Anima not only discusses general questions about the relation of soul and body, but also describes the different states of the soul: perception, imagination, thought, and desire. If we examine this aspect of the De Anima, we should be able to see whether Aristotle uses his general theory, and whether the theory is responsible for the better or worse of his account.
