Maria Alvarez
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199550005
- eISBN:
- 9780191720239
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of ...
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The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of Davidson's paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, namely, whether reasons are causes and whether reason explanations are causal explanations. It is suggested that the questions have often been debated in terms which are muddled due to the lack of nuance in understanding reasons. It is suggested that it would, therefore, be interesting to reassess the questions Davidson put on the table with a clearer grasp of what our reasons for acting are, and a clearer picture of the reasons that explain action and the variety of forms that explanations of action take.Less
The conclusion briefly draws together the main conclusions of the book and places them against the background of the questions that dominated action theory for decades after the publication of Davidson's paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, namely, whether reasons are causes and whether reason explanations are causal explanations. It is suggested that the questions have often been debated in terms which are muddled due to the lack of nuance in understanding reasons. It is suggested that it would, therefore, be interesting to reassess the questions Davidson put on the table with a clearer grasp of what our reasons for acting are, and a clearer picture of the reasons that explain action and the variety of forms that explanations of action take.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
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So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Anthony Brueckner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585861
- eISBN:
- 9780191595332
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter raises a problem for the Davidsonian anti-sceptical strategy that mirrors a problem raised for Putnam in Chapter 7.
This chapter raises a problem for the Davidsonian anti-sceptical strategy that mirrors a problem raised for Putnam in Chapter 7.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198237549
- eISBN:
- 9780191601378
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237545.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical ...
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Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.Less
Applies Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action to three families of problems involving various aspects of rationality, some degree of which Davidson's theory of radical interpretation attributes to any creature, which can be said to have a mind. These problems are the nature and our understanding of value judgements, the adequacy conditions for attributing mental states to a being, and the problem of irrationality.
The first four chapters apply Davidson's thesis that our interpretations of another person's mental states are a source of objectivity to value judgements: such judgements, Davidson argues in this section, are as objective as any judgement about the mind can be. Chs 5 to 10 develop Davidson's Unified Theory for interpreting thought, meaning, and action, the primary concern of this section being the specification of the minimal conditions for attributing mental states to an object or creature. Chs 11 to 14 deal primarily with the problems raised by those cognitive states and actions that seem to violate, in a fundamental way, the constraints of rationality. Since Davidson regards the constraints of rationality to be amongst the necessary conditions for both mind and interpretation, irrational thoughts, and actions pose a particular problem for his Unified Theory. The final four chapters attempt to remove the apparent contradiction.
Kenneth Millard
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122258
- eISBN:
- 9780191671395
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122258.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
The poets writing in the first years of the 20th century have commonly been discussed in isolation. This book considers together seven poets — Henry Newbolt, John Masefield, Thomas Hardy, Edward ...
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The poets writing in the first years of the 20th century have commonly been discussed in isolation. This book considers together seven poets — Henry Newbolt, John Masefield, Thomas Hardy, Edward Thomas, A. E. Housman, John Davidson, and Rupert Brooke — and argues that their work is worthy of more serious critical attention than it has previously received. Through an analysis of numerous individual poems, the chapter isolates certain common concerns: the changing and perhaps fading value of England; a distrust of the medium of language itself; a distrust also of the creative imagination. In its reassessment of these poets, the book provides a literary context for their work, finding in it a kind of pre-War modern British poetry distinct from the Modernism of subsequent decades. In establishing a literary context for the poetry of this century's first decade the book offers a revision of modern literary history and points towards an alternative line in 20th-century British poetry that culminates in the work of Philip Larkin.Less
The poets writing in the first years of the 20th century have commonly been discussed in isolation. This book considers together seven poets — Henry Newbolt, John Masefield, Thomas Hardy, Edward Thomas, A. E. Housman, John Davidson, and Rupert Brooke — and argues that their work is worthy of more serious critical attention than it has previously received. Through an analysis of numerous individual poems, the chapter isolates certain common concerns: the changing and perhaps fading value of England; a distrust of the medium of language itself; a distrust also of the creative imagination. In its reassessment of these poets, the book provides a literary context for their work, finding in it a kind of pre-War modern British poetry distinct from the Modernism of subsequent decades. In establishing a literary context for the poetry of this century's first decade the book offers a revision of modern literary history and points towards an alternative line in 20th-century British poetry that culminates in the work of Philip Larkin.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199217250
- eISBN:
- 9780191696053
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, ...
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This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, Moore, and now Davidson, who also relies crucially on an assumption of virtuous circularity. Along the way various lines of objection are explored. Part I of this book considers historical alternatives to the view developed in Part II. It begins with G. E. Moore's legendary proof, and the epistemology that lies behind it. That leads to classical foundationalism, a more general position encompassing the indirect realism advocated by Moore. Next the book turns to the quietist naturalism found in David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. After that comes Thomas Reid's common sense alternative. A quite different option is the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. Finally, Part I concludes with a study of Donald Davidson's distinctive form of epistemology naturalized (as the book argues). The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic circularity. This alternative retains elements of the earlier approaches, while discarding what was found wanting in them.Less
This book argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on a kind of virtuous circularity that may be found explicitly or just below the surface in the epistemological writings of Descartes, Moore, and now Davidson, who also relies crucially on an assumption of virtuous circularity. Along the way various lines of objection are explored. Part I of this book considers historical alternatives to the view developed in Part II. It begins with G. E. Moore's legendary proof, and the epistemology that lies behind it. That leads to classical foundationalism, a more general position encompassing the indirect realism advocated by Moore. Next the book turns to the quietist naturalism found in David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. After that comes Thomas Reid's common sense alternative. A quite different option is the subtle and complex epistemology developed by Wilfrid Sellars over the course of a long career. Finally, Part I concludes with a study of Donald Davidson's distinctive form of epistemology naturalized (as the book argues). The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic circularity. This alternative retains elements of the earlier approaches, while discarding what was found wanting in them.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252145
- eISBN:
- 9780191598487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252149.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical ...
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Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical questions of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, there are some papers devoted to specific questions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as papers on Quine, Searle, Davidson, and David Pears.The tenor of the essays on meaning is critical of reductive attempts to elucidate meaning and understanding ‘from outside’—i.e. without summoning intentional vocabulary referring to what speakers mean and understand in relation to each other. In view of considerations regarding the indispensably semantical nature of explanatory accounts of meaning, an appeal to speakers’ conformity to linguistic practice must satisfy the requirements of a thick, semantical description of the meaning of words in a community. There will be no satisfactory theories of meaning solely in terms of non‐semantic, non‐intentional regularities. In the author's estimation, this idea runs close to Wittgenstein's treatment of ‘inner’ or ‘private’ objects. The first essay in this collection addresses the attribution of a ‘conventionalist’ position to Wittgenstein in summation of his thought on necessity and logical truth. The author looks askance at Michael Dummett's conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein and takes it to task accordingly. ‘Inference, Belief and Understanding’ (essay 2) re‐examines the question of being ‘forced’ to a conclusion in the context of Lewis Carroll's ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. It is argued, here and throughout, that it is important to grasp the implications of the kind of regress besetting Achilles for a theory of understanding and the mind. The threat of regress is a key constraint on philosophical accounts of understanding viewed as a capacity possessed by the speaker. In his third essay ‘Evolution and the Necessity of Thought’, the author asks whether we can hold steadfast to a notion of necessity and an evolutionary or historical story of the acquisition of human knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments against the existence of a private language are treated in the fifth and again, in more detail, in the final essay in this volume— the author notes his intention to look at the question relatively unencumbered by existing scholarship in the hope of drawing out the very idea of what Wittgenstein was doing in his philosophy. The collection of essays on Wittgenstein includes a study of Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding, and community (essay 6), which partly overlaps with an essay on translation that additionally revisits the problem of regress and its implications for semantic competence (essay 8). It is argued that the indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts has the consequence that meaning is indeterminate tout court only if those facts are the only available facts; but a ‘community practice’ view of meaning has no such consequence. A fuller treatment of some of these topics is given in ‘Mind, Meaning and Practice’ (essay 11), which examines the idea of meaning as use, and ostensive teaching in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning and distorted conception of the mental.The essays on Quine (essay 7 and 10) consider the doctrine of physicalism and the question of conceptual schemes respectively. Searle's theory of intentionality (‘background’) supposes that there are attitudes that are mental, though pre‐intentional and non‐representational; considerations are brought against Searle in essay 9. The work on Davidson provides the renewed occasion for attacking the idea that linguistic competence or understanding is a matter of applying general rules or conventions to particular utterances (essay 12). A central theme of this book—the threat of regress and the pressure it exerts on semantic theory—is brought out with reference to the theory of understanding, which locates linguistic competence in the application of general knowledge to particular utterances. It is argued that such theories invariably fall foul of regress. A profitable semantic theory should combine the insight that explaining understanding and meaning is aptly fulfilled by invoking speakers’ abilities and knowledge, yet without positing additional mental entities, with a recognition that the abilities and knowledge in question go beyond mere relations between expressions.Less
Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical questions of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, there are some papers devoted to specific questions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as papers on Quine, Searle, Davidson, and David Pears.
The tenor of the essays on meaning is critical of reductive attempts to elucidate meaning and understanding ‘from outside’—i.e. without summoning intentional vocabulary referring to what speakers mean and understand in relation to each other. In view of considerations regarding the indispensably semantical nature of explanatory accounts of meaning, an appeal to speakers’ conformity to linguistic practice must satisfy the requirements of a thick, semantical description of the meaning of words in a community. There will be no satisfactory theories of meaning solely in terms of non‐semantic, non‐intentional regularities. In the author's estimation, this idea runs close to Wittgenstein's treatment of ‘inner’ or ‘private’ objects. The first essay in this collection addresses the attribution of a ‘conventionalist’ position to Wittgenstein in summation of his thought on necessity and logical truth. The author looks askance at Michael Dummett's conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein and takes it to task accordingly. ‘Inference, Belief and Understanding’ (essay 2) re‐examines the question of being ‘forced’ to a conclusion in the context of Lewis Carroll's ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. It is argued, here and throughout, that it is important to grasp the implications of the kind of regress besetting Achilles for a theory of understanding and the mind. The threat of regress is a key constraint on philosophical accounts of understanding viewed as a capacity possessed by the speaker. In his third essay ‘Evolution and the Necessity of Thought’, the author asks whether we can hold steadfast to a notion of necessity and an evolutionary or historical story of the acquisition of human knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments against the existence of a private language are treated in the fifth and again, in more detail, in the final essay in this volume— the author notes his intention to look at the question relatively unencumbered by existing scholarship in the hope of drawing out the very idea of what Wittgenstein was doing in his philosophy. The collection of essays on Wittgenstein includes a study of Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding, and community (essay 6), which partly overlaps with an essay on translation that additionally revisits the problem of regress and its implications for semantic competence (essay 8). It is argued that the indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts has the consequence that meaning is indeterminate tout court only if those facts are the only available facts; but a ‘community practice’ view of meaning has no such consequence. A fuller treatment of some of these topics is given in ‘Mind, Meaning and Practice’ (essay 11), which examines the idea of meaning as use, and ostensive teaching in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning and distorted conception of the mental.
The essays on Quine (essay 7 and 10) consider the doctrine of physicalism and the question of conceptual schemes respectively. Searle's theory of intentionality (‘background’) supposes that there are attitudes that are mental, though pre‐intentional and non‐representational; considerations are brought against Searle in essay 9. The work on Davidson provides the renewed occasion for attacking the idea that linguistic competence or understanding is a matter of applying general rules or conventions to particular utterances (essay 12). A central theme of this book—the threat of regress and the pressure it exerts on semantic theory—is brought out with reference to the theory of understanding, which locates linguistic competence in the application of general knowledge to particular utterances. It is argued that such theories invariably fall foul of regress. A profitable semantic theory should combine the insight that explaining understanding and meaning is aptly fulfilled by invoking speakers’ abilities and knowledge, yet without positing additional mental entities, with a recognition that the abilities and knowledge in question go beyond mere relations between expressions.
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations ...
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This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts—this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts, and correspondence can play any useful role in philosophy, and formal arguments have been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era in philosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways to different persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter. By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing original analyses of key aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Kurt Gödel (to each of whom a chapter is dedicated), Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with a powerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requires making some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices—choices that may send many philosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. The book will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.Less
This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts—this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts, and correspondence can play any useful role in philosophy, and formal arguments have been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era in philosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways to different persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter. By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing original analyses of key aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Kurt Gödel (to each of whom a chapter is dedicated), Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with a powerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requires making some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices—choices that may send many philosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. The book will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising ...
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Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.Less
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
Michael Dummett
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236214
- eISBN:
- 9780191597350
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236212.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the ...
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The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the meaning of a statement one must be in possession of a procedure to verify it. He also argues for the link between bivalence and the metaphysical doctrine of realism. Other topics discussed include refutation of instrumentalism, mathematical applicability, backward causation, and the analysis of the concept of existence.Less
The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the meaning of a statement one must be in possession of a procedure to verify it. He also argues for the link between bivalence and the metaphysical doctrine of realism. Other topics discussed include refutation of instrumentalism, mathematical applicability, backward causation, and the analysis of the concept of existence.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of ...
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This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.Less
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.
Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.
Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
G. F. Schueler
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250370
- eISBN:
- 9780191598364
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250375.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what ...
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This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself.In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well.Less
This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself.
In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well.
William Child
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236252
- eISBN:
- 9780191597206
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236255.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by ...
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Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.Less
Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section ...
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This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section 3.2 argues that only the second is of direct relevance. Section 3.3 examines attempts to frame constraints based on causal and psycho-behavioural reductions of reference. Section 3.4 investigates the Translational Reference Constraint (TRC), a constraint on reference which does not rely on a reduction of reference but makes essential use of translation (from object language to metalanguage) to sort out the models which get reference right. The claims made in this section, however, require foundation in a theory of translation, sufficient to sustain the assumptions it makes about that controversial and opaque notion. This foundation is supplied in section 3.5, whose general tenor is Davidsonian, its key notion being that of a ‘hermeneutic theory’, i.e., a Davidsonian theory of interpretation cast into model-theoretic terms. With Translational Truth Constraint (TTC) now identified as the most fundamental constraint on intendedness, it remains to see if it will suffice to rule out as unintended all the models of ideal theory whose existence the Completeness Theorem guarantees. The issue is examined in section 3.6.Less
This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section 3.2 argues that only the second is of direct relevance. Section 3.3 examines attempts to frame constraints based on causal and psycho-behavioural reductions of reference. Section 3.4 investigates the Translational Reference Constraint (TRC), a constraint on reference which does not rely on a reduction of reference but makes essential use of translation (from object language to metalanguage) to sort out the models which get reference right. The claims made in this section, however, require foundation in a theory of translation, sufficient to sustain the assumptions it makes about that controversial and opaque notion. This foundation is supplied in section 3.5, whose general tenor is Davidsonian, its key notion being that of a ‘hermeneutic theory’, i.e., a Davidsonian theory of interpretation cast into model-theoretic terms. With Translational Truth Constraint (TTC) now identified as the most fundamental constraint on intendedness, it remains to see if it will suffice to rule out as unintended all the models of ideal theory whose existence the Completeness Theorem guarantees. The issue is examined in section 3.6.
Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems ...
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Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems encountered here include the fact that actions can have an indefinite number of descriptions, that they can be subjected to indefinite spatio-temporal division, and that they give rise to indefinitely long causal chains of events. Solutions to these problems can be found through an application of Donald Davidson’s notion of actions as particulars, and by thinking of act-tokens as located in particular units within a space-time grid. Once possible actions have been adequately individuated, a formula for the measurement of freedom can be constructed, adapting a formula originally proposed by Hillel Steiner and taking into account the compossibility of particular actions and the probability of their being unconstrained. Careful attention to the structure of sets of available actions helps to mitigate some of the supposed counterintuitive implications of this analysis. Furthermore, subscribing to this empirical approach to the measurement of overall freedom does not necessarily imply subscribing to an empiricist or physicalist conception of action.Less
Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems encountered here include the fact that actions can have an indefinite number of descriptions, that they can be subjected to indefinite spatio-temporal division, and that they give rise to indefinitely long causal chains of events. Solutions to these problems can be found through an application of Donald Davidson’s notion of actions as particulars, and by thinking of act-tokens as located in particular units within a space-time grid. Once possible actions have been adequately individuated, a formula for the measurement of freedom can be constructed, adapting a formula originally proposed by Hillel Steiner and taking into account the compossibility of particular actions and the probability of their being unconstrained. Careful attention to the structure of sets of available actions helps to mitigate some of the supposed counterintuitive implications of this analysis. Furthermore, subscribing to this empirical approach to the measurement of overall freedom does not necessarily imply subscribing to an empiricist or physicalist conception of action.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question ...
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This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question is raised as to how meaning should be incorporated within it. In accord with the use-theoretic perspective of this book, an answer is developed whereby the association of I-sounds with I-meanings is achieved by virtue of the conceptual roles of those I-sounds, i.e., their basic acceptance-properties. It is shown that this picture compares favourably with various alternatives, including those suggested by Fodor’s mentalese, Davidson’s view of compositionality, naturalizations of the reference relation, and by Chomsky-style explicitly-represented definitions.Less
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question is raised as to how meaning should be incorporated within it. In accord with the use-theoretic perspective of this book, an answer is developed whereby the association of I-sounds with I-meanings is achieved by virtue of the conceptual roles of those I-sounds, i.e., their basic acceptance-properties. It is shown that this picture compares favourably with various alternatives, including those suggested by Fodor’s mentalese, Davidson’s view of compositionality, naturalizations of the reference relation, and by Chomsky-style explicitly-represented definitions.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and ...
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The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and what is its import? The answer is due to Davidson: that since we know (from Tarski) how to deduce the truth conditions of sentences from the referents of their words, we should explain it by identifying (or replacing) sentence-meanings with truth conditions and word-meanings with referents. This chapter offers a deflationary alternative according to which the meaning of a sentence is trivially compositional, since it is constituted by the facts concerning its structure and the meanings of its words. An important implication of this idea is that contrary to the writings of Fodor and Lepore, compositionality can place no constraint whatsoever on how word-meanings are engendered.Less
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and what is its import? The answer is due to Davidson: that since we know (from Tarski) how to deduce the truth conditions of sentences from the referents of their words, we should explain it by identifying (or replacing) sentence-meanings with truth conditions and word-meanings with referents. This chapter offers a deflationary alternative according to which the meaning of a sentence is trivially compositional, since it is constituted by the facts concerning its structure and the meanings of its words. An important implication of this idea is that contrary to the writings of Fodor and Lepore, compositionality can place no constraint whatsoever on how word-meanings are engendered.
Marcia Cavell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287086
- eISBN:
- 9780191603921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287082.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his ...
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This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change — the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations.Less
This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change — the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199739998
- eISBN:
- 9780199895045
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739998.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Figuratively Speaking (1986) examines figures of speech that concern meaning—irony, hyperbole, understatement, similes, metaphors, and others—to show how they work and to explain their ...
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Figuratively Speaking (1986) examines figures of speech that concern meaning—irony, hyperbole, understatement, similes, metaphors, and others—to show how they work and to explain their attraction. Building on the ideas of Paul Grice and Amos Tversky, this work shows how figurative language derives its power from its insistence that the reader participate in the text, looking beyond the literal meaning of the figurative language to the meanings that are implied. With examples ranging from Shakespeare, John Donne, and Jane Austen to e.e. cummings, Bessie Smith, and Monty Python, this work shows that the intellectual and aesthetic force of figurative language is not derived from inherent magical power, but instead from the opportunity it provides for unlimited elaboration in the hands of those gifted in its use. A distinctive feature of this work is that it presents a modern restatement of the view, first put forward by Aristotle, that metaphors are to be treated as elliptical similes. In a generalized form, this restatement of the Aristotelian view treats both metaphors and similes (and a number of other tropes) as figurative comparisons. The book then offers a detailed defense of this “comparativist” view of metaphors in response to the almost universal rejection of it by eminent philosophers. This new edition has extended the notion of figurative comparisons to cover synecdoche. It also ventures into new territory by considering two genres, fables and satires.Less
Figuratively Speaking (1986) examines figures of speech that concern meaning—irony, hyperbole, understatement, similes, metaphors, and others—to show how they work and to explain their attraction. Building on the ideas of Paul Grice and Amos Tversky, this work shows how figurative language derives its power from its insistence that the reader participate in the text, looking beyond the literal meaning of the figurative language to the meanings that are implied. With examples ranging from Shakespeare, John Donne, and Jane Austen to e.e. cummings, Bessie Smith, and Monty Python, this work shows that the intellectual and aesthetic force of figurative language is not derived from inherent magical power, but instead from the opportunity it provides for unlimited elaboration in the hands of those gifted in its use. A distinctive feature of this work is that it presents a modern restatement of the view, first put forward by Aristotle, that metaphors are to be treated as elliptical similes. In a generalized form, this restatement of the Aristotelian view treats both metaphors and similes (and a number of other tropes) as figurative comparisons. The book then offers a detailed defense of this “comparativist” view of metaphors in response to the almost universal rejection of it by eminent philosophers. This new edition has extended the notion of figurative comparisons to cover synecdoche. It also ventures into new territory by considering two genres, fables and satires.
Feng Bangyan and Nyaw Mee Kau
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789888028702
- eISBN:
- 9789882206946
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789888028702.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
Insurance is one of the oldest industries in Hong Kong, and it has long played a significant role in the city's economic development. Suffice it to say that the insurance industry has evolved in step ...
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Insurance is one of the oldest industries in Hong Kong, and it has long played a significant role in the city's economic development. Suffice it to say that the insurance industry has evolved in step with the economy at large. In essence, the industry's development encapsulates that of the overall development of the territory. The industry's birth in Hong Kong can be traced to the establishment of the Canton Insurance Office Ltd. and the Union Insurance Society of Canton in the nineteenth century. Canton Insurance was jointly formed, and run, by turns, by Davidson-Dent and Magniac & Co. In 1835, Dent quit the joint operation and set up Union Insurance. The following year, Jardine, Matheson & Co. re-established Canton Insurance as a limited liability company. After the British took over Hong Kong in 1841, Canton Insurance and Union Insurance moved their bases of operations and registered for business in what was soon to be the Crown colony.Less
Insurance is one of the oldest industries in Hong Kong, and it has long played a significant role in the city's economic development. Suffice it to say that the insurance industry has evolved in step with the economy at large. In essence, the industry's development encapsulates that of the overall development of the territory. The industry's birth in Hong Kong can be traced to the establishment of the Canton Insurance Office Ltd. and the Union Insurance Society of Canton in the nineteenth century. Canton Insurance was jointly formed, and run, by turns, by Davidson-Dent and Magniac & Co. In 1835, Dent quit the joint operation and set up Union Insurance. The following year, Jardine, Matheson & Co. re-established Canton Insurance as a limited liability company. After the British took over Hong Kong in 1841, Canton Insurance and Union Insurance moved their bases of operations and registered for business in what was soon to be the Crown colony.
