Dean Zimmerman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199766864
- eISBN:
- 9780199932184
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are two ways to combine the doctrine of complete divine foreknowledge with the philosophical thesis of libertarianism (i.e., that freedom and determinism are incompatible): Molinism (which ...
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There are two ways to combine the doctrine of complete divine foreknowledge with the philosophical thesis of libertarianism (i.e., that freedom and determinism are incompatible): Molinism (which requires the truth of what Plantinga has called “counterfactuals of freedom”) and simple foreknowledge (which does not). David Hunt has ably defended simple foreknowledge against its many critics; and he has claimed that God would have more providential control over the course of history if simple foreknowledge were true than if open theism were true (i.e., than if God did not know the outcomes of free choices until they happened). I develop a framework for describing different views about the “stages” in complete divine foreknowledge, and examine the providential advantages Hunt describes.Less
There are two ways to combine the doctrine of complete divine foreknowledge with the philosophical thesis of libertarianism (i.e., that freedom and determinism are incompatible): Molinism (which requires the truth of what Plantinga has called “counterfactuals of freedom”) and simple foreknowledge (which does not). David Hunt has ably defended simple foreknowledge against its many critics; and he has claimed that God would have more providential control over the course of history if simple foreknowledge were true than if open theism were true (i.e., than if God did not know the outcomes of free choices until they happened). I develop a framework for describing different views about the “stages” in complete divine foreknowledge, and examine the providential advantages Hunt describes.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198743972
- eISBN:
- 9780191803963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743972.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. ...
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Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. If M foresees that S chooses B on his own, M does nothing. S lacks options, but isn’t he free? The “dilemma defense” raises problems concerning foresight, but “blockage” (Mele and Robb) and “buffered” (Hunt) FSCs attempt to circumvent this defense. This chapter introduces a timeline and four theses, including the grounding principle. Anselmian FSCs are impossible since no one foresees what an agent will choose absent the agent’s choice. But an agent who chooses A (logically) cannot be made to choose B instead. Blockage cases fail, too, and buffered cases deny the “torn condition.” One possibility in which a divine manipulator might control the outcome of an agent’s a se choice—Rewind—is considered, but rejected.Less
Against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) Frankfurt proposes counterexamples (FSCs): Manipulator (M) wants agent (S) to choose B. If M foresees that S chooses A, M makes him choose B. If M foresees that S chooses B on his own, M does nothing. S lacks options, but isn’t he free? The “dilemma defense” raises problems concerning foresight, but “blockage” (Mele and Robb) and “buffered” (Hunt) FSCs attempt to circumvent this defense. This chapter introduces a timeline and four theses, including the grounding principle. Anselmian FSCs are impossible since no one foresees what an agent will choose absent the agent’s choice. But an agent who chooses A (logically) cannot be made to choose B instead. Blockage cases fail, too, and buffered cases deny the “torn condition.” One possibility in which a divine manipulator might control the outcome of an agent’s a se choice—Rewind—is considered, but rejected.
