Marian David
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. ...
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Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal.Less
Truthmakers have come to play a central role in David Armstrong's metaphysics. They are the things that stand in the relation of truthmaking to truthbearers. This chapter focuses on the relation. More specifically, it discusses a thesis Armstrong holds about truthmaking that is of special importance to him; namely, the thesis that truthmaking is an internal relation. It explores what work this thesis is supposed to do for Armstrong, especially for this doctrine of the ontological free lunch, raising questions and pointing out difficulties along the way. At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Armstrong's preferred truthbearers generate a serious difficulty for his thesis that the truthmaking relation is internal.
Bas C. van Fraassen
- Published in print:
- 1989
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198248606
- eISBN:
- 9780191597459
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198248601.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Universals accounts of laws of nature begin with a robust anti‐nominalism: there are real properties and relations that are to be distinguished from sets or arbitrary classifications. Those real ...
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Universals accounts of laws of nature begin with a robust anti‐nominalism: there are real properties and relations that are to be distinguished from sets or arbitrary classifications. Those real entities are then drawn on to provide a concept of laws operative in nature. Accounts of this sort here critically examined include those of Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong. These accounts display most saliently the impossibility of a simultaneous metaphysical solution to the joint problems of inference and of identification. Special attention is given to the failures of David Armstrong's account of probabilistic laws and of Michael Tooley's concept of probability inspired by Rudolf Carnap's views.Less
Universals accounts of laws of nature begin with a robust anti‐nominalism: there are real properties and relations that are to be distinguished from sets or arbitrary classifications. Those real entities are then drawn on to provide a concept of laws operative in nature. Accounts of this sort here critically examined include those of Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong. These accounts display most saliently the impossibility of a simultaneous metaphysical solution to the joint problems of inference and of identification. Special attention is given to the failures of David Armstrong's account of probabilistic laws and of Michael Tooley's concept of probability inspired by Rudolf Carnap's views.
Bas C. van Fraassen
- Published in print:
- 1989
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198248606
- eISBN:
- 9780191597459
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198248601.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter concentrates on isolating criteria of adequacy for any philosophical account of what laws of nature are. Sources include David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans Reichenbach, Donald ...
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This chapter concentrates on isolating criteria of adequacy for any philosophical account of what laws of nature are. Sources include David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans Reichenbach, Donald Davidson, David Armstrong, and David Lewis. Criteria examined pertain to universality, necessity, intensionality, explanation, prediction, confirmation, counter‐factuals, objectivity, and inference to the best explanation. Two main problems are presented: the problem of inference (that it is a law that A should imply that A is the case) and the problem of identification (there should be some identifiable aspect of nature that makes for laws). These two problems together constitute a dilemma, since a solution to one tends to pre‐empt any solution to the other.Less
This chapter concentrates on isolating criteria of adequacy for any philosophical account of what laws of nature are. Sources include David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans Reichenbach, Donald Davidson, David Armstrong, and David Lewis. Criteria examined pertain to universality, necessity, intensionality, explanation, prediction, confirmation, counter‐factuals, objectivity, and inference to the best explanation. Two main problems are presented: the problem of inference (that it is a law that A should imply that A is the case) and the problem of identification (there should be some identifiable aspect of nature that makes for laws). These two problems together constitute a dilemma, since a solution to one tends to pre‐empt any solution to the other.
Bas C. van Fraassen
- Published in print:
- 1989
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198248606
- eISBN:
- 9780191597459
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198248601.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Induction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of ...
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Induction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of traditional notions of Induction, and offer new foundations for inductive methods. This chapter and the next argue that neither Induction nor IBE qualifies as a rational strategy for change of opinion.Less
Induction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of traditional notions of Induction, and offer new foundations for inductive methods. This chapter and the next argue that neither Induction nor IBE qualifies as a rational strategy for change of opinion.
David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012560
- eISBN:
- 9780262255202
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to ...
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Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis (sometimes known as the “Canberra Plan” because many of its proponents have been associated with the Australian National University in Canberra) is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in everyday discourse. This book gathers work from a range of prominent philosophers who are working within this tradition, offering important new work as well as critical evaluations of the methodology. Its centerpiece is an important posthumous work by David Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility.” The chapters first address issues of philosophy of mind, semantics, and the new methodology’s a priori character, then turn to matters of metaphysics, and finally consider problems regarding normativity.Less
Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis (sometimes known as the “Canberra Plan” because many of its proponents have been associated with the Australian National University in Canberra) is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in everyday discourse. This book gathers work from a range of prominent philosophers who are working within this tradition, offering important new work as well as critical evaluations of the methodology. Its centerpiece is an important posthumous work by David Lewis, “Ramseyan Humility.” The chapters first address issues of philosophy of mind, semantics, and the new methodology’s a priori character, then turn to matters of metaphysics, and finally consider problems regarding normativity.
John Ryder
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780823244683
- eISBN:
- 9780823252770
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823244683.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
Chapter 4 defends the idea that particulars can be relational against what has been called the “standard view”. It begins with a brief description of an earlier version of a relational ontology in ...
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Chapter 4 defends the idea that particulars can be relational against what has been called the “standard view”. It begins with a brief description of an earlier version of a relational ontology in Hegel and British Hegelianism. Early 20th century philosophers, Bertrand Russell above all, rejected the idealism of British Hegelianism, and rested an alternative on a rejection of Hegelianism's relationality. Thus was born the “standard view” that particulars must be non-relational. The chapter explores the arguments of Russell, and more recently David Armstrong, and argues that their conclusions are not necessary, and thus there is no good reason to reject the possibility that particulars, and therefore nature generally, may be relational. Whether we ought to regard particulars as relational depends on the adequacy and plausibility of the ontology as it is developed, and on the conceptual work it can do.Less
Chapter 4 defends the idea that particulars can be relational against what has been called the “standard view”. It begins with a brief description of an earlier version of a relational ontology in Hegel and British Hegelianism. Early 20th century philosophers, Bertrand Russell above all, rejected the idealism of British Hegelianism, and rested an alternative on a rejection of Hegelianism's relationality. Thus was born the “standard view” that particulars must be non-relational. The chapter explores the arguments of Russell, and more recently David Armstrong, and argues that their conclusions are not necessary, and thus there is no good reason to reject the possibility that particulars, and therefore nature generally, may be relational. Whether we ought to regard particulars as relational depends on the adequacy and plausibility of the ontology as it is developed, and on the conceptual work it can do.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to Swinburne’s Bayesian argument from temporal order, the fact that our universe is ordered by relatively simple laws of nature is more probable if God exists than if he does not. If God ...
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According to Swinburne’s Bayesian argument from temporal order, the fact that our universe is ordered by relatively simple laws of nature is more probable if God exists than if he does not. If God does not exist, a completely chaotic universe allegedly is a priori more probable than a universe ordered by simple laws. However, this design argument from temporal order cannot be considered in isolation from the cosmological argument. With regard to each of three possible cosmological scenarios it can be shown that the argument from temporal order is unconvincing. Concerning design arguments from spatial order, Swinburne acknowledges that arguments on the basis of the functionality of organisms should be abandoned. Instead, he focuses on fine-tuning arguments. But neither the fine-tuning argument from logically possible universes nor the fine-tuning argument from complexity are convincing C-inductive arguments, which avoid the risk of God-of-the-gaps, even if they are supported by the argument from beauty.Less
According to Swinburne’s Bayesian argument from temporal order, the fact that our universe is ordered by relatively simple laws of nature is more probable if God exists than if he does not. If God does not exist, a completely chaotic universe allegedly is a priori more probable than a universe ordered by simple laws. However, this design argument from temporal order cannot be considered in isolation from the cosmological argument. With regard to each of three possible cosmological scenarios it can be shown that the argument from temporal order is unconvincing. Concerning design arguments from spatial order, Swinburne acknowledges that arguments on the basis of the functionality of organisms should be abandoned. Instead, he focuses on fine-tuning arguments. But neither the fine-tuning argument from logically possible universes nor the fine-tuning argument from complexity are convincing C-inductive arguments, which avoid the risk of God-of-the-gaps, even if they are supported by the argument from beauty.
Thomas Graham
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780813049373
- eISBN:
- 9780813050157
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813049373.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
During 1887 both Flagler and Franklin Smith hurried to complete their hotels. In 1887, a great fire destroyed part of the city, including the Catholic cathedral. Flagler helped finance its ...
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During 1887 both Flagler and Franklin Smith hurried to complete their hotels. In 1887, a great fire destroyed part of the city, including the Catholic cathedral. Flagler helped finance its reconstruction. James Renwick designed a bell tower to go with the rebuilt church. Bishop John Moore gave Flagler a piece of church land to compensate him for his financial help. Flagler and others attempted to save as much of “old” St. Augustine as possible, their efforts much resembling modern preservation movements. Terra cotta ornamentation went into the Ponce de Leon. Pottier and Stymus furnished the woodwork for the interior. The architect Bernard Maybeck joined the Carrère and Hastings firm while the hotel was being built. Louis C. Tiffany provided stained glass for the building. David Maitland Armstrong may have played a role in creation of the windows. George W. Maynard and Herman Schladermundt painted the murals on the ceilings of the hotel. The landscaping of the grounds was done in cooperation with Nathan Frank Barrett.Less
During 1887 both Flagler and Franklin Smith hurried to complete their hotels. In 1887, a great fire destroyed part of the city, including the Catholic cathedral. Flagler helped finance its reconstruction. James Renwick designed a bell tower to go with the rebuilt church. Bishop John Moore gave Flagler a piece of church land to compensate him for his financial help. Flagler and others attempted to save as much of “old” St. Augustine as possible, their efforts much resembling modern preservation movements. Terra cotta ornamentation went into the Ponce de Leon. Pottier and Stymus furnished the woodwork for the interior. The architect Bernard Maybeck joined the Carrère and Hastings firm while the hotel was being built. Louis C. Tiffany provided stained glass for the building. David Maitland Armstrong may have played a role in creation of the windows. George W. Maynard and Herman Schladermundt painted the murals on the ceilings of the hotel. The landscaping of the grounds was done in cooperation with Nathan Frank Barrett.
Frank Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262012560
- eISBN:
- 9780262255202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter shows that in advancing physicalist views of mind, Jack Smart, David Lewis, and David Armstrong were working within a tradition. It then asks, “What is the rationale for this tradition?” ...
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This chapter shows that in advancing physicalist views of mind, Jack Smart, David Lewis, and David Armstrong were working within a tradition. It then asks, “What is the rationale for this tradition?” The answer to this question is divided into five parts: one part is a thesis about properties and similarity, one part is a thesis about similarity and logical space, one part is a thesis about certain claims in fundamental metaphysics, one part is a thesis about similarities between aggregations, and one part is a certain optimism about our ability to capture similarities and patterns in words. With that many considerations, there is ample scope for dissent somewhere along the way, but the aim here is to make the argument path as clear as possible so it will not overwhelm with the detail of various considerations along the way.Less
This chapter shows that in advancing physicalist views of mind, Jack Smart, David Lewis, and David Armstrong were working within a tradition. It then asks, “What is the rationale for this tradition?” The answer to this question is divided into five parts: one part is a thesis about properties and similarity, one part is a thesis about similarity and logical space, one part is a thesis about certain claims in fundamental metaphysics, one part is a thesis about similarities between aggregations, and one part is a certain optimism about our ability to capture similarities and patterns in words. With that many considerations, there is ample scope for dissent somewhere along the way, but the aim here is to make the argument path as clear as possible so it will not overwhelm with the detail of various considerations along the way.
