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The Zünghar Invasion

Trent Pomplun

in Jesuit on the Roof of the World: Ippolito Desideri's Mission to Tibet

Desideri flees the capital to escape the Zünghar invasion of 1717 in the fourth chapter, which will largely be taken up by Desideri's narrative of the carnage that followed. This chapter outlines the ... More

Desideri flees the capital to escape the Zünghar invasion of 1717 in the fourth chapter, which will largely be taken up by Desideri's narrative of the carnage that followed. This chapter outlines the dominant ideological and political myths of seventeenth and early eighteenth century Tibet, especially those involving the Dalai Lamas, and addresses the missionary's understanding of the uniquely Tibetan understanding of reincarnation. This approach synthesizes much of the new research being done in Tibetan Studies today and introduces the reader to many of the ideas that the young Jesuit would later present to his European readers. The violent political struggles of seventeenth and eighteenth‐century Tibet also allow the reader to discern the political motives behind Desideri's writing that will be outlined in the fifth chapter and will set the stage for an assessment of his capacities as an historian.Less

The Dalai Lama Returns to Lhasa

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

The final decision about whether the Dalai Lama should return to Lhasa came after a three-day Assembly meeting of all government officials present in Yadong in early July 1951. The largest group in ... More

The final decision about whether the Dalai Lama should return to Lhasa came after a three-day Assembly meeting of all government officials present in Yadong in early July 1951. The largest group in Yadong was composed of officials who felt strongly that the Dalai Lama should return to Lhasa. While the United States was the only outside country that had offered Tibet any support, it had not offered a real hope of preventing the Chinese takeover or of Tibet regaining control in the near future. A second problem with the Americans' offers was that they were invariably contingent on the cooperation of the Government of India. The Dalai Lama's immediate future, therefore, was now committed to dealing with Zhang Jingwu and his comrades in a way that would preserve his authority and the integrity of Tibetan religion and society, albeit as an integral part of China.Less

The Dalai Lama in Beijing

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

The arrival of the Dalai Lama and his top officials in Beijing on 4 September 1954 opened a critical window of opportunity for the Chinese leadership. Winning over the Dalai Lama had been central to ... More

The arrival of the Dalai Lama and his top officials in Beijing on 4 September 1954 opened a critical window of opportunity for the Chinese leadership. Winning over the Dalai Lama had been central to Mao's gradualist strategy, but until then direct access of the Chinese to the Dalai Lama had been extremely limited. The CCP now had a rare opportunity to create a favorable impression about China, the CCP, and socialism. It also afforded the Chinese an excellent opportunity to revisit a number of outstanding issues that had been left in abeyance in 1951 and 1952, such as the Military-Administrative Committee, the Tibetan army, Tibetan currency, and the Panchen-Dalai lama conflict.Less

Struggle for Buddhist Government

Peter Schwieger

in The Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China: A Political History of the Tibetan Institution of Reincarnation

This chapter details events that ultimately led to the incorporation of Tibet into the Qing Empire and its administration. These include the death of the fifth dalai Lama in 1682, which was kept ... More

This chapter details events that ultimately led to the incorporation of Tibet into the Qing Empire and its administration. These include the death of the fifth dalai Lama in 1682, which was kept secret by his regent for a good fifteen years—not only from the Tibetan public but also from the emperor and the aristocracy of the various Mongol tribes; and the disappearance into retreat in 1651 of zhapdrung Ngawang Namgyel, who, like the Fifth Dalai Lama, had established the “union of religion and politics” in Bhutan, and whose death was not revealed until around 1705. In effect, during these years the Tibetan and Bhutanese states were both ruled by corpses, in a manner of speaking.Less

Initial Contacts and Strategies

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

The challenge for the Dalai Lama was to develop a strategy for Tibet to coexist successfully as part of the People's Republic of China. A new era in Tibet was clearly beginning, but it was not at all ... More

The challenge for the Dalai Lama was to develop a strategy for Tibet to coexist successfully as part of the People's Republic of China. A new era in Tibet was clearly beginning, but it was not at all clear how Tibet would best achieve its goals. Getting the Tibetan local government to sign the Seventeen-Point Agreement and allow Chinese troops and officials to enter Tibet peacefully was only the first step in Mao's Tibet strategy. Mao wanted more — to integrate Tibet harmoniously into the Communist Chinese state. In the traditional Tibetan polity, the people had no say in political affairs and were prohibited even from publicly criticizing the government. But times were changing, and later, a real people's association would become a political player, confronting the Chinese and almost precipitating a deadly outbreak of violence in Lhasa.Less

The Panchen Lama and the People’s Liberation Army

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

Another thorny problem still outstanding in these early months was the return of the Panchen Lama. In addition to the lack of a unified strategy within the Tibetan government, there was also a ... More

Another thorny problem still outstanding in these early months was the return of the Panchen Lama. In addition to the lack of a unified strategy within the Tibetan government, there was also a long-term divisive conflict between Tibet's two greatest lamas, the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama. Throughout the 1950s, this conflict was like a dangerous riptide pulling all sorts of issues into its midst, not only on the Tibetan side, but also on the Chinese side, where it created a deep split between the leaders of the Northwest and Southwest Bureaus in Tibet.Less

The Dalai Lama Goes to Beijing

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

At the same time that an anti-Chinese resistance organization was developing in India, a major political event occurred within Tibet — an invitation from the Central Committee for the Dalai Lama to ... More

At the same time that an anti-Chinese resistance organization was developing in India, a major political event occurred within Tibet — an invitation from the Central Committee for the Dalai Lama to visit China. In the spring of 1954, the Central Committee set September as the date for the inaugural meeting of the National People's Congress. With things going well in Tibet, this was to be China's first chance to gain direct access to the Dalai Lama and influence his attitudes and thinking. The invitation to the Dalai Lama had another important consequence; it led to a revival of the People's Association.Less

The Return to Lhasa

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

After an amazing six months in Beijing and inland China, on 12 March 1955, the two lamas and their entourages set off for Qinghai Province to start their trip back to Tibet. Whenever the Dalai Lama ... More

After an amazing six months in Beijing and inland China, on 12 March 1955, the two lamas and their entourages set off for Qinghai Province to start their trip back to Tibet. Whenever the Dalai Lama went to visit Chinese cities, the top officials, such as the governor and the first party secretary, always personally welcomed him if they were in town. The Dalai Lama arrived in Lhasa on 23 June 1955. For Mao, the trip was a resounding success. His gradualist strategy had set out to win over the Dalai Lama and then work down through him to transform Tibet and Tibetans. For the Dalai Lama, the trip was also a great success. He now felt that Tibet could fit into the new China as an autonomous region run by Tibetans so consequently felt great optimism and hope for the future.Less

Turning to the Dalai Lama and Removing the Sitsab

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

With tension at a heightened level, the Chinese now decided to bypass the sitsab and turn directly to the Dalai Lama for assistance in restoring order. Between 31 March and 4 April 1952, Zhang Jingwu ... More

With tension at a heightened level, the Chinese now decided to bypass the sitsab and turn directly to the Dalai Lama for assistance in restoring order. Between 31 March and 4 April 1952, Zhang Jingwu sent three letters to the Dalai Lama via the Kashag about this. On 1 April, the Central Committee sent the Tibet Work Committee a telegram revealing Mao's loss of confidence in the independent judgment of the leaders of the Tibet Work Committee. However, the Dalai Lama again did not take action regarding the bigger issues raised by Zhang Jingwu, and on the streets nothing changed. In the view of the Chinese, members of the People's Association, together with some monks and soldiers, continued actively to harass them. The Dalai Lama's refusal to intervene with the sitsab reflects his lack of involvement in the critical political events going on around him.Less

The Tibetan Buddhist World

Timothy Brook, Michael van Walt van Praag, and Miek Boltjes (eds)

in Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan

Buddhism and the authority of Tibetan hierarchs provided legitimacy of rule not only for Tibetans themselves, but for Mongol, Manchu, Bhutanese, Sikkimese, and Chinese rulers and their polities. The ... More

Buddhism and the authority of Tibetan hierarchs provided legitimacy of rule not only for Tibetans themselves, but for Mongol, Manchu, Bhutanese, Sikkimese, and Chinese rulers and their polities. The Buddhist relationship between a spiritual teacher and secular disciple formed the basis for the Teacher-Benefactor (or Priest-Patron) relations forged between powerful Tibetan lamas and Mongol and Manchu rulers who supported their religious institutions, and their state as well, financially, politically and militarily. Phagpa and Khubilai Khan build the model for this religio-political relationship, a model on which Manchu rulers subsequently drew. The financial impact of Teacher-Benefactor relations is revealed by the enormous value of the gifts Mongol pilgrims presented to Tibetan lamas and their monasteries. South of the Himalayas, the Tibetan Buddhist order shaped the political system as well, despite the at times strained relations between Tibet and Himalayan polities. The complexity and paradoxes of constructing relations to meet both religious and political imperatives became particularly pronounced between the Dalai Lamas of Tibet and Qing emperors after the latter asserted exclusive authority as chief benefactors and protectors in the mid-eighteenth century, and especially following the Qing intervention to help Tibet drive out invading Gorkha armies.Less

The Emperor Takes Control

Peter Schwieger

in The Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China: A Political History of the Tibetan Institution of Reincarnation

This chapter discusses how the emperor increasingly used to the social role of the trülku for his own political agenda. It details the how important control of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism ... More

This chapter discusses how the emperor increasingly used to the social role of the trülku for his own political agenda. It details the how important control of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism was in the Inner Asian power play between the Chinese emperor and the Tibetan regent; the regent's efforts to resist the emperor's pressure and to persevere with his own agenda, even at the beginning of the eighteenth century; the reincarnation of the Sixth Dalai Lama; the establishment of Qing control over eastern Tibet; Tibet's civil war; and the exile of the Dalai Lama in eastern Tibet for six year beginning in 1728.Less

An Interlude in Beijing

Melvyn C. Goldstein, Dawei Sherap, and William R. Siebenschuh

in A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phuntso Wangye

In 1953, Phüntso Wangye was sent to Beijing with a delegation of Tibetan religious leaders attending the inaugural meeting of the Buddhist Association of China. Just before they were going to depart, ... More

In 1953, Phüntso Wangye was sent to Beijing with a delegation of Tibetan religious leaders attending the inaugural meeting of the Buddhist Association of China. Just before they were going to depart, two senior cadres from the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, Wang Feng and Liu Geping, informed him that it had been suggested that he remain in Beijing. Two major events occurred in China in 1954 that affected Phüntso's life: the inaugural meeting of the National People's Congress and its approval of China's first constitution, and the Dalai Lama's first visit to inland China. The central government felt strongly that it was important for the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to resolve their differences, and so encouraged them to use this opportunity to discuss the outstanding issues. The Dalai Lama then prepared to leave for Tibet after the May First celebration.Less

The Tibet Issue in Sino-Indian Relations

Tien-sze Fang

in Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations

The Tibet issue is still a sensitive and intractable issue for China’s diplomacy. This Chapter provides a brief account of China’s ‘liberation’ of Tibet, pointing out India’s special role and Tibet’s ... More

The Tibet issue is still a sensitive and intractable issue for China’s diplomacy. This Chapter provides a brief account of China’s ‘liberation’ of Tibet, pointing out India’s special role and Tibet’s significance for China. As will be suggested in this chapter, the Chinese are not satisfied with India’s approach to the Tibet issue, particularly its accommodation of the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile. Although the Indian side has said in explicit terms that Tibet is a part of China and has stated that the Dalai Lama cannot carry out political activities in India, Beijing remains intensely suspicious of India’s Tibetan policy, and levels the criticism that India has been very reluctant to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. On the other hand, India has adopted a cautious approach in dealing with the Tibet issue, and faces a dilemma about playing the ‘Tibet card’.Less

Debate as a Diasporic Pedagogy

in Discipline and Debate: The Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery

This chapter argues that debate should be understood in relation to the Dalai Lama's reflexive activities, which are accessed through a consideration of his influential public addresses to Tibetans ... More

This chapter argues that debate should be understood in relation to the Dalai Lama's reflexive activities, which are accessed through a consideration of his influential public addresses to Tibetans in India (1959–2000). It suggests that the debate-based philosophical curriculum has been reframed by some as a modern diasporic pedagogy—a means by which Tibetans can cultivate an autonomous, critical rationality, the exercise of which confers a certain “stability” upon diasporic subjects. In the Dalai Lama's addresses, Buddhism is said to be a religion of reason that eschews blind faith and embraces critical thinking. Whatever functions these discourses might serve outside India, for Tibetan refugees in India they are frequently linked to diasporic and nationalist concerns and projects. A diasporic pedagogy, debate becomes a method for refugees to steel themselves against pluralism in exile and hold fast to their identity and religious patrimony for an eventual return to their homeland.Less

The United States Intervenes

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

Shakabpa, the Tibetan government official in India who had taken the lead in communicating with the United States and India, argued strongly that America was sympathetic and that Tibet would receive ... More

Shakabpa, the Tibetan government official in India who had taken the lead in communicating with the United States and India, argued strongly that America was sympathetic and that Tibet would receive strong support from it. However, his verbal optimism was met with considerable incredulity from the officials in favor of returning to Lhasa. The United States, of course, was interested in Tibet because American foreign policy at this time was focused on combating and containing communism, which it felt had replaced Nazi fascism as the main enemy of freedom and democracy. Tibet, therefore, was a potent example of Communist aggression against a small, peaceful country. Ambassador Loy Henderson's supportive letter to the Dalai Lama strongly urged him to oppose the Chinese and seek asylum abroad.Less

Buddhist Government under the Imperial Umbrella

Peter Schwieger

in The Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China: A Political History of the Tibetan Institution of Reincarnation

This chapter describes the reorganization of the Tibetan government under imperial rule. In 1750, after forestalling an impending revolt against the emperor by Tibetan ruler Gyurmé Namgyel, the court ... More

This chapter describes the reorganization of the Tibetan government under imperial rule. In 1750, after forestalling an impending revolt against the emperor by Tibetan ruler Gyurmé Namgyel, the court in Beijing reached three major conclusions. The first was that it was ill-advised to leave political power in the hands of the Tibetan aristocracy alone. The second was that the Dalai Lama should be reinstalled as the lord of Tibet. And the third was that control should be strengthened through the ambans or imperial representatives. The reorganization of the Tibetan government was devised by a commission under the leadership of Cereng, the governor-general of Sichuan Province. Enacted in 1751, the new document regulating the Tibetan government contained thirteen articles. The remainder of the chapter discusses the installation of trülkus as regents; the Qing dynasty's increasing interest in Tibetan Buddhism; and how a military conflict with Tibet's new southern neighbor provided the opportunity to execute a serious blow to the top of the Karma Kagyü hierarchy.Less

What Happens When Nothing Happens

Chris Thompson

in Felt: Fluxus, Joseph Beuys, and the Dalai Lama

This chapter details the meeting organized between Joseph Beuys and the Dalai Lama, and its aftermath. The meeting took place in Germany during the 1980s by one of Beuys’ contemporaries, Louwrien ... More

This chapter details the meeting organized between Joseph Beuys and the Dalai Lama, and its aftermath. The meeting took place in Germany during the 1980s by one of Beuys’ contemporaries, Louwrien Wijers. Both her mentor, Beuys, as well as the Dalai Lama, share the same ideals of impermanence and compassion, although the meeting itself had proved inconclusive. Beuys had received no great insight on art and its capacity for social change—the historic event was, in a word, uneventful. Nothing happened and kept on happening, yet within this sphere of nothingness the two men were able to engage in an interhuman intrigue that would affect both Beuys and his fellow Fluxus artists for the years to come. And perhaps Beuys himself had, in some small way, been able to influence the political rift between China and Tibet in the years to come.Less

Conflict within the Communist Party in Tibet

Melvyn C. Goldstein

in A History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955

As the Chinese side's relationship with the Tibetan government and local Tibetans was improving, party unity was deteriorating within the Tibet Work Committee when fundamental differences between ... More

As the Chinese side's relationship with the Tibetan government and local Tibetans was improving, party unity was deteriorating within the Tibet Work Committee when fundamental differences between Northwest and Southwest bureau officials exploded over the status of the Panchen Lama and the overall strategy for reforming Tibet. It exacerbated the split between the Northwest and Southwest bureau officials within the Tibet Work Committee. Fan Ming and his Northwest colleagues felt the party should have insisted that the Dalai Lama treat the Panchen Lama as an equal, while Zhang Guohua, Tan Guansan, and Zhang Jingwu disagreed with this, interpreting the Central Committee's instructions to mean they should treat the Dalai Lama as superior to the Panchen Lama. The Southwest's view prevailed, but Fan Ming and the Northwest officials thought this approach was ill conceived.Less