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This chapter discusses that traditional espionage using human spies peaked in Germany in the years 1945-1961. It explains two goals in conducting espionage in East Germany: to provide warning of any attack on Western Europe by the Soviet army, and to use the DDR's (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) connections with the Soviet Union to penetrate the latter. It also discusses the large programmes of arrests carried out by the Stasi of large numbers of Western spies and anti-Communist resistance fighters. It explains that despite losing many of its sources, the CIA claims that it achieved great success in Germany that resulted from the number of their spies and the depth of their penetration of East Germany's ministries, factories, political parties, armed forces, and Western services. It adds that the open border in Berlin allowed the Western secret services to fully exploit flight from the SED regime and resistance to it.

This chapter begins by discussing the targets and methods in the field of scientific espionage. It explains that a key factor of containment was having enough military force to deter Soviet aggression. It adds that spying on Soviet and satellite weaponry and war-related scientific research served the policies of containment and deterrence. It also investigates the intelligence on soviet scientific research and development. It explains that in order to exploit connections with the USSR, a standard method was to encourage suitably qualified spies to apply for jobs in targeted ministries, the East German army, or the SED. It discusses that spying on war-related research and development overlapped with broader industrial spying, for much science and technology with civilian applications was also relevant to war. It then explains that the West gained deep penetration of DDR's factories and research and development institutions active across the whole field of advanced technology.

National reconciliation efforts include the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and others affected by the war, demining, and the rehabilitation of basic services and infrastructure. This chapter argues that governments need to carry out these efforts continuously and implacably, from the early emergency phase to the end of economic reconstruction, when the country moves back to normal development. The chapter analyzes the danger that peace agreements and UN Security Council resolutions build up unrealistic expectations; the importance of ensuring proper planning, financing, synchronization, and sustainability of all peace-related programs until their full completion; the difficulty of moving away from emergency programs and humanitarian aid to the effective utilization of reconstruction aid to rebuild infrastructure, services, and other investment; and the role of governments, donors, and public-private partnerships in rebuilding and financing infrastructure. It also analyzes the rules for national reconciliation to ensure that past violence is addressed.

Siegel talks about the experience of doing research in the archives of the former office of State security in what Americans called/call East Germany (DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik), and about the thinking that underlies her experimental documentary on the DDR. DDR/DDR focuses primarily on the DDR’s surveillance industry, that short-lived nation’s largest employer, and on the popularity of a re-tooled version of the American Western by East German filmmakers who saw the Native Americans, the “redskins,” as “reds” whose communal way of living was analogous to the communist East German state. Siegel simultaneously calls up the various tropes of lecture documentary, observational and provocational documentary, and questions their implications. The doubling of the title has various implications, including the doubling of East Germany before and after “the Wende” (the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany).

This chapter investigates the gendered assumptions that underpin policy makers' responses to the question, “Why did so few women and girls participate in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in Sierra Leone?” It claims that the majority of policy responses to this question send three specific gendered messages. First, they perpetuate the notion of women as ideal victims lacking agency during war. Second, these accounts of the DDR presume that the program was effective and that the problem was that women and girls were not sufficiently included in the process. Third, those organizations that acknowledged the need to address women's and girls' specific gendered needs never asked women or girls what these needs were, implying that gender sensitivity can be achieved without speaking to beneficiaries.

This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book, reveals the consequences of these programs, and presents alternative policy options, offering three main criticisms. First, these programs fail to engage with how masculinity and femininity inform the radicalization process, and cannot understand personal drivers or the sociopolitical environment. Second, male radicalization is unreflectively linked to a flawed masculinity, and women’s radicalization depends on orientalist stereotypes about passivity and subjugation. Solutions hinge on particular ideals of masculinity that few men can obtain, while women are seen as a rescue mission. Third, a paternalist logic justifies intervention in ordinary lives in the name of security, yet fails to deliver. A gendered differential exists in the impact of counter-radicalization measures, and there are wider consequences. Individuals are denied agency, not given the option to critique for themselves the non-radical versions of agency and self being presented to them, engendering a limited form of loyalty to and security for the state.

Research on decommissioning usually falls within a larger literature on disarmament-demobilization-reintegration (DDR). Although much of the literature on DDR treats it as a single process, some scholars have narrowed in on the process of disarmament (or decommissioning as it was called in Northern Ireland). This work makes several assumptions. First, a process for disarmament is usually an integral part of most peace processes. Second, international third parties are crucial to the process. Third, failure to decommission quickly or in full faith is usually a sign that violence between parties will resume. This chapter argues that decommissioning in Northern Ireland’s peace process does not conform to theoretical expectations about the role of decommissioning. In Northern Ireland peace makers avoided establishing a detailed process for decommissioning because many worried such details would thwart a deal. Though the failure to decommission did have political consequences—the power sharing Assembly at the centre of the Agreement was shuttered for several years—it did not lead a resumption of violence between parties. Rather, delays in the process contributed to spikes in internal violence.

This chapter contains the personal reminiscence of the author as a scientist in the twentieth century, including my years in Berlin and contacts with scientists (including Angela Merkel) of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany). From Berlin I travelled to California and then onto Munich. In each place although there was a different way to do science, a common denominator existed. We shared the same rules along with a different approach to the problems to be solved, compared to present science: our desire and interest to discover new things was greater than that to publish another paper. I also include here personal anecdotes of the first signs of bad practices in science.

This chapter highlights the changes in the scope and scale of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants over the past thirty years and explores the likely trajectories of DDR in the twenty-first century. Over the past two decades the expectations of what DDR should achieve have dramatically expanded. It is not only a regular feature of conventional UN-mandated peace-support interventions, but also increasingly a component of counter-insurgency, stabilization, crime prevention, and counter-extremist operations. In the process, DDR has transformed from a carefully sequenced and discrete set of activities mandated by a peace agreement to an ever-widening array of security and development measures that can include the negotiation and implementation of the terms of peace. These changes in the policy and practice of DDR are precipitated by a transformation in the dynamics of organized violence around the world and the corresponding exigencies of diplomatic, defence, and development experts.