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This chapter discusses that traditional espionage using human spies peaked in Germany in the years 1945-1961. It explains two goals in conducting espionage in East Germany: to provide warning of any attack on Western Europe by the Soviet army, and to use the DDR's (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) connections with the Soviet Union to penetrate the latter. It also discusses the large programmes of arrests carried out by the Stasi of large numbers of Western spies and anti-Communist resistance fighters. It explains that despite losing many of its sources, the CIA claims that it achieved great success in Germany that resulted from the number of their spies and the depth of their penetration of East Germany's ministries, factories, political parties, armed forces, and Western services. It adds that the open border in Berlin allowed the Western secret services to fully exploit flight from the SED regime and resistance to it.

This chapter begins by discussing the targets and methods in the field of scientific espionage. It explains that a key factor of containment was having enough military force to deter Soviet aggression. It adds that spying on Soviet and satellite weaponry and war-related scientific research served the policies of containment and deterrence. It also investigates the intelligence on soviet scientific research and development. It explains that in order to exploit connections with the USSR, a standard method was to encourage suitably qualified spies to apply for jobs in targeted ministries, the East German army, or the SED. It discusses that spying on war-related research and development overlapped with broader industrial spying, for much science and technology with civilian applications was also relevant to war. It then explains that the West gained deep penetration of DDR's factories and research and development institutions active across the whole field of advanced technology.

National reconciliation efforts include the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and others affected by the war, demining, and the rehabilitation of basic services and infrastructure. This chapter argues that governments need to carry out these efforts continuously and implacably, from the early emergency phase to the end of economic reconstruction, when the country moves back to normal development. The chapter analyzes the danger that peace agreements and UN Security Council resolutions build up unrealistic expectations; the importance of ensuring proper planning, financing, synchronization, and sustainability of all peace-related programs until their full completion; the difficulty of moving away from emergency programs and humanitarian aid to the effective utilization of reconstruction aid to rebuild infrastructure, services, and other investment; and the role of governments, donors, and public-private partnerships in rebuilding and financing infrastructure. It also analyzes the rules for national reconciliation to ensure that past violence is addressed.

Siegel talks about the experience of doing research in the archives of the former office of State security in what Americans called/call East Germany (DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik), and about the thinking that underlies her experimental documentary on the DDR. DDR/DDR focuses primarily on the DDR’s surveillance industry, that short-lived nation’s largest employer, and on the popularity of a re-tooled version of the American Western by East German filmmakers who saw the Native Americans, the “redskins,” as “reds” whose communal way of living was analogous to the communist East German state. Siegel simultaneously calls up the various tropes of lecture documentary, observational and provocational documentary, and questions their implications. The doubling of the title has various implications, including the doubling of East Germany before and after “the Wende” (the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany).

Back again in the so-called Heldenstadt (city of heroes), as the faded bumper stickers on a few cars remind me. Is the word now tinged with irony? Though the city is in the middle of a construction boom, Leipzigers are the first to tell you that the city’s heroic image has been badly tarnished in the last few years. A warm mid-September afternoon in the smoggy city center. I take a seat in one of the cafes that dot the streets near the University. Students sit inside with books in their laps, talking animatedly to one another. Across the street is the Leipzig railway station—before the war, it was the biggest in Europe—and the Gewandhaus, where the Leipzig orchestra plays. Kurt Masur, who helped negotiate with police to hold their fire against Leipzig protesters before the city’s first mass demonstration— four years ago come October 9—is still conducting at the Gewandhaus. Otherwise, everything seems to have changed—the Leipzig smog excepted. Ute, a 23-year-old, first-year Germanistik student at the University, enters and greets me. Once an accomplished teenage ice skater in a top Sportschule—indeed, at 16, a young Privilegierte (privileged one) on her way to joining the elite traveling Sportkader—Ute is still slim and athletic. She has come to tell me about her expulsion almost a decade ago from the elect Red circle, the causes of which, she told me on the phone, “I have lately been brooding about incessantly.” She did not elaborate. I know only that the saga of her youthful rebellion against the State and her struggle to leave the DDR in 1988/89 had begun soon thereafter. Reared in Weissenfels, a town near Leipzig, Ute was born into a family of athletes. In the 1950s, her father competed on the DDR national ice hockey team and her mother was a top handball player and member of the DDR national championship squad; Ute’s older brother, Dieter, reached the Thuringia championship soccer team.

“Peace Street.” As we drive up to the home of Wolfgang Harich, 72, one of the leading intellectual controversialists in postwar Germany—indeed a one-man battlefield where DDR history and identity have fought themselves out—I remark to my friend Ulrike on the ironies of his address. It seemed to evoke what Harich wished for himself, after decades of struggle to regain his good name: to rest in peace. And that he not, as he once said, “go dishonored to the grave.” Ulrike, 35, a western Berlin linguist, is interested in hearing more about Harich’s history. The DDR itself is like a dream to her, she says—let alone such distant events such as Harich’s arrest and trial for sedition in 1956/57. She doesn’t remember ever paying much attention to the DDR; East Berlin was just a few streets yet a world away. She does not know much about DDR history, but as a Berliner, she says, she has always felt some special bond to “the east.” She too is eager to meet Wolfgang Harich, the man whose comprehensive reform proposals constituted the only Party attempt at internal restructuring of the DDR before its collapse in 1989/90. I talk about Harich’s reputation as a young man—what I’ve heard of it from acquaintances, such as Monika Hüchel, wife of the poet Peter Hüchel and a former colleague of Harich at the Tägliche Rundschau. Harich was “quite a ladies’ man,” she noted, very much a bon vivant, glittering in his wit and repartee amid the rubble in postwar Berlin. Brilliant, gossipy, impulsive, principled, rational, visionary, high-minded, refractory, moralizing, self-righteous: Harich, son of the distinguished literary critic Walther Harich—who died when Harich was a small boy—came from a well-to-do German bourgeois family and seemed in the late 1940s a throwback to an earlier era of broadly cultivated European intellectuals. I had long hoped to meet Wolfgang Harich—ever since I had read the 1956 Spiegel cover story about him—in which the editor of the Deutsche Rundschau had called him “an intellectual phenomenon,” “a pure intellect on two feet,” and “a genius, an intellectual Wunderkind.”

This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book, reveals the consequences of these programs, and presents alternative policy options, offering three main criticisms. First, these programs fail to engage with how masculinity and femininity inform the radicalization process, and cannot understand personal drivers or the sociopolitical environment. Second, male radicalization is unreflectively linked to a flawed masculinity, and women’s radicalization depends on orientalist stereotypes about passivity and subjugation. Solutions hinge on particular ideals of masculinity that few men can obtain, while women are seen as a rescue mission. Third, a paternalist logic justifies intervention in ordinary lives in the name of security, yet fails to deliver. A gendered differential exists in the impact of counter-radicalization measures, and there are wider consequences. Individuals are denied agency, not given the option to critique for themselves the non-radical versions of agency and self being presented to them, engendering a limited form of loyalty to and security for the state.

Research on decommissioning usually falls within a larger literature on disarmament-demobilization-reintegration (DDR). Although much of the literature on DDR treats it as a single process, some scholars have narrowed in on the process of disarmament (or decommissioning as it was called in Northern Ireland). This work makes several assumptions. First, a process for disarmament is usually an integral part of most peace processes. Second, international third parties are crucial to the process. Third, failure to decommission quickly or in full faith is usually a sign that violence between parties will resume. This chapter argues that decommissioning in Northern Ireland’s peace process does not conform to theoretical expectations about the role of decommissioning. In Northern Ireland peace makers avoided establishing a detailed process for decommissioning because many worried such details would thwart a deal. Though the failure to decommission did have political consequences—the power sharing Assembly at the centre of the Agreement was shuttered for several years—it did not lead a resumption of violence between parties. Rather, delays in the process contributed to spikes in internal violence.

This chapter investigates the gendered assumptions that underpin policy makers' responses to the question, “Why did so few women and girls participate in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in Sierra Leone?” It claims that the majority of policy responses to this question send three specific gendered messages. First, they perpetuate the notion of women as ideal victims lacking agency during war. Second, these accounts of the DDR presume that the program was effective and that the problem was that women and girls were not sufficiently included in the process. Third, those organizations that acknowledged the need to address women's and girls' specific gendered needs never asked women or girls what these needs were, implying that gender sensitivity can be achieved without speaking to beneficiaries.

This chapter contains the personal reminiscence of the author as a scientist in the twentieth century, including my years in Berlin and contacts with scientists (including Angela Merkel) of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany). From Berlin I travelled to California and then onto Munich. In each place although there was a different way to do science, a common denominator existed. We shared the same rules along with a different approach to the problems to be solved, compared to present science: our desire and interest to discover new things was greater than that to publish another paper. I also include here personal anecdotes of the first signs of bad practices in science.

This chapter highlights the changes in the scope and scale of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants over the past thirty years and explores the likely trajectories of DDR in the twenty-first century. Over the past two decades the expectations of what DDR should achieve have dramatically expanded. It is not only a regular feature of conventional UN-mandated peace-support interventions, but also increasingly a component of counter-insurgency, stabilization, crime prevention, and counter-extremist operations. In the process, DDR has transformed from a carefully sequenced and discrete set of activities mandated by a peace agreement to an ever-widening array of security and development measures that can include the negotiation and implementation of the terms of peace. These changes in the policy and practice of DDR are precipitated by a transformation in the dynamics of organized violence around the world and the corresponding exigencies of diplomatic, defence, and development experts.