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This chapter discusses cybersecurity in an era when everyone is constantly using the Internet. It highlights the importance of research to ensure that information stays safe while users are on the Internet. Artificial intelligence and machine learning are proposed as possible avenues to securing cyberspace. However, much is still unknown, and collaboration among individuals in different fields is important to advance the research in cybersecurity. The author calls for greater investment in the training of future cyberpractitioners at all levels of expertise.

This chapter tracks the expansion of digital surveillance across consumer activities, military actions, social media, and digital communications. It assesses a de facto commitment across corporations and state agencies to ubiquitous surveillance; that is, to real time collection of digital information and the production of large, permanent, ever-growing data sets subject to emerging and automated algorithmic assessment. Ubiquitous surveillance blurs distinctions between war and peace, intelligence and commerce, as well as public and private to an unprecedented degree. It also assumes that a full integration of data collection and data mining into everyday life is ultimately possible, encouraging the transformation of everyday objects, public spaces, expert encounters of every kind (medical, financial, communications), transportation systems, and commerce into connectible modes of surveillance. Tracking, observing, and screening, in other words, are becoming the basic tools of social institutions, making the individual less a citizen-subject than an informational node in an ever-emerging system of automated data collection and processing. Ultimately, this chapter argues that data collection is a critical terrain on which a new social contract is being forged in the 21st century.

This chapter examines how control in military contexts is refracted, multiplied, and circulated through the lens of the image. It looks at military developments in networking the battlefield, from visual interface technologies and recruitment games like America’s Army to the Future Combat System that aims to tie all combat forces together through graphical representation. The authors examine the development of imaging technologies that ‘dividualise’ people and tie them into circuits of power that often have little to do with the representational content of the image.

This chapter extends the time-honored tactical technique of the Operating Force--the After Action Report--and applies it to two transformation efforts of the US Army: the successful fielding of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), and the ill-fated Future Combat System (FCS). Five "institutional innovation challenges" are applied to each effort: Forecasting the Environment. Did the Army accurately forecast the Operating Environment that shaped these programs? Defining the Problem. Did the Army effectively (and compellingly) define the operational problem(s) the programs should solve? Aligning the Innovation Approach. Was the institutional innovation model properly aligned to Army institutional realities? Exploiting and Mitigating Process. Were the programs able to leverage institutional process while mitigating process limitations and pitfalls? Leveraging the Human Dimension. Did the program properly account for the human factors of leadership, politics, complexity, and culture? The disparate success of these two capability development efforts is clearly traceable to how they fared in addressing these challenges.

The US military has overcome its legacy features and imperfections and has made revolutionary innovations in key technological areas. The individual services—the army, navy, and air force—behave as well-entrenched legacy sectors. They use the “extended pipeline” model to develop innovations consistent with their established missions, doctrine, and organization—the military version of technological/economic/political/social paradigms. The military overcomes these limitations through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a unique innovation organization that uses connected science and technology and challenge models, undertaking high-risk, high-reward projects that link innovative great groups and breakthrough concepts to major military challenges. The history of DARPA’s many contributions to the Revolution in Military Affairs—precision strike, stealth aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones)—illustrates its unique operating characteristics and shows the critical importance of its island-bridge linkage, in which supporters at the highest levels of the Defense Department operate as change agents and meta-change agents to champion the implementation of the technologies whose development DARPA has enabled.

At the key early stage of most breakthrough innovations, when innovative ideas are hardest to communicate and most widely doubted, the innovations will be largely self-funded through job income, mortgage loans, or family investments. Many examples illustrate early self-funding, including Walt Disney, Frederic Tudor, Soichiro Honda, Steve Jobs, and Harold Hamm. Self-funding remains important at later stages of growth of the entrepreneurial firm because it allows the original innovative entrepreneur to maintain the enough control to continue innovating. This is especially important for project entrepreneurs. Centrally planned funders, such as MITI in Japan or DARPA in the United States, are unlikely to be the main agents of breakthrough innovations. Self-funding is easier to achieve when taxes are limited. The garage is the symbol of the importance of self-funding, where the inventor does not need to ask permission to invent, and the entrepreneur does not need to ask permission to innovate.