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D. M. Armstrong and the Recovery of Ontology

Keith Campbell

in Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199890576
eISBN:
9780199980031
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter provides an overview of the development of Armstrong’s metaphysics, with special reference to his contributions to Ontology proper, and to the place that ontology now commands in ... More


Kinds, Essence, and Natural Necessity

E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199254392
eISBN:
9780191603600
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199254397.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. ... More


Ontological Categories and Categorial Schemes

E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199254392
eISBN:
9780191603600
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199254397.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained ... More


Dispositions and Natural Laws

E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199254392
eISBN:
9780191603600
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199254397.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the ... More


Metaphysical Realism and the Unity of Truth

E. J. Lowe

in The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2006
ISBN:
9780199254392
eISBN:
9780191603600
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199254397.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth ... More


The Identity Theory

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Intrinsic properties of concrete objects are simultaneously dispositional and qualitative: properties are powerful qualities. This ‘surprising identity’ can be motivated by considering liabilities of ... More


Dispositional and Categorical Properties

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One popular view of dispositions turns them into ‘higher‐level’ properties with categorical ‘realizers’. The position is motivated in part by the belief that the same disposition can have different ... More


Properties as Pure Powers

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Properties are powers, but not pure powers. A world comprising objects, properties of which are exclusively dispositional, like a purely relational world, is indistinguishable from an empty world. If ... More


Conclusion

Walter Ott

in Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199570430
eISBN:
9780191722394
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0029
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The ... More


Truth Making

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Truths require truth‐makers; but what is it to be ‘made true’? One possibility: truth‐makers entail truths. I reject this account, arguing that entailment is a relation holding among representations, ... More


Imperfect Similarity

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Universals provide an explanation of similarity: similar objects share properties. Imperfect similarity among complex properties is explained by ‘partial identity’ of their constituents. What if ... More


Universals

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

An ontology that admits properties can treat properties as universals or particulars. Universals can be transcendent Platonic entities or in rebus: wholly present in each of their instances (and ... More


Modes

John Heil

in From an Ontological Point of View

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199259748
eISBN:
9780191597657
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199259747.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Suppose Locke were right: ‘All things that exist are only particulars’. Properties are modes; modes (tropes, abstract particulars), particularized ways objects are. Objects ‘share’ or possess ‘the ... More


Soft Nominalism in Quine and the School of Dignāga

Edith Wyschogrod

in Crossover Queries: Dwelling with Negatives, Embodying Philosophy's Others

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
March 2011
ISBN:
9780823226061
eISBN:
9780823235148
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Fordham University Press
DOI:
10.5422/fso/9780823226061.003.0032
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Nominalists argue that everything that is must be particular. D. M. Armstrong contends, “Nominalists deny that there is any objective identity in things which are not ... More


Looking Inwards

Quassim Cassam

in Self-Knowledge for Humans

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
December 2014
ISBN:
9780199657575
eISBN:
9780191793110
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The idea that we acquire self-knowledge by some form of inner perception has been recommended on the basis that it is well placed to account for the immediacy of self-knowledge. Boghossian and ... More


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