Kurt Lampe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161136
- eISBN:
- 9781400852499
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161136.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
According to Xenophon, Socrates tried to persuade his associate Aristippus to moderate his excessive indulgence in wine, women, and food, arguing that only hard work can bring happiness. Aristippus ...
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According to Xenophon, Socrates tried to persuade his associate Aristippus to moderate his excessive indulgence in wine, women, and food, arguing that only hard work can bring happiness. Aristippus wasn't convinced. Instead, he and his followers espoused the most radical form of hedonism in ancient Western philosophy. Before the rise of the better known but comparatively ascetic Epicureans, the Cyrenaics pursued a way of life in which moments of pleasure, particularly bodily pleasure, held the highest value. This book provides the most comprehensive account in any language of Cyrenaic ideas and behavior, revolutionizing the understanding of this neglected but important school of philosophy. The book reconstructs the doctrines and practices of the Cyrenaics, who were active between the fourth and third centuries BCE. The book examines not only Aristippus and the mainstream Cyrenaics, but also Hegesias, Anniceris, and Theodorus. Contrary to recent scholarship, the book shows that the Cyrenaics, despite giving primary value to discrete pleasurable experiences, accepted the dominant Greek philosophical belief that life-long happiness and the virtues that sustain it are the principal concerns of ethics. The book also offers the first in-depth effort to understand Theodorus' atheism and Hegesias' pessimism, both of which are extremely unusual in ancient Greek philosophy and which raise the interesting question of hedonism's relationship to pessimism and atheism. Finally, the book explores the “new Cyrenaicism” of the nineteenth-century writer and classicist Walter Pater, who drew out the enduring philosophical interest of Cyrenaic hedonism more than any other modern thinker.Less
According to Xenophon, Socrates tried to persuade his associate Aristippus to moderate his excessive indulgence in wine, women, and food, arguing that only hard work can bring happiness. Aristippus wasn't convinced. Instead, he and his followers espoused the most radical form of hedonism in ancient Western philosophy. Before the rise of the better known but comparatively ascetic Epicureans, the Cyrenaics pursued a way of life in which moments of pleasure, particularly bodily pleasure, held the highest value. This book provides the most comprehensive account in any language of Cyrenaic ideas and behavior, revolutionizing the understanding of this neglected but important school of philosophy. The book reconstructs the doctrines and practices of the Cyrenaics, who were active between the fourth and third centuries BCE. The book examines not only Aristippus and the mainstream Cyrenaics, but also Hegesias, Anniceris, and Theodorus. Contrary to recent scholarship, the book shows that the Cyrenaics, despite giving primary value to discrete pleasurable experiences, accepted the dominant Greek philosophical belief that life-long happiness and the virtues that sustain it are the principal concerns of ethics. The book also offers the first in-depth effort to understand Theodorus' atheism and Hegesias' pessimism, both of which are extremely unusual in ancient Greek philosophy and which raise the interesting question of hedonism's relationship to pessimism and atheism. Finally, the book explores the “new Cyrenaicism” of the nineteenth-century writer and classicist Walter Pater, who drew out the enduring philosophical interest of Cyrenaic hedonism more than any other modern thinker.
Christopher Gill
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198152682
- eISBN:
- 9780191710131
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198152682.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter challenges the rather common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a more subjective and individualistic conception of self. It argues that this period expresses an ...
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This chapter challenges the rather common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a more subjective and individualistic conception of self. It argues that this period expresses an ‘objective-participant’ conception, like that of Classical Greece. The account of self-knowledge in Plato’s Alcibiades is offered as an illustration of Classical Greek objective-participant thinking about the self. The chapter contests the idea, maintained by some scholars, that we find a shift towards a more subjective conception of self in the Stoic theory of development as appropriation or in Epictetus’ Stoic teachings on practical ethics. It also questions the idea that we can find in ancient thought generally certain themes associated in modern thought with subjective conceptions of selfhood, especially that of the uniquely ‘first-personal’ viewpoint; this point is illustrated by reference to Cyrenaic and Sceptical thought about impressions.Less
This chapter challenges the rather common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a more subjective and individualistic conception of self. It argues that this period expresses an ‘objective-participant’ conception, like that of Classical Greece. The account of self-knowledge in Plato’s Alcibiades is offered as an illustration of Classical Greek objective-participant thinking about the self. The chapter contests the idea, maintained by some scholars, that we find a shift towards a more subjective conception of self in the Stoic theory of development as appropriation or in Epictetus’ Stoic teachings on practical ethics. It also questions the idea that we can find in ancient thought generally certain themes associated in modern thought with subjective conceptions of selfhood, especially that of the uniquely ‘first-personal’ viewpoint; this point is illustrated by reference to Cyrenaic and Sceptical thought about impressions.
TERENCE IRWIN
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242673
- eISBN:
- 9780191680519
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In Plato's lifetime, Aristippus, a disciple of Socrates, defended at least some aspects of the hedonist position that came to be known as Cyrenaic. At ...
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In Plato's lifetime, Aristippus, a disciple of Socrates, defended at least some aspects of the hedonist position that came to be known as Cyrenaic. At the same time, Antisthenes defended the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, and understood this doctrine to exclude hedonism. His views were taken to extremes by Diogenes the Cynic. Later critics were surprised that moralists with such sharply opposed views could all claim to defend a Socratic position. Some have called the Cyrenaics and Cynics ‘the incomplete Socratics’, conveying the suggestion that they saw only one side of Socrates, and presumably that Plato and Aristotle saw both sides, and so reached a more accurate picture of him. This suggestion may not be quite fair to the one-sided Socratics. Socrates' views may have been indefinite enough to make each ‘incomplete’ construal of him a defensible way of tying up some loose ends that Socrates left.Less
In Plato's lifetime, Aristippus, a disciple of Socrates, defended at least some aspects of the hedonist position that came to be known as Cyrenaic. At the same time, Antisthenes defended the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, and understood this doctrine to exclude hedonism. His views were taken to extremes by Diogenes the Cynic. Later critics were surprised that moralists with such sharply opposed views could all claim to defend a Socratic position. Some have called the Cyrenaics and Cynics ‘the incomplete Socratics’, conveying the suggestion that they saw only one side of Socrates, and presumably that Plato and Aristotle saw both sides, and so reached a more accurate picture of him. This suggestion may not be quite fair to the one-sided Socratics. Socrates' views may have been indefinite enough to make each ‘incomplete’ construal of him a defensible way of tying up some loose ends that Socrates left.
TERENCE IRWIN
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242673
- eISBN:
- 9780191680519
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses Plato's ethical views and compares the Republic with the Socratic dialogues. The structure and style of the Republic encourages ...
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This chapter discusses Plato's ethical views and compares the Republic with the Socratic dialogues. The structure and style of the Republic encourages this comparison. The Socratic positions that it considers are recognizable in Plato's early dialogues. If Cynic and Cyrenaic views go back to Plato's contemporaries, one should suppose that he writes the middle and late dialogues against a background of conflicting interpretations and evaluations of Socrates. According to the Republic, some identify the good with pleasure, others with intelligence. Plato mentions these two candidates again in the Philebus. These descriptions capture the Cyrenaic and the Cynic attitudes to virtue, pleasure, and happiness. Plato disagrees with both of them. Plato and Aristotle do not dominate later reflexion on Socrates or later ethical theory. On the contrary, the one-sided Socratics influence the main Hellenistic ethical theories; the Stoics seem to derive more from the Cynics, and the Epicureans from the Cyrenaics, than either school seems to derive from Plato or Aristotle.Less
This chapter discusses Plato's ethical views and compares the Republic with the Socratic dialogues. The structure and style of the Republic encourages this comparison. The Socratic positions that it considers are recognizable in Plato's early dialogues. If Cynic and Cyrenaic views go back to Plato's contemporaries, one should suppose that he writes the middle and late dialogues against a background of conflicting interpretations and evaluations of Socrates. According to the Republic, some identify the good with pleasure, others with intelligence. Plato mentions these two candidates again in the Philebus. These descriptions capture the Cyrenaic and the Cynic attitudes to virtue, pleasure, and happiness. Plato disagrees with both of them. Plato and Aristotle do not dominate later reflexion on Socrates or later ethical theory. On the contrary, the one-sided Socratics influence the main Hellenistic ethical theories; the Stoics seem to derive more from the Cynics, and the Epicureans from the Cyrenaics, than either school seems to derive from Plato or Aristotle.
Kurt Lampe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161136
- eISBN:
- 9781400852499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161136.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This introductory chapter talks about the Cyrenaic philosophical hedonists and highlights two aspects of their beliefs. First, many of the Cyrenaics' fundamental beliefs and arguments revolve around ...
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This introductory chapter talks about the Cyrenaic philosophical hedonists and highlights two aspects of their beliefs. First, many of the Cyrenaics' fundamental beliefs and arguments revolve around pleasure and pain. In particular, they all agree that either bodily or mental pleasure is the greatest and most certain intrinsic good. This could be indicated as formal hedonism. Second, they actually indulge in all sorts of everyday pleasures such as food and sex. In other words, notwithstanding disagreements among members of the movement, in general it is not by sober parsimony or self-restraint that they attempt to live pleasantly. In this they differ (at least in degree) from many formal hedonists, including their competitors and eventual successors, the Epicureans. This is called everyday hedonism.Less
This introductory chapter talks about the Cyrenaic philosophical hedonists and highlights two aspects of their beliefs. First, many of the Cyrenaics' fundamental beliefs and arguments revolve around pleasure and pain. In particular, they all agree that either bodily or mental pleasure is the greatest and most certain intrinsic good. This could be indicated as formal hedonism. Second, they actually indulge in all sorts of everyday pleasures such as food and sex. In other words, notwithstanding disagreements among members of the movement, in general it is not by sober parsimony or self-restraint that they attempt to live pleasantly. In this they differ (at least in degree) from many formal hedonists, including their competitors and eventual successors, the Epicureans. This is called everyday hedonism.
Kurt Lampe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161136
- eISBN:
- 9781400852499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161136.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines the significance of all the named Cyrenaics, as well as the culture of ancient Cyrene, and introduces the members of the Cyrenaic movement. The principal figures are Aristippus, ...
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This chapter examines the significance of all the named Cyrenaics, as well as the culture of ancient Cyrene, and introduces the members of the Cyrenaic movement. The principal figures are Aristippus, their notional founder, who followed Socrates; the mainstream Cyrenaics, who first codified Aristippus' inspirational example; Hegesias, who accentuated the mainstream Cyrenaics' egoistic individualism and introduced pessimism; Anniceris, who opposed Hegesias by reasserting the importance of personal and civic relationships; and Theodorus, an eclectic and flamboyant thinker, who is most renowned for his supposed “atheism.” The chapter traces their history from around 435 BCE to around 250 BCE. Most of these philosophers were born in or around Cyrene, though some are known to have been active abroad.Less
This chapter examines the significance of all the named Cyrenaics, as well as the culture of ancient Cyrene, and introduces the members of the Cyrenaic movement. The principal figures are Aristippus, their notional founder, who followed Socrates; the mainstream Cyrenaics, who first codified Aristippus' inspirational example; Hegesias, who accentuated the mainstream Cyrenaics' egoistic individualism and introduced pessimism; Anniceris, who opposed Hegesias by reasserting the importance of personal and civic relationships; and Theodorus, an eclectic and flamboyant thinker, who is most renowned for his supposed “atheism.” The chapter traces their history from around 435 BCE to around 250 BCE. Most of these philosophers were born in or around Cyrene, though some are known to have been active abroad.
Kurt Lampe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161136
- eISBN:
- 9781400852499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161136.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter addresses the theoretical foundations of Cyrenaicism, which are the positive valuation of pleasure, the negative valuation of pain, and the impossibility of discerning any value ...
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This chapter addresses the theoretical foundations of Cyrenaicism, which are the positive valuation of pleasure, the negative valuation of pain, and the impossibility of discerning any value independent of pleasure or pain. This is a good example of a topic where chronological analysis descends almost immediately into pure speculation: it is best to treat Cyrenaic epistemology as the shared intellectual property of almost all the philosophers studied in this chapter. Investigating how the Cyrenaics describe pleasure, how they argue for its preeminent choiceworthiness, and how this choiceworthiness is supposed to guide their actions and establish their horizon of care is a good way to begin exploring their ethics.Less
This chapter addresses the theoretical foundations of Cyrenaicism, which are the positive valuation of pleasure, the negative valuation of pain, and the impossibility of discerning any value independent of pleasure or pain. This is a good example of a topic where chronological analysis descends almost immediately into pure speculation: it is best to treat Cyrenaic epistemology as the shared intellectual property of almost all the philosophers studied in this chapter. Investigating how the Cyrenaics describe pleasure, how they argue for its preeminent choiceworthiness, and how this choiceworthiness is supposed to guide their actions and establish their horizon of care is a good way to begin exploring their ethics.
Kurt Lampe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161136
- eISBN:
- 9781400852499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161136.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the greatest controversy in existing scholarship on Cyrenaic ethics, which is the school's “anti-eudaimonism.” On the basis of Anniceris' formulation of the end many scholars ...
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This chapter explores the greatest controversy in existing scholarship on Cyrenaic ethics, which is the school's “anti-eudaimonism.” On the basis of Anniceris' formulation of the end many scholars have asserted that Cyrenaics are not “eudaimonists,” meaning their ethics does not center on the pursuit of happiness through cultivation of the virtues. The chapter suggests that this is incorrect for most Cyrenaics, and misleading even for Anniceris. However, it has led to philosophically interesting speculation about why the Cyrenaics would reject eudaimonism. Explanations have focused on personal identity, the subjectivity of value, and prudential reasoning. The chapter shows that each of these explanations relies on unsustainable interpretations of particular pieces of evidence.Less
This chapter explores the greatest controversy in existing scholarship on Cyrenaic ethics, which is the school's “anti-eudaimonism.” On the basis of Anniceris' formulation of the end many scholars have asserted that Cyrenaics are not “eudaimonists,” meaning their ethics does not center on the pursuit of happiness through cultivation of the virtues. The chapter suggests that this is incorrect for most Cyrenaics, and misleading even for Anniceris. However, it has led to philosophically interesting speculation about why the Cyrenaics would reject eudaimonism. Explanations have focused on personal identity, the subjectivity of value, and prudential reasoning. The chapter shows that each of these explanations relies on unsustainable interpretations of particular pieces of evidence.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096521
- eISBN:
- 9780199833061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096525.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of ...
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The Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of friendship and of justice, with incomplete success. The Sceptics face problems in trying to claim that the Sceptic will be benevolent to others despite achieving tranquility as his final end.Less
The Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of friendship and of justice, with incomplete success. The Sceptics face problems in trying to claim that the Sceptic will be benevolent to others despite achieving tranquility as his final end.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096521
- eISBN:
- 9780199833061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096525.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book's methodology is set out: we must be critically aware of the theoretical assumptions we bring to the study of ancient ethics, or we risk importing anachronism. The limits of the ancient ...
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The book's methodology is set out: we must be critically aware of the theoretical assumptions we bring to the study of ancient ethics, or we risk importing anachronism. The limits of the ancient evidence should also be respected. We must also be aware of the structures of modern ethical theories and prepared to find that ancient theories differ. The ancient traditions and their major sources are listed: Aristotle, Stoics, Sceptics, Cyrenaics, Epicurus and hybrid theories.Less
The book's methodology is set out: we must be critically aware of the theoretical assumptions we bring to the study of ancient ethics, or we risk importing anachronism. The limits of the ancient evidence should also be respected. We must also be aware of the structures of modern ethical theories and prepared to find that ancient theories differ. The ancient traditions and their major sources are listed: Aristotle, Stoics, Sceptics, Cyrenaics, Epicurus and hybrid theories.
Kurt Lampe
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161136
- eISBN:
- 9781400852499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161136.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter turns from theoretical foundations to ideals of happiness. First, it focuses on what Aristippus, the mainstream Cyrenaics, and Annicereans say about education, virtue, and happiness. ...
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This chapter turns from theoretical foundations to ideals of happiness. First, it focuses on what Aristippus, the mainstream Cyrenaics, and Annicereans say about education, virtue, and happiness. This analysis shows how their foundational beliefs support a vision of what it means to have a successful life. The chapter then addresses their formulations of the ethical end, where Anniceris appears to have introduced a position that is strikingly unusual in ancient Greek ethics. Happiness is not the end, he says, nor is there any single end for the whole of life. Rather, each action has its own particular end. The chapter attempts a sympathetic interpretation of this innovation, yet acknowledges the problems it creates for other areas of Cyrenaic theory.Less
This chapter turns from theoretical foundations to ideals of happiness. First, it focuses on what Aristippus, the mainstream Cyrenaics, and Annicereans say about education, virtue, and happiness. This analysis shows how their foundational beliefs support a vision of what it means to have a successful life. The chapter then addresses their formulations of the ethical end, where Anniceris appears to have introduced a position that is strikingly unusual in ancient Greek ethics. Happiness is not the end, he says, nor is there any single end for the whole of life. Rather, each action has its own particular end. The chapter attempts a sympathetic interpretation of this innovation, yet acknowledges the problems it creates for other areas of Cyrenaic theory.
Eleni Kechagia
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199597239
- eISBN:
- 9780191731495
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199597239.003.0009
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter examines Plutarch's arguments in response to Colotes' claims against Cyrenaic epistemology. Colotes accused the Cyrenaics of making life impossible to live by claiming that they can only ...
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This chapter examines Plutarch's arguments in response to Colotes' claims against Cyrenaic epistemology. Colotes accused the Cyrenaics of making life impossible to live by claiming that they can only apprehend their own pathē, but not the external object causing them. Plutarch acknowledges that the Cyrenaic view eventually leads to extreme subjectivism, but goes on to show that the thoroughgoing empiricism of Epicurean epistemology can lead to subjectivist consequences too. Arguing that all impressions are true, which is what the Epicureans say, is ultimately not much different from arguing that none is: one's true impressions, which report only on themselves and on eidōla that may or may not be exactly the same as the external object they represent, do not lead one to firm knowledge of the external world.Less
This chapter examines Plutarch's arguments in response to Colotes' claims against Cyrenaic epistemology. Colotes accused the Cyrenaics of making life impossible to live by claiming that they can only apprehend their own pathē, but not the external object causing them. Plutarch acknowledges that the Cyrenaic view eventually leads to extreme subjectivism, but goes on to show that the thoroughgoing empiricism of Epicurean epistemology can lead to subjectivist consequences too. Arguing that all impressions are true, which is what the Epicureans say, is ultimately not much different from arguing that none is: one's true impressions, which report only on themselves and on eidōla that may or may not be exactly the same as the external object they represent, do not lead one to firm knowledge of the external world.
David Sedley
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198777250
- eISBN:
- 9780191823015
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777250.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it. What can this mean for hedonists? For Epicurus, it is made possible by the mind’s capacity to enjoy one’s whole life ...
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Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it. What can this mean for hedonists? For Epicurus, it is made possible by the mind’s capacity to enjoy one’s whole life from any temporal viewpoint: to relive past pleasures and enjoy future ones in anticipation, importantly including confidence in a serene closure. Enjoying your life is like enjoying a day as a whole, not least its sunset. Although pleasure is increased by greater duration (contrary to a more favoured reading), and premature death therefore better avoided, the finitude of human life as such does not lessen its value, and even a premature death need not prevent a life’s being enjoyed as ‘complete’. In this chapter, the above interpretation is documented, explained, and contextualized in terms of Epicurus’ diametrical opposition to his contemporaries, the Cyrenaics.Less
Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it. What can this mean for hedonists? For Epicurus, it is made possible by the mind’s capacity to enjoy one’s whole life from any temporal viewpoint: to relive past pleasures and enjoy future ones in anticipation, importantly including confidence in a serene closure. Enjoying your life is like enjoying a day as a whole, not least its sunset. Although pleasure is increased by greater duration (contrary to a more favoured reading), and premature death therefore better avoided, the finitude of human life as such does not lessen its value, and even a premature death need not prevent a life’s being enjoyed as ‘complete’. In this chapter, the above interpretation is documented, explained, and contextualized in terms of Epicurus’ diametrical opposition to his contemporaries, the Cyrenaics.
Sylvia Berryman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198835004
- eISBN:
- 9780191876561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198835004.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Examining Aristotle’s intellectual milieu, this chapter argues that the supposedly modern questions about the ‘sources of normativity’ are being asked by Aristotle’s contemporaries, even without the ...
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Examining Aristotle’s intellectual milieu, this chapter argues that the supposedly modern questions about the ‘sources of normativity’ are being asked by Aristotle’s contemporaries, even without the spur of the modern sciences. The challenge to traditional beliefs from materialism, awareness of cultural variations and from sophistic challengers unsettled belief in traditional piety, requiring philosophers to seek other forms of justification. Plato’s work clearly shows a felt need for metaphysical foundations of ethics. The subjectivism of the Cyrenaic school, among others, put pressure on the notion that there is a true good beyond appearances. This chapter notes that—on one reading of the justification for Aristotle’s teleology—he might reasonably have seen the appeal to human nature as an external point of appeal to justify the demands of ethics; the question is whether he did do so.Less
Examining Aristotle’s intellectual milieu, this chapter argues that the supposedly modern questions about the ‘sources of normativity’ are being asked by Aristotle’s contemporaries, even without the spur of the modern sciences. The challenge to traditional beliefs from materialism, awareness of cultural variations and from sophistic challengers unsettled belief in traditional piety, requiring philosophers to seek other forms of justification. Plato’s work clearly shows a felt need for metaphysical foundations of ethics. The subjectivism of the Cyrenaic school, among others, put pressure on the notion that there is a true good beyond appearances. This chapter notes that—on one reading of the justification for Aristotle’s teleology—he might reasonably have seen the appeal to human nature as an external point of appeal to justify the demands of ethics; the question is whether he did do so.
