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This chapter focuses on Advocate General Francis Jacobs and his contributions to intellectual property law. Jacobs was appointed Advocate General in 1988, at a time when the European Project had just been restarted with the adoption of the Single European Act and the establishment of the Court of First Instance. He retired in December 2005, making him the second longest holder of the office. During his 17 years in office he delivered over 500 Opinions. The chapter begins with a brief resume of the case law on intellectual property rights prior to his appointment; consideration is then given to the Opinions he delivered on the relationship between the EC Treaty rules on competition and free movement and the exercise of intellectual property rights. Finally, the Opinions he delivered in cases where interpretation questions were raised in respect of the Trade Mark Directive and the Trade Mark Regulation are examined.

This chapter discusses the role of the Advocate General in the context of proceedings before the European Court of Justice. Topics covered include procedure in the European Court of Justice (written, oral, and deliberation), Article 300(6) EC procedure, Article 103 EUROATOM procedure, and the Court of First Instance.

The institutionalization of European administration space is examined through one of the least visible or understudied, but most important, outcomes of integration: the development of administrative law for the European Union (EU). As positive integration came to constitute a central priority for EU organizations, the European Commission’s administrative responsibilities and capacities multiplied, so that it is now expected not only to monitor and enforce compliance with an increasingly dense and technical body of supranational rules but also to determine how that law is to be applied to specific individuals and situations. Neither task could be performed without appropriating a great deal of discretionary authority, and it is argued that, in Western democracies, the problem of controlling rising administrative discretion has inevitably been felt, and has typically been dealt with through the development of judicial mechanisms. Using the American (US) experience as a comparative backdrop, it is shown that once judges require that administrators furnish formal justifications for their actions, the judicial review of the ‘reasonableness’ of administrative acts follows. The author traces how these and other forms of judicial control of the EU’s administrative acts developed through litigation and the rule-making of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, despite the absence of explicit Treaty of Rome provision, so that the basic foundations of EU administrative law are now in place.

This chapter describes that the Court of First Instance is, from a practical standpoint, the most significant forum for the discovery of questions pertaining to State aid. It begins by presenting the control of legality of State aid decisions by the community courts. It is possible to attack European Commission decisions that approve or refuse to approve State aid, irrespective of the stage of the procedural cycle at which they are adopted, or which reject a complaint regarding alleged aid. Private parties must bring their challenge to a Commission decision before the Court of First Instance. Any action for annulment is subject to the two-month limit laid down in Article 230 EC. The grounds of annulment under Article 230 EC are: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.

This chapter discusses the issue of the legality of UN Security Council Resolutions in light of the 2008 European Court of Justice Kadi Judgment. With the increased use of targeted sanctions, in particular in connection with the freezing of assets of suspected terrorists, the legitimacy and accuracy of UN Security Council resolutions is under review. The presentation follows the initial judgment of the Court of First Instance, including the assessment of its qualification of a jus cogens violation that would allow the judicial review by this Court according to international law, the position taken by the Advocate General Poiares Maduro and the judgement by the ECJ that largely followed his dualist approach. The most important finding was the confirmation of the working hypotheses, notably on the challenge in the light of human rights, which was found to be a key factor for future solutions to similar problems.

This chapter focuses on challenges to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) — the ‘Community Courts’. It commences with a brief account of the prehistory of the EU ETS (Section 2), followed by its legal form and operation (Section 3), before addressing the Courts case law concerning Directive 2003/87/EC (Section 4).

Alongside the increasingly difficult and complex task of proving cartel activity and involvement for legal purposes there developed a responsive practice on the part of companies, seeking to the challenge the exercise of powers, decision-making, and the imposition of sanctions on the part of the European Commission. Large and well-resourced companies mounted appeals, invoking the basic rights protection accorded to individuals under the criminal law process at the national level. This chapter explores the development of judicial review of Commission cartel decisions carried out by the European Court of Justice and later the Court of First Instance (now the General Court), and the judicial response to basic rights argumentation in this context, as companies challenged the legality of investigations, formal decision-making, and the imposition of fines. The discussion touches upon underlying constitutional issues, such as the separation of powers in the context of EU institutions, and the level of basic rights protection appropriate for corporate actors.

This chapter is concerned with the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI), and that between the Community courts and the national courts. It begins with the analysis of the central structural and jurisdictional features of the present system, followed by consideration of the case-load problems of the Community courts, and the techniques available to limit the cases that are heard. Finally, the chapter discusses the aims that should underlie reform of the Community's judicial architecture.

This chapter is concerned with access. It is the natural starting point for consideration of administrative law doctrine. Any system of administrative law will have access points or gateways, which determine who can get into the system. There are two crucial access points in any legal regime. There will be procedural rules determining who is entitled to be heard or intervene before the initial decision is made, or who is entitled to be consulted before a legislative-type norm is enacted. There will also be rules of standing that determine who should be able to complain to the court that the initial decision-maker overstepped its powers. The discussion begins with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance/General Court concerning the right to take part in the initial determination. It shows that the courts have distinguished sharply between the right to be heard in relation to individualized decisions and consultation and participation in relation to norms of a legislative nature. This is followed by consideration of political initiatives to foster consultation in the EU legislative process. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the other main access point, standing to seek judicial review. There is a critical evaluation of the case law, discussion of the possible impact of the Charter of Rights, and consideration of the reforms made by the Lisbon Treaty.

Sir Francis Jacobs has been one of the most influential Advocates General in the history of the Court of Justice. He became a member of the Court in October 1988 and served until October 2005, thus being the second longest-serving Advocate General and one of the longest-serving members of the Court. This chapter examines his contribution on locus standi of individuals under Article 230(4). The contribution of Jacobs AG in this area of law can be traced primarily by reference to his opinions in Extramet, UPA, and, more recently, ARE. The chapter focuses on his opinion in UPA and the resulting trialogue among Jacobs AG, the CFI and the ECJ as it unravelled in UPA and subsequent case law.

Rule 355 allows the UPC to issue decisions by default. This provides a means for the UPC to enforce the parties’ duty to promote the proceedings as it prevents parties from blocking the proceedings by not participating. The possibility to block proceedings contradicts the principle of expediting proceedings as provided in the UPCA. According to this principle, the UPC should ensure expeditious and high-quality decisions taking into account the need for proportionality and flexibility. Proceedings before the UPC are determined by the parties and reliant on their actions. The Court is bound to the request submitted by the parties (Art 76(1) UPCA). An efficiency means of urging the parties, in their own interests, to participate in the proceedings is to hold out the prospect of a disadvantageous enforceable decision.

This chapter is concerned with access. It is the natural starting point for consideration of administrative law doctrine. The chapter begins with a discussion on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of First Instance (CFI) concerning the right to take part in the initial determination. It then considers political initiatives to foster consultation in the Community legislative process. It also discusses the possible impact of the Charter of Rights and considers the reform that would have been made by the Constitutional Treaty (CT).

Rule 266 regulates the requirements for a question to be referred to the CJEU by the UPC (Art 267 TFEU, Art 21 UPCA). Referrals to the CJEU ensure uniform interpretation of Union law. Rule 266 specifies the meaning of Arts 20 and 21 UPCA. According to Art 21 UPCA, the UPC cooperates with the CJEU for ensuring uniform application of Union law. The UPC is a common court of the Member States and is part of the jurisdiction of the Member States and therefore functionally a court of a Member State within the meaning of Art 267 TFEU.

This chapter analyses the role of rights in the Community legal order and their impact on judicial review. It begins with a discussion on the evolution of Community rights, revealing the input from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Court of First Instance (CFI), and the Community political organs. It then provides an overview of the concerns voiced about the protection of rights within the Community prior to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The focus shifts to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, its genesis, and content. It concludes by examining the broader relevance of human rights within the EU.

The period of three months provided for in Art 36(6) is reasonable. The intention is that the patent proprietor should not be deprived of his free choice of forum for the infringement action pursuant to Art 33(1) by the pending action for declaration of non-infringement. However, that choice cannot be preserved for an unlimited time because it would block the claimant in the action for a declaration of non-infringement for an unlimited time. Therefore, the obligation to stay proceedings is limited to a three-month period. The practical reason for this exact time limit is that the Reply to the Statement of claim in the proceedings for the action for declaration of non-infringement must be handed to the Court within two months of service of the Statement of claim. Therefore, after three months a first exchange of written submissions has already been completed. The procedure for the action for declaration of non-infringement would now have reached an advanced stage which would not admit a regular stay of proceedings.