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The development and reform of smart sanctions makes them a critical element of strategic peacebuilding, specifically in their ability to restrict war and to counter terrorism. Lopez and Cortright examine the shortcomings and lessons learned from counter-terrorism efforts, in particular those led by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). To address the root causes of terrorism, they argue, efforts must promote good governance, economic development, and human rights—all of which are central aims of strategic peacebuilding. The authors provide recommendations for increasing regional capacities and decreasing redundancy and overlap in UN Security Council counter-terrorism efforts.

Despite the significant attention given in the scholarly literature to exploring the strength, scope and implications of counter-terrorism policy since 9/11, there has been no systematic analysis of China’s approach to terrorism and counter-terrorism. This is a major lacuna given China’s increasing power and influence in international affairs and the increasing incidence of terrorism in Xinjiang. This chapter provides an overview of how the book addresses this gap in the literature via four major areas of investigation: the scope and nature of terrorism in China and its connection with developments in other regions; the development of legislative measures to combat terrorism; the institutional evolution of China's counter-terrorism bureaucracy; and Beijing's counter-terrorism cooperation with international partners.

China’s dilemmas with respect to Uyghur terrorism are increasingly transnational in nature, defined by the interpenetration of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security issues and threats. The chapter argues that this ‘internal-external’ security nexus has conditioned government responses to the threat of Uyghur terrorism in important ways in the context of its domestic governance of Xinjiang and its foreign policy. Domestically, the growing trans-nationalization of Uyghur militancy since the end of the Cold War has contributed to the effective securitization of Uyghur ethnic identity and been a spur to the development of new legislative and institutional measures to counter Uyghur terrorism. Internationally, Beijing has since the mid-1990s deployed the issue of Uyghur separatism and terrorism to, first, structure its relationship with independent Central Asia, and second, to legitimate the implementation of repression of Uyghur opposition in Xinjiang. The chapter concludes by noting that China’s responses to the threat of terrorism, while bearing individual and context-specific characteristics nonetheless displays some parallels with global trends with respect to counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 era.

This chapter analyzes China's counter-terrorism policy in the Middle East, and the linkage between the threats posed by terrorist groups at home and abroad. Specifically, this is an investigation of China's counter-terrorism policy in response to the growing threat of terrorism and the linkage between Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang and the increase in Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East as it impacts upon China's national security. These terrorist activities and the connections between them show that terrorism and radicalization transcend boundaries and regions, threatening not only countries in the Middle East but also China’s homeland security.

This chapter explores the factors that have shaped the operating environment of the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) and “Turkestan Islamic Party” (TIP) and the broader strategic context in which Chinese counter-terrorism policy operates. It demonstrates that for much of the period since 2001 ETIM and TIP’s operating environment was conditioned by the central role of Pakistan, which through its sponsorship of the Taliban and other militants gave it a unique capacity to influence how these groups behaved towards China. This situation has been overturned by renewed Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that have displaced TIP, while the Syrian conflict reconditioned the pathway to Uyghur militant recruitment away from South Asia to the Middle East. The net effect of this, the chapter concludes, is that after many years in which Beijing was able to mediate major elements of its counter-terrorism policy through its closest security partner, Pakistan, it is now being required to countenance a more direct role in addressing the threat across virtually all dimensions of policy – politically, economically, and potentially even militarily.

This chapter explores the relationship between Uyghur terrorism and the current wave of Islamist-inspired terrorism roiling the Middle East. In particular, it tracks the evolution of the ideological and operational impacts of Middle Eastern jihadist terrorism on Uyghur terrorism. The chapter does so through an exploration of the historical links between Middle Eastern jihadis and Uyghurs and the links between Uyghur extremists, such as the “Turkestan Islamic Party” (TIP) and the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq. It argues that the current fractured Middle East has created an environment in which Uyghur militancy and jihadism has not only thrived but provided conditions for the strengthening of TIP’s connection to al Qaeda’s core. The chapter concludes that that the terrorist threat to China may escalate further due to the fact of growing footprint of Chinese nationals and interests around the world and Uyghur militants’ linkages across the global jihadist community.

This chapter provides an analysis of the factors that have driven recent trans-migration of Uyghurs through Southeast Asia and explores potential linkages to terrorism. It argues that the trans-migration of Uyghurs via Southeast Asia cannot be isolated from the larger social resistance of Uyghurs in Xinjiang against Han Chinese rule. China’s harder line in Xinjiang under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, in particular, have left many Uyghurs with choices that are either to migrate, to abandon their culture and religious identity in favor of a homogenous Chinese identity, or to give expression to their identity either through violent or non-violent resistance. This situation has provided not only the impetus for thousands of Uyghurs to migrate but also the opportunity for the intersection of Uyghur aspirations with the global forces of Islamist radicalism.

Article 222 TFEU as a general solidarity clause was introduced by the ToL. Relevant provisions were contained in Articles I-43 and III-329 of the ConstT (not entered into force). Article 222 TFEU can be seen as one of the political responses to different terrorist attacks, such as those in New York on 11 September 2001 or in Madrid on 11 March 2004, but also of natural disasters such as in particular the floods in Central Europe in 2002. The location of Article 222 TFEU in Part V TFEU (external action by the EU), despite the fact that the events dealt with in that provision occur on the territory of the MS and not externally, underlines that the sources of these threats are, at least in part, seen to be seated outside the Union.

This chapter puts the famine of 2011 in the context of Somalia’s recent history, the political economy of humanitarian aid in the Greater Horn of Africa, and Somalia’s protracted crisis of development since the 1970s. This includes the Ethio-Somali war in 1978, the civil war in Somalia, the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, the 1992 famine, the “warlord” era, the rise of the Islamic Courts Union, the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and the rise of Al Shabaab. The chapter traces the history of the “normalization of crisis in Somalia,” and sets the scene for the crisis of 2011. Lastly, it traces the impact of Al Shabaab and the counter-terrorism legislation intended to curb its activities.