Anne Deighton
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198278986
- eISBN:
- 9780191684272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278986.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
It was generally anticipated that the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow would be ‘the most momentous session’ of the Council and that its failure to bring progress on Germany would bring ...
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It was generally anticipated that the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow would be ‘the most momentous session’ of the Council and that its failure to bring progress on Germany would bring the ‘end of an era’. The collapse of the Council has subsequently been designated as the moment at which it became obvious that wartime unity had finally broken down, ending Rooseveltian aspirations for the cooperative policing of the world. The Moscow Council also produced a shift in the direction of French foreign policy, away from its vainglorious and isolated stand on Germany and, eventually, into the arms of the Western powers. Such a shift confirms the most substantial change of direction that both participants and historians have commented on, linking the failure of the Council with the birth of Western Europe under the umbrella of Marshall Aid. This chapter examines the role of Britain in the fundamental shift that took place in Moscow.Less
It was generally anticipated that the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow would be ‘the most momentous session’ of the Council and that its failure to bring progress on Germany would bring the ‘end of an era’. The collapse of the Council has subsequently been designated as the moment at which it became obvious that wartime unity had finally broken down, ending Rooseveltian aspirations for the cooperative policing of the world. The Moscow Council also produced a shift in the direction of French foreign policy, away from its vainglorious and isolated stand on Germany and, eventually, into the arms of the Western powers. Such a shift confirms the most substantial change of direction that both participants and historians have commented on, linking the failure of the Council with the birth of Western Europe under the umbrella of Marshall Aid. This chapter examines the role of Britain in the fundamental shift that took place in Moscow.
Anne Deighton
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198278986
- eISBN:
- 9780191684272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278986.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
On April 25, 1946, The Times reported that the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was ‘the last chance which the allies will have of working together to set up a new world order’. ...
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On April 25, 1946, The Times reported that the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was ‘the last chance which the allies will have of working together to set up a new world order’. However, Germany, the litmus test of great-power relations, was not the central question on the agenda. Ernest Bevin was reluctant to commit himself to formal talks while international policy towards Germany was so unsettled and while he was still trying to probe American and Soviet thinking. But before the Council opened, he was forced to concede that German questions should be raised after the proposed satellite treaties had been discussed. The Council meetings were to culminate in a decision by Britain and the United States to begin to frame policy within the ‘Western’ option, while still publicly proclaiming a desire for quadripartite agreement over Germany.Less
On April 25, 1946, The Times reported that the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was ‘the last chance which the allies will have of working together to set up a new world order’. However, Germany, the litmus test of great-power relations, was not the central question on the agenda. Ernest Bevin was reluctant to commit himself to formal talks while international policy towards Germany was so unsettled and while he was still trying to probe American and Soviet thinking. But before the Council opened, he was forced to concede that German questions should be raised after the proposed satellite treaties had been discussed. The Council meetings were to culminate in a decision by Britain and the United States to begin to frame policy within the ‘Western’ option, while still publicly proclaiming a desire for quadripartite agreement over Germany.
Anne Deighton
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198278986
- eISBN:
- 9780191684272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278986.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The fifth Council of Foreign Ministers, and the last that was to be held for eighteen months, has generally been recognised as a failure. The changed international climate that George Marshall's ...
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The fifth Council of Foreign Ministers, and the last that was to be held for eighteen months, has generally been recognised as a failure. The changed international climate that George Marshall's offer brought about meant that by the summer of 1947 there was no serious expectation in any official quarter that the Council could now bring profitable four-power discussions on Germany. The Moscow Council had exposed the ideological gap between East and West, and to bridge that gap would require either much goodwill and a readiness to compromise on all sides, or a dramatic reversal of policy by one of the Allied powers. During discussions at the London Council, Ernest Bevin took and held the leading role with his allies, showing both skill and determination to construct the viable Western policy which he had worked towards over the previous eighteen months.Less
The fifth Council of Foreign Ministers, and the last that was to be held for eighteen months, has generally been recognised as a failure. The changed international climate that George Marshall's offer brought about meant that by the summer of 1947 there was no serious expectation in any official quarter that the Council could now bring profitable four-power discussions on Germany. The Moscow Council had exposed the ideological gap between East and West, and to bridge that gap would require either much goodwill and a readiness to compromise on all sides, or a dramatic reversal of policy by one of the Allied powers. During discussions at the London Council, Ernest Bevin took and held the leading role with his allies, showing both skill and determination to construct the viable Western policy which he had worked towards over the previous eighteen months.
Anne Deighton
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198278986
- eISBN:
- 9780191684272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278986.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
During the early postwar months, very little was achieved by way of implementing the Potsdam Agreement. Indeed, Ernest Bevin thought that the time had not yet come to take major political and ...
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During the early postwar months, very little was achieved by way of implementing the Potsdam Agreement. Indeed, Ernest Bevin thought that the time had not yet come to take major political and economic decisions necessary to establish British long-term foreign policy towards Germany. The dust had not yet settled after the war and European affairs were still in ‘a state of flux’. This was a view that seemed to be shared by the Russians and the Americans, who agreed that major German questions should still only be discussed through diplomatic channels. At the Potsdam Conference, the Americans had formally proposed the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to carry out the preliminary work on the peace treaties with the defeated powers. The Soviet Union suggested at Potsdam that France should not participate in the preparation of peace treaties with countries with whom it had not signed an armistice agreement, clearly fearing that the presence of a third Western power might tip the balance against the Russians.Less
During the early postwar months, very little was achieved by way of implementing the Potsdam Agreement. Indeed, Ernest Bevin thought that the time had not yet come to take major political and economic decisions necessary to establish British long-term foreign policy towards Germany. The dust had not yet settled after the war and European affairs were still in ‘a state of flux’. This was a view that seemed to be shared by the Russians and the Americans, who agreed that major German questions should still only be discussed through diplomatic channels. At the Potsdam Conference, the Americans had formally proposed the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to carry out the preliminary work on the peace treaties with the defeated powers. The Soviet Union suggested at Potsdam that France should not participate in the preparation of peace treaties with countries with whom it had not signed an armistice agreement, clearly fearing that the presence of a third Western power might tip the balance against the Russians.
Daniel F. Harrington
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813136134
- eISBN:
- 9780813136837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136134.003.0013
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Chapter 12 charts the diplomatic effects of the airlift’s unexpected success: Stalin’s decision to abandon the blockade, the Jessup-Malik talks, and the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. ...
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Chapter 12 charts the diplomatic effects of the airlift’s unexpected success: Stalin’s decision to abandon the blockade, the Jessup-Malik talks, and the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Most accounts hold that Stalin decided in January 1949 to lift the blockade, but he may have made his decision in March, after it became clear that winter would not ground the airlift. In the Jessup-Malik talks, the Russians tried, without success, to trade a lifting of the blockade for a suspension of the London program. In Paris, both sides advanced maximum proposals. They settled for the status quo: the division of Berlin, Germany, and Europe. In doing so, they brought the initial phase of the Cold War to a close.Less
Chapter 12 charts the diplomatic effects of the airlift’s unexpected success: Stalin’s decision to abandon the blockade, the Jessup-Malik talks, and the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Most accounts hold that Stalin decided in January 1949 to lift the blockade, but he may have made his decision in March, after it became clear that winter would not ground the airlift. In the Jessup-Malik talks, the Russians tried, without success, to trade a lifting of the blockade for a suspension of the London program. In Paris, both sides advanced maximum proposals. They settled for the status quo: the division of Berlin, Germany, and Europe. In doing so, they brought the initial phase of the Cold War to a close.
Daniel Harrington
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813136134
- eISBN:
- 9780813136837
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136134.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign ...
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No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1949. Tracing the blockade’s origins, it explains why British and American planners during the Second World War neglected Western access to postwar Berlin and why Western officials did little to reduce Berlin’s vulnerability as Cold War tensions increased. Standard accounts mistakenly emphasize an early decision to rely on an airlift to defeat the blockade. Leaders did not sit down, weigh alternatives, and choose “airlift” as the course of action that would resolve the crisis on their terms. No one at first believed the airlift could defeat the blockade; its inevitable failure would confront the Western powers with a choice between withdrawing from Berlin and starting a war. The airlift’s unexpected success transformed the crisis, confronting the Soviets with the choice between war and retreat. The Western powers found it harder to concert policy during the crisis than standard accounts acknowledge. The study traces diplomatic negotiations at all levels, from Berlin to the United Nations, examines the crisis’s effects on the 1948 US presidential election, and traces how the blockade affected US debates over the custody and use of atomic weapons.Less
No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1949. Tracing the blockade’s origins, it explains why British and American planners during the Second World War neglected Western access to postwar Berlin and why Western officials did little to reduce Berlin’s vulnerability as Cold War tensions increased. Standard accounts mistakenly emphasize an early decision to rely on an airlift to defeat the blockade. Leaders did not sit down, weigh alternatives, and choose “airlift” as the course of action that would resolve the crisis on their terms. No one at first believed the airlift could defeat the blockade; its inevitable failure would confront the Western powers with a choice between withdrawing from Berlin and starting a war. The airlift’s unexpected success transformed the crisis, confronting the Soviets with the choice between war and retreat. The Western powers found it harder to concert policy during the crisis than standard accounts acknowledge. The study traces diplomatic negotiations at all levels, from Berlin to the United Nations, examines the crisis’s effects on the 1948 US presidential election, and traces how the blockade affected US debates over the custody and use of atomic weapons.
Daniel F. Harrington
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813136134
- eISBN:
- 9780813136837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136134.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Chapter 2 describes the deterioration of Allied relations in Germany, 1945-48, the division of Germany, and the sources of Stalin’s willingness to blockade Berlin. These included the failure of the ...
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Chapter 2 describes the deterioration of Allied relations in Germany, 1945-48, the division of Germany, and the sources of Stalin’s willingness to blockade Berlin. These included the failure of the Potsdam system for Germany; disputes over reparations; the growing power of pro-Western political parties in Berlin; and the collapse of four-power cooperation, resulting in the failure of the 1947 London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting and the breakup of the Allied Control Council. It also describes Western initiatives—plans for a North Atlantic pact and a separate government in the Western occupation zones (the “London program”)—that Stalin believed he could thwart through pressure on Berlin.Less
Chapter 2 describes the deterioration of Allied relations in Germany, 1945-48, the division of Germany, and the sources of Stalin’s willingness to blockade Berlin. These included the failure of the Potsdam system for Germany; disputes over reparations; the growing power of pro-Western political parties in Berlin; and the collapse of four-power cooperation, resulting in the failure of the 1947 London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting and the breakup of the Allied Control Council. It also describes Western initiatives—plans for a North Atlantic pact and a separate government in the Western occupation zones (the “London program”)—that Stalin believed he could thwart through pressure on Berlin.