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Since the mid-nineteenth century, numerous sources have mentioned, and sometimes described in great detail, stable mafia associations in both Sicily and Calabria. Today, members and branches of both Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta can be found in numerous northern Italian centers as well as in all those foreign countries that have attracted consistent migration flows from southern Italy. The cosche composing Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta may be considered fully developed organizations, clearly distinguished from the blood families of their members, because they have ruling bodies to enforce their normative order. For many years, the power apparatuses of the single mafia families were the sole ruling bodies within the two organizations. Only in the late 1950s, in fact, did Cosa Nostra families in the Palermo province create a superordinate body of coordination: the so-called provincial commission. Despite the experiments carried out in the last four decades of the twentieth century, the ruling bodies of single families remain the real centers of mafia power, and segmentation is the prevalent form of differentiation.

Self-excluding from state jurisdiction through secrecy, mafia groups cannot do without violence to solve internal conflicts, defend common interests, or guarantee the effectiveness of their legal order. In Sicily and Calabria, the groups' adoption of secrecy has never been a matter of principle only, promoted by ideals or by the desire to copy liberal secret sects. Variations and discontinuity in the enforcement of secrecy can be seen in dimensions other than that of time. This is because, far from being an unchanging property, secrecy is relational. As the history of families belonging to Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta demonstrates, the degree to which it is used varies depending on the external referents with whom the individual or the organization has to deal. The cultural code that symbolizes, despite its multivocality, the obligation of secrecy is omertà. In the Cosa Nostra, the boundary between the initiates and the outsiders created by the rite of mafia initiation is strengthened by the rigid obligation to silence on members.

Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta gain much of their strength through reliance on a premodern contractual form. On entering a mafia family, the new member underwrites what Max Weber called a “status contract,” which is also a “fraternization contract,” as the members of a mafia cosca are obliged to consider themselves brothers. The key value of the mafia subuniverse of meaning—that set of cultural codes, rituals, and norms through which mafia associations justify their existence and impose a new status on their associates—is honor. The ceremony of mafia initiation is comprised of the three phases making up a rite of passage: “separation,” “transition,” and “incorporation.” Mafia initiation rites are not only rites of passage. By solemnly staging the stepping over of a line establishing a fundamental division in the social order, the ceremonies of mafia affiliation are also “rites of institution.” Though real life is often very different, relationships among Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta associates are prescriptively a form of communitas.

In the reflections of several scholars, mafiosi of the past have been identified tout court with the few figures who showed a clearly modern acquisitive attitude in the traditional economic and social system of western Sicily and southern Calabria, and have been presented as the true expression of the local bourgeoisie. In their turn, contemporary mafia groups have been assimilated into the model of legal business firms. Far from being economic enterprises aiming at the maximization of profits, however, mafia associations are functionally diffused entities, which claim to exercise a political dominion over their areas of settlement. More than wealth, their members have always aimed to gain power over their communities, occupying the central points of the local social, economic, and political systems. Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta families have managed to mix politics and economics, as exemplified by the activities undertaken by them in the building sector, and specifically in the market of construction for the state.

The Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta have been singled out as Italy's largest and most powerful mafia associations. The mafiosi's illegal businesses and their infiltration in legitimate industries have been targeted by criminal investigations. Analysis of the defectors' testimonies, criminal cases, and other sources shows many analogies between the most lasting and successful Italian American mafia association, Cosa Nostra, and its southern Italian counterparts, particularly the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. Just like the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, America's largest and most powerful mafia association is a loose confederation of mafia families that mutually recognize each other but are independent on most issues. The two organizations, however, differ in their internal organization and activities and their relationship with underworld competitors, civil society, politicians, and law enforcement. Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta resort systematically to violence and secrecy to defend themselves from state repression and to pursue their aims. In addition, they have a plurality of functions within their social environment.

The development and existence of mafia associations in Sicily and Calabria over the last hundred and fifty years cannot be explained without mentioning the longstanding incapacity of state institutions to guarantee order and public security over wide areas of the Mezzogiorno through the monopoly of force, and thus to gain full legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Mafia cosche long enjoyed the consensus—or at least, the tolerance—of large strata of the local population, whose cultural codes they repeated and manipulated. Unlike the state, at least up to the 1950s, mafia power thus succeeded in transforming itself into authority. Empowered by popular consensus and the benign neglect of law-enforcement agencies, members of Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta met with little difficulty in accomplishing their roles as brokers and pursuing their own goals of power and wealth. The deterioration of relations between the mafia and politics is the result of a slow process of delegitimation that has invested mafia power during the whole post-war period, but has recorded a sharp acceleration from the early 1980s onward.

This book has shown that Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta are secret and multifunctional brotherhoods each composed of about a hundred units. Though these are usually called families by their members, they are clearly distinct from the latter's blood families. They rely instead on bonds of artificial kinship created through the ceremony of initiation of new members. Exploiting secrecy and violence, the families of Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta have traditionally employed the strength of mafia bonds to pursue a plurality of goals and to carry out numerous different functions, so much so that it is impossible to identify any one who is exclusive. The cosche are neither economic enterprises aiming at the maximization of profits nor an industry for private protection. Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta cannot be considered a universally valid ideal type of organized crime if it is understood as the provision of illegal goods and services.

This chapter introduces the major players in the case US v. IBT, filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its investigative arm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its top officers in June 1988. The lawsuit was jointly prepared by US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's office in the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Washington, DC. This lawsuit launched a major battle in DOJ's decades-long war against the Cosa Nostra organized-crime families. This chapter provides a background on the plaintiff, the amici curiae (Teamsters for a Democratic Union and Association for Union Democracy), the defendants, and the judge who presided over the case for its first twelve years, David Edelstein.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

This chapter introduces the major players in the case US v. IBT, filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its investigative arm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its top officers in June 1988. The lawsuit was jointly prepared by US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's office in the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Washington, DC. This lawsuit launched a major battle in DOJ's decades-long war against the Cosa Nostra organized-crime families. This chapter provides a background on the plaintiff, the amici curiae (Teamsters for a Democratic Union and Association for Union Democracy), the defendants, and the judge who presided over the case for its first twelve years, David Edelstein.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

The crucial importance of property rights in the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy is explained as the basis for emergence of mafia groups: if trust is scarce, and the state is not able or willing to protect property rights, then there is a demand for non-state, private protection. The emergence of the Sicilian Mafia (the Cosa Nostra) is briefly described, for the study of the emergence of the Russian Mafia presented in the book is largely informed by the Sicilian case. The author explains that he treats the term ‘mafia’ as a species of a broader genus of organized crime, which is willing to offer protection to both legal and illegal transactions – although this study is mainly concerned with legal rather than illegal markets (and also does not include the role of ethnic networks as a source of protection services). The reasoning behind the choice of the city of Perm for the location of the study, the type of evidence collected there, and methods of data collection used, are outlined. A summary of the contents of each chapter of the book is also included.

If mafia groups are present in a market, they must be organized in some form. Two questions have generated a heated and long-running debate among scholars of the mafias: first, are criminal groups organized in a hierarchical and military fashion or, on the contrary, are they loose networks of individuals, getting together to perform a specific task; second, are these groups territorially or functionally organized? Chapter 6 addresses these two questions with reference to the city of Perm, which is in the Gulag Archipelago in the Ural region of Russia. It pieces together some elements in the history of Perm’s criminality at the time of the transition from the Soviet economic and political system to the market economy, discussing the legacy of the Gulag (in the shape of the criminal fraternity of the vory-v-zakone – thieves-with-a-code-of-honour – that flourished in the Soviet labour camps between the 1920s and the 1950s, and re-emerged in the 1970s) in relation to the contemporary criminal situation, the post-Soviet criminal groups that emerged in the city, and inter-group relations and conflicts. Lastly, it analyses the organizational arrangements (structure, size, and internal division of labour) of the mafia groups in Perm, and compares them with other gangs and mafias (principally the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra).

This chapter discusses different aspects of the Mafia in Italy, first by describing the organisation in itself, as an institution parallel to and independent of the state. The focus is on the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, although some comparisons are made with other Italian Mafia groupings. The chapter argues that the relation between the Mafia and the state should be understood as an exchange relation, although some sectors are more penetrated by Mafia interests than others. The chapter then looks at the Mafia's territorial control and the weakness of the state and shows that the Mafia's power is closely related to its control over a specific territory, including control over the citizens who are living in that area. It also considers the Mafia's mental control and argues that the Mafia has actively used some Sicilian values as a means to render its activities more legitimate. The sway of the Mafia is not only a consequence of distrust: it is also a promoter of distrust. The chapter concludes by discussing the Mafia and its role in politics.

This chapter reflects on the lessons that can be learned from US v. IBT and speculates about how the case will conclude. It places US v. IBT, a government lawsuit that charged the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with racketeering and being associated with organized crime through Cosa Nostra, in political context. It also examines the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat Cosa Nostra's infiltration of the legitimate economy, including labor unions, as well as the US v. IBT consent decree. Finally, it outlines the US v. IBT lessons for union democracy and for court-supervised institutional reform, along with the issue of who should bear the case's remediation costs.

This chapter reflects on the lessons that can be learned from US v. IBT and speculates about how the case will conclude. It places US v. IBT, a government lawsuit that charged the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with racketeering and being associated with organized crime through Cosa Nostra, in political context. It also examines the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat Cosa Nostra's infiltration of the legitimate economy, including labor unions, as well as the US v. IBT consent decree. Finally, it outlines the US v. IBT lessons for union democracy and for court-supervised institutional reform, along with the issue of who should bear the case's remediation costs.

Chapter 5 elaborates on the extent to which traditional cultural codes (for example, the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini, considered the foundation of the Albanian culture) can help in understanding the behavior of Albanian organized crime figures. What are the drives and rationalizations that enable Albanian offenders to commit ruthless crimes and remain silent about them? Do Albanian criminals use violence to terrorize their victims into silence, gain reputation in criminal circles, defend their “honor,” or simply project masculinity? Are the conditions of access to Albanian organized crime groups strict and ritualized? Do Albanian organized crime figures respect their Kanun laws? By studying cultural codes, this chapter explains the value system of Albanian offenders. Chapter 5 explores how meaning is constructed, and re-constructed, in Albanian criminal groups in order for them to endure, maintain order, and survive in hostile environments. The dynamic between the Albanian codes of honor, secrecy, and violence lies at the heart of this analysis.

This book examines the emergence and continuation of traditional organized crime in Chicago from a sociological perspective. It uses the term “organized crime” to define the political corruption that afforded protection to gambling, prostitution, and other vice activity in large American cities from the second half of the nineteenth century until the end of the twentieth century. The book challenges the alien conspiracy theory's interpretation that organized crime evolved in a linear fashion beginning with the Sicilian Mafia in Sicily, emerging in the form of the Black Hand in America's immigrant colonies, and culminating in the development of the Cosa Nostra in America's urban centers. The book instead argues that Italians continued to dominate organized crime after rising out of poverty because of the presence of “racket subcultures” within American society. It thus highlights the importance of social structural conditions for the emergence and continuation of traditional organized crime in American society. This introduction provides an overview of the chapters that follow.

This chapter focuses on James P. Hoffa's victory in the 1998 rerun election as general president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It first considers the argument between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the IBT over the issue of who should finance the 1998 rerun election before looking at the candidates and their campaigns. In particular, it examines Hoffa's election promise that he will persuade the DOJ and the district court judge that the US v. IBT consent decree was no longer necessary. The chapter then discusses the election results, which saw Hoffa emerge victorious, and his creation of an internal IBT anticorruption unit called Project RISE (respect, integrity, strength, and ethics). It also explores Project RISE's investigation of Cosa Nostra's influence over IBT locals and joint councils and concludes with an assessment of the independent review board's investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of individual disciplinary cases and systemic corruption at the IBT during its second five-year term (July 1996–July 2001).