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This chapter illustrates how the national debate over consumer protection underwent a remarkable transformation during the mid-1970s largely in response to the successes of an increasingly mobilized and organized corporate lobbying community. Once a relatively uncontested social goal, consumerism emerged from the contested politics of a stagflationary decade as a fraught clash of interests. To analyze the mechanisms of business lobbying and its effect on the shifting politics of consumer product regulation, the chapter traces the origins, rise, and slow death of Ralph Nader's biggest legislative priority for the consumer movement in the 1970s: a consumer protection agency in the federal government. Designed to institutionalize consumerism by inserting what Nader called a “consumer perspective” into the national regulatory apparatus, the Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) was a constant fixture on the congressional docket from 1969 to 1978.

This chapter discusses the rise of Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) and the changes it brought to both state and federal regulatory regimes. It presents an empirical perspective on the new era of consumer protection and the differences between consumer protection under state and federal law.

This chapter explores the intersection of consumer protection and human right. Recent years have seen a progressive convergence of fundamental rights and consumer protection in EU law. This chapter argues that fundamental rights, especially if used in combination with other rights can strengthen consumer protection in specific areas. Accordingly, it examines the conceptualisation of consumer protection as a human right, and describes the influence of international human rights on consumer law. It then analyses the scope and the limitation of consumer protection under the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, it assesses the practical significance of constitutional rights and principles on consumer protection in the light of specific cases.

Bankruptcy rates rose after 1978. The debtor-friendliness of the 1978 changes set the stage for a new bankruptcy crisis, but the increasing importance of banks that issue credit cards was the most important force. The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Services Corp. led directly to the growth in the market for credit cards. Banks could now profit from offering cards to high-risk consumers, and this put more people on the path to bankruptcy. Card issuers used some of their profits to lobby for changes to bankruptcy law. Studies by creditor-funded organizations, such as the Credit Research Center, supported a narrative in which lax bankruptcy law and lack of stigma led households to file for bankruptcy even when they could pay, imposing a so-called bankruptcy tax on honest debtors. In 2005, Congress passed a bankruptcy reform bill supported by banks and credit card companies, over the objections of many legal professional, scholars, and even some creditors. Today personal bankrupts must use Chapter 13 repayment plans unless they can show that they do not have sufficient income to repay. Credit card issuers won the argument that retailers began in the 1930s.

Pro-creditor garnishment law was a key driver of the bankruptcy rate for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, but it did not survive the consumer rights movement of the 1960s. By 1970, Congress and the Supreme Court limited the ability of states to maintain and enforce pro-creditor collection laws. Chapter 5 shows that the federal restrictions on garnishment law, especially the Consumer Credit Protection Act, reduced the state-to-state variation in the bankruptcy rate and caused the national bankruptcy rate to level off. Although the growth of bankruptcy in the 1950s and 1960s led to calls for reform of federal bankruptcy law, the effort moved slowly. By the time recommendations for bankruptcy reform were made to Congress, bankruptcy rates were no longer regarded as a problem. Almost all of the changes to personal bankruptcy in the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act encouraged debtors to file.

This chapter discusses the U.S. and EU regulatory proposals for dealing with the global financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act were two of the landmark legislations for overhauling the U.S. regulatory framework. The Dodd Frank proposal sought to address five regulatory issues: (i) the excessive risk taking of financial institutions; (ii) regulatory controls for over-the-counter derivatives and credit default swaps; (iii) the protection of consumers as holders of mortgages and credit cards; (iv) the distribution of regulatory functions among regulatory agencies; and (v) the uniformity and accessibility of global regulatory agencies. In contrast, the regulatory momentum in the EU was slow and dissonant due to the lack of political cohesiveness of nation-states.

This chapter examines depth in appointment, focusing on the tension between qualifications for administrative office and expectations for presidential control. What Trump’s administration has brought to the fore are the suspicions harbored by a unitary executive toward qualifications per se and in the broadest sense of the term. Ability, sound judgment, commitment to assigned duties are all presumptive conditions on presidential control, implicit limits on political subordination, anticipated brakes on personal will. Conversely, the demand for executive branch unity elevates loyalty above all other qualifications. Here, we offer snapshots of the drive to dissolve administrative qualifications into loyalty to the president at several sites, considering: a hybrid arrangement at the National Security Council; the use of acting appointments at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; the assault on merit-based appointments for administrative law judges; and protections against at-will removal at independence agencies like the Federal Reserve.

The growing concern about children's pre-occupation with brands has led to calls for tighter government-backed restrictions on brand owners‘ marketing activities. The appeal of digital worlds to young consumers has not gone unmissed by professional marketers. The concerns of marketing regulators around the world has grown particularly acute with the emergence of more subtle forms of branding activity in online environments that often disguise their true purpose. Until they reach a level of psychological development that approaches adulthood, children are in any case susceptible to marketing appeals. This is true even with forms of advertising that stand apart from other media content or the physical setting in which they are presented. In digital worlds, brand promotions are frequently integrated with surrounding content and form part of it. This chapter examines these concerns and considers concepts of taste, freedom of choice and harm in debating what kinds of restrictions might be placed on different brand marketing activities where children are concerned.

The structure of Florida’s government and the state’s public policies have been transformed during the modern two-party era, and the chapter identifies the contributions made by the Republican partisans during that transformation. The chapter includes a narrative of the Republican dogma in areas of public policies, including criminal justice and prison reform; taxation and economic incentives; consumer protection; and environmental reform, including reform for the Florida Everglades. The chapter discusses the policy changes that occurred in bipartisan efforts between Republicans and Democrats; it describes the policy changes in the wake of the Republican majority, including changes in school choice and other areas; and it contrasts the changes from the policies of the one-party, Pork Chop era, to the two-party system.

Before liability is incurred under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, a product containing a defect must cause damage. Section 1(2) of the Act provides a definition of ‘product’. It states that ‘product’ means ‘any goods or electricity and … includes a product which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or raw material or otherwise’. Notwithstanding the short title of the Act, the definition of product is sufficiently broad to have a wider application than merely to consumer goods. For example, disasters resulting from chemicals or aircraft could be litigated under the Act, as could asbestos and other toxic substances which have given rise to much litigation in the United States.

The subprime crisis showed that federal banking regulators cannot be relied on to put consumer safety over the interests of regulated banks. This chapter evaluates whether the Dodd-Frank Act achieves the goals that are critical to consumer protection. The Dodd-Frank Act transfers most of the responsibility for consumer financial protection from federal banking regulators to a new, dedicated agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The Act empowers the CFPB to establish rules for many aspects of mortgage lending. It also allows the states to protect consumers over and above the standards set by federal law. The chapter argues that although the Dodd-Frank takes bold steps toward protecting consumers, with the ultimate effect of reducing the threat of systemic risk, the consumer protection reforms do not eliminate that threat altogether.

The adoption of the strict liability scheme for defective products by the European Union Product Liability Directive, and its subsequent transposition through Pt 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, changed the basis on which actions for compensation for damage caused by defective products had been brought for over fifty years. In essence, the change was from a system which required proof of negligence to one in which liability was dependent on proving that a defective product had caused damage. While we shall see that many academics and commentators had originally assumed a critical view of the strict liability regime, considering that in practice liability would be no wider than under negligence, it is now clearly established that, in respect of products supplied on or after 1 March 1988, strict liability under the 1987 Act is the primary cause of action in product liability litigation in the United Kingdom. In many Member States, the effects of the new regime have been very significant indeed.

One of the most important and complex elements in many product liability actions is the establishment of a causative link between the allegedly defective product and the relevant damage. Indeed, the significance of causation cannot be overstated since, whether the claim is in negligence or under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, proof of causation will often lead to either a settlement or a successful claim.

There is ample room for debate as to the category of persons who should be required to assume responsibility for damage caused by a defective product. The most obvious is the producer or manufacturer for usually they will have actively created the defect or at least have failed to eliminate it. However, in recognition of the fact that not all such producers will be solvent, readily identifiable, and available to be sued, it is widely recognized that others should also be potentially liable. The most obvious is the commercial importer and distributor of a defective product since in the absence of such liability an injured claimant would be left with the alternative of suing in a foreign jurisdiction. Secondly, there is the case of own-brand products. As the Law Commissions observed, many commercial organizations ‘sell products under their brand name as if they themselves had produced them, although the products were in fact made by their suppliers’.

The removal of a requirement of proving negligence, which is usually regarded as the distinguishing feature of the system of strict liability introduced by Pt I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, will in all probability shift the focus of attention to the question of whether the claimant has established that the product is defective. As will be seen, the question gives rise to many difficult issues. Indeed, one writer has observed that ‘the problem of defining defectiveness has exercised the minds of legal scholars perhaps more than any other aspect of product liability law’.

The main purpose of this book is to provide a detailed statement of the principles governing the civil liability of manufacturers and others for damage or loss caused by defective products. In this final chapter we refer briefly to some of the main sources which seek to regulate product safety through the use of the criminal law. Of course, many types of products are covered by specific legislation. For example, the sale of food for human consumption and medicines fall into this category. The details fall outside the scope of this work.

Section 4 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides a number of defences to liability which mirror those provided by Article 7 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC (the Product Liability Directive). By s 1(1), the Act and hence the defences must be construed so as to give effect to Article 7 and consistently with it. The defences cover such matters as:

Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, sparking a bitter partisan battle. The bureau’s mission—to help individual consumers cope with their financial problems and to ward off future crises like the 2008 financial collapse—posed a direct challenge to the financial industry. As the industry has grown, it has also greatly expanded its power in Washington through extensive political contributions and lobbying efforts. Its support for the Tea Party movement shifted the political balance in the 2010 elections. Using its political might, the industry opposed the bureau and then sought to block confirmation of anyone as its director, hoping to hobble efforts to operationalize it. On Elizabeth Warren’s recommendation, President Obama nominated Richard Cordray to be the first director, starting a fight over his confirmation that would last two years.