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This chapter illustrates how the national debate over consumer protection underwent a remarkable transformation during the mid-1970s largely in response to the successes of an increasingly mobilized and organized corporate lobbying community. Once a relatively uncontested social goal, consumerism emerged from the contested politics of a stagflationary decade as a fraught clash of interests. To analyze the mechanisms of business lobbying and its effect on the shifting politics of consumer product regulation, the chapter traces the origins, rise, and slow death of Ralph Nader's biggest legislative priority for the consumer movement in the 1970s: a consumer protection agency in the federal government. Designed to institutionalize consumerism by inserting what Nader called a “consumer perspective” into the national regulatory apparatus, the Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) was a constant fixture on the congressional docket from 1969 to 1978.

This chapter discusses the rise of Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) and the changes it brought to both state and federal regulatory regimes. It presents an empirical perspective on the new era of consumer protection and the differences between consumer protection under state and federal law.

This chapter explores the intersection of consumer protection and human right. Recent years have seen a progressive convergence of fundamental rights and consumer protection in EU law. This chapter argues that fundamental rights, especially if used in combination with other rights can strengthen consumer protection in specific areas. Accordingly, it examines the conceptualisation of consumer protection as a human right, and describes the influence of international human rights on consumer law. It then analyses the scope and the limitation of consumer protection under the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, it assesses the practical significance of constitutional rights and principles on consumer protection in the light of specific cases.

Chapter six, Race to the Bottom: Regulatory Feedback Effects and the Politics of Rulemaking, explores how the policy feedback dynamics introduced in previous chapters coalesce within the administrative state to limit the lobbying power of consumer advocacy groups and diminish borrower political participation in regulatory rulemaking. This chapter investigates how two features of consumer credit policy administration—1) whether rulemaking and enforcement authority for a policy is fragmented or centralized and 2) whether the responsible agency has a primary mission of prudential regulation or consumer protection—constrain the behavior of bureaucrats, the capacity of advocacy groups to lobby on behalf of consumer financial protection, and the political participation of citizens. Drawing on interviews with consumer advocates and records of consumer credit complaints, the chapter shows how the historical tendency to fragment regulatory authority for consumer financial protections across several agencies whose mission is to protect banks and not borrowers creates obstacles for both public interest lobbying and borrower engagement. It explores how the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau might reshape these dynamics by centralizing much of the regulatory authority for consumer financial protection in a single agency designed explicitly to work on behalf of borrowers.

Bankruptcy rates rose after 1978. The debtor-friendliness of the 1978 changes set the stage for a new bankruptcy crisis, but the increasing importance of banks that issue credit cards was the most important force. The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Services Corp. led directly to the growth in the market for credit cards. Banks could now profit from offering cards to high-risk consumers, and this put more people on the path to bankruptcy. Card issuers used some of their profits to lobby for changes to bankruptcy law. Studies by creditor-funded organizations, such as the Credit Research Center, supported a narrative in which lax bankruptcy law and lack of stigma led households to file for bankruptcy even when they could pay, imposing a so-called bankruptcy tax on honest debtors. In 2005, Congress passed a bankruptcy reform bill supported by banks and credit card companies, over the objections of many legal professional, scholars, and even some creditors. Today personal bankrupts must use Chapter 13 repayment plans unless they can show that they do not have sufficient income to repay. Credit card issuers won the argument that retailers began in the 1930s.

Pro-creditor garnishment law was a key driver of the bankruptcy rate for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, but it did not survive the consumer rights movement of the 1960s. By 1970, Congress and the Supreme Court limited the ability of states to maintain and enforce pro-creditor collection laws. Chapter 5 shows that the federal restrictions on garnishment law, especially the Consumer Credit Protection Act, reduced the state-to-state variation in the bankruptcy rate and caused the national bankruptcy rate to level off. Although the growth of bankruptcy in the 1950s and 1960s led to calls for reform of federal bankruptcy law, the effort moved slowly. By the time recommendations for bankruptcy reform were made to Congress, bankruptcy rates were no longer regarded as a problem. Almost all of the changes to personal bankruptcy in the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act encouraged debtors to file.

The conclusion, A New Lease: The CFPB and the Uncertain Future of Consumer Financial Protection Politics, considers how the U.S. political economy of credit shapes the broader politics of consumer financial protection and the prospects for future policy reform. The political economy of credit has induced a self-perpetuating cycle that forecloses on more borrower-friendly financial practices. Policymakers are motivated to rely on the status quo—information disclosures. This policy regime produces regulatory feedback effects that teach people that consumer financial protection lies entirely in the realm of the market, removing their incentives for political participation. Without receptive lawmakers or demanding citizens, public interest groups face a nearly impossible task convincing government officials to consider new methods of consumer financial protection regulation. The chapter considers whether the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will serve as a critical juncture, reshaping the future politics of consumer financial protection. I conclude that the CFPB alters the administrative environment sufficiently that it may improve prospects for public interest lobbying and boost citizen political engagement to support predatory lending reform, but only if its distinctive character survives political attacks.

This chapter discusses the U.S. and EU regulatory proposals for dealing with the global financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act were two of the landmark legislations for overhauling the U.S. regulatory framework. The Dodd Frank proposal sought to address five regulatory issues: (i) the excessive risk taking of financial institutions; (ii) regulatory controls for over-the-counter derivatives and credit default swaps; (iii) the protection of consumers as holders of mortgages and credit cards; (iv) the distribution of regulatory functions among regulatory agencies; and (v) the uniformity and accessibility of global regulatory agencies. In contrast, the regulatory momentum in the EU was slow and dissonant due to the lack of political cohesiveness of nation-states.

This chapter examines depth in appointment, focusing on the tension between qualifications for administrative office and expectations for presidential control. What Trump’s administration has brought to the fore are the suspicions harbored by a unitary executive toward qualifications per se and in the broadest sense of the term. Ability, sound judgment, commitment to assigned duties are all presumptive conditions on presidential control, implicit limits on political subordination, anticipated brakes on personal will. Conversely, the demand for executive branch unity elevates loyalty above all other qualifications. Here, we offer snapshots of the drive to dissolve administrative qualifications into loyalty to the president at several sites, considering: a hybrid arrangement at the National Security Council; the use of acting appointments at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; the assault on merit-based appointments for administrative law judges; and protections against at-will removal at independence agencies like the Federal Reserve.

The growing concern about children's pre-occupation with brands has led to calls for tighter government-backed restrictions on brand owners‘ marketing activities. The appeal of digital worlds to young consumers has not gone unmissed by professional marketers. The concerns of marketing regulators around the world has grown particularly acute with the emergence of more subtle forms of branding activity in online environments that often disguise their true purpose. Until they reach a level of psychological development that approaches adulthood, children are in any case susceptible to marketing appeals. This is true even with forms of advertising that stand apart from other media content or the physical setting in which they are presented. In digital worlds, brand promotions are frequently integrated with surrounding content and form part of it. This chapter examines these concerns and considers concepts of taste, freedom of choice and harm in debating what kinds of restrictions might be placed on different brand marketing activities where children are concerned.

The structure of Florida’s government and the state’s public policies have been transformed during the modern two-party era, and the chapter identifies the contributions made by the Republican partisans during that transformation. The chapter includes a narrative of the Republican dogma in areas of public policies, including criminal justice and prison reform; taxation and economic incentives; consumer protection; and environmental reform, including reform for the Florida Everglades. The chapter discusses the policy changes that occurred in bipartisan efforts between Republicans and Democrats; it describes the policy changes in the wake of the Republican majority, including changes in school choice and other areas; and it contrasts the changes from the policies of the one-party, Pork Chop era, to the two-party system.

Before liability is incurred under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, a product containing a defect must cause damage. Section 1(2) of the Act provides a definition of ‘product’. It states that ‘product’ means ‘any goods or electricity and … includes a product which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or raw material or otherwise’. Notwithstanding the short title of the Act, the definition of product is sufficiently broad to have a wider application than merely to consumer goods. For example, disasters resulting from chemicals or aircraft could be litigated under the Act, as could asbestos and other toxic substances which have given rise to much litigation in the United States.

The subprime crisis showed that federal banking regulators cannot be relied on to put consumer safety over the interests of regulated banks. This chapter evaluates whether the Dodd-Frank Act achieves the goals that are critical to consumer protection. The Dodd-Frank Act transfers most of the responsibility for consumer financial protection from federal banking regulators to a new, dedicated agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The Act empowers the CFPB to establish rules for many aspects of mortgage lending. It also allows the states to protect consumers over and above the standards set by federal law. The chapter argues that although the Dodd-Frank takes bold steps toward protecting consumers, with the ultimate effect of reducing the threat of systemic risk, the consumer protection reforms do not eliminate that threat altogether.

The adoption of the strict liability scheme for defective products by the European Union Product Liability Directive, and its subsequent transposition through Pt 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, changed the basis on which actions for compensation for damage caused by defective products had been brought for over fifty years. In essence, the change was from a system which required proof of negligence to one in which liability was dependent on proving that a defective product had caused damage. While we shall see that many academics and commentators had originally assumed a critical view of the strict liability regime, considering that in practice liability would be no wider than under negligence, it is now clearly established that, in respect of products supplied on or after 1 March 1988, strict liability under the 1987 Act is the primary cause of action in product liability litigation in the United Kingdom. In many Member States, the effects of the new regime have been very significant indeed.

One of the most important and complex elements in many product liability actions is the establishment of a causative link between the allegedly defective product and the relevant damage. Indeed, the significance of causation cannot be overstated since, whether the claim is in negligence or under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, proof of causation will often lead to either a settlement or a successful claim.

There is ample room for debate as to the category of persons who should be required to assume responsibility for damage caused by a defective product. The most obvious is the producer or manufacturer for usually they will have actively created the defect or at least have failed to eliminate it. However, in recognition of the fact that not all such producers will be solvent, readily identifiable, and available to be sued, it is widely recognized that others should also be potentially liable. The most obvious is the commercial importer and distributor of a defective product since in the absence of such liability an injured claimant would be left with the alternative of suing in a foreign jurisdiction. Secondly, there is the case of own-brand products. As the Law Commissions observed, many commercial organizations ‘sell products under their brand name as if they themselves had produced them, although the products were in fact made by their suppliers’.

The removal of a requirement of proving negligence, which is usually regarded as the distinguishing feature of the system of strict liability introduced by Pt I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, will in all probability shift the focus of attention to the question of whether the claimant has established that the product is defective. As will be seen, the question gives rise to many difficult issues. Indeed, one writer has observed that ‘the problem of defining defectiveness has exercised the minds of legal scholars perhaps more than any other aspect of product liability law’.

Section 4 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides a number of defences to liability which mirror those provided by Article 7 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC (the Product Liability Directive). By s 1(1), the Act and hence the defences must be construed so as to give effect to Article 7 and consistently with it. The defences cover such matters as: