Jasmine Farrier
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813192628
- eISBN:
- 9780813135496
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813192628.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Is the United States Congress dead, alive, or trapped in a moribund cycle? When confronted with controversial policy issues, members of Congress struggle to satisfy conflicting legislative, ...
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Is the United States Congress dead, alive, or trapped in a moribund cycle? When confronted with controversial policy issues, members of Congress struggle to satisfy conflicting legislative, representative, and oversight duties. These competing goals, along with the pressure to satisfy local constituents, cause members of Congress to routinely cede power on a variety of policies, express regret over their loss of control, and later return to the habit of delegating their power. This pattern of institutional ambivalence undermines conventional wisdom about congressional party resurgence, the power of oversight, and the return of the so-called imperial presidency. This book examines Congress's frequent delegation of power by analyzing primary source materials such as bills, committee reports, and the Congressional Record. The book demonstrates that Congress is caught between abdication and ambition and that this ambivalence affects numerous facets of the legislative process. Explaining specific instances of post-delegation disorder, including Congress's use of new bills, obstruction, public criticism, and oversight to salvage its lost power, the book exposes the tensions surrounding Congress's roles in recent hot-button issues such as base-closing commissions, presidential trade promotion authority, and responses to the attacks of September 11. It also examines shifting public rhetoric used by members of Congress as they emphasize, in institutionally self-conscious terms, the difficulties of balancing their multiple roles.Less
Is the United States Congress dead, alive, or trapped in a moribund cycle? When confronted with controversial policy issues, members of Congress struggle to satisfy conflicting legislative, representative, and oversight duties. These competing goals, along with the pressure to satisfy local constituents, cause members of Congress to routinely cede power on a variety of policies, express regret over their loss of control, and later return to the habit of delegating their power. This pattern of institutional ambivalence undermines conventional wisdom about congressional party resurgence, the power of oversight, and the return of the so-called imperial presidency. This book examines Congress's frequent delegation of power by analyzing primary source materials such as bills, committee reports, and the Congressional Record. The book demonstrates that Congress is caught between abdication and ambition and that this ambivalence affects numerous facets of the legislative process. Explaining specific instances of post-delegation disorder, including Congress's use of new bills, obstruction, public criticism, and oversight to salvage its lost power, the book exposes the tensions surrounding Congress's roles in recent hot-button issues such as base-closing commissions, presidential trade promotion authority, and responses to the attacks of September 11. It also examines shifting public rhetoric used by members of Congress as they emphasize, in institutionally self-conscious terms, the difficulties of balancing their multiple roles.
Charles F. Wurster
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190219413
- eISBN:
- 9780197559512
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190219413.003.0015
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Pollution and Threats to the Environment
EPA was only five weeks old on January 7, 1971, when the Court of Appeals ordered the agency to cancel all DDT registrations. The situation was fluid, to say the least. EPA did not know how the ...
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EPA was only five weeks old on January 7, 1971, when the Court of Appeals ordered the agency to cancel all DDT registrations. The situation was fluid, to say the least. EPA did not know how the cancellation process was to be carried out, since USDA before them had never executed a cancellation procedure. There was no precedent to follow, and the parties did not agree on the rules for cancellation. The cancellation process for DDT clearly would be adversarial, with the pesticide industry already objecting. Represented by Bill Butler, EDF insisted on judicial rules of evidence with qualification of expert witnesses, testimony to be relevant to the topics at issue, and full rights of cross-examination for all parties. That was a bottom line for EDF, and EPA lawyers agreed. If a witness was qualified as expert on topic A and not on topic B, he or she could testify on A but not on B. We had learned from experience that we did not want industry representatives and salesmen or lobbyists making opinion statements and then walking away, leaving a muddy record that would be little more than a popular vote open to varied interpretations. Industry wanted that. EDF wanted competent scientists to build an accurate record, and after months of haggling, EDF and EPA ultimately prevailed. There would be judicial rules of evidence. It was a triumph for Bill Butler and EDF. Little did we know then that this procedure would influence pesticide regulation by EPA far into the future. Judicial rules of evidence proved critically important in the litigation and eventual banning of aldrin, dieldrin, chlordane, heptachlor, and mirex, as we will describe in Chapter 12. Qualified scientists and experts testified in those proceedings, and some previously vocal advocates never appeared. Since EPA had been ordered by the court to consider cancellation of all registrations of DDT, it was the DDT proponents who were bringing the appeal. They were known as the Group Petitioners. It had become the burden of industry to prove DDT safe, whereas before it had been our burden to prove hazard.
Less
EPA was only five weeks old on January 7, 1971, when the Court of Appeals ordered the agency to cancel all DDT registrations. The situation was fluid, to say the least. EPA did not know how the cancellation process was to be carried out, since USDA before them had never executed a cancellation procedure. There was no precedent to follow, and the parties did not agree on the rules for cancellation. The cancellation process for DDT clearly would be adversarial, with the pesticide industry already objecting. Represented by Bill Butler, EDF insisted on judicial rules of evidence with qualification of expert witnesses, testimony to be relevant to the topics at issue, and full rights of cross-examination for all parties. That was a bottom line for EDF, and EPA lawyers agreed. If a witness was qualified as expert on topic A and not on topic B, he or she could testify on A but not on B. We had learned from experience that we did not want industry representatives and salesmen or lobbyists making opinion statements and then walking away, leaving a muddy record that would be little more than a popular vote open to varied interpretations. Industry wanted that. EDF wanted competent scientists to build an accurate record, and after months of haggling, EDF and EPA ultimately prevailed. There would be judicial rules of evidence. It was a triumph for Bill Butler and EDF. Little did we know then that this procedure would influence pesticide regulation by EPA far into the future. Judicial rules of evidence proved critically important in the litigation and eventual banning of aldrin, dieldrin, chlordane, heptachlor, and mirex, as we will describe in Chapter 12. Qualified scientists and experts testified in those proceedings, and some previously vocal advocates never appeared. Since EPA had been ordered by the court to consider cancellation of all registrations of DDT, it was the DDT proponents who were bringing the appeal. They were known as the Group Petitioners. It had become the burden of industry to prove DDT safe, whereas before it had been our burden to prove hazard.
