Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories ...
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Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Against facts examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, distinguished as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. Compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument are criticized in part I. Propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what Against facts calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on a Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, are criticized in part II. Against facts argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.Less
Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Against facts examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, distinguished as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. Compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument are criticized in part I. Propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what Against facts calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on a Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, are criticized in part II. Against facts argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter fixes what compositional facts are and what they are for. Five semantic roles are distinguished that entities can play in the theoretical space at the intersection of language and world, ...
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This chapter fixes what compositional facts are and what they are for. Five semantic roles are distinguished that entities can play in the theoretical space at the intersection of language and world, and compositional facts are characterized as entities able to play two such roles (sentence-object, and truthmaker). A reconstruction of Armstrong’s argument in favor of compositional facts as truthmakers is then offered, and in this connection, seven ontological characteristics are individuated that facts are taken to possess. These ontological characteristics distinguish facts from neighboring entities (propositions, states of affairs, tropes, events, integral wholes and complexes) and form, taken together, the seven conditions of the (working) definition of the notion of compositional fact. A compositional fact is characterized as a complex entity with a fixed number of constituents (minimally two) that is part of the furniture of the world, and whose composition is formal, nonmereological, and heterogeneous both from the ontological point of view and from the point of view of the categories involved.Less
This chapter fixes what compositional facts are and what they are for. Five semantic roles are distinguished that entities can play in the theoretical space at the intersection of language and world, and compositional facts are characterized as entities able to play two such roles (sentence-object, and truthmaker). A reconstruction of Armstrong’s argument in favor of compositional facts as truthmakers is then offered, and in this connection, seven ontological characteristics are individuated that facts are taken to possess. These ontological characteristics distinguish facts from neighboring entities (propositions, states of affairs, tropes, events, integral wholes and complexes) and form, taken together, the seven conditions of the (working) definition of the notion of compositional fact. A compositional fact is characterized as a complex entity with a fixed number of constituents (minimally two) that is part of the furniture of the world, and whose composition is formal, nonmereological, and heterogeneous both from the ontological point of view and from the point of view of the categories involved.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This Chapter introduces the Unity Problem: what is the ontological ground of the difference between two objects taken together (their mereological sum or ‘mere aggregate’) and their real unity (the ...
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This Chapter introduces the Unity Problem: what is the ontological ground of the difference between two objects taken together (their mereological sum or ‘mere aggregate’) and their real unity (the ‘really unified’ complex of the two objects)? The attempts at answering this question are presented by means of a Master Argument, and ranked using a flow chart, which shows as best Armstrong’s solution accepting compositional facts as primitive unities of their constituents with a special nonmereological composition. A first step to dismiss Armstrong’s solution as ad hoc is taken in this chapter by drawing upon elements of the debate on material constitution, and concluding that there are no direct or indirect arguments in favor of the special nonmereological composition of facts that are independent of the need to solve the unity problem. The last section of the chapter establishes that states of affairs are, a fortiori, more problematic entities than facts with respect to the Unity Problem.Less
This Chapter introduces the Unity Problem: what is the ontological ground of the difference between two objects taken together (their mereological sum or ‘mere aggregate’) and their real unity (the ‘really unified’ complex of the two objects)? The attempts at answering this question are presented by means of a Master Argument, and ranked using a flow chart, which shows as best Armstrong’s solution accepting compositional facts as primitive unities of their constituents with a special nonmereological composition. A first step to dismiss Armstrong’s solution as ad hoc is taken in this chapter by drawing upon elements of the debate on material constitution, and concluding that there are no direct or indirect arguments in favor of the special nonmereological composition of facts that are independent of the need to solve the unity problem. The last section of the chapter establishes that states of affairs are, a fortiori, more problematic entities than facts with respect to the Unity Problem.