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This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for the book. Initially, the problem of escalation is argued to be central to limited warfare and limited war strategies. Undesired escalation can take in three forms: vertical, horizontal, and durational. Successful limited war strategies are those that effectively balance the military and diplomatic objectives sought. Four possible strategic outcomes are rendered from the interaction of military failure/success and diplomatic failure/success. The chapter argues that successful limited war strategies result from a state's capacities to extract and convert relevant military and diplomatic information into strategy. A state's information institution (i.e., the pattern of information flow among policymakers and national security organizations) is the ultimate source of strategic success and failure. Two alternative explanations of strategic performance in limited war are presented: organizational culture theory and democratic civil-military relations theory. Finally, the hybrid method of typological theory and process tracing is discussed.

This chapter summarizes the findings of the previous four empirical chapters and spells out the implications of the information institution approach for international relations theory and foreign policy. Four causal pathways generating the strategic outcomes of limited wars are identified. The information institution approach is shown to offer superior explanations for each of these outcomes than do either organizational culture theory or democratic civil-military relations theory. Additionally, the information institution approach is shown to offer more compelling explanations for these strategic outcomes than rationalist bargaining theory. In terms of theoretical implications, the information institution approach offers a more compelling understanding of the interaction between state-level organizations and political leaders than do traditional organizational theories. This approach also provides a firmer foundation for strategic choice theories of interstate conflict and cooperation. Finally, the relevance of the information institution approach to coercive diplomacy, executive decision-making styles, and interagency coordination is addressed.

British withdrawal from Palestine was a long-drawn out affair. Britain had been awarded the mandate from the League of Nations after the First World War but remained a reluctant ruler until the evacuation was announced in late 1947. As the civil war between the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers intensified and boiled over into open terrorism. By 15 May 1948 British forces were in retreat, their strategic interests in the Middle East region uncertain, and the Labour Government in London determined to rid itself of this problematic territory. Effectively British involvement in Palestine highlights Labour's failure in the Middle East and its inability to balance wider priorities in the emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union. But how did Britain conduct its military campaign in Palestine and, moreover, did the counter-insurgency campaign really end in failure? This chapter analyses the ebb and flow of civil-military relations in Palestine and sets the scene for the key themes of political will, constraints on the use of force, and the effectiveness of civil-military relations explored in the remainder of the book.

This chapter begins with a personal vignette from one of the authors (Reich) regarding scenario planning and its relationship to strategizing. In this chapter, we outline the major strands of contemporary US grand strategy, and identify the conditions under which each one is employed by policymakers and, ultimately, the U.S. Navy. It then examines theories that may explain why a series of strategies run simultaneously before comprehensively examining the contemporary contending variants of grand strategy. It outlines three major variants and then distinguish two sub-categories within each variant for a total of six. It compares and contrasts the key elements of each to illustrate how – despite the fact that they may share features –is ultimately configures in a unique way.

This chapter highlights how, in many respects, the military (MGK) was the author of its own decline, a result of infighting and internal and external plots and intrigue. By the AKP’s second term, tensions arose within the military’s lower officer ranks about how to deal with what they considered to be the AKP’s challenge to the secular nature of the state. This created disarray within the ranks while at the same time spurious conspiracies to overthrow the government emerged, leading to a purge within the military’s officer class. By the time the AKP entered its third term in office, the military was a spent force in Turkish politics ushering in a new era in the political and cultural dynamics of the country.

This chapter shifts its focus away from the euphoric optimism that emerged after 2011 and instead looks at one of the more enduring realities of contemporary Myanmar: the continuing dominance of the military institution despite the disbanding of the junta in 2011. The Tatmadaw remains a key policy actor as the “last resort decision-maker” in the new post-junta hybrid system. As crises emerge, threats escalate and local contentious politics grow uncontrollable, the armed forces continue to decisively intervene. The Tatmadaw has also secured a “post-junta” legislative role through the constitutional reservation of a quarter of all new parliamentary seats. This chapter reviews the various policy and legislative functions performed by the Tatmadaw in the new constitution order, evaluating the effects of its lingering influence.

The chapter argues that the main policy actor at the core of the transitional process remains Myanmar’s secretive military institution. It was the armed forces and its uncontested leadership that let the “opening” outstretch soon after the 2010 elections, by officially disbanding the “junta” and morphing into a hybrid “transit regime”. In a sense, the Tatmadaw stood, as in 1960 and 1974, as a “caretaker” of the transition. Yet, even if the partial disengagement of the armed forces from politics observed after 2011 had carefully been planned by the military leadership, an institutional and political “elite pact” was needed regardless, and sought after by several key elite groups, to pursue the initial procedural transition.