Matthew S. Seligmann
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199574032
- eISBN:
- 9780191741432
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574032.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This book examines the way in which the prospect of a wartime German assault on British seaborne commerce influenced the development of British naval policy in the run up to the First World War. It ...
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This book examines the way in which the prospect of a wartime German assault on British seaborne commerce influenced the development of British naval policy in the run up to the First World War. It argues that, owing to the Admiralty’s consistently expressed fears that, in the event of an Anglo-German conflict, German commerce-raiders could interdict vital supplies, the British government began to consider German maritime power as a serious danger to British national security at the very outset of the twentieth century and that this sense of anxiety continued, even sharpened, as the years unfolded. It further argues that as a result of this perception of a growing menace, the Royal Navy devoted considerable time and energy to devising ever more elaborate countermeasures. These included developing new types of auxiliary and then regular warships, attempting to change international maritime law, creating a new global intelligence network, seeking to involve the government in the maritime insurance system and, finally, arming British merchant vessels and taking steps to place trained gun crews on these vessels in peacetime. While some of these developments have been subject to alternative explanations, some have never been explained at all. Yet, as this book shows, all had their origins, substantially or even entirely, in the Admiralty’s fears of a German threat to British maritime commerce. As a result, it concludes that the prospect of a German assault on British trade played a major part in shaping Admiralty policy in the twelve years before 1914.Less
This book examines the way in which the prospect of a wartime German assault on British seaborne commerce influenced the development of British naval policy in the run up to the First World War. It argues that, owing to the Admiralty’s consistently expressed fears that, in the event of an Anglo-German conflict, German commerce-raiders could interdict vital supplies, the British government began to consider German maritime power as a serious danger to British national security at the very outset of the twentieth century and that this sense of anxiety continued, even sharpened, as the years unfolded. It further argues that as a result of this perception of a growing menace, the Royal Navy devoted considerable time and energy to devising ever more elaborate countermeasures. These included developing new types of auxiliary and then regular warships, attempting to change international maritime law, creating a new global intelligence network, seeking to involve the government in the maritime insurance system and, finally, arming British merchant vessels and taking steps to place trained gun crews on these vessels in peacetime. While some of these developments have been subject to alternative explanations, some have never been explained at all. Yet, as this book shows, all had their origins, substantially or even entirely, in the Admiralty’s fears of a German threat to British maritime commerce. As a result, it concludes that the prospect of a German assault on British trade played a major part in shaping Admiralty policy in the twelve years before 1914.
John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold ...
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This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.Less
This book aims to promote debate about John Mueller's thesis that questions whether nuclear weapons had revolutionary effects in international relations. By bringing together evidence of how ten Cold War statesmen thought about nuclear weapons, especially at moments when they had to contemplate setting in motion chains of events that might present them with a clear choice of using or not using them, it concludes that nuclear weapons did play the determining role in making great‐power war obsolete. The essays deal not only with Truman, Churchill, and Stalin but also with Truman's immediate successors: Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy; Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev; Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and three leaders of other nations: France's Charles de Gaulle, Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and China's Mao Zedong.
William Bain
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199260263
- eISBN:
- 9780191600975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260265.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The place and purpose of trusteeship in the post‐Second World War world order aroused passions and suspicions that were no less pronounced than those which threatened to disrupt the peace ...
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The place and purpose of trusteeship in the post‐Second World War world order aroused passions and suspicions that were no less pronounced than those which threatened to disrupt the peace negotiations at Versailles two decades earlier, and these tensions, which divided the US and Britain in particular, emanated from a fundamental disagreement over the purpose of trusteeship and its relation to the future of empire in world affairs. British commentators on empire tended to interpret the idea of trusteeship in the context of an imperial tradition that dated back to Edmund Burke's interest in the affairs of the East India Company, invoking trusteeship as a principle against which to judge colonial administration and, therefore, understood the tutelage of dependent peoples as a justification of empire. Americans, who were born of a very different colonial and political experience, were a great deal less inclined to see trusteeship as a justification of empire than as an alternative to the perpetuation of empire. Interrogates the claims that structured the terms of this debate, how they shaped the purpose of trusteeship as contemplated in the Charter of the UN, and the ideas upon which the anti‐colonial movement seized in order to destroy the legitimacy of trusteeship in international society. There are five sections: The Atlantic Charter and the Future of Empire; The Reform of Empire; Trusteeship and the Charter of the UN; The End of Empire; and Human Equality and the Illegitimacy of Trusteeship.Less
The place and purpose of trusteeship in the post‐Second World War world order aroused passions and suspicions that were no less pronounced than those which threatened to disrupt the peace negotiations at Versailles two decades earlier, and these tensions, which divided the US and Britain in particular, emanated from a fundamental disagreement over the purpose of trusteeship and its relation to the future of empire in world affairs. British commentators on empire tended to interpret the idea of trusteeship in the context of an imperial tradition that dated back to Edmund Burke's interest in the affairs of the East India Company, invoking trusteeship as a principle against which to judge colonial administration and, therefore, understood the tutelage of dependent peoples as a justification of empire. Americans, who were born of a very different colonial and political experience, were a great deal less inclined to see trusteeship as a justification of empire than as an alternative to the perpetuation of empire. Interrogates the claims that structured the terms of this debate, how they shaped the purpose of trusteeship as contemplated in the Charter of the UN, and the ideas upon which the anti‐colonial movement seized in order to destroy the legitimacy of trusteeship in international society. There are five sections: The Atlantic Charter and the Future of Empire; The Reform of Empire; Trusteeship and the Charter of the UN; The End of Empire; and Human Equality and the Illegitimacy of Trusteeship.
Jonathan Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent ...
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Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.Less
Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.
Arthur J. Marder, Mark Jacobsen, and John Horsfield
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201502
- eISBN:
- 9780191674907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201502.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This first account of the Royal Navy in the Pacific War is a companion volume to Arthur Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies: Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941. Picking up the story at the nadir of British ...
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This first account of the Royal Navy in the Pacific War is a companion volume to Arthur Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies: Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941. Picking up the story at the nadir of British naval fortunes – ‘everywhere weak and naked’, in Churchill's phrase – it examines the Royal Navy's role in events from 1942 to the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Drawing on both British and Japanese sources and personal accounts by participants, the authors retell the story of the collapse of Allied defences in the Dutch East Indies, culminating in the Battle of the Java Sea. They recount the attempts of the ‘fighting admiral’, Sir James Somerville, to train his motley fleet of cast-offs into an efficient fighting force in spite of the reluctance of Churchill, who resisted the formation of a full-scale British Pacific Fleet until the 1945 assault on the Ryukyu Islands immediately south of Japan. The account provides an analysis of the key personalities who shaped events in these momentous years.Less
This first account of the Royal Navy in the Pacific War is a companion volume to Arthur Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies: Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941. Picking up the story at the nadir of British naval fortunes – ‘everywhere weak and naked’, in Churchill's phrase – it examines the Royal Navy's role in events from 1942 to the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Drawing on both British and Japanese sources and personal accounts by participants, the authors retell the story of the collapse of Allied defences in the Dutch East Indies, culminating in the Battle of the Java Sea. They recount the attempts of the ‘fighting admiral’, Sir James Somerville, to train his motley fleet of cast-offs into an efficient fighting force in spite of the reluctance of Churchill, who resisted the formation of a full-scale British Pacific Fleet until the 1945 assault on the Ryukyu Islands immediately south of Japan. The account provides an analysis of the key personalities who shaped events in these momentous years.
Ray Barman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622099760
- eISBN:
- 9789882207363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622099760.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter provides details of the defence plan of Hong Kong in the event of an all-out attack by the Japanese. It describes that it was impossible for the Japanese to launch a surprise attack upon ...
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This chapter provides details of the defence plan of Hong Kong in the event of an all-out attack by the Japanese. It describes that it was impossible for the Japanese to launch a surprise attack upon the New Territories and Hong Kong, as British observation posts established on the hills overlooking the river plain were able to observe any significant concentration of enemy troops. It notes that the total defence strength on 8 December 1941 was approximately 14,000 men with no modern Air Force or Navy allotted to the defence of the colony and faced with a ground force of 60,000 experienced Japanese troops, together with a modern air force and navy. In a telegram to the commander-in-chief and governor of Hong Kong, Sir Mark Young, Winston Churchill said, “We expect you to resist to the end. The honour of the empire is in your hands”.Less
This chapter provides details of the defence plan of Hong Kong in the event of an all-out attack by the Japanese. It describes that it was impossible for the Japanese to launch a surprise attack upon the New Territories and Hong Kong, as British observation posts established on the hills overlooking the river plain were able to observe any significant concentration of enemy troops. It notes that the total defence strength on 8 December 1941 was approximately 14,000 men with no modern Air Force or Navy allotted to the defence of the colony and faced with a ground force of 60,000 experienced Japanese troops, together with a modern air force and navy. In a telegram to the commander-in-chief and governor of Hong Kong, Sir Mark Young, Winston Churchill said, “We expect you to resist to the end. The honour of the empire is in your hands”.
Stephen Spector
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195368024
- eISBN:
- 9780199867646
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368024.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society, Judaism
This chapter explores many evangelicals’ hostility toward Arabs and other Muslims. It notes the Christian Zionist core belief that conceding territory will not bring Israel peace. The Palestinians, ...
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This chapter explores many evangelicals’ hostility toward Arabs and other Muslims. It notes the Christian Zionist core belief that conceding territory will not bring Israel peace. The Palestinians, they say, seek only the phased destruction of the Jewish state. Hal Lindsey argues that the Oslo framework and all other political agreements with Israel are only temporary steps toward the Palestinians’ ultimate goal—taking all of historic Palestine from the Jews. Several leading Christian Zionists have argued that the Islamist group Hamas’ upset victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006 revealed the Arabs’ true murderous intentions. Many evangelicals say that all Islamic terrorists, and many or all Muslims, are part of a murderous organic whole intent on world conquest. If Israel falls to the terrorists, they say, the United States will too. World War III has already begun, they argue. A number of experts on terrorism and religion disagree with these propositions. John Hagee notes, however, that Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stated his intention to wipe Israel off the map and has promised that Islam will strike down the United States as well. A number of evangelicals identify with Winston Churchill as they warn of an approaching Islamofascist threat.Less
This chapter explores many evangelicals’ hostility toward Arabs and other Muslims. It notes the Christian Zionist core belief that conceding territory will not bring Israel peace. The Palestinians, they say, seek only the phased destruction of the Jewish state. Hal Lindsey argues that the Oslo framework and all other political agreements with Israel are only temporary steps toward the Palestinians’ ultimate goal—taking all of historic Palestine from the Jews. Several leading Christian Zionists have argued that the Islamist group Hamas’ upset victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006 revealed the Arabs’ true murderous intentions. Many evangelicals say that all Islamic terrorists, and many or all Muslims, are part of a murderous organic whole intent on world conquest. If Israel falls to the terrorists, they say, the United States will too. World War III has already begun, they argue. A number of experts on terrorism and religion disagree with these propositions. John Hagee notes, however, that Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stated his intention to wipe Israel off the map and has promised that Islam will strike down the United States as well. A number of evangelicals identify with Winston Churchill as they warn of an approaching Islamofascist threat.
Neville Wylie
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199547593
- eISBN:
- 9780191720581
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547593.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter traces British policy towards POWs from the start of the war until the end of 1941, and highlights the steps taken to encourage German compliance with the POW regime. The development of ...
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This chapter traces British policy towards POWs from the start of the war until the end of 1941, and highlights the steps taken to encourage German compliance with the POW regime. The development of a consistent policy towards its POWs was frequently compromised by Winston Churchill's refusal to place the prisoners' humanitarian interests before the country's strategic and military objectives. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of care and attention paid by those in power to Britain's own responsibilities as a detaining power. Notwithstanding these difficulties and the outbreak of Hitler's ideological war of annihilation against the Soviet Union in July 1941, substantial progress had been made towards forging an effective working relationship with the German regime over the treatment of POWs. The sense of stability that had developed by the autumn of 1941 was thrown into doubt by Adolf Hitler's last‐minute refusal to countenance the repatriation of British sick and wounded POWs in October 1941, an act which called into question Germany's long‐term commitment to cooperative relations with the British government.Less
This chapter traces British policy towards POWs from the start of the war until the end of 1941, and highlights the steps taken to encourage German compliance with the POW regime. The development of a consistent policy towards its POWs was frequently compromised by Winston Churchill's refusal to place the prisoners' humanitarian interests before the country's strategic and military objectives. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of care and attention paid by those in power to Britain's own responsibilities as a detaining power. Notwithstanding these difficulties and the outbreak of Hitler's ideological war of annihilation against the Soviet Union in July 1941, substantial progress had been made towards forging an effective working relationship with the German regime over the treatment of POWs. The sense of stability that had developed by the autumn of 1941 was thrown into doubt by Adolf Hitler's last‐minute refusal to countenance the repatriation of British sick and wounded POWs in October 1941, an act which called into question Germany's long‐term commitment to cooperative relations with the British government.
Neville Wylie
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199547593
- eISBN:
- 9780191720581
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547593.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter charts the decline in Anglo‐German POW relations from late 1941 until December 1942. It shows how mutual confidence diminished under the pressure of events, on and off the battlefield, ...
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This chapter charts the decline in Anglo‐German POW relations from late 1941 until December 1942. It shows how mutual confidence diminished under the pressure of events, on and off the battlefield, in Europe and the Far East, and how authorities on both sides came to adopt a more restrictive attitude towards their reciprocal relations. The chapter closes with a discussion of the ‘shackling crisis’ of late 1942 and demonstrates how, contrary to perceived wisdom, Churchill's determination to match German reprisals, while failing to bring the crisis to a satisfactory conclusion, had a salutary effect on German attitudes towards the POW regime. Though the level of cooperation declined, both sides remained conscious of the value of the POW regime and were prepared to coordinate their behaviour for mutual benefit when required.Less
This chapter charts the decline in Anglo‐German POW relations from late 1941 until December 1942. It shows how mutual confidence diminished under the pressure of events, on and off the battlefield, in Europe and the Far East, and how authorities on both sides came to adopt a more restrictive attitude towards their reciprocal relations. The chapter closes with a discussion of the ‘shackling crisis’ of late 1942 and demonstrates how, contrary to perceived wisdom, Churchill's determination to match German reprisals, while failing to bring the crisis to a satisfactory conclusion, had a salutary effect on German attitudes towards the POW regime. Though the level of cooperation declined, both sides remained conscious of the value of the POW regime and were prepared to coordinate their behaviour for mutual benefit when required.
Martin Ceadel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199571161
- eISBN:
- 9780191721762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571161.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter traces Angell's development into a largely orthodox liberal internationalist, as he belatedly realized that his ‘illusion’ thesis had assumed that aggressors could be reasoned into ...
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This chapter traces Angell's development into a largely orthodox liberal internationalist, as he belatedly realized that his ‘illusion’ thesis had assumed that aggressors could be reasoned into self-restraint, whereas he now understood that at least in the short term they had either to be appeased or to be deterred. Rejecting the former option, he opted decisively for the latter, campaigning vigorously for collective security and becoming both a leader alongside Viscount Cecil and Gilbert Murray of the League of Nations Union and a member of Winston Churchill's private support group. Admittedly, during 1932–5 Angell somewhat pulled his punches, implying that economic sanctions alone could prevent or punish aggression. After 1936, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, Mussolini conquered Abyssinia, and Franco rebelled in Spain, he accepted that collective security required rearmament and military alliances, though idiosyncratically he claimed to support such measures only because the public would not accept his first-choice policy of pacifism. The strain caused by this unresolved contradiction in his thinking caused his health, never good, to deteriorate as war approached.Less
This chapter traces Angell's development into a largely orthodox liberal internationalist, as he belatedly realized that his ‘illusion’ thesis had assumed that aggressors could be reasoned into self-restraint, whereas he now understood that at least in the short term they had either to be appeased or to be deterred. Rejecting the former option, he opted decisively for the latter, campaigning vigorously for collective security and becoming both a leader alongside Viscount Cecil and Gilbert Murray of the League of Nations Union and a member of Winston Churchill's private support group. Admittedly, during 1932–5 Angell somewhat pulled his punches, implying that economic sanctions alone could prevent or punish aggression. After 1936, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, Mussolini conquered Abyssinia, and Franco rebelled in Spain, he accepted that collective security required rearmament and military alliances, though idiosyncratically he claimed to support such measures only because the public would not accept his first-choice policy of pacifism. The strain caused by this unresolved contradiction in his thinking caused his health, never good, to deteriorate as war approached.
Eunan O'Halpin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199253296
- eISBN:
- 9780191719202
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253296.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Irish neutrality during the Second World War presented Britain with significant challenges to its security. Exploring how British agencies identified and addressed these problems, this book reveals ...
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Irish neutrality during the Second World War presented Britain with significant challenges to its security. Exploring how British agencies identified and addressed these problems, this book reveals how Britain simultaneously planned sabotage in and spied on Ireland, and at times sought to damage the neutral state's reputation internationally through black propaganda operations. It analyses the extent of British knowledge of Axis and other diplomatic missions in Ireland, and shows the crucial role of diplomatic code-breaking in shaping British policy. The book also underlines just how much Ireland both interested and irritated Churchill throughout the war. Rather than viewing this as a uniquely Anglo-Irish experience, the book argues that British activities concerning Ireland should be placed in the wider context of the intelligence and security problems that Britain faced in other neutral states, particularly Afghanistan and Persia. Taking a comparative approach, it illuminates how Britain dealt with challenges in these countries through a combination of diplomacy, covert gathering of intelligence, propaganda, and intimidation. The British perspective on issues in Ireland becomes far clearer when discussed in terms of similar problems Britain faced with neutral states worldwide.Less
Irish neutrality during the Second World War presented Britain with significant challenges to its security. Exploring how British agencies identified and addressed these problems, this book reveals how Britain simultaneously planned sabotage in and spied on Ireland, and at times sought to damage the neutral state's reputation internationally through black propaganda operations. It analyses the extent of British knowledge of Axis and other diplomatic missions in Ireland, and shows the crucial role of diplomatic code-breaking in shaping British policy. The book also underlines just how much Ireland both interested and irritated Churchill throughout the war. Rather than viewing this as a uniquely Anglo-Irish experience, the book argues that British activities concerning Ireland should be placed in the wider context of the intelligence and security problems that Britain faced in other neutral states, particularly Afghanistan and Persia. Taking a comparative approach, it illuminates how Britain dealt with challenges in these countries through a combination of diplomacy, covert gathering of intelligence, propaganda, and intimidation. The British perspective on issues in Ireland becomes far clearer when discussed in terms of similar problems Britain faced with neutral states worldwide.
Srdjan Vucetic
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780197266618
- eISBN:
- 9780191896064
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266618.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Contemporary Anglospherism – a convenient shorthand for recent calls for more cooperation and unity between select English-speaking polities – draws considerable potency from the existence of the ...
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Contemporary Anglospherism – a convenient shorthand for recent calls for more cooperation and unity between select English-speaking polities – draws considerable potency from the existence of the Five Eyes network, ABCANZ and many institutions and practices that constitute the Anglosphere in security. For some, the connection is self-evident and should be made explicit: ‘we’ are already glued together in security, so why not build a zone of free movement in goods, services and labour, too? The mutual constitution of these two Anglospheres – political Anglospherism on the one hand and the Anglosphere in security on the other – is more than a century old but remains poorly understood. In this chapter I perform three tasks set out to interrogate this relationship. First, I provide a genealogy of the Anglosphere and of the nearby ‘CANZUK Union’. Next, I map out the Anglosphere in security, probing the depth and frequency of coordination and cooperation among Five Eyes states since the Second World War. I then argue that the deep origins of the Anglosphere in security lie in late nineteenth-century inter-racial politics.Less
Contemporary Anglospherism – a convenient shorthand for recent calls for more cooperation and unity between select English-speaking polities – draws considerable potency from the existence of the Five Eyes network, ABCANZ and many institutions and practices that constitute the Anglosphere in security. For some, the connection is self-evident and should be made explicit: ‘we’ are already glued together in security, so why not build a zone of free movement in goods, services and labour, too? The mutual constitution of these two Anglospheres – political Anglospherism on the one hand and the Anglosphere in security on the other – is more than a century old but remains poorly understood. In this chapter I perform three tasks set out to interrogate this relationship. First, I provide a genealogy of the Anglosphere and of the nearby ‘CANZUK Union’. Next, I map out the Anglosphere in security, probing the depth and frequency of coordination and cooperation among Five Eyes states since the Second World War. I then argue that the deep origins of the Anglosphere in security lie in late nineteenth-century inter-racial politics.
Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780197266618
- eISBN:
- 9780191896064
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266618.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter advances the case for a more ‘political’ reading of the Anglosphere discourse than is typically offered by its advocates, or by its academic commentators and critics. The authors stress ...
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This chapter advances the case for a more ‘political’ reading of the Anglosphere discourse than is typically offered by its advocates, or by its academic commentators and critics. The authors stress the plentiful rhetorical resources and motifs associated with this shifting current of thinking, and the political opportunities and dilemmas associated with its recurrent deployment in high politics throughout the twentieth century. They give particular emphasis to the ways in which the Anglosphere ideal was re-worked and re-invented in different eras. And they explore its particular importance in the last three decades in British politics, highlighting its growing importance as a vehicle for an antithetical characterisation of the UK’s past and future to conventional ideas about the integral importance of the European Union to British prospects. They highlight the stirrings of this manner of thinking during the Thatcher years, its coalescence within a wider Anglo-American community in the 1990s, and its subsequent influence over leading campaigners for Brexit. They draw lessons from this account for wider debates about how the Anglosphere might be conceptualised and interpreted.Less
This chapter advances the case for a more ‘political’ reading of the Anglosphere discourse than is typically offered by its advocates, or by its academic commentators and critics. The authors stress the plentiful rhetorical resources and motifs associated with this shifting current of thinking, and the political opportunities and dilemmas associated with its recurrent deployment in high politics throughout the twentieth century. They give particular emphasis to the ways in which the Anglosphere ideal was re-worked and re-invented in different eras. And they explore its particular importance in the last three decades in British politics, highlighting its growing importance as a vehicle for an antithetical characterisation of the UK’s past and future to conventional ideas about the integral importance of the European Union to British prospects. They highlight the stirrings of this manner of thinking during the Thatcher years, its coalescence within a wider Anglo-American community in the 1990s, and its subsequent influence over leading campaigners for Brexit. They draw lessons from this account for wider debates about how the Anglosphere might be conceptualised and interpreted.
Arthur J. Marder
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201502
- eISBN:
- 9780191674907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201502.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The first section of this chapter describes Somerville's withdrawal to Kilindini. It discusses the search for safety and for a safe base; the bleak immediate naval position; and the impossibility of ...
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The first section of this chapter describes Somerville's withdrawal to Kilindini. It discusses the search for safety and for a safe base; the bleak immediate naval position; and the impossibility of using Bombay, Addu Atoll, Trincomalee, or Colombo without dividing the Eastern Fleet. The second section describes the Japanese delight over their triumphs, which led to overconfidence and dangerous errors by Nagumo. The third section explores the defenders and their dilemmas. It looks at British press reactions, public dismay, Churchill's and Pound's pressure on the Americans to take the offensive, aircraft reinforcements for India and the extent of American help, and the preparations to defend Australia.Less
The first section of this chapter describes Somerville's withdrawal to Kilindini. It discusses the search for safety and for a safe base; the bleak immediate naval position; and the impossibility of using Bombay, Addu Atoll, Trincomalee, or Colombo without dividing the Eastern Fleet. The second section describes the Japanese delight over their triumphs, which led to overconfidence and dangerous errors by Nagumo. The third section explores the defenders and their dilemmas. It looks at British press reactions, public dismay, Churchill's and Pound's pressure on the Americans to take the offensive, aircraft reinforcements for India and the extent of American help, and the preparations to defend Australia.
Arthur J. Marder
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201502
- eISBN:
- 9780191674907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201502.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Military History
It was not only submarines that bedeviled Somerville's return to Ceylon, but, increasingly, in late 1943 and into 1944, command problems arising out of the structure of South East Asia Command. The ...
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It was not only submarines that bedeviled Somerville's return to Ceylon, but, increasingly, in late 1943 and into 1944, command problems arising out of the structure of South East Asia Command. The first section of this chapter examines the confusing division of naval responsibilities and the friction between Mountbatten and Somerville. The second section discusses Operation ‘Culverin’. The third section describes the reinforcements for the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese battle fleet at Singapore, Japanese shortage of fuel oil, convoying, and Somerville's preference for hunting groups. The last section describes the search for strategies in the spring of 1944.Less
It was not only submarines that bedeviled Somerville's return to Ceylon, but, increasingly, in late 1943 and into 1944, command problems arising out of the structure of South East Asia Command. The first section of this chapter examines the confusing division of naval responsibilities and the friction between Mountbatten and Somerville. The second section discusses Operation ‘Culverin’. The third section describes the reinforcements for the Eastern Fleet, the Japanese battle fleet at Singapore, Japanese shortage of fuel oil, convoying, and Somerville's preference for hunting groups. The last section describes the search for strategies in the spring of 1944.
Arthur J. Marder
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201502
- eISBN:
- 9780191674907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201502.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The first section of this chapter describes the operations of the Eastern Fleet. It discusses the arrival of the Saratoga and the Richeliu, the air raid on Sabang, Somerville's operational command, ...
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The first section of this chapter describes the operations of the Eastern Fleet. It discusses the arrival of the Saratoga and the Richeliu, the air raid on Sabang, Somerville's operational command, and the deteriorating relations between the admirals. The second section discusses the rift between the admirals, the quarrels over communiqués, Somerville's relief of command, Mountbatten's flawed understanding of Somerville's relief, strategic differences underlying the quarrel, and the disagreement between the Admiralty and Churchill on extending Somerville's appointment.Less
The first section of this chapter describes the operations of the Eastern Fleet. It discusses the arrival of the Saratoga and the Richeliu, the air raid on Sabang, Somerville's operational command, and the deteriorating relations between the admirals. The second section discusses the rift between the admirals, the quarrels over communiqués, Somerville's relief of command, Mountbatten's flawed understanding of Somerville's relief, strategic differences underlying the quarrel, and the disagreement between the Admiralty and Churchill on extending Somerville's appointment.
Arthur J. Marder
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198201502
- eISBN:
- 9780191674907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198201502.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The first section of this chapter reviews the difficulties of mounting the ‘Middle Strategy’; the renewed bitterness between COS and Churchill; the pressures on Churchill; and the agreement between ...
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The first section of this chapter reviews the difficulties of mounting the ‘Middle Strategy’; the renewed bitterness between COS and Churchill; the pressures on Churchill; and the agreement between COS and Churchill to retake Rangoon, to offer a British Pacific Fleet, and to await the American verdict at Quebec. The second section discusses the decision at Quebec, Churchill's last push for ‘Culverin’, and King's rearguard action to keep the British out of the Pacific. The third section examines the Eastern Fleet under Admiral Bruce Fraser. The last section discusses Washington and the fleet train.Less
The first section of this chapter reviews the difficulties of mounting the ‘Middle Strategy’; the renewed bitterness between COS and Churchill; the pressures on Churchill; and the agreement between COS and Churchill to retake Rangoon, to offer a British Pacific Fleet, and to await the American verdict at Quebec. The second section discusses the decision at Quebec, Churchill's last push for ‘Culverin’, and King's rearguard action to keep the British out of the Pacific. The third section examines the Eastern Fleet under Admiral Bruce Fraser. The last section discusses Washington and the fleet train.
TALBOT C. IMLAY
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199261222
- eISBN:
- 9780191717550
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261222.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Military History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter argues that Winston Churchill' coalition government represented the culmination of a process, begun before the war, in which the Labour Party and growing number of Conservatives and ...
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This chapter argues that Winston Churchill' coalition government represented the culmination of a process, begun before the war, in which the Labour Party and growing number of Conservatives and Liberals converged on a common response to the prospect and eventual reality of war. Unlike the previous government which clung to a more limited view of Britain's effort, its opponents espoused the need for total war against Germany. In stark contrast to the French case, this conception of total was became the basis of a stable, cross-party parliamentary majority.Less
This chapter argues that Winston Churchill' coalition government represented the culmination of a process, begun before the war, in which the Labour Party and growing number of Conservatives and Liberals converged on a common response to the prospect and eventual reality of war. Unlike the previous government which clung to a more limited view of Britain's effort, its opponents espoused the need for total war against Germany. In stark contrast to the French case, this conception of total was became the basis of a stable, cross-party parliamentary majority.
Eunan O'Halpin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199253296
- eISBN:
- 9780191719202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253296.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter begins with a discussion of British policy and Irish neutrality during the phoney war. It then discusses the Navy's Irish concerns, MI5's Irish problems, naval intelligence and Ireland, ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of British policy and Irish neutrality during the phoney war. It then discusses the Navy's Irish concerns, MI5's Irish problems, naval intelligence and Ireland, the SIS and Ireland, and security of war information in the British Isles. It is argued that the quality of British intelligence concerning Ireland during the phoney war was low, with different agencies having different agendas: NID began the war with a fixation about German submarines on the west coast, and sought hard information which preferably would confirm that such reports were true; MI5 were concerned mainly to build up a liaison with G2; and SIS were reluctant to spy in Ireland, partly for fear that this would jeopardize security cooperation. Compounding these problems was the general incoherence of British security policy when war broke out. Neither were the mechanisms, the trained personnel, nor the rules in place to create an effective security screen around the UK.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of British policy and Irish neutrality during the phoney war. It then discusses the Navy's Irish concerns, MI5's Irish problems, naval intelligence and Ireland, the SIS and Ireland, and security of war information in the British Isles. It is argued that the quality of British intelligence concerning Ireland during the phoney war was low, with different agencies having different agendas: NID began the war with a fixation about German submarines on the west coast, and sought hard information which preferably would confirm that such reports were true; MI5 were concerned mainly to build up a liaison with G2; and SIS were reluctant to spy in Ireland, partly for fear that this would jeopardize security cooperation. Compounding these problems was the general incoherence of British security policy when war broke out. Neither were the mechanisms, the trained personnel, nor the rules in place to create an effective security screen around the UK.
Eunan O'Halpin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199253296
- eISBN:
- 9780191719202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253296.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter begins with a discussion of British intelligence's focus on Irish security during the first five months of 1944. It then discusses the isolation of Ireland before Overlord, security ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of British intelligence's focus on Irish security during the first five months of 1944. It then discusses the isolation of Ireland before Overlord, security cooperation after Overlord, diplomatic intelligence, Axis intelligence gathering, SIS and Ireland, and Ireland's impact on Britain's war. The five months leading up to Overlord were difficult and tense for British agencies dealing with Irish security. They were made more so by Churchill's petulant streak: despite advice from all quarters he insisted on supporting an ill-thought-out and ill-informed American démarche which would only increase the instability of Irish-Allied security relations and put existing cooperation, not only on Overlord security but on operational matters, in jeopardy. Once Overlord took place, Ireland virtually disappeared from London's intelligence agenda. It continued to have some significance for air and sea operations, but the danger of serious leakage of war information had gone, and with it the attention of ministers and senior officials.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of British intelligence's focus on Irish security during the first five months of 1944. It then discusses the isolation of Ireland before Overlord, security cooperation after Overlord, diplomatic intelligence, Axis intelligence gathering, SIS and Ireland, and Ireland's impact on Britain's war. The five months leading up to Overlord were difficult and tense for British agencies dealing with Irish security. They were made more so by Churchill's petulant streak: despite advice from all quarters he insisted on supporting an ill-thought-out and ill-informed American démarche which would only increase the instability of Irish-Allied security relations and put existing cooperation, not only on Overlord security but on operational matters, in jeopardy. Once Overlord took place, Ireland virtually disappeared from London's intelligence agenda. It continued to have some significance for air and sea operations, but the danger of serious leakage of war information had gone, and with it the attention of ministers and senior officials.
