Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean ...
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The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. Paul Horwich’s answer takes off from Wittgenstein’s appealingly demystifying remark, that the meaning of a term is nothing over and above its use, and proceeds with a groundbreaking articulation and defence of that idea, showing how it can deal successfully with Quinean and Kripkean forms of scepticism about meaning, with the various normative features of thought and language, with the paradoxical phenomenon of vagueness, with the way that word-meanings combine to yield sentence-meanings, and with Chomsky-style models of the language faculty. The main lines of this theory were first suggested in Horwich’s 1998 book, Meaning. The present volume (which requires no familiarity with its predecessor) provides a host of improved, formulations, fresh arguments, responses to criticism, and extensions of the position into new areas.Less
The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. Paul Horwich’s answer takes off from Wittgenstein’s appealingly demystifying remark, that the meaning of a term is nothing over and above its use, and proceeds with a groundbreaking articulation and defence of that idea, showing how it can deal successfully with Quinean and Kripkean forms of scepticism about meaning, with the various normative features of thought and language, with the paradoxical phenomenon of vagueness, with the way that word-meanings combine to yield sentence-meanings, and with Chomsky-style models of the language faculty. The main lines of this theory were first suggested in Horwich’s 1998 book, Meaning. The present volume (which requires no familiarity with its predecessor) provides a host of improved, formulations, fresh arguments, responses to criticism, and extensions of the position into new areas.
Wolfram Hinzen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289257
- eISBN:
- 9780191706424
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289257.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the ...
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This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. It introduces Chomsky's program of a ‘minimalist’ syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. It explains how the Minimalist Program originated from work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. It also considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are historical and internalist in character. The book suggests that linguistic meaning arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this, the book substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. It also provides an insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.Less
This book introduces generative grammar as an area of study, asking what it tells us about the human mind. It lays the foundation for the unification of modern generative linguistics with the philosophies of mind and language. It introduces Chomsky's program of a ‘minimalist’ syntax as a novel explanatory vision of the human mind. It explains how the Minimalist Program originated from work in cognitive science, biology, linguistics, and philosophy, and examines its implications for work in these fields. It also considers the way the human mind is designed when seen as an arrangement of structural patterns in nature, and argues that its design is the product not so much of adaptive evolutionary history as of principles and processes that are historical and internalist in character. The book suggests that linguistic meaning arises in the mind as a consequence of structures emerging on formal rather than functional grounds. From this, the book substantiates an unexpected and deeply unfashionable notion of human nature. It also provides an insight into the nature and aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program.
Fiona Cowie
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195159783
- eISBN:
- 9780199849529
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159783.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. ...
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This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. The author argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different—and probably inconsistent—theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our brains at birth. This “faculties hypothesis” finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. The author, marshalling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also, in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible to scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. The author addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. She challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable.Less
This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. The author argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different—and probably inconsistent—theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our brains at birth. This “faculties hypothesis” finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. The author, marshalling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also, in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible to scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. The author addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. She challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there ...
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Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there “a language faculty”? The book gives controversial answers to such questions: that linguistics is about linguistic reality and not part of psychology; that linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers’ intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that thought is prior to language in various ways; that linguistics should be concerned with what idiolects share, not with idiolects; that language processing is a fairly brute-causal associationist matter; that the rules of “Universal Grammar” are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty.Less
Is Chomsky right about the psychological reality of language? What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there “a language faculty”? The book gives controversial answers to such questions: that linguistics is about linguistic reality and not part of psychology; that linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers’ intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that thought is prior to language in various ways; that linguistics should be concerned with what idiolects share, not with idiolects; that language processing is a fairly brute-causal associationist matter; that the rules of “Universal Grammar” are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; and that there is little or nothing to the language faculty.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In Chomsky’s view, linguistics is about a psychological state, the speaker’s knowledge of language which constitutes her linguistic competence. This knowledge is said to underlie her linguistic ...
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In Chomsky’s view, linguistics is about a psychological state, the speaker’s knowledge of language which constitutes her linguistic competence. This knowledge is said to underlie her linguistic intuitions. The rules (principles) of the language are thought to be “psychologically real” in that they are represented — the Representational Thesis (RT) — or otherwise embodied in the language faculty. This book’s plan is described, which is to look critically at these views and propose others. The chapter concludes with some clarifications of the book’s relation to I-languages, to grammatical levels and to linguistic details; and of the importance of its conclusions.Less
In Chomsky’s view, linguistics is about a psychological state, the speaker’s knowledge of language which constitutes her linguistic competence. This knowledge is said to underlie her linguistic intuitions. The rules (principles) of the language are thought to be “psychologically real” in that they are represented — the Representational Thesis (RT) — or otherwise embodied in the language faculty. This book’s plan is described, which is to look critically at these views and propose others. The chapter concludes with some clarifications of the book’s relation to I-languages, to grammatical levels and to linguistic details; and of the importance of its conclusions.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues against Chomsky’s view that linguistics is a branch of psychology, and hence concerns a psychological reality: the speaker’s linguistic competence. With the help of three quite ...
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This chapter argues against Chomsky’s view that linguistics is a branch of psychology, and hence concerns a psychological reality: the speaker’s linguistic competence. With the help of three quite general distinctions, including that between structure rules and processing rules, and between being a structure rule and “respecting” one, it is argued that there is something other than psychological reality for a grammar to be true of: it can be true of a linguistic reality. Given the weight of evidence, it is plausible that the grammar is indeed more or less true of that reality. The grammar might also be true of a psychological reality, but to show that it is so requires further psychological assumption. It will prove hard to establish a psychological assumption that will do the trick.Less
This chapter argues against Chomsky’s view that linguistics is a branch of psychology, and hence concerns a psychological reality: the speaker’s linguistic competence. With the help of three quite general distinctions, including that between structure rules and processing rules, and between being a structure rule and “respecting” one, it is argued that there is something other than psychological reality for a grammar to be true of: it can be true of a linguistic reality. Given the weight of evidence, it is plausible that the grammar is indeed more or less true of that reality. The grammar might also be true of a psychological reality, but to show that it is so requires further psychological assumption. It will prove hard to establish a psychological assumption that will do the trick.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter places some historically interesting actual positions among the possible positions on psychological reality, on linguistic competence. There is strong evidence that Chomsky is committed ...
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This chapter places some historically interesting actual positions among the possible positions on psychological reality, on linguistic competence. There is strong evidence that Chomsky is committed to the Representational Thesis (RT), but that commitment is open to question. Although Fodor, Bever, and Garrett, Bresnan and Kaplan, and Berwick and Weinberg all seem to subscribe to RT, it is often unclear what role, if any, RT plays in their theories of language use. Matthews rejects RT. His view of the psychological reality is hard to distinguish from the uncontroversial minimal position according to which the processing rules simply “respect” the linguistic rules.Less
This chapter places some historically interesting actual positions among the possible positions on psychological reality, on linguistic competence. There is strong evidence that Chomsky is committed to the Representational Thesis (RT), but that commitment is open to question. Although Fodor, Bever, and Garrett, Bresnan and Kaplan, and Berwick and Weinberg all seem to subscribe to RT, it is often unclear what role, if any, RT plays in their theories of language use. Matthews rejects RT. His view of the psychological reality is hard to distinguish from the uncontroversial minimal position according to which the processing rules simply “respect” the linguistic rules.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers the argument for the Representational Thesis (RT) from the folk psychological view that a person competent in a language “knows” the language. Despite Chomsky’s objections, it ...
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This chapter considers the argument for the Representational Thesis (RT) from the folk psychological view that a person competent in a language “knows” the language. Despite Chomsky’s objections, it is plausible to think that this knowledge is mere knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In which case, the knowledge does not support RT.Less
This chapter considers the argument for the Representational Thesis (RT) from the folk psychological view that a person competent in a language “knows” the language. Despite Chomsky’s objections, it is plausible to think that this knowledge is mere knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In which case, the knowledge does not support RT.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues that the view that conceptual competence is part of linguistic competence is not undermined by the well-known dissociation of cognitive impairment and linguistic impairment. In ...
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This chapter argues that the view that conceptual competence is part of linguistic competence is not undermined by the well-known dissociation of cognitive impairment and linguistic impairment. In light of the evidence from brain impairment and the proposal that the structure rules of thought are similar to those of the language, the chapter proposes that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. A critical view is taken of Chomsky’s apparently very different views of thought and its relation to language, and of some puzzling claims he makes against linguistic conventions and in favor of an interest in idiolects. These criticisms lead to the conclusion that the primary concern in linguistics should be with linguistic expressions that share meanings in idiolects. These views are developed by contrasting them with Rey’s antirealism about linguistic entities.Less
This chapter argues that the view that conceptual competence is part of linguistic competence is not undermined by the well-known dissociation of cognitive impairment and linguistic impairment. In light of the evidence from brain impairment and the proposal that the structure rules of thought are similar to those of the language, the chapter proposes that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. A critical view is taken of Chomsky’s apparently very different views of thought and its relation to language, and of some puzzling claims he makes against linguistic conventions and in favor of an interest in idiolects. These criticisms lead to the conclusion that the primary concern in linguistics should be with linguistic expressions that share meanings in idiolects. These views are developed by contrasting them with Rey’s antirealism about linguistic entities.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question ...
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This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question is raised as to how meaning should be incorporated within it. In accord with the use-theoretic perspective of this book, an answer is developed whereby the association of I-sounds with I-meanings is achieved by virtue of the conceptual roles of those I-sounds, i.e., their basic acceptance-properties. It is shown that this picture compares favourably with various alternatives, including those suggested by Fodor’s mentalese, Davidson’s view of compositionality, naturalizations of the reference relation, and by Chomsky-style explicitly-represented definitions.Less
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question is raised as to how meaning should be incorporated within it. In accord with the use-theoretic perspective of this book, an answer is developed whereby the association of I-sounds with I-meanings is achieved by virtue of the conceptual roles of those I-sounds, i.e., their basic acceptance-properties. It is shown that this picture compares favourably with various alternatives, including those suggested by Fodor’s mentalese, Davidson’s view of compositionality, naturalizations of the reference relation, and by Chomsky-style explicitly-represented definitions.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets out the ...
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This chapter argues that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets out the basic form of the central argument in the Chomskian arsenal — the poverty of the stimulus (POS) argument, as well as the conclusions about domain specificity and innate propositional knowledge that are supposed to follow. Section 2 distinguishes three hypotheses about innateness and morality: rule nativism, moral principle nativism, and moral judgment nativism. Sections 3–5 consider each of these hypotheses. It is argued that while there is some reason to favour rule nativism, the arguments that moral principles and moral judgment derive from innate moral knowledge don't work. The capacity for moral judgment is better explained by appeal to innate affective systems rather than innate moral knowledge. In the final section, it is argued that the role of such affective mechanisms in structuring the mind complicates the standard picture about poverty of the stimulus arguments and nativism. For the affective mechanisms that influence cognitive structures can make contributions that are neither domain general nor domain specific.Less
This chapter argues that the recent attempts to use Chomsky-style arguments in support of innate moral knowledge are uniformly unconvincing. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets out the basic form of the central argument in the Chomskian arsenal — the poverty of the stimulus (POS) argument, as well as the conclusions about domain specificity and innate propositional knowledge that are supposed to follow. Section 2 distinguishes three hypotheses about innateness and morality: rule nativism, moral principle nativism, and moral judgment nativism. Sections 3–5 consider each of these hypotheses. It is argued that while there is some reason to favour rule nativism, the arguments that moral principles and moral judgment derive from innate moral knowledge don't work. The capacity for moral judgment is better explained by appeal to innate affective systems rather than innate moral knowledge. In the final section, it is argued that the role of such affective mechanisms in structuring the mind complicates the standard picture about poverty of the stimulus arguments and nativism. For the affective mechanisms that influence cognitive structures can make contributions that are neither domain general nor domain specific.
Juan Uriagereka
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593521
- eISBN:
- 9780191731402
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593521.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Since Juan Uriagereka originated the multiple spell-out model in 1999 it has been one of the most influential lines of research in syntactic theorizing. The model simplified a crucial element of the ...
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Since Juan Uriagereka originated the multiple spell-out model in 1999 it has been one of the most influential lines of research in syntactic theorizing. The model simplified a crucial element of the minimalist account of language making it a more accurate reflection of syntax and its acquisition. This book explores important consequences of the multiple spell-out hypothesis and of the linked notion of cyclicity. It combines the latest thinking in linguistics with perspectives drawn from physics, biology, and animal behaviour, aiming thereby to advance the field first described by Noam Chomsky as biolinguistics. Without simplifying, this book seeks to present the issues and their broader biological significance. The subjects discussed include the linearization of structure, the punctuated nature of a derivation (the multiple spell-out model), cyclicity and its consequences for locality, and the definition of c-command and its relevance to various types of grammatical dependency. The book discusses the evolutionary implications of Uriagereka's work, considering, for example, whether the punctuated nature of the derivation is a resolution of conflicting demands that yield an equilibrium found in nature more generally.Less
Since Juan Uriagereka originated the multiple spell-out model in 1999 it has been one of the most influential lines of research in syntactic theorizing. The model simplified a crucial element of the minimalist account of language making it a more accurate reflection of syntax and its acquisition. This book explores important consequences of the multiple spell-out hypothesis and of the linked notion of cyclicity. It combines the latest thinking in linguistics with perspectives drawn from physics, biology, and animal behaviour, aiming thereby to advance the field first described by Noam Chomsky as biolinguistics. Without simplifying, this book seeks to present the issues and their broader biological significance. The subjects discussed include the linearization of structure, the punctuated nature of a derivation (the multiple spell-out model), cyclicity and its consequences for locality, and the definition of c-command and its relevance to various types of grammatical dependency. The book discusses the evolutionary implications of Uriagereka's work, considering, for example, whether the punctuated nature of the derivation is a resolution of conflicting demands that yield an equilibrium found in nature more generally.
Ray Jackendoff
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198270126
- eISBN:
- 9780191713255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198270126.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
Children learn language through exposure to the environment. However, Chomsky's most famous and controversial hypothesis is that the child brings resources to language learning beyond those used for ...
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Children learn language through exposure to the environment. However, Chomsky's most famous and controversial hypothesis is that the child brings resources to language learning beyond those used for other sorts of learning: he claims that the ability to learn language is in part a cognitive specialization of our species, a ‘Universal Grammar’ that is ‘wired into’ children's brains. This chapter is devoted to a fairly careful exegesis of the Universal Grammar hypothesis, the evidence for it, the arguments against it, and the tensions and challenges it presents to linguistic theory and the other disciplines on which it impinges. It is argued that a suitably nuanced version of the Universal Grammar hypothesis is supportable, and that it should continue to play the central role in linguistic investigation that it has enjoyed since Aspects.Less
Children learn language through exposure to the environment. However, Chomsky's most famous and controversial hypothesis is that the child brings resources to language learning beyond those used for other sorts of learning: he claims that the ability to learn language is in part a cognitive specialization of our species, a ‘Universal Grammar’ that is ‘wired into’ children's brains. This chapter is devoted to a fairly careful exegesis of the Universal Grammar hypothesis, the evidence for it, the arguments against it, and the tensions and challenges it presents to linguistic theory and the other disciplines on which it impinges. It is argued that a suitably nuanced version of the Universal Grammar hypothesis is supportable, and that it should continue to play the central role in linguistic investigation that it has enjoyed since Aspects.
Ray Jackendoff
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198270126
- eISBN:
- 9780191713255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198270126.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter begins by couching the questions of semantic theory in mentalistic terms, so that semantics can be compatible with generative grammar. It contrasts this position with a number of other ...
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This chapter begins by couching the questions of semantic theory in mentalistic terms, so that semantics can be compatible with generative grammar. It contrasts this position with a number of other views of what semantics is about. The chapter also addresses the putative distinction between linguistic meaning and ‘world knowledge’, arguing that various ways of making this distinction do not serve the intended purpose. Rather, if there is a special ‘linguistic semantics’, it is the theory of the interface components between meaning and linguistic expression.Less
This chapter begins by couching the questions of semantic theory in mentalistic terms, so that semantics can be compatible with generative grammar. It contrasts this position with a number of other views of what semantics is about. The chapter also addresses the putative distinction between linguistic meaning and ‘world knowledge’, arguing that various ways of making this distinction do not serve the intended purpose. Rather, if there is a special ‘linguistic semantics’, it is the theory of the interface components between meaning and linguistic expression.
Wolfram Hinzen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289257
- eISBN:
- 9780191706424
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289257.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
This chapter introduces, defends, and contrasts the meaning of methodological naturalism with the metaphysical naturalism (‘phyicalism’) that characterizes much contemporary philosophical thought, ...
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This chapter introduces, defends, and contrasts the meaning of methodological naturalism with the metaphysical naturalism (‘phyicalism’) that characterizes much contemporary philosophical thought, but perverts the early modern project of a natural philosophy. The essential continuity between Chomsky's contemporary rationalist project in the study of mind design and early modern ‘rationalism’ is analysed.Less
This chapter introduces, defends, and contrasts the meaning of methodological naturalism with the metaphysical naturalism (‘phyicalism’) that characterizes much contemporary philosophical thought, but perverts the early modern project of a natural philosophy. The essential continuity between Chomsky's contemporary rationalist project in the study of mind design and early modern ‘rationalism’ is analysed.
Terryl L. Givens
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195313901
- eISBN:
- 9780199871933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313901.003.0013
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Preexistence has survived through poetry, philosophy, and theology. In the contemporary world, the cultural work done by preexistence is now done by surrogates, scientific or quasi-scientific ...
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Preexistence has survived through poetry, philosophy, and theology. In the contemporary world, the cultural work done by preexistence is now done by surrogates, scientific or quasi-scientific paradigms that address the same dilemmas, yearnings, and questions. Examples include John Rawls, Charles Darwin, Carl Jung, Rupert Sheldrake, Richard Dawkins, and Noam Chomsky.Less
Preexistence has survived through poetry, philosophy, and theology. In the contemporary world, the cultural work done by preexistence is now done by surrogates, scientific or quasi-scientific paradigms that address the same dilemmas, yearnings, and questions. Examples include John Rawls, Charles Darwin, Carl Jung, Rupert Sheldrake, Richard Dawkins, and Noam Chomsky.
John A. Sloboda
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198521280
- eISBN:
- 9780191706257
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198521280.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Comparisons between Chomsky and Schenker frame a discussion of the extent to which music and language share similar cognitive processes. Music and language share similar generativity and deep ...
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Comparisons between Chomsky and Schenker frame a discussion of the extent to which music and language share similar cognitive processes. Music and language share similar generativity and deep structure, and the different levels of phonology, syntax, and semantics are present in both forms. The treatment of phonology centres on the phenomenon of categorical perception. Syntax is treated through harmony and tonality, rhythm and metre, and melody. Semantics is treated through emotional meaning.Less
Comparisons between Chomsky and Schenker frame a discussion of the extent to which music and language share similar cognitive processes. Music and language share similar generativity and deep structure, and the different levels of phonology, syntax, and semantics are present in both forms. The treatment of phonology centres on the phenomenon of categorical perception. Syntax is treated through harmony and tonality, rhythm and metre, and melody. Semantics is treated through emotional meaning.
Stephen Clingman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199278497
- eISBN:
- 9780191706981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278497.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century and Contemporary Literature
The contemporary world presents us with the reality of globalization and multiplicity, yet we still face powerful appeals to singularity. Beyond vague notions such as hybridity and multiculturalism, ...
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The contemporary world presents us with the reality of globalization and multiplicity, yet we still face powerful appeals to singularity. Beyond vague notions such as hybridity and multiculturalism, can we fashion alternative versions of location and identity? In this context the Introduction considers transnational fiction as a question of form, outlining the idea of a ‘grammar of identity’, and exploring its key terms: the metonymic, the generative, the transitive, the navigational, the nature of the boundary. In doing so, it draws on figures such as Chomsky, Jakobson, Freud, and Levinas. The implications for such a theory are set out in areas ranging from migration, to myth, to psychology, to ethics, to fiction itself. The discussion sets out the case for seeing transnational fiction as intrinsically navigational, a form of great significance for our times.Less
The contemporary world presents us with the reality of globalization and multiplicity, yet we still face powerful appeals to singularity. Beyond vague notions such as hybridity and multiculturalism, can we fashion alternative versions of location and identity? In this context the Introduction considers transnational fiction as a question of form, outlining the idea of a ‘grammar of identity’, and exploring its key terms: the metonymic, the generative, the transitive, the navigational, the nature of the boundary. In doing so, it draws on figures such as Chomsky, Jakobson, Freud, and Levinas. The implications for such a theory are set out in areas ranging from migration, to myth, to psychology, to ethics, to fiction itself. The discussion sets out the case for seeing transnational fiction as intrinsically navigational, a form of great significance for our times.
Roy Harris
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748613083
- eISBN:
- 9780748652334
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748613083.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book provides a reassessment of the reception of Saussure's ideas. That Saussure's work profoundly influenced developments in such diverse fields as linguistics, anthropology, psychology and ...
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This book provides a reassessment of the reception of Saussure's ideas. That Saussure's work profoundly influenced developments in such diverse fields as linguistics, anthropology, psychology and literary studies is denied by no one. But what exactly Saussure's views were taken to be by his interpreters has not hitherto been subject to any comprehensive critical survey. How well were Saussure's ideas understood by those who took them up? Or how badly misunderstood? And why? The answers to these questions address central issues in the history of Western culture. Each chapter in this book focuses on one particular interpreter of Saussure's work, but many others are mentioned in context for purposes of comparison, and attention is drawn to connections and disparities between their interpretations. Those whose interpretations are examined in detail include Bloomfield, Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, Chomsky, Barthes and Derrida.Less
This book provides a reassessment of the reception of Saussure's ideas. That Saussure's work profoundly influenced developments in such diverse fields as linguistics, anthropology, psychology and literary studies is denied by no one. But what exactly Saussure's views were taken to be by his interpreters has not hitherto been subject to any comprehensive critical survey. How well were Saussure's ideas understood by those who took them up? Or how badly misunderstood? And why? The answers to these questions address central issues in the history of Western culture. Each chapter in this book focuses on one particular interpreter of Saussure's work, but many others are mentioned in context for purposes of comparison, and attention is drawn to connections and disparities between their interpretations. Those whose interpretations are examined in detail include Bloomfield, Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Levi-Strauss, Chomsky, Barthes and Derrida.
Mark C. Baker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332834
- eISBN:
- 9780199868117
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on one particular component of the human capacity for language, which Chomsky calls the ‘creative aspect of language use’ (CALU). It argues that the CALU is a distinct module of ...
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This chapter focuses on one particular component of the human capacity for language, which Chomsky calls the ‘creative aspect of language use’ (CALU). It argues that the CALU is a distinct module of the mind, and that it is innate in humans. It shows that the biological paradigm adds nothing to our understanding of it. On the contrary, there is a striking lack of evidence that this part of the language faculty is neurally embodied, genetically encoded, or an evolved adaptation. It seems to be characterized by a kind of abductive reasoning that does not even fit within the computational theory of the mind. The chapter concludes that this may be an instance of a sort of nativism that falls outside the purview of evolutionary psychology and would fit better within a different explanatory paradigm.Less
This chapter focuses on one particular component of the human capacity for language, which Chomsky calls the ‘creative aspect of language use’ (CALU). It argues that the CALU is a distinct module of the mind, and that it is innate in humans. It shows that the biological paradigm adds nothing to our understanding of it. On the contrary, there is a striking lack of evidence that this part of the language faculty is neurally embodied, genetically encoded, or an evolved adaptation. It seems to be characterized by a kind of abductive reasoning that does not even fit within the computational theory of the mind. The chapter concludes that this may be an instance of a sort of nativism that falls outside the purview of evolutionary psychology and would fit better within a different explanatory paradigm.
