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Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts

Papineau David

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

This chapter focuses on the topic of phenomenal concepts. It develops and extends the comparison of phenomenal concepts with so-called “perceptual concepts,” to throw the nature of phenomenal ... More

This chapter focuses on the topic of phenomenal concepts. It develops and extends the comparison of phenomenal concepts with so-called “perceptual concepts,” to throw the nature of phenomenal concepts into clearer focus. A position against a recent argument by David Chalmers against the whole type-B strategy of defending physicalism by appeal to phenomenal concepts is defended.Less

High Politics: Church and State

S. A. Skinner

in Tractarians and the 'Condition of England': The Social and Political Thought of the Oxford Movement

This chapter argues that tractarian attitudes to establishment marked a breach with the social utilitarianism which they felt had corrupted the older high-church position, and signified a dynamic ... More

This chapter argues that tractarian attitudes to establishment marked a breach with the social utilitarianism which they felt had corrupted the older high-church position, and signified a dynamic conception of the church's function in society. The conviction that the catholic Church of England had been compromised by the erastian pretensions of a liberal state sent up clouds of anti-establishment chaff among supporters of tractarianism. Tractarians emphasised the independence of the church from the state; the derivation of its authority not from the ‘accident’ of national establishment but from the ‘plain historical fact’ of the apostolic succession. A specific measure of the differences between old high-church and later tractarian reviewers lies in the British Critic's changing attitudes to Thomas Chalmers, whose celebrated London lectures of April and May 1838 confirmed his reputation as the principal advocate of national establishments. This chapter also considers the views of John Keble regarding the separation of church and state.Less

Qualia Empiricism

Joseph Mendola

in Anti-Externalism

This chapter gathers together the various elements of the correct internalist theory, which is called qualia empiricism. It shows how such a theory can reply to one characteristic form of private ... More

This chapter gathers together the various elements of the correct internalist theory, which is called qualia empiricism. It shows how such a theory can reply to one characteristic form of private language argument. And it contrasts this proposal with relatively close competitor proposals by Chalmers and Yablo. It propounds a kind of semantic two-dimensionalism, and is less centered on epistemological concerns than traditional forms of empiricism.Less

Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts

Stephen Yablo

in Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality

This chapter analyzes the Textbook Kripkeanism about conceivability and possibility. It argues that Textbook Kripkeanism is not right. The ‘good news’ that E's conceivability ensures its possibility ... More

This chapter analyzes the Textbook Kripkeanism about conceivability and possibility. It argues that Textbook Kripkeanism is not right. The ‘good news’ that E's conceivability ensures its possibility whenever no obfuscating presentation suggests itself is too good to be true.Less

Roads Not Taken

R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye

in Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts

This chapter reviews some theories we do not adopt: two versions of Fregeanism, and two versions of Millianism.

Inverted Spectra

J.T. Ismael

in The Situated Self

This chapter discusses the Problem of Inverted Spectra, which has been used as fuel against a number of different philosophical positions, for example, in attempts to analyze phenomenal properties in ... More

This chapter discusses the Problem of Inverted Spectra, which has been used as fuel against a number of different philosophical positions, for example, in attempts to analyze phenomenal properties in functional or behavioral terms, and recently by David Chalmers as another argument for dualism. It argues that by recognizing the ineliminable relationality of thought about the experience of others, we can acknowledge the epistemic and cognitive gaps brought out by the Knowledge Argument and the possibility of inverted spectra, while restricting them to purely epistemic ones.Less

Naturalism, Imagination, and the Scientific Worldview

E. J. Lowe

in Turning Images in Philosophy, Science, and Religion: A New Book of Nature

This chapter develops a challenge to naturalistic accounts of human thought and understanding, drawing on insights that we ultimately owe to Immanuel Kant concerning the intimate relationship between ... More

This chapter develops a challenge to naturalistic accounts of human thought and understanding, drawing on insights that we ultimately owe to Immanuel Kant concerning the intimate relationship between concepts, perceptual experience, and our imaginative capacities. The focus is on two recent naturalistic theories — those of the philosopher David Chalmers and the evolutionary anthropologist Merlin Donald — both of whom appeal to the idea that the human mind/brain is essentially an information-processing system. It is argued that the notion of information relied on by such theorists is too thin to serve its intended purpose.Less

A Puzzle about Sameness of Satisfaction across Time

Gary Ebbs

in Truth and Words

The account of truth and words proposed in Chapter 4 conflicts with the metaphysical intuition that if word-token w is uttered or inscribed at some time t before the utterance or inscription of ... More

The account of truth and words proposed in Chapter 4 conflicts with the metaphysical intuition that if word-token w is uttered or inscribed at some time t before the utterance or inscription of word-token w', then w and w' have the same extension only if for (i) some set E, E is the extension of w and w', and (ii) the facts about how w is used at times prior to or identical with t determine that E is the extension of w. This chapter presents a thought experiment that shows that this intuition does not fit with our practical judgments of sameness of extension across time, including our judgment that tokens of ‘gold’ used by English speakers today have the same extension as tokens of ‘gold’ used by English speakers in 1650. The thought experiment discredits accounts of reference proposed by Chalmers, Grice, Jackson, Kripke, Peacocke, and Putnam.Less

John Sharpe and Alexander Chalmers: A Body of Standard English Poetry

Thomas F. Bonnell

in The Most Disreputable Trade: Publishing the Classics of English Poetry 1765-1810

In 1805, as Cooke brought his project to an end, John Sharpe started a series called The Works of the British Poets, extending to nearly 50 years an unbroken chain of continuity: from 1765 to 1812, ... More

In 1805, as Cooke brought his project to an end, John Sharpe started a series called The Works of the British Poets, extending to nearly 50 years an unbroken chain of continuity: from 1765 to 1812, from Foulis through Sharpe. An edition of Shakespeare paved the way for ‘Sharpe's Edition of The British Theatre’. He also produced ‘British Classics’ and ‘Sharpe's Select Edition of the British Prose Writers’. Sharpe's edition moved the series forward, from a canonical collection of English verse into a full supplementary anthology of minor verse and finally the Greek and Roman classics in translation. The third section of the chapter looks at engravings and vignettes, and examines the marketing logic behind them. The last part of the chapter discusses Alexander Chalmers, publisher of A General Biographical Dictionary, Glossary to Shakespeare, an edition of George Steevens's Shakespeare, and British Essayists.Less

Principles of Demarcation

Robert D. Rupert

in Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

In this chapter, it is assumed that, in order for the debate over extended cognition (and mind) to have substance, there must be a genuine distinction between what is cognitive and what is not. This ... More

In this chapter, it is assumed that, in order for the debate over extended cognition (and mind) to have substance, there must be a genuine distinction between what is cognitive and what is not. This motivates the search for a mark of the cognitive, a principle demarcating the cognitive. Desiderata for a principle of demarcation are set out. Various principles supportive of the extended view are considered, and it is argued that they fall short of the desiderata or are unsatisfactory on independent grounds. These candidate criteria include causal, metaphysical, and epistemic principles, as well as proposals gleaned from Clark and Chalmers's paper, “The Extended Mind.”Less

The metaphysics of the Extended Mind in ontological entanglements 1

Anna Marmodoro

in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation

The human mind often relies on external mechanisms for carrying out its cognitive processes, for example by using a calculator. Vehicle externalism and in particular the Extended Mind theory (Clark ... More

The human mind often relies on external mechanisms for carrying out its cognitive processes, for example by using a calculator. Vehicle externalism and in particular the Extended Mind theory (Clark and Chalmers 1998) explore whether such external mechanisms, under specified conditions, are more than mere instruments for the mind; the claim is that they are parts of the mind and thus extend it beyond its outer boundaries of skin and skull. This chapter argues that high degrees of interdependence between the mind and its extensions give rise to ontological entanglements, with respect to which there is at present no theory of individuation which can tell us how many entities there are in the entanglement and what type of entity the entanglement is. The chapter argues that the Extended Mind theory sheds light on the problem of the incarnation by motivating, in a more intuitively compelling way, the need for new ways of thinking about oneness and distinctness. The problems we encounter with the metaphysics of the incarnation are not peculiar to it; the solutions might not be either.Less

Reductive Explanation and the ‘Explanatory Gap’

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional, and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of ... More

Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional, and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained. Some writers claim that the existence of such a gap warrants a belief in some form of ontological dualism, whereas others argue that no such entailment holds. In the other main camp, there are people who argue that a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is possible in principle, and yet others who claim, moreover, to have provided such an explanation in practice. The focus of this chapter is on the explanatory gap itself–more specifically, on the question whether any such principled gap exists. The author argues that it does not. The debate revolves around the nature and demands of reductive explanation in general. A recent essay by Chalmers and Jackson is used as a stalking horse, since it provides the clearest, best articulated case for an explanatory gap.Less

Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective

Argues for the need to recognise higher-order perceptual experiences and briefly argues for the superiority of the author’s own dispositional HOT version of higher-order perception (HOP) theory (here ... More

Argues for the need to recognise higher-order perceptual experiences and briefly argues for the superiority of the author’s own dispositional HOT version of higher-order perception (HOP) theory (here described as ‘dual-content theory’). But its main focus is on purely recognitional concepts of experience (often called ‘phenomenal concepts’). There is an emerging consensus amongst naturalistically minded philosophers that the existence of such concepts is the key to blocking the zombie-style arguments of both dualist mysterians like Chalmers and physicalist mysterians like McGinn and Levine. But, the author argues in this chapter that a successful account of the possibility of such concepts requires acceptance of one or another form of higher-order perception theory.Less

Cartesianism

Wallace Matson

in Grand Theories and Everyday Beliefs: Science, Philosophy, and their Histories

Cartesian skepticism, unlike Pyrrhonism, was total, calling into question low beliefs as well as high. Descartes himself was not a skeptic but set out the argument in its favor for the purpose of ... More

Cartesian skepticism, unlike Pyrrhonism, was total, calling into question low beliefs as well as high. Descartes himself was not a skeptic but set out the argument in its favor for the purpose of refuting it and thereby strengthening theology. His argument was only possible against a specifically medieval background, his Evil Demon being the Omnipotent Creator-Legislator (OCL) in disguise. But as the skepticism was more convincing than the refutation, this concept is still around in our day, responsible for ‘modern’ philosophy's obsession with finding ‘foundations’ for knowledge. The pattern of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, which moves from subjective conceivability to objective existence, can still be discerned in David Chalmers's advocacy of mind-body dualism: the subjective ‘logical possibility’ of zombies purporting to show the objective reality of the schism.Less

Case Studies

Herman Cappelen

in Philosophy without Intuitions

This chapter sets about testing empirically the claim that philosophical practice involves an implicit reliance on intuitions. It does this by examining ten philosophical thought experiments in ... More

This chapter sets about testing empirically the claim that philosophical practice involves an implicit reliance on intuitions. It does this by examining ten philosophical thought experiments in argumentative context: Perry’s cases in “The Essential Indexical”, Burge’s arthritis cases in “Individualism and the Mental”, Thomson’s violinist, Thomson’s and Foot’s trolley cases, Cohen’s lottery cases, Lehrer’s Truetemp, Goldman’s fake barn cases, Cappelen and Hawthorne’s cases on judgments of taste, Williams’ cases on personal identity, and Chalmers’ zombies. Relying on the diagnostics developed in the previous chapter, it is shown that none of the judgments involved have the special features that methodologists typically take as characteristic of intuitions.Less

The Case for Zombies

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

The definition of zombies is clarified, and the main arguments for the alleged possibility of zombies are examined. The ‘conceivability argument’ is influential: zombies are conceivable; whatever is ... More

The definition of zombies is clarified, and the main arguments for the alleged possibility of zombies are examined. The ‘conceivability argument’ is influential: zombies are conceivable; whatever is conceivable is possible; therefore zombies are possible. Chalmers’s arguments for conceivability are given special attention, notably his use of Block’s homunculus-head; the apparent gap between physical information and facts about experiences; Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’; and the argument from the ‘absence of analysis’. It is argued that none of the arguments is conclusive.Less

Zapping the Zombie Idea

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Although the zombie idea seems to fit in with some ‘natural and plain’ intuitions (Chalmers), it conflicts with others. Reinforced by the ‘jacket fallacy’, it both feeds on and feeds an incoherent ... More

Although the zombie idea seems to fit in with some ‘natural and plain’ intuitions (Chalmers), it conflicts with others. Reinforced by the ‘jacket fallacy’, it both feeds on and feeds an incoherent conception of phenomenal consciousness. The ‘sole-pictures argument’ shows that a certain variety of epiphenomenalism is inconceivable in the relevant sense. Then it is argued that if zombies are conceivable, so is that kind of epiphenomenalism. If the reasoning is sound, the inconceivability of zombies follows. Among other corollaries of the main conclusion is that the idea of the inverted spectrum (transposed qualia) without physical differences is incoherent too.Less