Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
After 1923 the size of the Central Committee increased, but membership was still overwhelmingly made up of pre‐1917 party members or Old Bolsheviks. The system of ‘job‐slot representation’ quickly ...
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After 1923 the size of the Central Committee increased, but membership was still overwhelmingly made up of pre‐1917 party members or Old Bolsheviks. The system of ‘job‐slot representation’ quickly took shape and approached maturity in 1934. Ironically, this apparent stability coincided with the destruction of much of the ‘first generation’ leadership in Stalin's purges of 1937‐38. Two examples of new leaders who added to the CC in the 1920s and early 1930s, who had much in common with the makers of the 1917 revolution and who fell victim to the purges, were I. M. Vareikis and P. O. Liubchenko. The involvement of the Central Committee in the purges was complex, and its great extent was partly explained by the integrated nature of the elite.Less
After 1923 the size of the Central Committee increased, but membership was still overwhelmingly made up of pre‐1917 party members or Old Bolsheviks. The system of ‘job‐slot representation’ quickly took shape and approached maturity in 1934. Ironically, this apparent stability coincided with the destruction of much of the ‘first generation’ leadership in Stalin's purges of 1937‐38. Two examples of new leaders who added to the CC in the 1920s and early 1930s, who had much in common with the makers of the 1917 revolution and who fell victim to the purges, were I. M. Vareikis and P. O. Liubchenko. The involvement of the Central Committee in the purges was complex, and its great extent was partly explained by the integrated nature of the elite.
Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
There were high levels of turnover in the Central Committee during the Gorbachev years, reflecting the new leader's conviction that the renewal of party and government officials was essential to the ...
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There were high levels of turnover in the Central Committee during the Gorbachev years, reflecting the new leader's conviction that the renewal of party and government officials was essential to the achievement of perestroika. The composition of the Central Committee elite changed in parallel as the job‐slot system was modified and then abandoned. Figures of the ‘third generation’, born in the 1920s and 1930s, were able to advance to membership at this time, including the Ukrainian regional first secretary V. E. Dobrik and the communications industry minister E. K. Pervyshin. A few were from the ‘fourth generation’, such as Komsomol leader V. M. Mishin. Meetings of the Central Committee itself became more frequent and substantive, but it reflected widening differences within the party and failed to provide a mechanism through which its members could exercise effective control over party policy or over the leadership that spoke in their name.Less
There were high levels of turnover in the Central Committee during the Gorbachev years, reflecting the new leader's conviction that the renewal of party and government officials was essential to the achievement of perestroika. The composition of the Central Committee elite changed in parallel as the job‐slot system was modified and then abandoned. Figures of the ‘third generation’, born in the 1920s and 1930s, were able to advance to membership at this time, including the Ukrainian regional first secretary V. E. Dobrik and the communications industry minister E. K. Pervyshin. A few were from the ‘fourth generation’, such as Komsomol leader V. M. Mishin. Meetings of the Central Committee itself became more frequent and substantive, but it reflected widening differences within the party and failed to provide a mechanism through which its members could exercise effective control over party policy or over the leadership that spoke in their name.
Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
The purges were followed by a very high turnover of members of the Central Committee and in effect a new generation of leaders appeared, younger and more from the mass of workers and peasants than ...
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The purges were followed by a very high turnover of members of the Central Committee and in effect a new generation of leaders appeared, younger and more from the mass of workers and peasants than their predecessors. Members of this ‘second generation’ would dominate Soviet politics until the 1980s. The job‐slot system continued in the form it had reached in 1934, although there was now more stability and personal security. Examples of a new Stalinist generation were N. S. Baibakov and N. K. Patolichev, one a technocrat, the other a party generalist. The Central Committee was also much larger now, but had less real influence in politics, compared to the supreme leader and the Politburo/Presidium.Less
The purges were followed by a very high turnover of members of the Central Committee and in effect a new generation of leaders appeared, younger and more from the mass of workers and peasants than their predecessors. Members of this ‘second generation’ would dominate Soviet politics until the 1980s. The job‐slot system continued in the form it had reached in 1934, although there was now more stability and personal security. Examples of a new Stalinist generation were N. S. Baibakov and N. K. Patolichev, one a technocrat, the other a party generalist. The Central Committee was also much larger now, but had less real influence in politics, compared to the supreme leader and the Politburo/Presidium.
Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, which constituted the political elite of Soviet Russia, was in Lenin's time, relatively homogeneous and was entirely composed of people who had ...
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The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, which constituted the political elite of Soviet Russia, was in Lenin's time, relatively homogeneous and was entirely composed of people who had been members of the underground Bolshevik party. It is, however, possible to make some differentiation between members of this Central Committee elite, and two examples of ‘types’, one from the intelligentsia and one from the working class, are N. N. Krestinskii and A. A. Andreev. Even in this period, the Central Committee was not a policy‐making body, but all its members were important policymakers in other party and state organs.Less
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, which constituted the political elite of Soviet Russia, was in Lenin's time, relatively homogeneous and was entirely composed of people who had been members of the underground Bolshevik party. It is, however, possible to make some differentiation between members of this Central Committee elite, and two examples of ‘types’, one from the intelligentsia and one from the working class, are N. N. Krestinskii and A. A. Andreev. Even in this period, the Central Committee was not a policy‐making body, but all its members were important policymakers in other party and state organs.
Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
The Central Committee was never a ‘representative’ elite. Like other revolutionary elites, it was disproportionately male and well educated; but it was generally more representative of the mass ...
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The Central Committee was never a ‘representative’ elite. Like other revolutionary elites, it was disproportionately male and well educated; but it was generally more representative of the mass membership and of the population as a whole than the national party leadership. A system for the distribution of material benefits gradually developed to service its requirements, one that came increasingly to identify Central Committee members as a privileged group of a kind that had been characterized by Trotsky as a bureaucracy. But there were internal divisions and internal safeguards that helped to prevent the formation of an exploitative as well as politically dominant group.Less
The Central Committee was never a ‘representative’ elite. Like other revolutionary elites, it was disproportionately male and well educated; but it was generally more representative of the mass membership and of the population as a whole than the national party leadership. A system for the distribution of material benefits gradually developed to service its requirements, one that came increasingly to identify Central Committee members as a privileged group of a kind that had been characterized by Trotsky as a bureaucracy. But there were internal divisions and internal safeguards that helped to prevent the formation of an exploitative as well as politically dominant group.
Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
Across the years of its existence, the USSR witnessed three elite revolutions: in 1917, when the Tsarist elite was replaced by a Bolshevik elite of professional revolutionaries; during the Purges, ...
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Across the years of its existence, the USSR witnessed three elite revolutions: in 1917, when the Tsarist elite was replaced by a Bolshevik elite of professional revolutionaries; during the Purges, when the ‘second generation’ moved into positions of power; and under Gorbachev, when levels of turnover in the Central Committee were at their highest, although they were not sufficient to bring many of the ‘fourth generation’ into the political elite. Considerable numbers of the Central Committee membership, however, retained their status into the post‐communist years, and they took part in a wider transition from political position (which had become insecure) to the more enduring advantage of property.Less
Across the years of its existence, the USSR witnessed three elite revolutions: in 1917, when the Tsarist elite was replaced by a Bolshevik elite of professional revolutionaries; during the Purges, when the ‘second generation’ moved into positions of power; and under Gorbachev, when levels of turnover in the Central Committee were at their highest, although they were not sufficient to bring many of the ‘fourth generation’ into the political elite. Considerable numbers of the Central Committee membership, however, retained their status into the post‐communist years, and they took part in a wider transition from political position (which had become insecure) to the more enduring advantage of property.
Archie Brown
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192880529
- eISBN:
- 9780191598876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0192880527.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
When Gorbachev moved to Moscow in November 1978, he became – at the age of 47 – the youngest member of the predominantly elderly Soviet top leadership team. He received rapid promotion, becoming a ...
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When Gorbachev moved to Moscow in November 1978, he became – at the age of 47 – the youngest member of the predominantly elderly Soviet top leadership team. He received rapid promotion, becoming a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980, while retaining the Secretaryship of the Central Committee he had been accorded in 1978. It was only after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, however, and the choice of Andropov to succeed him, that Gorbachev entered the inner circle of the leadership. He was unusual for a Politburo member in consulting widely among social scientists and in taking full advantage of Moscow's cultural life. Andropov, when he was dying, tried to elevate Gorbachev above Konstantin Chernenko and make him his heir apparent, but the old guard in the Soviet leadership prevented this. There was also an attempt to prevent Gorbachev becoming de facto ‘second secretary’ after Chernenko succeeded Andropov in March 1984, but Gorbachev eventually became the clear number two within the party hierarchy and the obvious, and in the end unanimous, choice to succeed Chernenko as General Secretary when the latter died in March 1985. Meantime, Gorbachev had begun to show that he was a potential leader of a different kind by impressing Margaret Thatcher and the British public on a visit to the UK in December 1984 and, in the same month, making a speech in Moscow which castigated Soviet stereotypical thinking and introduced some of the new ideas that were to become so important during his years as General Secretary.Less
When Gorbachev moved to Moscow in November 1978, he became – at the age of 47 – the youngest member of the predominantly elderly Soviet top leadership team. He received rapid promotion, becoming a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980, while retaining the Secretaryship of the Central Committee he had been accorded in 1978. It was only after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, however, and the choice of Andropov to succeed him, that Gorbachev entered the inner circle of the leadership. He was unusual for a Politburo member in consulting widely among social scientists and in taking full advantage of Moscow's cultural life. Andropov, when he was dying, tried to elevate Gorbachev above Konstantin Chernenko and make him his heir apparent, but the old guard in the Soviet leadership prevented this. There was also an attempt to prevent Gorbachev becoming de facto ‘second secretary’ after Chernenko succeeded Andropov in March 1984, but Gorbachev eventually became the clear number two within the party hierarchy and the obvious, and in the end unanimous, choice to succeed Chernenko as General Secretary when the latter died in March 1985. Meantime, Gorbachev had begun to show that he was a potential leader of a different kind by impressing Margaret Thatcher and the British public on a visit to the UK in December 1984 and, in the same month, making a speech in Moscow which castigated Soviet stereotypical thinking and introduced some of the new ideas that were to become so important during his years as General Secretary.
Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297383
- eISBN:
- 9780191599842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297386.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
The USSR was dominated by its ruling Communist Party, and the party was in turn dominated by a political elite that was represented in its Central Committee. Nearly two thousand individuals were ...
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The USSR was dominated by its ruling Communist Party, and the party was in turn dominated by a political elite that was represented in its Central Committee. Nearly two thousand individuals were members of the Central Committee between 1917 and 1991, who may be divided into four distinct political generations from the professional revolutionaries born in the late nineteenth century to the post‐war generation that was beginning to enter the political elite in the Gorbachev years. There were considerable variations over time in the characteristics of the Central Committee, including the extent to which its membership was replaced at successive party congresses. But a close relationship developed between particular occupational positions and Central Committee membership, a ‘job‐slot’ system that lasted until the final years of communist rule. The Central Committee as an institution was generally marginal to the political process. But it met more frequently and took more decisions in the 1920s and late 1980s, and on several occasions, its meetings were decisive in resolving leadership conflicts; they also ventilated policy alternatives, and sometimes disagreements. In the last years of communist rule, the elite sought increasingly to transform their positions of political power into the more enduring advantage of property, and this allowed many of them to maintain their elite status into the post‐communist period. As well as printed sources, the study draws on recently opened party archives and about a hundred interviews with members of the Brezhnev‐era Central Committee.Less
The USSR was dominated by its ruling Communist Party, and the party was in turn dominated by a political elite that was represented in its Central Committee. Nearly two thousand individuals were members of the Central Committee between 1917 and 1991, who may be divided into four distinct political generations from the professional revolutionaries born in the late nineteenth century to the post‐war generation that was beginning to enter the political elite in the Gorbachev years. There were considerable variations over time in the characteristics of the Central Committee, including the extent to which its membership was replaced at successive party congresses. But a close relationship developed between particular occupational positions and Central Committee membership, a ‘job‐slot’ system that lasted until the final years of communist rule. The Central Committee as an institution was generally marginal to the political process. But it met more frequently and took more decisions in the 1920s and late 1980s, and on several occasions, its meetings were decisive in resolving leadership conflicts; they also ventilated policy alternatives, and sometimes disagreements. In the last years of communist rule, the elite sought increasingly to transform their positions of political power into the more enduring advantage of property, and this allowed many of them to maintain their elite status into the post‐communist period. As well as printed sources, the study draws on recently opened party archives and about a hundred interviews with members of the Brezhnev‐era Central Committee.
Robert Daniels
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300106497
- eISBN:
- 9780300134933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300106497.003.0028
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is considered an institutionally defined elite. Research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s explored the educational and career ...
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The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is considered an institutionally defined elite. Research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s explored the educational and career backgrounds of Central Committee members as well as the channels for “recruitment” or “co-optation” into that body. Also investigated was the “representation” of functional entities, ranging from the party apparatus to military, government bureaucracy, and intelligentsia, along with various geographical regions and social groups, in the composition of the Central Committee membership. However, the exact composition of the Central Committee and the specific posts that were associated with Central Committee status received little attention. Members of the Central Committee were chosen neither by free election nor by random appointment, but in accordance with a system of unwritten (or at least unannounced) rules. The Central Committee as a bureaucratic elite appears to reflect a complex matrix of unacknowledged but strongly felt status relationships in Soviet politics.Less
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is considered an institutionally defined elite. Research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s explored the educational and career backgrounds of Central Committee members as well as the channels for “recruitment” or “co-optation” into that body. Also investigated was the “representation” of functional entities, ranging from the party apparatus to military, government bureaucracy, and intelligentsia, along with various geographical regions and social groups, in the composition of the Central Committee membership. However, the exact composition of the Central Committee and the specific posts that were associated with Central Committee status received little attention. Members of the Central Committee were chosen neither by free election nor by random appointment, but in accordance with a system of unwritten (or at least unannounced) rules. The Central Committee as a bureaucratic elite appears to reflect a complex matrix of unacknowledged but strongly felt status relationships in Soviet politics.
Robert Daniels
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300106497
- eISBN:
- 9780300134933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300106497.003.0029
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its Twenty-seventh Congress in February and March 1986, signaling the end of an era characterized by an unprecedented series of leadership changes sparked ...
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The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its Twenty-seventh Congress in February and March 1986, signaling the end of an era characterized by an unprecedented series of leadership changes sparked by the successive deaths of three national chiefs in less than two-and-a-half years. The bureaucratic elite also underwent radical changes. There were important questions about the nature of political power in the Soviet system, such as how power was mobilized and transferred and what difference the succession from one generation to another made as the experience of Stalinism receded into the past. The composition of the Central Committee in terms of functional and regional status reflects a compulsion about rank and precedence that seems to have been deeply embedded in Russian political culture. Generational politics undoubtedly played a central role in the surprise turns of Soviet politics during the triple succession to Leonid Brezhnev. Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership and his reform line were both confirmed at the Twenty-seventh Congress as the outcome of the triple succession.Less
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its Twenty-seventh Congress in February and March 1986, signaling the end of an era characterized by an unprecedented series of leadership changes sparked by the successive deaths of three national chiefs in less than two-and-a-half years. The bureaucratic elite also underwent radical changes. There were important questions about the nature of political power in the Soviet system, such as how power was mobilized and transferred and what difference the succession from one generation to another made as the experience of Stalinism receded into the past. The composition of the Central Committee in terms of functional and regional status reflects a compulsion about rank and precedence that seems to have been deeply embedded in Russian political culture. Generational politics undoubtedly played a central role in the surprise turns of Soviet politics during the triple succession to Leonid Brezhnev. Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership and his reform line were both confirmed at the Twenty-seventh Congress as the outcome of the triple succession.
Robert Daniels
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300106497
- eISBN:
- 9780300134933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300106497.003.0027
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Soviet politics may be studied by means of an art of educated guesswork known as Kremlinology, defined as the occult science of deducing what was going on in the Kremlin based on whatever evidence is ...
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Soviet politics may be studied by means of an art of educated guesswork known as Kremlinology, defined as the occult science of deducing what was going on in the Kremlin based on whatever evidence is available. There were two main schools of speculation about Soviet politics: the “totalitarian model” and the “conflict model.” The first model is convincing under Joseph Stalin while the conflict model is more appropriate under Nikita Khrushchev. An anti-Khrushchev conservative faction led by Communist Party secretary Frol Kozlov existed from 1960 to 1963. The shakeup in the Secretariat in May 1960 was the first obvious sign of the campaign against Khrushchev, who was finally removed by the rules of representative procedure. What appears to have been evolving, in the party framework, was a new kind of Soviet politics called participatory bureaucracy, which made the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the cornerstone of the entire Soviet system.Less
Soviet politics may be studied by means of an art of educated guesswork known as Kremlinology, defined as the occult science of deducing what was going on in the Kremlin based on whatever evidence is available. There were two main schools of speculation about Soviet politics: the “totalitarian model” and the “conflict model.” The first model is convincing under Joseph Stalin while the conflict model is more appropriate under Nikita Khrushchev. An anti-Khrushchev conservative faction led by Communist Party secretary Frol Kozlov existed from 1960 to 1963. The shakeup in the Secretariat in May 1960 was the first obvious sign of the campaign against Khrushchev, who was finally removed by the rules of representative procedure. What appears to have been evolving, in the party framework, was a new kind of Soviet politics called participatory bureaucracy, which made the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the cornerstone of the entire Soviet system.
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804753173
- eISBN:
- 9780804767873
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804753173.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Victor Basch, a spokesman for the Ligue des droits de l'homme (League of the Rights of Man), admitted that the League has always been involved in politics, but only in the form of public policy. ...
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Victor Basch, a spokesman for the Ligue des droits de l'homme (League of the Rights of Man), admitted that the League has always been involved in politics, but only in the form of public policy. League members also asserted that they did not engage in electoral politics or parliamentary politics. However, the League always participated in elections in France. In fact, partisan quarrels arising from the 1906 elections resulted in intense ideological tensions within the League. Some members blamed Article 17, which allowed local sections to support a candidate on the first ballot only if he were the only left-wing candidate in the race, as the root of the “crisis” experienced by the League in the latter half of the decade. Almost half of the governments in the interwar years were headed by men who were members, or used to be members, of the League. After World War I, the League's Central Committee formed a parliamentary group comprised of all League deputies and senators.Less
Victor Basch, a spokesman for the Ligue des droits de l'homme (League of the Rights of Man), admitted that the League has always been involved in politics, but only in the form of public policy. League members also asserted that they did not engage in electoral politics or parliamentary politics. However, the League always participated in elections in France. In fact, partisan quarrels arising from the 1906 elections resulted in intense ideological tensions within the League. Some members blamed Article 17, which allowed local sections to support a candidate on the first ballot only if he were the only left-wing candidate in the race, as the root of the “crisis” experienced by the League in the latter half of the decade. Almost half of the governments in the interwar years were headed by men who were members, or used to be members, of the League. After World War I, the League's Central Committee formed a parliamentary group comprised of all League deputies and senators.
Mary McAuley
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198219828
- eISBN:
- 9780191678387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198219828.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Partly as a consequence of differing conceptions, partly for historic and institutional reasons, the attempt to create a socialist industry produced institutional rivals. This chapter begins by ...
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Partly as a consequence of differing conceptions, partly for historic and institutional reasons, the attempt to create a socialist industry produced institutional rivals. This chapter begins by describing the main actors, as they emerged in the early months after October. The two key contenders for the role of industrial administrators, at that time, were the unions and the factory committees. The latter had developed from within the union movement in 1917 but largely independent of it: they had their own Central Factory-Committee Council, housed in the same building as the Trade Union Council, but quite separate from it. Although both Councils had Bolshevik majorities by the autumn, they did not share a common strategy on the organization of industry.Less
Partly as a consequence of differing conceptions, partly for historic and institutional reasons, the attempt to create a socialist industry produced institutional rivals. This chapter begins by describing the main actors, as they emerged in the early months after October. The two key contenders for the role of industrial administrators, at that time, were the unions and the factory committees. The latter had developed from within the union movement in 1917 but largely independent of it: they had their own Central Factory-Committee Council, housed in the same building as the Trade Union Council, but quite separate from it. Although both Councils had Bolshevik majorities by the autumn, they did not share a common strategy on the organization of industry.
Paul Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300134247
- eISBN:
- 9780300152227
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300134247.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter examines the origins of the Politburo transcripts and the way they fit with the other documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the interwar period. It suggests that the ...
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This chapter examines the origins of the Politburo transcripts and the way they fit with the other documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the interwar period. It suggests that the Politburo used the transcripts to circulate information from the inner circle of party leaders to the Central Committee and state and party leaders in the regions. The chapter also contends that they were intended to discipline regional leaders and make them more responsive to the Kremlin's policies, and highlights the fact that they were sometimes withheld from distribution because the discussions were too sensitive or indiscrete for dissemination.Less
This chapter examines the origins of the Politburo transcripts and the way they fit with the other documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the interwar period. It suggests that the Politburo used the transcripts to circulate information from the inner circle of party leaders to the Central Committee and state and party leaders in the regions. The chapter also contends that they were intended to discipline regional leaders and make them more responsive to the Kremlin's policies, and highlights the fact that they were sometimes withheld from distribution because the discussions were too sensitive or indiscrete for dissemination.
Oleg V. Khlevniuk
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300110661
- eISBN:
- 9780300161281
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300110661.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Based on research in previously unavailable documents in the Soviet archives, this book illuminates the secret inner mechanisms of power in the Soviet Union during the years when Stalin established ...
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Based on research in previously unavailable documents in the Soviet archives, this book illuminates the secret inner mechanisms of power in the Soviet Union during the years when Stalin established his notorious dictatorship. It focuses on the top organ in Soviet Russia's political hierarchy of the 1930s—the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party—and on the political and interpersonal dynamics that weakened its collective leadership and enabled Stalin's rise. The author's research challenges existing theories of the workings of the Politburo and uncovers many new findings regarding the nature of alliances among Politburo members, Sergei Kirov's murder, the implementation of the Great Terror, and much more. The author analyzes Stalin's mechanisms of generating and retaining power, and presents a new understanding of the highest tiers of the Communist Party in a crucial era of Soviet history.Less
Based on research in previously unavailable documents in the Soviet archives, this book illuminates the secret inner mechanisms of power in the Soviet Union during the years when Stalin established his notorious dictatorship. It focuses on the top organ in Soviet Russia's political hierarchy of the 1930s—the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party—and on the political and interpersonal dynamics that weakened its collective leadership and enabled Stalin's rise. The author's research challenges existing theories of the workings of the Politburo and uncovers many new findings regarding the nature of alliances among Politburo members, Sergei Kirov's murder, the implementation of the Great Terror, and much more. The author analyzes Stalin's mechanisms of generating and retaining power, and presents a new understanding of the highest tiers of the Communist Party in a crucial era of Soviet history.
Shomona Khanna
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198099123
- eISBN:
- 9780199083077
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198099123.003.0007
- Subject:
- Sociology, Science, Technology and Environment
This chapter presents an insider’s view and detailed critique of the judicial process behind the Godavarman case. It suggests that the Godavarman judgment has further centralized forest management by ...
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This chapter presents an insider’s view and detailed critique of the judicial process behind the Godavarman case. It suggests that the Godavarman judgment has further centralized forest management by empowering a special bench of the Supreme Court to decide upon matters of forest conservation and conversion and the forest bureaucracy to implement such decisions. Though the judiciary was initially seen as a possible last resort to protect people’s rights in the face of an insensitive bureaucracy, the chapter highlights how the judiciary has by and large supported the executive’s centralized and exclusionary vision of forest governance. While the device of a ‘continuing mandamus’ was evolved in order to ensure that court orders passed in public interest litigations are actually implemented, the Godavarman case has exploded beyond manageable proportions, resulting in greater and greater mystification of the process of law. It is argued that the Godavarman judgment has redefined the boundaries of forests in such a way as to deny people’s historical claims to forests.Less
This chapter presents an insider’s view and detailed critique of the judicial process behind the Godavarman case. It suggests that the Godavarman judgment has further centralized forest management by empowering a special bench of the Supreme Court to decide upon matters of forest conservation and conversion and the forest bureaucracy to implement such decisions. Though the judiciary was initially seen as a possible last resort to protect people’s rights in the face of an insensitive bureaucracy, the chapter highlights how the judiciary has by and large supported the executive’s centralized and exclusionary vision of forest governance. While the device of a ‘continuing mandamus’ was evolved in order to ensure that court orders passed in public interest litigations are actually implemented, the Godavarman case has exploded beyond manageable proportions, resulting in greater and greater mystification of the process of law. It is argued that the Godavarman judgment has redefined the boundaries of forests in such a way as to deny people’s historical claims to forests.
Christine E. Evans
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780300208481
- eISBN:
- 9780300208962
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300208481.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter focuses on Soviet television “enthusiasm,” the set of values and ambitions espoused by Central Television workers in the second half of the 1950s. It first considers the creation of the ...
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This chapter focuses on Soviet television “enthusiasm,” the set of values and ambitions espoused by Central Television workers in the second half of the 1950s. It first considers the creation of the Moscow Youth Festival as the founding moment of a new, festive television aesthetics in the Soviet Union. It then discusses some of the problems encountered by Central Television workers that rendered theater critic Vladimir Sappak's linkage between liveness, unscriptedness, and the everyday impossible, with particular emphasis on the quiz show Evening of Merry Questions. The chapter also explores the role of television workers and members of the intelligentsia as model persons on screen, along with on-air roles by television journalists; and the Central Committee's 1960 decree “On the Future Development of Soviet Television.” Finally, it explains how a more limited version of Soviet television enthusiasm persisted, and even flourished, through the 1970s and to the present.Less
This chapter focuses on Soviet television “enthusiasm,” the set of values and ambitions espoused by Central Television workers in the second half of the 1950s. It first considers the creation of the Moscow Youth Festival as the founding moment of a new, festive television aesthetics in the Soviet Union. It then discusses some of the problems encountered by Central Television workers that rendered theater critic Vladimir Sappak's linkage between liveness, unscriptedness, and the everyday impossible, with particular emphasis on the quiz show Evening of Merry Questions. The chapter also explores the role of television workers and members of the intelligentsia as model persons on screen, along with on-air roles by television journalists; and the Central Committee's 1960 decree “On the Future Development of Soviet Television.” Finally, it explains how a more limited version of Soviet television enthusiasm persisted, and even flourished, through the 1970s and to the present.
Harold James
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198735915
- eISBN:
- 9780191799860
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735915.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Political Economy
As President of the Bundesbank Council, Karl-Otto Pöhl occupied a pivotal position in the negotiations leading to EMU, principally within the Delors Committee and within the Committee of EC Central ...
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As President of the Bundesbank Council, Karl-Otto Pöhl occupied a pivotal position in the negotiations leading to EMU, principally within the Delors Committee and within the Committee of EC Central Bank Governors. Based on original research, this chapter examines the factors conditioning Pöhl’s attitude to EMU, the paradox that accompanied his contribution to EMU, and his longer-term legacy. Pöhl was sceptical of the idea of monetary union, and many (including Margaret Thatcher) thought that he would block the proposal; but in fact, he agreed to sign the Delors Report. Later, he was instrumental in designing the ECB statute, and in particular the emphasis on the price stability mandate. At the same time, he offered public criticism of the project of monetary union. The chapter offers an insight into the role of the Bundesbank staff as well as of the President of the Bundesbank Council in the making of monetary union.Less
As President of the Bundesbank Council, Karl-Otto Pöhl occupied a pivotal position in the negotiations leading to EMU, principally within the Delors Committee and within the Committee of EC Central Bank Governors. Based on original research, this chapter examines the factors conditioning Pöhl’s attitude to EMU, the paradox that accompanied his contribution to EMU, and his longer-term legacy. Pöhl was sceptical of the idea of monetary union, and many (including Margaret Thatcher) thought that he would block the proposal; but in fact, he agreed to sign the Delors Report. Later, he was instrumental in designing the ECB statute, and in particular the emphasis on the price stability mandate. At the same time, he offered public criticism of the project of monetary union. The chapter offers an insight into the role of the Bundesbank staff as well as of the President of the Bundesbank Council in the making of monetary union.
Timothy Cheek
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198290667
- eISBN:
- 9780191684821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198290667.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
Along with other establishment intellectuals and their political patrons, Deng Tuo was purged in 1966 and his ideas were castigated as ‘anti-socialist’ and ‘anti-Party’. He was faced with an ...
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Along with other establishment intellectuals and their political patrons, Deng Tuo was purged in 1966 and his ideas were castigated as ‘anti-socialist’ and ‘anti-Party’. He was faced with an impossible choice: repudiate Mao or turn his back on the rules of Party life and rational methods of leadership he so valued and had popularized in Evening Chats. Deng Tuo's suicide on the evening of 17 May 1966 by overdose of sleeping tablets was a poignant and tragic final statement of a loyal servant made in protest at what he considered to be unjust charges. It was not until January 1979 that Deng Tuo's name appeared in the official press in other than his Cultural Revolution persona as a negative role model. After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held that December, a broad range of cadres purged in the Cultural Revolution, including Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha, were rehabilitated by the Central Committee. As with other well-known Party loyalists from the 1960s, the current regime has used Deng Tuo posthumously to promote its model for intellectual participation in public life.Less
Along with other establishment intellectuals and their political patrons, Deng Tuo was purged in 1966 and his ideas were castigated as ‘anti-socialist’ and ‘anti-Party’. He was faced with an impossible choice: repudiate Mao or turn his back on the rules of Party life and rational methods of leadership he so valued and had popularized in Evening Chats. Deng Tuo's suicide on the evening of 17 May 1966 by overdose of sleeping tablets was a poignant and tragic final statement of a loyal servant made in protest at what he considered to be unjust charges. It was not until January 1979 that Deng Tuo's name appeared in the official press in other than his Cultural Revolution persona as a negative role model. After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held that December, a broad range of cadres purged in the Cultural Revolution, including Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha, were rehabilitated by the Central Committee. As with other well-known Party loyalists from the 1960s, the current regime has used Deng Tuo posthumously to promote its model for intellectual participation in public life.
Melvyn C. Goldstein, Dawei Sherap, and William R. Siebenschuh
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520240896
- eISBN:
- 9780520940307
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520240896.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
When he reached Kalimpong, Phüntso Wangye began to make contact with representatives of the Indian Communist Party. It was not easy. The Communist Party was illegal, so it did not have an office with ...
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When he reached Kalimpong, Phüntso Wangye began to make contact with representatives of the Indian Communist Party. It was not easy. The Communist Party was illegal, so it did not have an office with a signboard. When he arrived in Calcutta, Phüntso found a strong Communist Party presence there. He got a message from the Central Committee requesting that he meet them immediately. The Communist Party of India was poor, but the members were generally optimistic and upbeat, and not all the memories were bad. Phüntso sent a letter to Yuthok telling him that he had tried every means but received no help from the Council of Ministers, and said he hoped Yuthok could help them. And so, determined that it was time for them to take matters into his own hands, he returned to Kham.Less
When he reached Kalimpong, Phüntso Wangye began to make contact with representatives of the Indian Communist Party. It was not easy. The Communist Party was illegal, so it did not have an office with a signboard. When he arrived in Calcutta, Phüntso found a strong Communist Party presence there. He got a message from the Central Committee requesting that he meet them immediately. The Communist Party of India was poor, but the members were generally optimistic and upbeat, and not all the memories were bad. Phüntso sent a letter to Yuthok telling him that he had tried every means but received no help from the Council of Ministers, and said he hoped Yuthok could help them. And so, determined that it was time for them to take matters into his own hands, he returned to Kham.
