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This essay elucidates the characteristics of cartels as a type of corporate crime in Hungary and consider the implications of such corporate crimes for the European region. To this end, the essay analyses cartel cases from the Hungarian Competition Authority to answer the following core question: what is the role of the state in responding to cartel cases and in ensuring the freedom of competition in the market? The analysis reveals that the state has different approaches to dealing with corporate crime, like cartels. In some cases, the state itself initiates the cartel (see the watermelon case below), in other incidents, the state facilitates the process (see the cash register case below). In these terms, the conceptual framework of state-corporate crime is used to interrogate the Hungarian context.

Michoacán is experiencing a war between two armed groups of civilians and has become the “Wild West” of twenty-first century Mexico. Neither side, nor the government, agrees on what is actually going on. Drug production and the money to be made from it, cartels, borders, poverty, and migration partly explain the violence.

In response to the exploitation of their land by drug cartels, the indigenous Nahua people formed a self-defense group. The Ostula Manifesto, declared in 2009 in Michoacán, proclaimed a right to indigenous self-defense and is of historical importance to the history of indigenous struggle in Mexico. Other indigenous groups throughout the area claimed the Ostula Manifesto and began forming self-defense systems to protect themselves.

If vaudeville spoke so effectively to modern life and if it was so popular, why did it disappear after World War I? There was nothing inevitable about vaudeville’s decline; but its vulnerabilities were apparent even as it grew. As vaudeville became more popular, some entrepreneurs tried to separate their businesses from the mass of variety theaters by creating what they called the “big time,” a glitzier vaudeville based on palatial theaters, glamorous amenities and high-priced celebrities. Referencing characters like Fred Proctor, Edward F. Albee, and Sherman Dudley, this chapter shows how managers formed national chains and booking cartels and tried to strangle out their competitors. These tactics drove managers who could not secure enough affordable celebrity acts to reduce overhead by showing movies. The cost of ever-increasing glamor burdened “big time” chains with staggering overhead, something which made them vulnerable when the market contracted sharply after WWI. The cause of vaudeville’s decline was both structural and unrehearsed.

This chapter assesses the role of conference system from its formation through to 1914. During the nineteenth century a sharp and persistent increase in competition between shipowners over trade and trade routes led to the need for conferences, with the intention of curbing rivalry and retaining customers. Robert G. Greenhill seeks to determine how successful these conferences were at meeting their goals, and finds that though results varied from location to location, overall the consensus amongst shipowners was that it was better for business to be involved in the conference system, rather than not be.

This chapter examines the International Merchant Marine (IMM) merger and consolidations in the shipping industry and how they affected the transatlantic passenger trade. It offers a close analysis of the strategies utilised by conferences against outside competitor lines; the level of success of the New York Continental Conference in preventing lines from enlarging market shares; the internal relations between conference members and the impact this had on steerage rates; the efforts to rationalise migrant agent networks through conference agreements; and the way the antitrust campaign caught up with the shipping industry during the Progressive Era. It concludes by asserting that conferences were willing to take strong measures to prevent the passage of American laws that might harm their business interests, particularly that of migrant shipping.

This chapter explores the responses to lack of orders that the warshipbuilders and other naval arms manufacturers undertook after 1926 and the collapse of the Coventry Ordnance Works. These ranged from the predictable (diversification) to the illegal (cartels and price fixing). The role the Admiralty, particularly Chatfield, played in allowing this cartel to operate is also examined.

This chapter looks at rearmament itself, and argues that the transition towards wartime levels of production was not as smooth as it ought to have been given the circumstances. It looks at the role of engineers, such as Sir Harold Brown, who grew tired of the endless lists of committees, and effectively circumvented the Committee of Imperial Defence in order to secure production capacity effectively. Finally, it returns to the role of the shipbuilding cartel, showing how their scheme eventually came undone, and how the Admiralty took control of profiteering – but only well into the war itself.

In Chapter 13, Angus MacCulloch focuses on criminal enforcement. The UK Cartel Offence was introduced in the Enterprise Act 2002 to challenge hard-core cartels and enhance the deterrent effect of the UK competition regime. In its initial phase of operation there was some success. However, a number of significant cases failed to secure convictions. This damaged confidence in the ability of the UK competition authorities to bring successful prosecutions, and ultimately questioned the usefulness of the Cartel Offence. This chapter examines the problems that beset the original Cartel Offence and the lessons learned from the small number of prosecutions brought before the courts. It goes on to examine the reforms in 2013, that removed the controversial ‘dishonesty’ element from the offence, and replaced it with carve outs for openness and publication. Alongside the practical issues in relation to the development of the UK Cartel Offence consideration is also given to a parallel process which saw a form of consensus developing in the academic literature as to the nature of the wrong at the heart of individual cartel activity. It is suggested that this greater understanding can be used to direct efforts to rebuild confidence in the reformed UK Cartel Offence going forward. Increased importance should be given to the securing of good evidence of individual culpability in relation to cartel activity during the investigation phase. It argues that once good evidence is secured, better prosecution cases can be built on the basis of the new narrative of wrongfulness for hard core cartel activity.

Chapter 2 considers the application of the Competition Act 1998 to ‘Horizontal Agreements’, and in particular to cartel behaviour, since that piece of legislation entered into force on 1 March 2000. It is a tour de force of the enforcement practice. The chapter notes that early years of the legislation were somewhat disappointing, with a fairly low level of enforcement, although the OFT did score success with pioneering investigations of so-called ‘hub and spoke’ cartels in the Football Shirts and Toys and Games cases. From about 2006 onwards there were more decisions from the OFT, and some of the cases, such as Construction bid-rigging and Fuel surcharges, were high profile ones. Despite this, criticism of under-performance was voiced, not least by the National Audit Office. It is noted that in due course the OFT was replaced by the CMA, and there has been a noticeable increase in enforcement in recent years. Whish suggests that in a post-Brexit world it can be anticipated that there will be yet more enforcement, including of larger cartels which historically would have been investigated by the European Commission in Brussels.

The single most important feature of American history after 1945 was the United States’s assumption of hegemonic leadership. Europeans had noted America’s enormous potential since at least the nineteenth century. After the Civil War the United States had one of the largest economies in the world, but, as noted earlier in this book, in geopolitical terms it remained a surprisingly minor player. By 1900 the United States was playing a more significant political role. But it was only after 1945 that the nation’s potential on the world stage was fully realized. Victory in the Second World War left the United States in an enviable position. Unlike the Soviet Union, which endured devastating fighting on its territory and lost tens of millions of citizens, the United States had experienced only one major attack on its soil. Thanks to its actions in the war America had great influence in Europe. And the national economy emerged surprisingly vibrant from the years of conflagration, easily dominant over any conceivable rival or set of rivals. When the First World War ended the United States ultimately chose to return to its hemispheric perch. It declined to join the new League of Nations, and rather than maintaining engagement with the great powers of the day, America generally turned inward. The years following the Second World War were quite different. In addition to championing—and hosting—the new United Nations, the United States quickly established a panoply of important institutions aimed at maintaining and organizing international cooperation in both economic and security affairs. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union, apparent to many shortly after the war’s end, led the United States to remain militarily active in both Europe and Asia. The intensifying Cold War cemented this unprecedented approach to world politics. The prolonged occupations of Germany and Japan were straightforward examples of this newly active global role. In both cases the United States refashioned a conquered enemy into a democratic, free-market ally—a significant feat. The United States did not, however, seek a formal empire in the wake of its victory.