Search Results

This chapter examines issues arising from the elections that were held in France, Germany, and Italy in the spring of 1924, asking in particular whether the elections could resolve the political ambiguities persisting in the three countries. It suggests that the presence of important political alternatives could not guarantee that the voting would yield clear decisions. Even where significant majorities or shifts of opinion occurred, the results were not unequivocal in terms of the issues at stake. Choices on the ballot did not parallel real policy alternatives. Superficially decisive victories led merely to coalitions built around opportunity rather than policy. The chapter considers the limits of Benito Mussolini's majority, the setback suffered by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the polls, and the coalition between the Radical Socialist Party and the SPD to form the Cartel des Gauches.

Competition policy has been said to lie at the heart of the German social market economy and to have been a key influence on the EC competition regime. This chapter assesses the impact of Europeanization on the competition law policy domain in the light of earlier claims that suggest a marginalization of the Federal Cartel Office. The question is pursued through three case studies that involve three different Europeanization dynamics: those of domestic assimilation of EU policy provisions, of informing policy change at the EU level, and of ‘collision’ between national and Commission policy preferences. The cases cover three distinct policy issues: the Europeanization of domestic competition law, attempts to shape changes to the EC regime's Regulation 17/62, and efforts of the DG Competition to prohibit the fixed-book price agreement between Austria and Germany. While those cases leading to domestic policy change suggest a considerable degree of national ‘resilience’, the example of ‘informing EC policy change’ points to the declining influence of the German approach vis-à-vis other national competition law experiences, Commission preferences, and changing competition policy ‘ideas’.

The revival of conservative activism was evident in the emergence of the anti-parliamentary leagues, the Jeunesses patriotes and Faisceau, the mobilization of Catholics in the FNC, and the creation of a Christian Democrat party, the PDP. Re-organization was rooted in an internal crisis of conservatism, the emergence of peasant activism, the growth of Catholic trade unionism, and the radicalization of the regionalist movement. The Right and the leagues were ambiguous in their relationship with each other, for the leagues represented both hostility to the Cartel and to the perceived failures of the Bloc. The leagues selectively admired Fascism, while drawing from Nationalism, Bonapartism, and royalism as well as organizationalism, the veteran movement, and women's groups. Meanwhile, some centrists admired aspects of the Cartel's policies. They saw a means to achieve organization on a European scale, and were prepared to make some concessions to social democracy.

This chapter explores the journeys women undertake through Central America, Mexico and the United States as they seek to escape violence, and the new forms of violence they are made vulnerable to. Exploring youth gang, cartel, police, military, and immigration officials’ violence, the chapter argues that there is a fundamentally new type of state that is analytically inseparable from the illegality and violence, a “Neoliberal multicriminal” state. It considers the relation of this state to structures of settler capitalism.

This chapter studies how the French and German governments, both dealing with domestic constraints, exchanged a number of formal notes whose contents could have broken off negotiations. Under pressure from the French right to engage in coercive bargaining, the Cartel des Gauches government reimagined the German proposal in a way that suited French interests. The French appreciated the concessions made by the Germans—an attitude that is indicative of the liberal diplomacy expected from a government with prosocial motivations. The chapter explains that the role of Britain in the run-up to the negotiations was to urge the two sides to avoid coercive bargaining statements and to keep their exchanges short. The British continually stressed that the two countries should consider the practical benefits of an agreement, and eventually succeeded in getting all the parties to the table.

The Emperor of China, with the aim of gathering profits from trade with the foreigners, all the while attempting to keep them as far away as possible from mainland China, proposed to the Portuguese that foreign trade be centralized in Macau in 1719, and again in 1733. The senate refused both times, stating that the foreigners corrupted the city’s morals and that their permanent residence in the city reduced the Macau trading community’s power to manoeuvre and weakened their privileged position. Instead, they prefer to derive their income from import duties offered by the Emperor of China to the city and from renting the names of Portuguese trading businesses to the British, since Portuguese law banned foreigners from owning landed properties and opening businesses in Macau. The Chinese meanwhile established the co-hong to regulate foreign trade, which turned into a cartel in 1760.

What transpired in Pisarovina, a small village located on the outskirts of Zagreb, is unique not only to Yugoslavia, but to the Second World War in general. Pisarovina was the location officially agreed by both the German occupation authorities and the Yugoslav Partisans to function as the center of the prisoner exchange cartel at the end of 1943. In order to facilitate this, the village and its immediate surroundings were declared a neutral zone, quite possibly the only such place in war-torn Europe. The system saved hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners who faced an uncertain fate. Frequent contacts between the envoys provided both the Germans and the Partisans with a "back-channel" for talks on political issues and trade, as well as the opportunity to spy on each other.

This chapter contains a few concluding remarks. This book is the first attempt at a comprehensive analysis of non-violent contacts between the Partisans and the German occupation authorities in Yugoslavia in the Second World War. Far from being the final word on the topic, it is a starting point for further research on various aspects of POW history. Frequent exchanges of able-bodied prisoners between the occupation forces and a resistance movement, partly through a cartel negotiated directly between their high commands, was a distinctive feature of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. It was probably the only place in war-torn Europe where representatives of two irreconcilable ideologies, Communism and Nazism, met regularly at the negotiating table. Both were primarily motivated by the desire to save their own men, but the talks did mitigate, however marginally, the horrors of the war.

The NFL is a cartel and has been able to use that power reality in a number of ways to enhance its economic success and in turn increase its power. The Stadium Game comes in many forms but essentially involves using promises and extortion to get new stadiums for its franchises. Expansion is another element in the process. Movement of franchises was restricted until Al Davis and the Los Angeles Municipal Coliseum Commission won their court case to move the Raiders to Los Angeles. There also were struggles over ownership rules pitting Edward Bennett Williams of Washington against the Commissioner. The argument was settled in the court of appeals in NASL v. NFL. These cases opened up an era of movement that further enhanced community exploitation. Among those moving were Baltimore to Indianapolis and Cleveland to Baltimore. Jerry Jones and the Dallas Cowboys took a different and effective route to a new stadium, while others like the Minnesota Vikings threatened movement to get a new stadium. On the other hand, Leonard Tose in Philadelphia is an example of how one could actually drive an NFL franchise to ruin while enriching oneself. These changes diminished the power of the Commissioner.

This chapter commences with a discussion of the essential features of competition law, focussing upon the law’s prohibition upon anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. It then moves on to toidentify a selection of the key competition issues that arise in practice in different phases of oil and gas operations. The difficulties inherent in identifying the relevant market in the context of, e.g., a proposed agreement to transport oil or gas is a particular focus of the chapter, which also discusses the distinction between vertical and horizontal agreements.

Capt. William Henry Asbury Speer marches off to war from his beloved Yadkin River Valley a reluctant soldier who blames the Secessionists for the war. He is captured in battle, then exchanged, and rejoins the 28th regiment. Even as he fights bravely at Fredericksburg and is wounded at Chancellorsville, he campaigns hardest to keep his younger brother out of the war. He survives Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg and ten more major engagements, rising to command the regiment. He pens a dark poem predicting his on death and near Petersburg is blasted by shrapnel from an artillery shell. Friends cart his body home in a wagon for burial among his Ulster Scots and Quaker ancestors.

Pvt. Benjamin F. Booth, captured in the Battle of Cedar Creek, is imprisoned at Salisbury Prison, which become s a notorious death camp. Booth faithfully records all the deaths he witnesses in a secret diary-including those shot down in a prison uprising and some who were buried alive. An estimated 5,000 die at Salisbury. At last he is liberated and, emaciated and nearly naked, walks into Wilmington under a banner that reads “We Welcome You Home Our Brothers.” The USCT soldiers give him and his companions food, water, shoes, and uniforms as a band plays “Home, Sweet Home,” and many tears are shed.

This chapter analyses the challenge of legal certainty for European antitrust criminalization from three perspectives: the concept, substance, and existence of a criminal antitrust offence. The relationship with the concept is analysed first. The main argument examined is that, due to the inherently vague nature of the antitrust rules, it would be inappropriate to enforce such rules with criminal sanctions. In analysing how legal certainty can influence the substance of an offence, a case study of the (originally drafted) UK Cartel Offence is presented, explaining how mistakes in the drafting process can engender issues with legal certainty. Finally, in examining the impact of legal certainty upon the existence of an offence, this chapter analyses the issue of ‘sleeping giants’: i.e., the use of existing (relatively broad, non-antitrust-specific) criminal laws to impose sanctions upon cartel activity. The controversial UK case of Norris is particularly instructive and is therefore analysed in detail.