Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for ...
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Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for atheism. Other philosophers say yes and claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. And still other philosophers say yes but demur on the task of explaining the role of evils in our world. Philosophers who believe in God and yet take this latter route are called “skeptical theists.” Such thinkers are skeptical about human abilities to determine whether the evils in our world could be justifiably allowed by a being such as God. Despite believing in God, these philosophers insist that humans are not cognitively equipped to discern many of the reasons that might be available to God. This collection of essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Part I investigates the epistemology of skepticism as it applies to evils and the nature of epistemic humility. Part II explores the tenability of a particular epistemic principle about the conditions of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA). The remaining sections of the book address objections to sceptical theism, namely the objection that skeptical theism undermines the theistic life (Part III) and the objection that skeptical theism undermines the moral life (Part IV).Less
Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for atheism. Other philosophers say yes and claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. And still other philosophers say yes but demur on the task of explaining the role of evils in our world. Philosophers who believe in God and yet take this latter route are called “skeptical theists.” Such thinkers are skeptical about human abilities to determine whether the evils in our world could be justifiably allowed by a being such as God. Despite believing in God, these philosophers insist that humans are not cognitively equipped to discern many of the reasons that might be available to God. This collection of essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Part I investigates the epistemology of skepticism as it applies to evils and the nature of epistemic humility. Part II explores the tenability of a particular epistemic principle about the conditions of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA). The remaining sections of the book address objections to sceptical theism, namely the objection that skeptical theism undermines the theistic life (Part III) and the objection that skeptical theism undermines the moral life (Part IV).
Paul Draper
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this chapter, elementary confirmation ...
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Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this chapter, elementary confirmation theory is used to analyze CORNEA’s core. This allows one to see precisely what is right about Wykstra’s very influential defense of skeptical theism and precisely what is wrong with it. A key premise of Wykstra’s defense is that, on the assumption that God exists, one wouldn’t expect to know God’s reasons for allowing certain evils. This chapter shows that, while that premise together with CORNEA’s core shows that a general inability to adequately explain the existence of those evils in terms of theism is not strong evidence against theism, it fails to show that the evils themselves are not strong evidence against theism.Less
Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this chapter, elementary confirmation theory is used to analyze CORNEA’s core. This allows one to see precisely what is right about Wykstra’s very influential defense of skeptical theism and precisely what is wrong with it. A key premise of Wykstra’s defense is that, on the assumption that God exists, one wouldn’t expect to know God’s reasons for allowing certain evils. This chapter shows that, while that premise together with CORNEA’s core shows that a general inability to adequately explain the existence of those evils in terms of theism is not strong evidence against theism, it fails to show that the evils themselves are not strong evidence against theism.
Timothy Perrine and Stephen J. Wykstra
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
What is called “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical ...
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What is called “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later, more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. The chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, this chapter suggests that a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology.Less
What is called “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later, more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. The chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, this chapter suggests that a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology.
Paul Draper
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Chapter 11 attempted to retool Stephen J. Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism so that it is effective against abductive or “Humean” arguments from evil. The result is a radically new form of ...
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Chapter 11 attempted to retool Stephen J. Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism so that it is effective against abductive or “Humean” arguments from evil. The result is a radically new form of skeptical theism that is not based on CORNEA. Chapter 11 used this new form of skeptical theism to raise several objections to my premise that naturalism has much more “predictive power” than theism does with respect to what we know about pleasure and pain, flourishing and floundering, virtue and vice, and triumph and tragedy. This chapter shows that none of these objections succeeds.Less
Chapter 11 attempted to retool Stephen J. Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism so that it is effective against abductive or “Humean” arguments from evil. The result is a radically new form of skeptical theism that is not based on CORNEA. Chapter 11 used this new form of skeptical theism to raise several objections to my premise that naturalism has much more “predictive power” than theism does with respect to what we know about pleasure and pain, flourishing and floundering, virtue and vice, and triumph and tragedy. This chapter shows that none of these objections succeeds.
Kenneth Boyce
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Skeptical theists have been charged with being committed to global skepticism. This chapter considers this objection as it applies to a common variety of skeptical theism based on an epistemological ...
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Skeptical theists have been charged with being committed to global skepticism. This chapter considers this objection as it applies to a common variety of skeptical theism based on an epistemological principle that Stephen Wykstra labeled “CORNEA.” Further, it shows how a recent reformulation of CORNEA (provided here by Stephen Wykstra and Timothy Perrine) affords a formal apparatus that reveals just where this objection gets a grip on that view, as well as what is needed for an adequate response. This chapter concludes by arguing that, given some plausible, modest, and independently motivated anti-skeptical principles, this objection poses no threat to Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism.Less
Skeptical theists have been charged with being committed to global skepticism. This chapter considers this objection as it applies to a common variety of skeptical theism based on an epistemological principle that Stephen Wykstra labeled “CORNEA.” Further, it shows how a recent reformulation of CORNEA (provided here by Stephen Wykstra and Timothy Perrine) affords a formal apparatus that reveals just where this objection gets a grip on that view, as well as what is needed for an adequate response. This chapter concludes by arguing that, given some plausible, modest, and independently motivated anti-skeptical principles, this objection poses no threat to Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism.
