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The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.

The hypothesis is that space‐time is what there is. W.V. Quine's ‘abstract objects’ are rejected. What exists should play some causal role (Graham Oddie's Eleatic Principle). The nature of space‐time is subject to scientific investigation (Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of the world). Is there room for metaphysics? Yes, because a number of topic neutral notions (of which causality is an important instance) are contested by philosophers and scientists. As argued by C.B. Martin, metaphysics seeks a more abstract model of the world than that provided by science.

Truths require truth‐makers; but what is it to be ‘made true’? One possibility: truth‐makers entail truths. I reject this account, arguing that entailment is a relation holding among representations, and suggesting that the entailment model owes its plausibility to an implicit acceptance of the Picture Theory.

Molnar's four propositions are introduced. They present an important dilemma. C.B. Martin's distinction between limits and absences is then introduced. It is argued that there are objective limits in the world, totality states of affairs or ‘allnesses’. In this sense there is negation in the world. Totalities may even be perceived. But absences are not required as truthmakers. Mereology is introduced to elucidate the form that totality states of affairs take. Limits are not ‘additions of being’ and, arguably, do not clash with the Eleatic Principle.

Intrinsic properties of concrete objects endow their possessors with powers or dispositionalities. Powers are not relations or ‘relational properties’, nor are they ‘higher‐level’ properties. A power exists whether or not it is ever manifested. A power's manifestation is, in most cases, reciprocal: a mutual manifestation of reciprocal partners.

Intrinsic properties of concrete objects are simultaneously dispositional and qualitative: properties are powerful qualities. This ‘surprising identity’ can be motivated by considering liabilities of the alternatives: properties as pure powers, as pure qualities, as both pure powers and pure qualities, and as contingently empowered qualities. Identity suggests itself when ‘higher‐level’ powers are relocated in ‘lower‐level’ realizers.

The world is a world of objects. Objects are various ways; these ways are their properties. A substance–property conception of this sort differs from a conception according to which objects are bundles of properties. Might every object have proper parts that are themselves objects? Or are some objects simple? A tentative argument for simple objects is advanced.

Suppose Locke were right: ‘All things that exist are only particulars’. Properties are modes; modes (tropes, abstract particulars), particularized ways objects are. Objects ‘share’ or possess ‘the same’ property in the way two brokers can wear the same tie to work. Objects are similar by virtue of possessing similar modes; modes are similar tout court.

When and how do powers manifest themselves? There are two models. The orthodox view has powers standing in need of stimuli, which once received issue in responses. This model portrays powers as passive. The stimuli are powerful, but the powers are disempowered, turning the order of explanation on its head. The second model is more promising: C. B. Martin’s notion of mutual manifestation partnering. Powers exercise when they meet their reciprocal partners and produce something jointly that they could not have produced alone. In his chapter on causation, Martin offers an analogy to explain mutual manifestation: it is like two triangular cards coming together to form a square. The triangles do not cause the square; they become the square. We argue that although mutual manifestation is the right model, Martin’s analogy of the two triangles is misleading. If we look at natural processes in which powers exercise and manifest themselves, we see that three revisions are needed to the analogy. First, the triangles need not become the square immediately. It can take time for a process to unfold. Second, powers compose often in a non-linear fashion. This would mean that the area of the square need not be the sum of the areas of the two triangles. Third, component powers needn’t be found in their resultant powers. This would be like the two triangles sometimes forming a circle rather than a square. Martin’s analogy depicted mereological composition rather than the natural processes issuing from powers and, contrary to his claim, causation is indeed the notion we should be thinking of.

This chapter distinguishes two species of functionalism: what Ned Block called, ‘functional specifier functionalism’ (now often called ‘realizer functionalism’) and ‘functional identity functionalism’ (now often called ‘role functionalism’). The first species of functionalism was defended by Armstrong and by David Lewis, and remains the dominant strain in Australian philosophy of mind. The second species became dominant in the US. A range of problems in the philosophy of mind over the last forty years stemming from the latter’s dominance are discussed. Most notably, issues about mental causation do not arise for Armstrong and Lewis because mental states literally are the causally efficacious states that play functional roles. In contrast, on the second view, mental states are higher-order states, such as ‘the state of having a state that plays a particular role’ the efficacy if which is dubitable. Heil argues that problems for the former view can be dealt with by modifying it to incorporate an account of dispositions traceable to C. B. Martin, according to which dispositions are identified with their categorical bases. Mental states are first-order states, not abstract states of being in some state that satisfies a particular functional specification, but dispositions with dispositional profiles that correspond to functional specifications. The chapter concludes by arguing that this modification has the potential to support a straightforward identification of experiential states with neurological states that avoids the pitfalls of previous attempts to do this.