John P. Burke
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines decision making in the Bush presidency by analyzing its formal organizational processes, including the structure of the advisory process, the access of advisers to the ...
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This chapter examines decision making in the Bush presidency by analyzing its formal organizational processes, including the structure of the advisory process, the access of advisers to the president, the coordination and management of the advisory process, and the president's penchant for delegation, his emphasis on loyalty, and his willingness to impose organizational discipline on top advisers. On each dimension, the process is found wanting. The administration's collegial deliberation is then considered, raising troubling questions about the president's failure to press critical questions (such as the reliability of evidence regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the premises on which the administration planned for postwar Iraq) and his tendency to focus on how to accomplish something rather than whether to accomplish it. The issues of diversity of whom Bush chose to engage and the imbalance of power and influence among the principals are also addressed.Less
This chapter examines decision making in the Bush presidency by analyzing its formal organizational processes, including the structure of the advisory process, the access of advisers to the president, the coordination and management of the advisory process, and the president's penchant for delegation, his emphasis on loyalty, and his willingness to impose organizational discipline on top advisers. On each dimension, the process is found wanting. The administration's collegial deliberation is then considered, raising troubling questions about the president's failure to press critical questions (such as the reliability of evidence regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the premises on which the administration planned for postwar Iraq) and his tendency to focus on how to accomplish something rather than whether to accomplish it. The issues of diversity of whom Bush chose to engage and the imbalance of power and influence among the principals are also addressed.
James P. Pfiffner
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the use of intelligence by George W. Bush and his administration in decision making before the war in Iraq. It is argued that as the administration moved toward war, decision ...
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This chapter examines the use of intelligence by George W. Bush and his administration in decision making before the war in Iraq. It is argued that as the administration moved toward war, decision making was neither deliberate nor deliberative, but consisted of a series of decisions that cumulatively led to war. The administration's arguments that Iraq was closely linked to al-Qaeda, and that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were a threat to the United States, are analyzed. The intelligence produced by the intelligence community was sketchy and ambiguous; political officials in the administration, however, presented it with unwarranted certainty to bolster their case for war. The administration sought to shape the conclusions of intelligence agencies and downplayed or ignored contrary evidence and the reservations of intelligence professionals. As a result of flawed decision making, the administration went to war in Iraq under misperceptions that resulted in the undermining of US credibility throughout the world.Less
This chapter examines the use of intelligence by George W. Bush and his administration in decision making before the war in Iraq. It is argued that as the administration moved toward war, decision making was neither deliberate nor deliberative, but consisted of a series of decisions that cumulatively led to war. The administration's arguments that Iraq was closely linked to al-Qaeda, and that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were a threat to the United States, are analyzed. The intelligence produced by the intelligence community was sketchy and ambiguous; political officials in the administration, however, presented it with unwarranted certainty to bolster their case for war. The administration sought to shape the conclusions of intelligence agencies and downplayed or ignored contrary evidence and the reservations of intelligence professionals. As a result of flawed decision making, the administration went to war in Iraq under misperceptions that resulted in the undermining of US credibility throughout the world.
Martha Joynt Kumar
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the Bush White House's communications operation, including its basic functions and the staff requirements of each. Special attention is given to the need for both long-term ...
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This chapter examines the Bush White House's communications operation, including its basic functions and the staff requirements of each. Special attention is given to the need for both long-term planning and coordination for offensive efforts and for an organization capable of quick-response defensive moves. In the first term, the White House was able to set priorities, plan ahead, coordinate among government units, and stick with the plan, making news on the president's terms. The administration has been less successful, however, in handling unanticipated situations and criticisms of the president, and in responding to what others wanted to talk about. At the same time, there were natural limits to what communications operations can do that depend upon the president himself, the difficulties in most administrations of admitting communications problems, and the troubles that come with promoting unpopular policies.Less
This chapter examines the Bush White House's communications operation, including its basic functions and the staff requirements of each. Special attention is given to the need for both long-term planning and coordination for offensive efforts and for an organization capable of quick-response defensive moves. In the first term, the White House was able to set priorities, plan ahead, coordinate among government units, and stick with the plan, making news on the president's terms. The administration has been less successful, however, in handling unanticipated situations and criticisms of the president, and in responding to what others wanted to talk about. At the same time, there were natural limits to what communications operations can do that depend upon the president himself, the difficulties in most administrations of admitting communications problems, and the troubles that come with promoting unpopular policies.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of ...
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In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of the West and Islam. This book explores the moral‐theological arguments for war offered by the George W. Bush administration and al‐Qaeda. It examines the way in which these actors have drawn upon key just war concepts and, in some cases, reconceptualized their scope and content. The book's principal contention is that, in significant ways, the just war arguments of Bush and bin Laden are inconsistent with the moral requirements of their respective just war traditions. In two parts, the book examines these arguments in relation to the body of thought which comprises the Western just war tradition and that of Islamic jihad, and assesses the consistency of Bush and bin Laden's claims. The central argument of the book—that the Bush administration and al‐Qaeda depart from important consensuses about justified warfare—contains within it an alternative way of understanding the war on terror. Rather than a clash between civilizations, it is suggested that the war on terror can be accounted for by a clash within civilizations: in resorting to violence, both sides have acted against their own traditions and contravened the requirements of their own civilizations.Less
In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of the West and Islam. This book explores the moral‐theological arguments for war offered by the George W. Bush administration and al‐Qaeda. It examines the way in which these actors have drawn upon key just war concepts and, in some cases, reconceptualized their scope and content. The book's principal contention is that, in significant ways, the just war arguments of Bush and bin Laden are inconsistent with the moral requirements of their respective just war traditions. In two parts, the book examines these arguments in relation to the body of thought which comprises the Western just war tradition and that of Islamic jihad, and assesses the consistency of Bush and bin Laden's claims. The central argument of the book—that the Bush administration and al‐Qaeda depart from important consensuses about justified warfare—contains within it an alternative way of understanding the war on terror. Rather than a clash between civilizations, it is suggested that the war on terror can be accounted for by a clash within civilizations: in resorting to violence, both sides have acted against their own traditions and contravened the requirements of their own civilizations.
Thomas S. Langston
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
The purpose of this chapter is not to second-guess the president's decision to go to war with Iraq, but to inquire into the possibility that it represents an outstanding example of the influence of ...
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The purpose of this chapter is not to second-guess the president's decision to go to war with Iraq, but to inquire into the possibility that it represents an outstanding example of the influence of personality upon decision making of the highest importance. The chapter proceeds first by presenting a composite view of the personality of the president, taking into account both his major personality traits and his world-view. Next, it breaks down the decision for war in Iraq into seven discrete decisions. The first six progressively made war increasingly likely. The last was the final decision to launch the invasion. Each decision is characterized based on the major actors who influenced the president's choice, the manner in which the decision was made, and the practical consequences of each choice for the likelihood of war. There is compelling evidence that personal factors drove the decision to wage war in Iraq.Less
The purpose of this chapter is not to second-guess the president's decision to go to war with Iraq, but to inquire into the possibility that it represents an outstanding example of the influence of personality upon decision making of the highest importance. The chapter proceeds first by presenting a composite view of the personality of the president, taking into account both his major personality traits and his world-view. Next, it breaks down the decision for war in Iraq into seven discrete decisions. The first six progressively made war increasingly likely. The last was the final decision to launch the invasion. Each decision is characterized based on the major actors who influenced the president's choice, the manner in which the decision was made, and the practical consequences of each choice for the likelihood of war. There is compelling evidence that personal factors drove the decision to wage war in Iraq.
Gary C. Jacobson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter reviews a selection of polling data on the president and the war to document the unprecedented partisan polarization in public attitudes these have jointly provoked, and to begin to ...
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This chapter reviews a selection of polling data on the president and the war to document the unprecedented partisan polarization in public attitudes these have jointly provoked, and to begin to explore some of the questions the data can be used to address concerning the formation, evolution, and consequences of mass opinion on the war. The public's unusually wide partisan divisions over evaluations of President Bush and his decision to force a regime change in Iraq are closely connected. Among Republicans of all stripes, but especially Christian conservatives, initial high regard for the president and trust in his honesty encouraged acceptance of his original case for war. When its premises proved faulty, they either missed that story or decided it was irrelevant and continued to support the war, accepting the administration's claim that it was integral to the war on terrorism and thus to the security of the US. Democrats tended to neither trust Bush nor appreciate his performance as president, so their support for the war depended crucially on belief in its necessity.Less
This chapter reviews a selection of polling data on the president and the war to document the unprecedented partisan polarization in public attitudes these have jointly provoked, and to begin to explore some of the questions the data can be used to address concerning the formation, evolution, and consequences of mass opinion on the war. The public's unusually wide partisan divisions over evaluations of President Bush and his decision to force a regime change in Iraq are closely connected. Among Republicans of all stripes, but especially Christian conservatives, initial high regard for the president and trust in his honesty encouraged acceptance of his original case for war. When its premises proved faulty, they either missed that story or decided it was irrelevant and continued to support the war, accepting the administration's claim that it was integral to the war on terrorism and thus to the security of the US. Democrats tended to neither trust Bush nor appreciate his performance as president, so their support for the war depended crucially on belief in its necessity.
Scott B. Blinder
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
President Bush and administration officials sought to persuade the domestic public, lawmakers in Washington, and the international community of the need to take military action against Saddam ...
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President Bush and administration officials sought to persuade the domestic public, lawmakers in Washington, and the international community of the need to take military action against Saddam Hussein's regime, even after the decision to go to war had apparently been made. Using the power of the presidential bully pulpit and sending high-ranking officials to the airwaves and speech circuits, the administration spared no effort to make the case for ‘disarming’ Saddam, by force if necessary. But was ‘going public’ — appealing to the American public to try to increase support for the president's preferred policy — a necessary or even useful step on the president's road to Baghdad? This chapter argues that ‘going public’ was useful in at least one sense: improving the president's chances of success in the Congress.Less
President Bush and administration officials sought to persuade the domestic public, lawmakers in Washington, and the international community of the need to take military action against Saddam Hussein's regime, even after the decision to go to war had apparently been made. Using the power of the presidential bully pulpit and sending high-ranking officials to the airwaves and speech circuits, the administration spared no effort to make the case for ‘disarming’ Saddam, by force if necessary. But was ‘going public’ — appealing to the American public to try to increase support for the president's preferred policy — a necessary or even useful step on the president's road to Baghdad? This chapter argues that ‘going public’ was useful in at least one sense: improving the president's chances of success in the Congress.
Richard M. Pious
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the president's use of prerogative powers and the treatment of detainees in the war on terror. President Bush asserted his prerogative power in interpreting and reinterpreting ...
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This chapter focuses on the president's use of prerogative powers and the treatment of detainees in the war on terror. President Bush asserted his prerogative power in interpreting and reinterpreting conventions and customary international law obligations, and in interpreting the obligations of government officials to execute faithfully statute law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and various directives. It is argued that officials at the highest levels of government made decisions based on the constitutional authority of the president (as administration lawyers defined it) that left open the probability that detainees would be subjected to inhuman treatment and torture as defined by international law. The chapter explores why the issue of the treatment of prisoners has not risen to the level of an Iran-Contra affair and what the reaction tells us about the politics of prerogative power.Less
This chapter focuses on the president's use of prerogative powers and the treatment of detainees in the war on terror. President Bush asserted his prerogative power in interpreting and reinterpreting conventions and customary international law obligations, and in interpreting the obligations of government officials to execute faithfully statute law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and various directives. It is argued that officials at the highest levels of government made decisions based on the constitutional authority of the president (as administration lawyers defined it) that left open the probability that detainees would be subjected to inhuman treatment and torture as defined by international law. The chapter explores why the issue of the treatment of prisoners has not risen to the level of an Iran-Contra affair and what the reaction tells us about the politics of prerogative power.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
The Bush administration argued vigorously that the 2003 Iraq war was just. The war's critics similarly invoked the language and concepts of the just war tradition to register their opposition. These ...
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The Bush administration argued vigorously that the 2003 Iraq war was just. The war's critics similarly invoked the language and concepts of the just war tradition to register their opposition. These arguments are explored in the context of seven jus ad bellum criteria: just cause, right authority, right intention, goal of peace, proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. It is argued that the main source of controversy arose from the Bush administration's shift away from the more narrow, modern understanding of the just war by making arguments which rested on the broader moral tradition of the just war and the larger moral agenda of the ‘war on terror’.Less
The Bush administration argued vigorously that the 2003 Iraq war was just. The war's critics similarly invoked the language and concepts of the just war tradition to register their opposition. These arguments are explored in the context of seven jus ad bellum criteria: just cause, right authority, right intention, goal of peace, proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. It is argued that the main source of controversy arose from the Bush administration's shift away from the more narrow, modern understanding of the just war by making arguments which rested on the broader moral tradition of the just war and the larger moral agenda of the ‘war on terror’.
George C Edwards III and Desmond King (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199217977
- eISBN:
- 9780191711541
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This book examines the foreign and domestic policies of President George W. Bush's administration. The analysis begins with an account of how highly polarized — in terms of public opinion and ...
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This book examines the foreign and domestic policies of President George W. Bush's administration. The analysis begins with an account of how highly polarized — in terms of public opinion and electoral patterns — this presidency has proved to be (in a chapter by the editors). This is followed by chapters on the use of unilateral executive powers (by Louis Fisher and William Howell) and prerogative powers (by Richard Pious). Because the policy choices of the Bush presidency have had such fundamental effects both in domestic policy and in US foreign policy, three contributors (Thomas Langston, John Burke, James Pfiffner) then address the processes of decision making especially in respect to the war against Iraq. How the administration governs by a recurring process of campaigning is examined in chapters on public opinion and war (by Gary Jacobson), the promotional presidency (by Larry Jacobs), mobilizing congressional support for war (by Scott Blinder), and the White House communications system (by Martha Kumar). Finally, the way in which the Bush White House relates to congress and the process of building congressional coalitions to enact laws is the subject of chapters on ‘executive style’ of this administration (by Charles O. Jones) and the failure to reform social security (by Fiona Ross).Less
This book examines the foreign and domestic policies of President George W. Bush's administration. The analysis begins with an account of how highly polarized — in terms of public opinion and electoral patterns — this presidency has proved to be (in a chapter by the editors). This is followed by chapters on the use of unilateral executive powers (by Louis Fisher and William Howell) and prerogative powers (by Richard Pious). Because the policy choices of the Bush presidency have had such fundamental effects both in domestic policy and in US foreign policy, three contributors (Thomas Langston, John Burke, James Pfiffner) then address the processes of decision making especially in respect to the war against Iraq. How the administration governs by a recurring process of campaigning is examined in chapters on public opinion and war (by Gary Jacobson), the promotional presidency (by Larry Jacobs), mobilizing congressional support for war (by Scott Blinder), and the White House communications system (by Martha Kumar). Finally, the way in which the Bush White House relates to congress and the process of building congressional coalitions to enact laws is the subject of chapters on ‘executive style’ of this administration (by Charles O. Jones) and the failure to reform social security (by Fiona Ross).
Geir Lundestad
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266685
- eISBN:
- 9780191601057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266689.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Charts the changes that occurred in American–Western European relations during the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations of 1984–1993, which marked a change in the Cold War (largely as a ...
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Charts the changes that occurred in American–Western European relations during the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations of 1984–1993, which marked a change in the Cold War (largely as a result of Gorbachev's policy changes in the Soviet Union), and its eventual end, which could be marked as the year 1989 (the year of the American–Soviet summit in Malta and of the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes). The first section of the chapter examines the Reagan and Gorbachev ‘Lovefest’: the change of Ronald Reagan's hardline anti‐Soviet policies to a policy of American–Soviet cooperation under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, and discusses Reagan's other foreign policies and Western European attitudes toward these. The second section, ‘The Liberation of Eastern Europe, the Unification of Germany, and the New World Order’, looks at the foreign policies of George Bush (who became President in January 1989) during this time of immense change in Europe, and at the increasing East–West cooperation that he presided over; the Gulf War strengthened American–European relations considerably during this period. The third section of the chapter shows that American–EU relations improved markedly under Bush, although the attitudes of the various European countries to a role for America in Europe varied, with the French being notably anti‐American. The last section of the chapter briefly considers the survival of the American–European relationship through this period and the changes that occurred in it.Less
Charts the changes that occurred in American–Western European relations during the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations of 1984–1993, which marked a change in the Cold War (largely as a result of Gorbachev's policy changes in the Soviet Union), and its eventual end, which could be marked as the year 1989 (the year of the American–Soviet summit in Malta and of the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes). The first section of the chapter examines the Reagan and Gorbachev ‘Lovefest’: the change of Ronald Reagan's hardline anti‐Soviet policies to a policy of American–Soviet cooperation under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, and discusses Reagan's other foreign policies and Western European attitudes toward these. The second section, ‘The Liberation of Eastern Europe, the Unification of Germany, and the New World Order’, looks at the foreign policies of George Bush (who became President in January 1989) during this time of immense change in Europe, and at the increasing East–West cooperation that he presided over; the Gulf War strengthened American–European relations considerably during this period. The third section of the chapter shows that American–EU relations improved markedly under Bush, although the attitudes of the various European countries to a role for America in Europe varied, with the French being notably anti‐American. The last section of the chapter briefly considers the survival of the American–European relationship through this period and the changes that occurred in it.
Geir Lundestad
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266685
- eISBN:
- 9780191601057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266689.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Discusses the transatlantic drift (or split) that has occurred between the US and Western Europe since the election of George W. Bush in December 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Centre in New ...
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Discusses the transatlantic drift (or split) that has occurred between the US and Western Europe since the election of George W. Bush in December 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 Sept 2001. The further tensions that have arisen since then over the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are discussed, as is the crisis over North Korea and the huge expansion in NATO and in the EU through the entry of Eastern European countries. The author presents speculations on the future of the American–Western European relationship, and forecasts an even further drift apart. This he bases on eight primary reasons, which he discusses in detail. These are: the Cold War is over; unilateralism is growing stronger in the US; the EU is slowly but steadily taking on an ever stronger role; out‐of‐area disputes are becoming increasingly frequent and they have been notoriously difficult to handle for the two sides of the Atlantic; redefinitions of leadership and burdens are always difficult to do; economic disputes are proliferating; even cultural disputes are becoming increasingly numerous; and finally, demographic changes are taking place, particularly on the American side of the Atlantic, that in the long run are likely to challenge the existing relationship.Less
Discusses the transatlantic drift (or split) that has occurred between the US and Western Europe since the election of George W. Bush in December 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 Sept 2001. The further tensions that have arisen since then over the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are discussed, as is the crisis over North Korea and the huge expansion in NATO and in the EU through the entry of Eastern European countries. The author presents speculations on the future of the American–Western European relationship, and forecasts an even further drift apart. This he bases on eight primary reasons, which he discusses in detail. These are: the Cold War is over; unilateralism is growing stronger in the US; the EU is slowly but steadily taking on an ever stronger role; out‐of‐area disputes are becoming increasingly frequent and they have been notoriously difficult to handle for the two sides of the Atlantic; redefinitions of leadership and burdens are always difficult to do; economic disputes are proliferating; even cultural disputes are becoming increasingly numerous; and finally, demographic changes are taking place, particularly on the American side of the Atlantic, that in the long run are likely to challenge the existing relationship.
Marc Trachtenberg
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199233137
- eISBN:
- 9780191716270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233137.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses US policy on preventive war. Following September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration established a new national security policy that was no longer based on the principle of ...
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This chapter discusses US policy on preventive war. Following September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration established a new national security policy that was no longer based on the principle of deterrence, but based on pre-emption. It is shown that the Bush strategy is anomalous and has really broken with American tradition. This is done by considering the policies pursued by other American governments, and in particular by looking at how the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and even Clinton administrations dealt with this sort of problem in earlier phases of the atomic age, but also by looking with some care at the policy the Roosevelt administration pursued in the period before Pearl Harbor.Less
This chapter discusses US policy on preventive war. Following September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration established a new national security policy that was no longer based on the principle of deterrence, but based on pre-emption. It is shown that the Bush strategy is anomalous and has really broken with American tradition. This is done by considering the policies pursued by other American governments, and in particular by looking at how the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and even Clinton administrations dealt with this sort of problem in earlier phases of the atomic age, but also by looking with some care at the policy the Roosevelt administration pursued in the period before Pearl Harbor.
Neta C. Crawford
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199233137
- eISBN:
- 9780191716270
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233137.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter begins by outlining the arguments for preventive war by an individual state, as articulated by the United States. It then outlines the argument for preventive war undertaken with the ...
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This chapter begins by outlining the arguments for preventive war by an individual state, as articulated by the United States. It then outlines the argument for preventive war undertaken with the approval of the UN Security Council. The underlying logic of the US and the UN High-level Panel are compared, and it is shown that despite apparent significant differences from the logic of the United Sates, the High-level Panel's arguments are based on a similar understanding of the contemporary context of world politics and of security. The chapter then shows how the logic of collective preventive war is almost as destructive of international society as unilateral preventive war.Less
This chapter begins by outlining the arguments for preventive war by an individual state, as articulated by the United States. It then outlines the argument for preventive war undertaken with the approval of the UN Security Council. The underlying logic of the US and the UN High-level Panel are compared, and it is shown that despite apparent significant differences from the logic of the United Sates, the High-level Panel's arguments are based on a similar understanding of the contemporary context of world politics and of security. The chapter then shows how the logic of collective preventive war is almost as destructive of international society as unilateral preventive war.
Steven Kull
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199552030
- eISBN:
- 9780191720291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552030.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics, European Union
This chapter argues that the prognosis for repairing the Atlantic relationship ought to be good. There may well be a large split between the policies of the Bush administration and the attitudes of ...
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This chapter argues that the prognosis for repairing the Atlantic relationship ought to be good. There may well be a large split between the policies of the Bush administration and the attitudes of the European public, but “the changes in US foreign policy that the Europeans have found objectionable have also made the American public uncomfortable.” Although American opinion may have acquiesced to these changes, particularly in the wake of September 11, public resistance soon increased and the Bush administration is now on its way out. In broad terms, therefore, despite recent policy tensions, American and European public opinion reveal “substantial common ground on numerous policy issues and the preferred character of the relationship between the United States and Europe.” The rumors of the death of the Atlantic alliance may indeed be highly exaggerated.Less
This chapter argues that the prognosis for repairing the Atlantic relationship ought to be good. There may well be a large split between the policies of the Bush administration and the attitudes of the European public, but “the changes in US foreign policy that the Europeans have found objectionable have also made the American public uncomfortable.” Although American opinion may have acquiesced to these changes, particularly in the wake of September 11, public resistance soon increased and the Bush administration is now on its way out. In broad terms, therefore, despite recent policy tensions, American and European public opinion reveal “substantial common ground on numerous policy issues and the preferred character of the relationship between the United States and Europe.” The rumors of the death of the Atlantic alliance may indeed be highly exaggerated.
Hal Brands
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124629
- eISBN:
- 9780813134925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124629.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter discusses the attempts of the next administration to handle U.S. policy and the unsettling precedent of the Clinton years. However, the Bush administration drew directly on the lessons ...
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This chapter discusses the attempts of the next administration to handle U.S. policy and the unsettling precedent of the Clinton years. However, the Bush administration drew directly on the lessons of the 1990s in framing an expansive response to 9/11. George H. W. Bush took care to avoid his predecessor's error of failing to articulate a persuasive, overarching conception of the international role of the United States. The nation slowly returned to a foreign policy that was no less clear or straightforward than containment, and the Americans also subscribed to Bush's worldview.Less
This chapter discusses the attempts of the next administration to handle U.S. policy and the unsettling precedent of the Clinton years. However, the Bush administration drew directly on the lessons of the 1990s in framing an expansive response to 9/11. George H. W. Bush took care to avoid his predecessor's error of failing to articulate a persuasive, overarching conception of the international role of the United States. The nation slowly returned to a foreign policy that was no less clear or straightforward than containment, and the Americans also subscribed to Bush's worldview.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
Examining questions of jus in bello, this chapter begins by applying the principles of proportionality and discrimination to the invasion of Iraq. The analysis then focuses on the Bush ...
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Examining questions of jus in bello, this chapter begins by applying the principles of proportionality and discrimination to the invasion of Iraq. The analysis then focuses on the Bush administration's justifications for the treatment of ‘non‐lawful combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay. Using the logic of ‘supreme emergency’, alleged terrorists were stripped of Geneva Convention protections because the defensive just cause was presented as unusually urgent and the stakes were said to be civilizational. First‐order principles such as the prohibition against torture were qualified by the emergency of the jus ad bellum, thus rendering supposedly absolute human rights contingent upon the state of the world. The Bush administration's ‘choice of evils’ strategy was critiqued by other lawyers, governments, and human rights groups worldwide, as well as by members of the Bush administration's Department of State.Less
Examining questions of jus in bello, this chapter begins by applying the principles of proportionality and discrimination to the invasion of Iraq. The analysis then focuses on the Bush administration's justifications for the treatment of ‘non‐lawful combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay. Using the logic of ‘supreme emergency’, alleged terrorists were stripped of Geneva Convention protections because the defensive just cause was presented as unusually urgent and the stakes were said to be civilizational. First‐order principles such as the prohibition against torture were qualified by the emergency of the jus ad bellum, thus rendering supposedly absolute human rights contingent upon the state of the world. The Bush administration's ‘choice of evils’ strategy was critiqued by other lawyers, governments, and human rights groups worldwide, as well as by members of the Bush administration's Department of State.
Alia Brahimi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199562961
- eISBN:
- 9780191595059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562961.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
Continuing the discussion of the Bush administration's just cause began in Chapter 1, this chapter examines the arguments put forward for pre‐emptive war and responses to those arguments. The Bush ...
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Continuing the discussion of the Bush administration's just cause began in Chapter 1, this chapter examines the arguments put forward for pre‐emptive war and responses to those arguments. The Bush administration maintains that the Iraq invasion was conducted in self‐defence—a proposition which requires an expansive conception of threat, owing to the destructiveness of WMD and the stealth of the enemy. This finesses the distinction between pre‐empting an imminent attack, largely regarded as legitimate in the just war tradition, and the more controversial doctrine of preventive warfare.Less
Continuing the discussion of the Bush administration's just cause began in Chapter 1, this chapter examines the arguments put forward for pre‐emptive war and responses to those arguments. The Bush administration maintains that the Iraq invasion was conducted in self‐defence—a proposition which requires an expansive conception of threat, owing to the destructiveness of WMD and the stealth of the enemy. This finesses the distinction between pre‐empting an imminent attack, largely regarded as legitimate in the just war tradition, and the more controversial doctrine of preventive warfare.
Hal Brands
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124629
- eISBN:
- 9780813134925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124629.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter discusses the war on terror, which unfolded during the early 2000s. This showed that the strategy of the Bush administration was not nearly well integrated as it had originally appeared. ...
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This chapter discusses the war on terror, which unfolded during the early 2000s. This showed that the strategy of the Bush administration was not nearly well integrated as it had originally appeared. At the same time, the war on terror quickly evolved into a political lever, and antiterrorism remained a powerful rhetorical tool. In the end, the return to coherence brought about by 9/11 had mixed results for the practice and politics of U.S. diplomacy.Less
This chapter discusses the war on terror, which unfolded during the early 2000s. This showed that the strategy of the Bush administration was not nearly well integrated as it had originally appeared. At the same time, the war on terror quickly evolved into a political lever, and antiterrorism remained a powerful rhetorical tool. In the end, the return to coherence brought about by 9/11 had mixed results for the practice and politics of U.S. diplomacy.
Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451478
- eISBN:
- 9780801465864
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451478.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter assesses the peace process during the first term of President George W. Bush. When Bush entered office, he rejected the deep involvement of the American president to the details of ...
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This chapter assesses the peace process during the first term of President George W. Bush. When Bush entered office, he rejected the deep involvement of the American president to the details of Arab–Israeli diplomacy. In September 2000, the Palestinians had launched the second Intifada and within a few months of Bush's accession to the presidency, Palestinian violence—including suicide bombings—and Israeli retaliation had become very deadly. Equally important, the policy of the Bush administration after the terrorism of 9/11 included little interest in the peace process. Indeed, although Bush became the first U.S. president to offer official support for the creation of a Palestinian state, the administration during Bush's first term became ideologically fixated on the region's other problems first—including the achievement of political reform in Palestine—before considering active engagement in Arab–Israeli affairs.Less
This chapter assesses the peace process during the first term of President George W. Bush. When Bush entered office, he rejected the deep involvement of the American president to the details of Arab–Israeli diplomacy. In September 2000, the Palestinians had launched the second Intifada and within a few months of Bush's accession to the presidency, Palestinian violence—including suicide bombings—and Israeli retaliation had become very deadly. Equally important, the policy of the Bush administration after the terrorism of 9/11 included little interest in the peace process. Indeed, although Bush became the first U.S. president to offer official support for the creation of a Palestinian state, the administration during Bush's first term became ideologically fixated on the region's other problems first—including the achievement of political reform in Palestine—before considering active engagement in Arab–Israeli affairs.
