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This is the first of three chapters that set out the differing contexts through which the dilemma in the laws of war over the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants can be viewed: political and diplomatic (this chapter), social (Chapter 2) and intellectual (Chapter 3). The narrative begins by summarizing the diplomatic history of the conferences at Brussels in 1874, at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, and at Geneva in 1949. While the negotiations of the laws of war proved successful in many respects, they consistently failed to agree on a common legal understanding of a lawful combatant.

Chapter 4 begins with a brief discussion on the origins of Flemish nationalism. Then, it analyses the post-war expansion of social policy in Belgium and the meshing of social policy reform and nationalist mobilization in Flanders after 1980. This leads to a discussion of the Flemish push for the federalization of the Belgian social insurance system. Such a discussion addresses the following puzzle: Why has the federal social insurance system not been at least partially decentralized in light of the fact that the Flemish political class overwhelmingly supports it? The answer is that federal social partners and, especially, Francophone parties are in a strong institutional position to successfully oppose decentralization. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Flemish dependency insurance scheme, which could pave the way for the development of further distinct social policies in Flanders.

The general process of institutionalization in the European Union is examined from a macro perspective, building on the theoretical materials developed in the earlier book European Integration and Supranational Governance, and examining the extent to which linkages between rule-making (legislation), dispute resolution, and different forms of transnational activity have created a dynamic, inherently expansionary system. The process is evaluated from the standpoint of institutionalist theory by testing specific hypotheses against relatively comprehensive quantitative measures of integration: trading, legislating, litigating, and lobbying within the context of the Treaty of Rome. The main findings are that (1) increasing economic transactions, (2) the construction of the Brussels complex, (3) the capacity of supranational authorities to produce legislation, and (4) the operation of the European Commission (EC) legal system have become linked through a complex set of feedback loops that binds them together in a self-reinforcing system that broadly determines the course of integration. Although the perspective used is a macro one, the authors emphasize actors and agency: as increasing numbers of actors learn how to be effective in the EC, they build and consolidate new arenas for political activity, thereby bolstering the centrality of supranational governance.

Although this chapter touches on the long-term development of the Austrian permanent representation at Brussels (which dates back to the mid-1950s, when Austria had a mission for handling relations with the European Coal and Steel Community), it concentrates on the time since Austria has been a member of the European Union (1995). The first two sections deal with the organization and personnel of the permanent representation. The following section locates the permanent representation in the policy co-ordination process. A discussion follows of the limits to co-ordination that are inherent in the set-up of the Austrian institutions, and there is also a brief discussion of activities and strategies. The conclusion attempts to situate the empirical findings in the context of models of government.

The chapter is divided into two main parts, with the first part of the discussion providing the contextual backdrop to the detailed study of the Swedish permanent representation that follows. The argument presented in the first part is twofold: first, it is argued that effective co-ordination of EU policy at both the national and EU levels is regarded as extremely important by the Swedish government for at least two related reasons—the high political salience of EU matters in Sweden, and the Social Democratic government’s determination to be an influential actor in the EU policy arena; second, it is argued that, although Swedish administrative adjustment to EU membership has been relatively unproblematic in the short term, the process of adaptation is not yet complete—the initial belief that EU matters could simply be incorporated into the Swedish system of ministerial consultation has proved problematic, and the volume and pace of EU policy-making has placed considerable strains upon the limited resources of the Swedish ministries, and might yet prove to be incompatible with Swedish policy style. In an attempt to address these problems, the government introduced in 1998 new co-ordinating structures designed to streamline central EU policy co-ordination and strengthen political leadership on EU policy. The second part of the chapter examines how the Swedish permanent representation fits into this wider picture; it discusses the organization, personnel, internal functioning and working methods, and role of the Brussels-based administration, and evaluates its effectiveness and capacity to implement ambitions, bearing in mind the co-ordination needs and policy ambitions of the Swedish administration. The picture that emerges from this study is one of a technically specialized, functionally segmented, and non-hierarchical bureaucracy, which, after five years, is nevertheless still evolving as an administration, and whose effectiveness in delivering national policy ambitions is as much a reflection of its capacity to influence the national administration as of its diplomatic role in Brussels.

This final country study describes how limited material resources impose severe constraints on the coverage of action and the type of activities that can be pursued by Ireland at the European level. At the same time, however, it shows that policy co-ordination can be effectively achieved when relations within an administrative élite are close and there is a political consensus in favour of Europe. Ireland’s permanent representation was established at Brussels in 1967 as an EU mission, and was part of a long-term strategy to ensure that Ireland would be successful in its application for membership of the European Union. This was finally achieved in 1973. The chapter describes the size and development of the Irish permanent representation from 1967 onwards, its current working methods, its role, and its effectiveness and capacity to implement ambitions.

The purpose of this Introduction to the book is to provide a point of reference and context for the eleven country studies that follow. It begins with a brief discussion of national co-ordination and why it matters to governments at the European level, and then outlines the tasks and difficulties that face national co-ordinators in Brussels, looking at the EU as a political system, and at its complex institutional structure (the Council of the Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission). The following section looks at the tasks that national co-ordinators are called to perform in routine policy-making, and identifies four phases: policy initiation, policy formulation, deliberation and decision; and implementation and enforcement. A brief section on ‘heroic’ decision-making by national governments follows, and then the matter of the emergence of an overall pattern in national co-ordination—of convergence or divergence—is considered. The next section looks at the effectiveness of national arrangements in Brussels, and the concluding one introduces the eleven country case studies.

This chapter examines the co-ordination of UK policy in Brussels, starting by putting the institutions, procedures, and policies that the UK has put in place at the European level in the context of the UK’s strategic or ‘positive’ co-ordination ambition. It then focuses on the role of the UK permanent representation (UKREP) in the system. After briefly outlining its history, the internal organization of UKREP is described, with accounts of its policies relating to personnel (composition, recruitment), its internal processes and working methods, and its responsibilities, roles, and functions. An assessment is then made of the capacity and effectiveness both of UKREP specifically and of the UK co-ordination arrangements more generally. Two arguments are advanced: the first is that the factors that account for the UK’s exacting co-ordination ambition—principally, the centralized nature of its political system, scepticism towards the European project, and a preference for intergovernmentalism over supranationalism—also largely explain why it has been administratively efficient, but not politically effective, at the European level; the second argument relates to devolution, and makes the point that, on the present evidence, the creation of devolved governments in Scotland and Wales does not threaten the co-ordination strategy pursued by the UK since its accession to the European Communities, since despite institutional adjustments made by the devolved authorities, in Brussels UKREP retains its primacy.

France has traditionally aspired to play a leading role in shaping the development of European integration, and implicit in this approach has been a vision of integration as a process within which the member states predominate. Debates within the EU are carried out, as far as the traditional French conception has it, on the basis of competing and conflicting national interests, and the effectiveness with which individual member states can shape outputs at the EU level is intrinsically related to their success in presenting coherent positions within such debates; this emphasis on coherence has led to the creation in Paris of a centralized and institutionalized system of interministerial co-ordination. Although often overlooked, 1 the French administration in Brussels also plays a key role in ensuring the coherence of national positions and in defending French interests within the EU; this is most true of the French permanent representation, whose staff represent France in most meetings of the Council of Ministers, and which is responsible for keeping Paris appraised of developments in Brussels. Paris has increasingly, however, also come to recognize the need to exert influence over the supranational institutions of the EU, and over the Commission in particular, so the French have developed strategies both for ensuring the presence of French officials within these institutions and for maintaining close contact with them. This chapter is divided into three sections: the first examines the composition, organization, internal workings, and role of the French permanent representation to the European Union; the second investigates French strategies designed to ensure both a sufficient and an effective French presence within the supranational institutions—notably the Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament; and the final section critically evaluates the performance of the French administration in Brussels, considering first its capacity to carry out its allotted tasks, and second its effectiveness, particularly in terms of its ability to further France’s EU policy objectives.

This study of the German permanent representation at Brussels unravels the complexities of co-ordination in a domestic political system characterized by vertical and horizontal pluralism, administrative fragmentation, and parallel competition from the ‘foreign relations systems’ of the Länder. Success in high politics at the European level contrasts with the ‘diplomacy of improvisation’ that is the outcome of ‘autonomy, polyphony, and organized anarchy in routine policy-making. The first section of the chapter conceptualizes the ‘Janus-like character of permanent representations at Brussels and discusses various theoretical approaches to these bodies. The following sections look at the history, growth and differentiation of the German permanent representation, its tasks, the German Länder system as a complicating factor, and the co-ordination and communication activities of the German permanent representation, which orients its European policy-making activities in six directions—between Bonn/Berlin and Brussels, within Brussels, within Bonn/Berlin, with the Länder, with the European Commission and the European Parliament, and with Brussels-based interest groups.

The Italian permanent representation at Brussels has received very little academic or political attention, and there has been no explicit debate as to how this body should be shaped. Even when the central government decided that it should control all aspects of the formulation of EC policies though delegating to regions their implementation in a number of cases, the permanent representation was not even mentioned in the legislation. It is argued that this neglect is problematic for several reasons, which are discussed. An explanation is advanced for this neglect in terms of the high politics of Italian membership of the European Community. The chapter is organized in five sections: first, a brief examination is made of the broader problem determined by the lack of a central authority to co-ordinate of EU policies in Italy; second and third, the functions and powers of the permanent representation, and its organization and internal functioning are considered; fourth, the division of labour between the central authorities (the Italian government) and the permanent representation is examined; finally, other policy networks that influence Italian European policies are discussed.

This account of the Greek permanent representation at Brussels starts by describing the Greek administrative system as characterized by sectorization and fragmentation, low co-ordination, centralization and hierarchical structure, importance of informal networks and personal strategies, and weak institutionalization of horizontal and staff functions. Deficient steering at the top and lack of clearly set priorities are deeper reasons for co-ordination deficiencies at the national and sectoral level. In that sense, the co-ordination scheme for Greek EU policy can be seen as a ‘truncated pyramid’, even though, more recently, major national priorities represent an exception to the rule. This chapter argues that the EU environment and its functional imperatives put pressure on the Greek permanent representation to compensate for defensive attitudes and domestic administrative weaknesses, while at the same time being affected by them. It discusses the organization of the Greek permanent representation, and its tasks and functions (including communication with the centre, internal functioning and working methods, transmission of national positions and instructions, presentation and negotiation of national positions, and networking), and finally gives a brief assessment of the situation.

The Portuguese permanent representation is regarded as an important part of the national system for EU policy co-ordination, and the Portuguese administration tends to send its best officials to the mission in Brussels. The permanent representation was created after Portugal became a member of the European Union in 1986, and from the very beginning it was influenced by the missions of other member states, the main models being the permanent representations of France and the UK. The special relationship of Portugal to these countries shaped the organization and operation of the Portuguese permanent representation. The lessons learnt were not so much related to the structure of the permanent representation, which is similar to those of other member states, but more to the skills and the way the members of permanent representation do their jobs, which is related to the experience of those civil servants in the French and British administrations before they were sent to the permanent representation. The different sections of the chapter discuss: the organization of the Portuguese permanent representation, its personnel, its internal functioning and working methods, its role, its capacity to implement ambitions, its success, and the simplicity and efficiency of national EU policy co-ordination structures in Portugal.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the Belgian permanent representation to the European Union from two angles. The first is sceptical, and asks, in light of the presence of all federal Belgian institutions (including the federal Foreign Ministry) in Brussels, what role the Belgian permanent representation plays beyond that of postbox, of transmitter of messages between the EU and Belgium and vice versa? The second viewpoint is quite the opposite, and is the perspective of high expectations: being in Brussels and representing Belgium’s interests in the same city could be beneficial, with a local presence providing added value to the work a permanent representation traditionally plays or is expected to play. What that added value may be can be determined by looking at the general benefits and the extent to which they are used productively by the Belgian permanent representation, and at the particular dividends it pays within the context of the Belgian federal political system. The first section of the chapter looks at the internal organization of the Belgian permanent representation (personnel and internal operation), the second looks at the position of the permanent representation in the Belgian policy co-ordination system, and the last discusses the added value and role of the Belgian permanent representation in relation to its presence inside the country it is supposed to represent.

This chapter on the Dutch permanent representation at Brussels sets out to test the claim that national idiosyncrasies are the key to understanding the functioning of the permanent representations of the European Union. The authors find, contrary to this contention, that the features of the Dutch political and administrative system—fragmentation, segmentation, and a lack of central authority—do not produce national arrangements at the European level that are similarly fractured. Indeed, in this important area of policy co-ordination, the machinery put in place by the Netherlands is considerably less idiosyncratic than might have been expected. The different sections of the chapter discuss the organization of the Dutch permanent representation, its personnel, its internal functioning and working methods, its role, its capacity to implement ambitions, and its effectiveness.

Examines the internationalization of trusteeship as it arose in the context of British colonial administration in Africa, the Berlin and Brussels Conferences, and the experience of the Congo Free State. It is out of these experiences and events that the idea of trusteeship emerges as a recognized and accepted practice of international society. The chapter has five sections: the first discusses British attitudes towards Africa; the second looks at Lord Lugard's ‘dual mandate’ principle of colonial administration—the proposal that the exploitation of Africa's natural wealth should reciprocally benefit the industrial classes of Europe and the native population of Africa; the third discusses the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 and the Brussels Conference of 1890; the fourth describes trusteeship in relation to the Congo Free State. The fifth section of the chapter points out the progression from the idea of trusteeship in the East India Company's dominion in India—in which the improvement of native peoples would come about rapidly and result in institutional forms and practices that closely resembled those in Europe—to a new incrementalist approach in which societies and people were thought of as occupying different rungs on a progressive ‘ladder of civilization’, and, depending on their stage of development on this ladder, were suited to different forms of constitution.

The conflicts of these years were religious and intellectual as well as political. New ideas generated in the universities challenged religious orthodoxy. The rise of the secular state led to conflicts with the churches over the control of higher education and degree qualifications. In Germany, regionalism allowed the coexistence of Protestant and Catholic universities. In Catholic Belgium, after independence in 1830, conflict led both to the revival of Leuven as a Catholic confessional university — a significant innovation — and to the foundation of the secular ‘free’ university of Brussels. Confessional disputes were also significant in England and in Ireland, where the rejection of the state's non-denominational policies led to the foundation of a Catholic university at Dublin with J. H. Newman as rector. In France, the ‘monopoly’ of Napoleon's University was maintained until 1875, when several Catholic universities were set up, though their powers were severely restricted once the Third Republic was securely established.