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How have liberal political theorists grappled with liberal democratic states’ sometimes competing commitments to sexual equality and accommodation of minority cultural groups? This chapter begins by offering a critique of the paradigm of toleration as a vehicle for reflecting on the accommodation of cultural minorities. It also engages liberal multiculturalism — work by Will Kymlicka, Brian Barry, and Susan Moller Okin — as well as more laissez-faire approaches to cultural accommodation, such as those of Chandran Kukathas, Jeff Spinner-Halev, and Jorge Valadez, critically evaluating their responses to the challenges presented when cultural arrangements (particularly of non-liberal cultural and religious minorities) conflict with sexual equality.

Having argued that theories of punishment need to be embedded in wider moral theories, this chapter considers impartial theories of justice, such as those offered by Rawls and Barry. These aspire to give an account of the justification of the use of public power that does not depend on any particular, comprehensive conception of the good. By considering the relationship of impartial justice and morality, and testing the scope of impartial theories of justice, an argument is constructed to show that impartialist theory cannot give an account of the kind of rules relevant to punishment within the constraints of justificatory neutrality.

Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice.

This chapter contrasts his consequentialist account of democratic rights with prominent nonconsequentialist accounts, including those of Rawls, Habermas, Barry, and Waldron. He explains why majority rule itself requires a consequentialist rationale. To illustrate that the rationale for democratic rights is consequentialist, the chapter proposes an alternative to democratic rights, election by deliberative poll, that would be an improvement under the main principle, were it not for the potential for abuse. Democratic rights are a solution to a CAP. To be endorsed by the main principle, democratic rights must equitably promote the life prospects of all compliers and nonresponsible noncompliers. The chapter argues that group rights or cultural rights are not fundamental rights, but rather rights that are instrumental to protecting the individual rights of members of minorities against majorities. The chapter shows that the main principle can explain why human rights, including democratic rights, should be inalienable. This is a puzzle on many nonconsequentialist views. The chapter describes one kind of problem that no form of government, not even democracy, is very good at solving, the time lag problem. Finally, the chapter discusses the inappropriateness of the U.S. Supreme Court’s overturning campaign finance reform laws on free speech grounds.

This chapter looks at the concept and practice of equality, and it draws on the works of Ernesto Laclau, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Rancière. It begins with the legal case Mandla from the late 1970s and early 1980s. The decision in that case played a pivotal role in rearticulating the meaning of Sikh, race and ethnicity. As such, it plays an important role in British race relations legislation because it redefined the meaning of ‘race’. The discussion of the case takes the chapter on to a discussion of the debate between the liberal multiculturalist Bhikhu Parekh and the liberal egalitarian Brian Barry. The discussion of Mandla and of the Parekh/Barry debate both show that equality is articulated through identity, which is to say that we need to pay attention to the way identities and categories are represented: ‘Sikh’, ‘race’, ‘human’, and so on. Equality is always connected to particular images – representations – of what it means to be, for instance, a Sikh or a human being. The politics of equality is a politics of representation.

Brian Barry attacks the ‘resource account’ of power, providing a set of definitions through which power should be analysed. While there might be different, equally good, ways of defining power, I argue that my formulations are superior to those of Barry, as they produce fewer anomalies and provide a better foundation for empirical research. The chapter defends the resource account against Barry’s criticisms and argues for the utility of the ideas of luck and ‘systematic luck’.

The final chapter begins by highlighting how this has been a history of segregation, and how this segregation has been encouraged both by Bengali political mobilisation and by mainstream politics. It then looks at why this matters, and at what can be done, developing a Marxist critique of multiculturalism and identity politics. It makes use of comparisons with earlier Marxist theory and practice, stressing the importance of maintaining a socialist materialist analysis while working sensitively with people of different cultures. It shows how the rare liberal critics of multiculturalism have exposed its inherent dangers, but not provided an alternative route that could lead to a fairer less prejudiced society; and it argues that this could be achieved by a new focus on economic structures and class-based politics.