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Advaitins have held that the experiencing of the transcendental truth is the same as the experiencing of the falsity of all our empirical experiences. But this book takes the stand that no experience can falsify another experience. An experience may falsify only the ideas or beliefs generated by previous experiences. This truth is extremely well known among common people in the world and to illustrate it, a page from the story of Rip Van Winkle is taken in which, not knowing that he himself had slept for twenty long years, Winkle begins to doubt all his experiences after waking up from long sleep. An analogy is made out here between him and the traditional Advaitin who argues that when Brahman is experienced, it renders our world-experience illusory.

This chapter is an analysis of the most famous epigrammatic account of the traditional Advaita position in half a verse which means Brahman is real, the world is illusory and the individual self is none but Brahman. This chapter therefore asks: Is the sentence expressed by this half-verse a conjunction, a disjunction or an implication? Does it meet the logical requirements mandatory for such a sentence? Understood as a sentence of any one of the above three kinds, does it faultlessly express the traditional Advaita position? These are some of the questions raised and answered in this chapter.

A full translation of Venkatesha's Sanskrit stotra in praise of Vishnu Devanayaka as Krishna, the Gopalavimshati, with detailed thematic afterword and notes. The afterword situates Venkatesha's Sanskrit praise‐poem to Krishna in the broader history of Vishnu/Krishna devotion in Tamil South India, where Krishna as such rarely stands alone as an object of praise. In the poetry of the Alvars and Acaryas, particularly in the poems of Antal, there are several sometimes quite vivid references to Krishna, as god‐child and as god‐lover, but always within the larger context of Vishnu and his ten incarnations (avataras). Venkatesha, however, in the Gopalavimshati and in his mahakavyam, the Yadhavabhyudayam, has written quite concretely about Krishna, as Gopala, the Cowherder god loved by the gopis, the cowherd girls; as the prankster child‐god, the Butter‐Thief; as divine Lover, the god of love and the god in love (kami); and also, as the inconceivable godhead, Brahman itself, the ground of being, formless and in essence unknowable, that takes the form of a playful, vulnerable human being. This chapter revisits themes of ecstatic beholding of the body of god, the devotional relish of the big in the little, and passionate religious love (bhakti and kama).

The south‐facing panels represent afternoon moving toward twilight, a time of ambiguity, contradiction, and paradox. Bharata's ambiguous and compromised history told in Book Nine of the Bhagavata Purana may be described as written in “language in the manner of twilight.” The first corner panel depicts Dattatreya with Soma and Durvasas, and assumes knowledge of the Ramayana and Mahabharata; it signifies the tejas of Aniruddha the Unobstructed. In the other corner panel Mohini serves the devas amrita as the asuras watch; tantric rites using the “five m's” are referenced. Two of the bracketed panels illustrate Krishna's long “Summary of the Brahman Doctrine”: Krishna teaches Uddhava at Dvaraka, and Dattatreya as an avadhuta teaches Yadu. The latter alludes to the stories of Taravaloka and Vessantara. The next panel depicts Prahlada worshiping Man‐lion; the meaning of Sudarshana, the wheel‐weapon that embodies Shakti's will, is explored. The “Man‐lion Consecration” is implied. Finally, the Goddess Earth worships Boar, who rescued her from Hiranyaksha.

This chapter looks at the Upanishads, primarily the Brihadaranyaka and Chandogya. It focuses on a priestly contest at the court of King Janaka where the philosopher Yajnavalkya explains the nature of reality, particularly Atman and Brahman. The foundation of the Indian Vedanta philosophy is explained.

This chapter presents an analysis of the Dharmaranya Purana. The analysis selects certain myths that are connected to the meaning of the sanyasi, Brahman, and king categories. It demonstrates that Hinduism's conceptual order is featured in these myths through a categorical partition of the three categories. It first discusses and analyses the myths of the creation of Dharmaranya, the creation of the Vanikas, the austerities of Dharmaraja, the story of the Jayadeva, the sorrows of Shrimata, and the story of King Aama. It then tries to show that when the myths are combined, they would help define a complete universe of discourse, based on the connections between the categories that represent the social and asocial. The chapter also studies the meaning of the Vanika/Shudra, Brahman, king, and sanyasi categories.

This chapter continues the discussion of the structure of the Dharmaranya Purana. It is mostly concerned with the myths that are connected to the differentiation among the Vanikas and Brahmas. The chapter begins by discussing jatis, where it shows that the jatis is found within the conceptual order of Hinduism. Here, it notes that jatis references a set of relations among the sanyasi, Brahman, and king, and explains that a jati can be classified by three principles of organization. It then looks at the primary divisions among the Brahmans and the reasons—as stated in the Purana—why these divisions occurred. It also discusses the differences that arose between the Chaturvedi Brahmans and the Trivedi Brahmans, the Modh Brahmans' code of conduct, the Puranic thinkers, and the theory of the kalivarjya. The final part of the chapter discusses the conception of caste fission within the Dharmaranya Purana.

Bhakti-yoga is directed towards the realization of saguna Brahman, and this kind of yoga functions within the framework of a somewhat different set of presuppositions. A special mark of monotheistic belief, whether Śaivism or Vaishavism, is the distinction between God, the individual soul, and the world of which he is the author. The soul is usually conceived as eternal, but as entirely dependent upon God; and it therefore becomes the first duty of man to make himself a conscious and willing instrument in the fulfillment of His purpose. The conception of the goal of life according to early Indian theism may be taken as reaching the presence of God, or becoming godlike. The predominant means of achieving this end is, besides good conduct (caryā), is loving devotion (bhakti) to God.

This chapter discusses the concept of māyā. This term is the key to understanding the relationship between Brahman and the universe in which we live and breathe and have our existence. In referring to the world as māyā, classical Hindu thought is suggesting that ‘there is something tricky’ about the universe, whether it tricks us in terms of fact or value. For those who follow the path of devotion or prefer the theistic standpoint, māyā is that quality of the world which distracts us from God: ‘seductive in the attractiveness in which it presents the world, trapping us within it and leaving us with no desire to journey on’.

Advaitins of post-Śankara period hold a strange thesis that when ropes are mistaken for snakes, there are indeed snakes there, but only illusory ones. They believe so on metaphysical grounds, disregarding the obvious facts that after realizing that it was an illusion, it is believed (1) by none that there was a snake (of any kind), and (2) that it was just the rope itself that was seen as a snake. Further, they hold that at the moment of illusion, the ignorance in the perceiver instantly creates that illusory snake. Upon dispelling of illusion, that illusory snake is sublated by correct knowledge of rope. Our experience of the world is also regarded an illusion created by cosmic ignorance (māyā) present in Brahman. This chapter is a detailed, novel refutation of this ontology of illusion, a prelude to an ensuing rejection of cosmic ontology.

The inquiries into Ātman and Brahman and the declaration of their identity in the Upanisads has vital implications for Advaita which Śankara’s commentators completely miss and misunderstand. While the Ātman-inquiry into the inner essence of man used a device of exclusion (like the body is not Ātman etc.), the Brahman-inquiry into the source of the universe did not use it. But yet, whatever was being excluded from Ātman (like the body, senses, mind, etc.) in the first inquiry went on being included under Brahmanin the second, so that ultimately these two inquiries brought under themselves just everything existing in the universe. Therefore when their identity was discovered, non-duality emerged as the only truth. But, missing this completely, the commentators hypostatize ignorance into a beginningless “second entity” and create every possible problem within a perfect doctrine of non-duality.

This chapter briefly summarizes the stand taken in this book. It consists of the rejection of the ontology and metaphysics of avidyā and māyā; of the thesis that our experience of the world is illusory in which we experience “false objects”; of the idea that anātman is a false entity of some kind experienced by us; of the notion that ignorance is an entity of a positive kind; of the claim that false entities are created by ignorance and are also destroyed by correct knowledge; of the thesis that the entire world is sublated upon attaining Brahman-realization and so on. It argues that duality is only imagined by ignorance and it can never be an experiential, ontological fact of discovery. It is a re-statement of non-duality thesis through fresh insights obtained by criticism and rejection of the doctrines of traditional Advaita.

This chapter describes the history and social organization of the Kashmiri Pandits. It begins with an overview of the Hindus of Kashmir covering population statistics, Pandits domiciled outside Kashmir, and Kashmiri Brahmans under early Muslim rule. It then discusses Pandit subscastes covering status and territorial distinctions among the ‘karkun’ and kinship and marriage among the Pandits.

This chapter examines Guru Nanak’s compositions, Japu and Asa di Var, in which he comments on the political, social, and religious environment of his times and proclaims a set of interrelated ideas that constitute an ideology independent of the existing systems of religious belief and practice. The Japu, which relates primarily to theology, deals with three religious traditions that provide the frame of reference for contention and transcendence, as in the statement that the time of creation was not known to the pandits, the qāzīs, and the jogīs. The pandit represented India’s Brahmanical tradition in all its form, while the qāzī represented the Islamic tradition and the jogī represented the ascetical traditions. This chapter discusses Guru Nanak’s views on equality, caste, gender, and contemporary Islam.

This chapter focuses on Pandit Malaviya's efforts to make religion apowerful tool in education. It discusses dominance of Brahmans at the university, as well as the opposition to their authority. It looks at the eventual loosening of the rules on required religious education, and reveals that the BHU's founders intended to use religion as a powerful tool. It also examines the ideas of the ‘Hindu Renaissance’, the challenges posed by setting up Hinduism within a University, and the search for a textbook for instruction on the Hindu religion. Finally, the chapter looks at the religious interpretation of western knowledge and Malaviya's definition of the university teaching profession as Karmayoga.

The author is appointed to an office under the Political Agent in Káttiawár. He talks about the Nágar Bráhmans and his resignation from office in order to accompany Captain W.J. Eastwick. Mr Erskine presents the author a certificate and a Kashmír shawl. The author finds three unexpected companions and leaves Rájkót. He describes the Jám of Nowanagar, Dharol, the merry Governor of Juria Bandar, speculations of the Sindhis as to the author's purpose in coming to their country, and his march to Tatta.