Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239450
- eISBN:
- 9780191716997
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of ...
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This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.Less
This book is about the philosophy of language. It analyses what is distinctive about sentences and the propositions they express — what marks them off from mere lists of words and mere aggregates of word-meanings respectively. Since it identifies the world with all the true and false propositions, the book's account of the unity of the proposition has significant implications for our understanding of the nature of reality. The book argues that the unity of the proposition is constituted by a certain infinitistic structure known in the tradition as ‘Bradley's regress’. Usually, Bradley's regress has been regarded as vicious, but the book argues that it is the metaphysical ground of the propositional unity, and gives us an important insight into the fundamental make-up of the world.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, ...
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The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.Less
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.
Wanja Wiese
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262036993
- eISBN:
- 9780262343275
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036993.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter first discusses a problem that is central to accounts of phenomenal unity, which is here called the phenomenological Bradley (PB). Basically, the problem is to explain how two phenomenal ...
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This chapter first discusses a problem that is central to accounts of phenomenal unity, which is here called the phenomenological Bradley (PB). Basically, the problem is to explain how two phenomenal parts can be connected to each other (without treating this “connectedness” as a primitive relation about which one cannot say more). This problem is structurally similar to a problem known as “Bradley’s regress” in metaphysics. Considering possible solutions to the metaphysical version of the problem is at least heuristically fruitful for the project at hand, because these solutions can, to some extent, also be applied to the phenomenological version of the problem. In particular, the chapter presents four possible solutions to PB and draws connections to historical precursors and existing accounts of phenomenal unity. After that, the mélange model is proposed, which suggests a way in which different possible solutions to PB can be integrated.Less
This chapter first discusses a problem that is central to accounts of phenomenal unity, which is here called the phenomenological Bradley (PB). Basically, the problem is to explain how two phenomenal parts can be connected to each other (without treating this “connectedness” as a primitive relation about which one cannot say more). This problem is structurally similar to a problem known as “Bradley’s regress” in metaphysics. Considering possible solutions to the metaphysical version of the problem is at least heuristically fruitful for the project at hand, because these solutions can, to some extent, also be applied to the phenomenological version of the problem. In particular, the chapter presents four possible solutions to PB and draws connections to historical precursors and existing accounts of phenomenal unity. After that, the mélange model is proposed, which suggests a way in which different possible solutions to PB can be integrated.
