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This chapter introduces northern Nigeria as the regional context for the emergence of both Sufi- and Salafi-oriented movements of reform. It shows again that neither movement of reform was monolithic but characterized by multiple splits. The chapter presents Abubakar Gumi as the first major representative of Salafi-minded reform in northern Nigeria and discusses the emergence of the ‘Yan Izala as the first Salafi-oriented movement of reform that also became a popular mass movement. Due to its conservative political positions, the ‘Yan Izala movement was challenged by more radical movements such as the “Islamic Movement” led by Ibrahim al-Zakzaki. Some radical movements eventually advocated jihad as in the case of the Boko Haram movement. Some ‘Yan Izala fractions, representing a second generation of Salafi-minded reformers, came to form the ahl al-sunna movement of reform which played a major role in the implementation of “political shariÝa” in the 2000s. The chapter finally compares the development of Salafi-oriented reform in northern Nigeria with developments in neighbouring Niger and shows that the failure of Salafi-minded reform in Niger was again linked with the different historical and social context.

This chapter briefly charts the emerge of the violent Islamist group Boko Haram in Nigeria before detailing its international connections and interactions with Al-Qaeda and, more significantly, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It goes on to discuss the group’s successful attempts at territorial control in the north east and its leader’s ambition to establish an Islamic state. The text explains how the Nigerians converged with ISIS, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and rebranded Boko Haram as Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). This is complemented by an analysis of the practical manifestations of this allegiance, the remaining differences between ISWAP and ISIL/ISIS, and the possibly opportunistic reasons that may have motivated this move and that, in the future, could make the Nigerian outfit look elsewhere for more productive partnerships.

Violence in Nigeria has a tendency to shape-shift - from violent crimes, such as kidnapping and robbery, to various expressions of political violence, such as terrorism and insurgency, as well as police and military brutality.  Indeed, because of this, it’s difficult to talk about one type of violence without appreciating not only how it relates to specific contextual conditions but also to other forms of violence, which often overlap each other. Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 the term ‘terrorism’ has increasingly been a part of the national discourse on security. On the one hand, the government refers to countering terrorism within the framework of its national security agenda while on the other hand, insurgent movements, namely those that have emerged in the southern Niger Delta region as well as the northeast, have increasingly used terrorism as one of many tactics within their violent campaigns. Though one can certainly make the argument that terrorism in Nigeria has been a growing concern, particularly in the last decade, analysis tends to look at the phenomenon in isolation rather than considering how it is connected to other forms of violence, and more importantly, how state responses to organized violence drive non-state groups to adopt new tactics and escalate conflict. To fill this gap this article will look at how terrorism is understood and experienced in Nigeria and how its conceptualization shapes the practice of counter-terrorism. Our analysis will capture both international and domestic factors - including the impact of 9/11 and subsequent EU and US efforts to counter terrorism in Nigeria - as well domestic realities, namely the societal impact of Nigeria's 1999 transformation from long military to democratic rule as well as the more recent insurgencies in the Niger Delta (2005-2009) and in the northeast (2009-present). Combined, analyzing the domestic and international considerations over a 15-year time period will allow us to trace how the conceptualization of terrorism and practice of counter-terrorism has changed over time.

Chapter 6, “Can Big Bird Fight Terrorism?,” examines some creators’ hopes that messages on Sesame Square—particularly messages about school attendance, gender equality, and tolerance—could counter Boko Haram’s messages. This chapter addresses both of the book’s overarching arguments. First, as creators decided what messages northern children needed to hear to make them less susceptible to extremist ideologies, they sometimes stereotyped northerners as all being connected to Boko Haram—supporting the book’s first argument that multicultural efforts can reproduce stereotypes. Second, the public curriculum in Nigeria undermined Sesame Square’s antiterrorist messages. Moreover, some creators seemed skeptical that an iconically American educational television program could be a match for an extremist group whose name means “Western education is forbidden.” The current conflict is further eroding intergroup trust and reinforcing stereotypes between groups, making Sesame Square’s messages seem increasingly unrealistic. This chapter explores the particular challenges that terrorism poses to educational soft power efforts.

Chapter 1 introduces the book by discussing the key dilemmas that arose during the creation of Sesame Square, the Nigerian version of Sesame Street. It outlines the program’s goals to teach tolerance and peaceful coexistence to Nigerian children and the challenges of promoting these goals in the Nigerian context. This chapter introduces two dilemmas that form the central arguments of the book: first, that multicultural education and celebrating diversity can inadvertently exacerbate stereotypes; and second, that a violent and unjust context can undermine tolerance messages. This chapter reviews historical, political, and cultural aspects of the Nigerian context, including the rise of the extremist group Boko Haram, whose name means “Western education is forbidden.” It also explores what the United States government (which funds Sesame Square) believes the program might do to build stability, peace, and American goodwill in Nigeria. The chapter closes by previewing the content of the following chapters.

This chapter offers a set of conclusions, linking potentially waning support for democracy across northern Nigeria with the challenge posed by the “sharia paradox” in contemporary political Islam. Contemporary sharia movements exist fully within the realm of secular state authority, encouraging top-down implementations schemes that offer few opportunities for citizen engagement or feedback. Despite the broad popular sentiment in Nigeria and elsewhere in the Muslim world that sharia and democracy are potentially compatible, the failure of these state-driven sharia plans to live up to their transformative promises opens the door for the rise of new religious critiques of state power, including groups like Boko Haram.

Since September 2001, the struggle against international terrorism and extremism across the globe has become a defining security paradigm of the 21st century. Africa is now an inescapable and increasingly critical part of this new security equation. This presents an enormous political and socio-economic challenge for many African countries and organizations that are already over burden trying to cope with longstanding and other newly arising security threats. Terrorism and extremism, however, are certainly not new to Africa, but what has changed in the post-September 11^th world for Africa is the apparent melding of domestic and international terrorism and extremism. Accordingly, much of the success or failure to counter these threats will be as much affected by the actions and policies of external forces than on the capabilities (or lack thereof) of African governments and institutions.

Chapter Eight covers three countries: Nigeria, the largest in Africa by population, Sudan, the largest by area, and Somalia, which is, in 2010, probably the most religiously repressive area in the Muslim world. In Nigeria, the growth of more militant forms of Islam, together with accusations of apostasy and blasphemy have led to riots and murders, with thousands dead. There are also violent militias, such as Boko Haram, which appear to regard everyone else as blasphemers or apostates who must be attacked. Somalia is torn between rival jurisdictions and rival militias, none of which is open to political or religious difference. Among them is the Al-Shabab – the Union of Islamic Courts – movement. It enforces its radically repressive version of sharia, which includes banning music and bells, destroys graves and anything else that it believes smacks of Sufism, and is embarked on a policy of exterminating every Christian in the country, including by beheading children. Apart from its repression of journalists and politicians, Sudan executed its leading Muslim scholar on charges of apostasy, implicitly charged a UN Special Rapporteur with blasphemy, and its agents declared hundreds of thousands of Nuba Muslims apostates who deserved death.

Too many of Africa’s nation-states, both north and south of the Sahara, remain convulsed by combatants, infiltrated by insurgents, and damaged deeply either by the self-inflicted wounds of civil conflict or attacked from within by Islamists supported from without and loyal to externally propagated ideologies. In their founding years, independent northern and southern Africa harbored conflicts that tore new nations apart. In contemporary times some of those civil wars linger, joined as they have been since the dawning of the new century by newly spawned fundamentalist revolutionaries and by reactionaries who regard constituted authority and modern political instrumentalities as illegitimate, even haram—“forbidden.” Although there are fewer civil conflict deaths per year than there were in the 1980s and 1990s, there are many more episodes of terror, and fatalities, than there were in those times. And the seemingly intractable nature of some of the conflicts and many of the campaigns against terror give the impression that sections of Africa—Egypt and the Sinai; Algeria, Libya, and the Sahel; the Horn of Africa and Kenya; Nigeria and its northeastern neighbors; and the Democratic Republic of Congo—are today immured in warfare that will not easily end.

One of the common explanations for the expansion of Boko Haram in Lake Chad Basin is to consider that it has been fostered by the links between the jihadist movement and Kanuris. Indeed, the area of this insurgency largely covers the historical settlement area of Kanuris between northeastern Nigeria, the far-north of Cameroon and southeastern of Niger. Many Boko Haram supporters are from Kanuri populations. Yet many victims of this insurgency also belong to this community. Based on observations made in the far-north of Cameroon, this chapter calls into question the primacy of community ties in the diffusion of Boko Haram. It highlights the ability of the jihadist movement to undermine the tribal system upon which the state has always based its local domination. In particular, it shows how Boko Haram, whose social base is in reality trans-communal, has been able to take advantage of inequalities and divisions within tribes to create links stronger than community ties. This has taken place in a context of contestation of state and community elites by the marginalized peoples living in these border areas.

Chapter 5, “Can Zobi Build National Unity?,” examines the depiction of the Nigerian nation—and the calls for national unity—on Sesame Square. It explores the hopes of Sesame Square’s creators that the program could create a sense of “Nigerian-ness” among young viewers. Feelings of national pride were seen as antidotes to the ethnic and religious allegiances that were allegedly contributing to ongoing conflicts, so creators included symbols, songs, and messages celebrating Nigeria. Yet calls for viewers to be proud of their country seemed unrealistic in a context where the fragile Nigerian state is failing to provide basic services for its citizens (including education) and is indiscriminately arresting and executing thousands of Muslims. This chapter focuses on the book’s second overarching argument: that a violent public curriculum undermines messages of unity and peace.