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A Critique of Expressivism

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan ... More

This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.Less

Introduction

Mark Schroeder

in Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism

This chapter introduces metaethical expressivism, explains its main sources of interest over earlier noncognitivist theories, and illustrates how it has been applied to many topics across all ... More

This chapter introduces metaethical expressivism, explains its main sources of interest over earlier noncognitivist theories, and illustrates how it has been applied to many topics across all different areas of philosophy. The progress which proponents such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have made in developing expressivist theories is contrasted sharply with five major problems which remain unsolved, starting with an adequate account of what ‘express’ means. The concept of an argument from ‘license for optimism’ is introduced, and contrasted with the project of actually constructing an expressivist semantic theory. Finally, the chapter announces the main conclusions of the book and lays out its organization.Less

The Motive Power of Evaluative Concepts

Paul Horwich

in Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

The focus here is on the emotivist/expressivist contention that normative concepts are constituted non-cognitively, by their motivational role. This chapter defends that contention against the ... More

The focus here is on the emotivist/expressivist contention that normative concepts are constituted non-cognitively, by their motivational role. This chapter defends that contention against the influential double-barreled objection (known as the Frege-Geach point) that (i) deployments of such concepts often have no motivational import, and that (ii) unless normative pronouncements express genuine beliefs (rather than mere desires) the validity of inferences amongst them cannot be accommodated. It is suggested here, in response, that that the use conception of meaning provides a general perspective from which this objection can be deflected. For we can suppose that the meaning of a primitive normative term (e.g., ‘ought’) is constituted by the tendency for certain desire-like states to causally correlate with the internal acceptance of certain sentences containing these terms (hence, with the beliefs that are expressed by those sentences). Thus (and pace Blackburn and Gibbard) we can accommodate the essential motivational import of certain normative beliefs without compromising either on their genuineness, or on the reality of the normative facts that make them true or false.Less

Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons

Ulrike Heuer

in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams

In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the ... More

In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the members of a community who have a disposition to be guided by the concepts in question. His internalism about practical reasons may help to explain this claim: the disposition to be guided by a thick concept provides the link to existing motives that all reasons must have. Understood thus, Williams makes room for explaining and vindicating Oscar Wilde's ‘…not one of my words’-dictum about certain thick concepts. However, the chapter argues that the combination of the account of thick concepts that Williams expounds with reasons internalism leads into a dilemma: either the facts that thick concepts, correctly applied, refer to, do not provide reasons (not even for those who have a disposition to be guided by them) — except perhaps in the way in which any other, non-evaluative fact may provide a reason; or they provide reasons for everyone, independently of the disposition to be guided by the concepts. Getting out of the dilemma requires giving up on reasons internalism or, alternatively, modifying the account of thick concepts that Williams sets out.Less

Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

This chapter discusses expressivism as a form of moral skepticism that denies the truth-aptness of moral beliefs and judgments. It focuses on whether expressivists can solve the problem of embedding ... More

This chapter discusses expressivism as a form of moral skepticism that denies the truth-aptness of moral beliefs and judgments. It focuses on whether expressivists can solve the problem of embedding (also known as the Frege problem) by allowing that some moral beliefs have a minimal kind of truth, and whether expressivists can account for the apparent objectivity of moral beliefs. It concludes that if expressivists succeed in mimicking all apparently realistic moral language, then expressivism does not really matter to moral epistemology.Less

Biology and Ethics

Philip Kitcher

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa ... More

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa Foot; Humean approaches found in Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard; and biologically grounded approaches found in of Elliott Sober and Brian Skyrms. The first two approaches begin with a philosophical view, and seek support for it in biology. The third approach begins with biology, and uses it to illuminate the status of morality. This chapter pursues a version of the third program. A major accomplishment of evolutionary biology has been the explanation of biological altruism, which opens the door to a similar explanation of psychological altruism, or “fellow-feeling.” The chapter conjectures that humans have evolved a capacity for normative governance by socially shared rules. A process of cultural evolution led to the social rules with which we are familiar. This genealogical story poses a challenge, for the idea of moral truth plays no role in it. The story therefore lends support to non-cognitivism or anti-realist expressivism. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications of the genealogical story for moral knowledge, moral objectivity, and the idea of moral authority.Less

Sensibility Theory and Projectivism

Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell ... More

This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists (such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard), and the advocates of sensibility theory (most notably John McDowell and David Wiggins). Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral psychology; it concerns how best to understand the emotions to which sentimentalist theories must appeal.Less

On the Source of Necessity

Ross P. Cameron

in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology

Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If ... More

Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If necessary, we begin the process towards regress; but if contingent, we undermine the necessity whose source we wanted to explain. Bob Hale attempts to blunt both horns of this dilemma and this chapter defends Hale's conclusion that the dilemma can be resisted. The chapter ends by defending an account of the source of necessity, and showing why it does not fall victim to Blackburn's problem.Less

‘The Alphabet of Our Liberty’: Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in the Old Bailey

R. W. Kostal

in A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law

This chapter focuses on the content of and public reaction to the grand jury charge of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in the case of The Queen v. Nelson and Brand. It closely examines the legal and ... More

This chapter focuses on the content of and public reaction to the grand jury charge of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in the case of The Queen v. Nelson and Brand. It closely examines the legal and political underpinnings of the charges, the public reaction they engendered, and the unprecedented dispute that arose between Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and Justice Blackburn (case of The Queen v. Eyre).Less

‘The Most Law-Loving People in the World’: The Denouement of the Jamaica Litigation

R. W. Kostal

in A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law

The legal program of the Jamaica Committee was founded on the premise that an English high court would seize on the private criminal prosecutions of Edward Eyre and Nelson and Brand to resolve the ... More

The legal program of the Jamaica Committee was founded on the premise that an English high court would seize on the private criminal prosecutions of Edward Eyre and Nelson and Brand to resolve the national dispute over martial law, and decisively in favour of liberty and the rule of law. This chapter excavates the two most important and authoritative judicial pronouncements on the Jamaica cases (in the form of separate charges to the grand jury provided in turn by Chief Justice Cockburn and Justice Blackburn). It considers the legal and political content of these charges, and the extensive critical commentaries they generated. The argument is made that instead of providing a coherent, definitive, and liberal account of martial law in the English constitution, judicial intervention in the Jamaica cases succeeded only in provoking further discord over its nature and content.Less

Alternatives to Realism: Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard

Angus Ritchie

in From Morality to Metaphysics: The Theistic Implications of our Ethical Commitments

This chapter evaluates the theory of ethics developed by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard. It argues that their ‘moral quasi-realism’ cannot vindicate the fundamental ethical commitments which were ... More

This chapter evaluates the theory of ethics developed by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard. It argues that their ‘moral quasi-realism’ cannot vindicate the fundamental ethical commitments which were defended in Chapter 1. Either it must say that our current sentiments fix moral truth (whoever ‘we’ are deemed to be) or they must allow that the truth could be different from what we now think. The chapter argues that neither alternative is acceptable: the former position rules out future moral progress (‘emancipatory changes’), whereas the latter (in the absence of any notion of a more objective order of reason) re-opens the door to the very kind of morally obnoxious counterfactuals quasi-realism was designed to avoid.Less

Supervenience and Causation

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the ... More

Addresses two outstanding worries about ethical non‐naturalism. The first, developed primarily by Simon Blackburn, is that this form of moral realism cannot provide an adequate account of the supervenience of the moral upon the non‐moral. The second, prompted by Gilbert Harman, is that moral facts lack any independent causal power, and so we have excellent reason to regard them as unreal.Less

” … take the book … and tell God to make them dead … “: Scripturalization as White Men's Hegemony

Vincent L. Wimbush

in White Men's Magic: Scripturalization as Slavery

Chapter 6 opens a window onto Equiano’s understanding and practice of the power that scripturalization represents.

Metaphysics

David Enoch

in Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism

This chapter is a discussion of some distinct but related metaphysical worries about Robust Realism. The first is the most general worry associated with Mackie's argument from queerness. But this ... More

This chapter is a discussion of some distinct but related metaphysical worries about Robust Realism. The first is the most general worry associated with Mackie's argument from queerness. But this argument — unless it can be seen as standing for some other worries discussed elsewhere in the book — can rather easily be dismissed. The two other objections start from the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative. One challenge about supervenience states that given such supervenience, and the identity of necessarily co-extensive properties, naturalism follows. Robust Realism avoids this objection by rejecting the identity of necessarily co-extensive properties, a rejection that is motivated by the discussion of indispensability and parsimony in Chapter 3. The second supervenience challenge requires an explanation for supervenience-without-reduction. A partial explanation of this kind — one that is consistent with Robust Realism — is provided, and the remaining bruteness and violation of Hume's Dictum is shown to be quite acceptable.Less

Anscombe on Spirit and Intention

John Finnis

in Intention and Identity: Collected Essays Volume II

This chapter presents a 2009 essay which reviews posthumously published papers of Elizabeth Anscombe. It draws attention to her energetic affirmation and explanatory illustration of the reality of ... More

This chapter presents a 2009 essay which reviews posthumously published papers of Elizabeth Anscombe. It draws attention to her energetic affirmation and explanatory illustration of the reality of human soul and the spiritual (as well as bodily) nature of human life. It extends and is extended by the remarks on her treatment (and Wittgenstein's) of this volume's Introduction. It also critiques Simon Blackburn's understanding of Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, and her own treatment of intention in her works on morality (as distinct from her great book Intention).Less

Mind-Independence without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have it Both Ways

Sharon Street

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6

Quasi-realism about normativity is an ambitious attempt to have one's cake and eat it too in metaethics. The cake in question is an uncompromising naturalism that disavows anything metaphysically or ... More

Quasi-realism about normativity is an ambitious attempt to have one's cake and eat it too in metaethics. The cake in question is an uncompromising naturalism that disavows anything metaphysically or epistemologically mysterious. Eating it consists in being able to go on saying all the things that ordinary realists about normativity say. This chapter argues that quasi-realists can't have it both ways. They must choose between a naturalistically palatable understanding of the nature and origins of normative judgment, on the one hand, and affirmations of the mind-independence of value, on the other. Quasi-realism—understood as an attempt to circumvent this choice and secure all the benefits of realism with none of the costs—fails. Moreover, even though one may in principle be an expressivist without being a quasi-realist, once quasi-realism's failure becomes clear, it is no longer obvious what advantages are to be gained from being an expressivist.Less

Smile When You’re Winning: How to Become a Cambridge Pragmatist

Hallvard Lillehammer

in The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century

This chapter traces the development of a particular current of thought known by the label ‘pragmatism’ during the last part of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first, and ... More

This chapter traces the development of a particular current of thought known by the label ‘pragmatism’ during the last part of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first, and latterly associated with the work of Simon Blackburn and Huw Price. Three questions are addressed. First, how did this current of thought actually develop? Second, does this current of thought constitute a single, coherent, theoretical outlook? Third, does this current of thought constitute an attractive philosophical outlook? In answering these questions, attention is drawn to a tension between the two main proponents of this current of thought, namely the different attitudes they take to the naturalist ‘master narrative’ on which it depends.Less

Landscape

Rodney Harrison and John Schofield

in After Modernity: Archaeological Approaches to the Contemporary Past

As we saw in the previous chapter, many close comparisons exist between the archaeology of the contemporary past and that of earlier periods, most ... More

As we saw in the previous chapter, many close comparisons exist between the archaeology of the contemporary past and that of earlier periods, most obviously in the way we conceptualize and investigate sites as places or loci of human activity through the material traces left behind. We saw how this approach, this archaeological methodology, applies equally to prehistoric settlements and abandoned office spaces that we ourselves have occupied. Another comparison concerns the question of landscape, and the ways in which human activity occurs within and across landscape; how it can be influenced by the properties of landscape, whether physical or social; how the present landscape is the result of actions, activities, and attitudes in the past, and their collective and cumulative impact over time; and how we can helpfully study human activity at this broader scale. We are not talking here about particular landscapes that become fossilized at a certain time, coincident for example with their abandonment or some natural catastrophe: the Roman townscape of Pompeii for example; the Palaeolithic land surfaces at Boxgrove (West Sussex); or nuclear testing facilities of the western United States, closed or downgraded at the end of the Cold War. Rather, for the contemporary past, we are (or at least should be) referring to landscape in a more holistic sense: the everything, the everywhere, and of course—what makes it so interesting and so relevant that we examine this as archaeologists—the everyday. This scale of inquiry, the sheer amount of stuff within the contemporary landscape, and the new technologies that make it possible now to begin making sense of all this material, is one of the main challenges and benefits of exploring the archaeology of the late modern world. This chapter returns initially to the principles of historic landscape characterization or ‘HLC’, first discussed in Chapter 3, to think further about investigations of this kind, and how, for example, national and international patterns of change and use can be studied archaeologically. Less