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The Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Regimes

Daniel H. Joyner

in International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

This chapter analyzes international legal regimes regulating the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. It begins with a brief description of chemical and biological weapons. It then ... More

This chapter analyzes international legal regimes regulating the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. It begins with a brief description of chemical and biological weapons. It then discusses provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It argues that the biological and chemical weapons regulatory regimes, with the BWC and CWC as their cornerstones, have succeeded in establishing a comprehensive legal prohibition upon possession, development, proliferation, and use of biological and chemical weapons. This legal prohibition is supported by a pervasive and powerful ancient moral taboo particularly on the use of biological and chemical weapons.Less

Poison, Poisoned Weapons, Asphyxiating Gases, Biological and Chemical Weapons

William H. Boothby

in Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict

After tracing the emergence of the modern law prohibiting the use of poison and poisoned weapons, this chapter considers the meaning and significance of the rule. It assesses asphyxiating gases, ... More

After tracing the emergence of the modern law prohibiting the use of poison and poisoned weapons, this chapter considers the meaning and significance of the rule. It assesses asphyxiating gases, notes the action taken in 1899 to address the matter and looks at the prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, noting that the instrument also addresses bacteriological weapons. More recent treaties, in the form of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, are then discussed article by article, explaining each provision and analysing the obligations of states party to each. In the case of each instrument, participation by states in that body of law is assessed and the status of the relevant rules in customary law is considered. The particular rules relating to riot control agents and the practical implications of those rules are noted.Less

Biological weapons

Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy

in Terrorism and Public Health: A balanced approach to strengthening systems and protecting people

This chapter describes biological weapons, including the history of their proliferation and use, outbreaks of anthrax and salmonellosis, international control of biological weapons, and specific ... More

This chapter describes biological weapons, including the history of their proliferation and use, outbreaks of anthrax and salmonellosis, international control of biological weapons, and specific bioterrorist weapons and their adverse health effects. It concludes with a discussion of what health professionals can do to address biological weapons.Less

Acting Globally

Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester

in Breeding Bio Insecurity: How U.S. Biodefense Is Exporting Fear, Globalizing Risk, and Making Us All Less Secure

The confidence-building measures by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) included information on defensive programs, high-biocontainment laboratories, vaccine manufacturing plants, and infectious ... More

The confidence-building measures by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) included information on defensive programs, high-biocontainment laboratories, vaccine manufacturing plants, and infectious disease outbreaks. A major detractors' argument is that bioweapons agents can be destroyed in a short time, unlike hundreds of drums of chemicals agents. So, it is asserted that the BWC is unverifiable even with the added protocol, and no parallel can be drawn with verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Global support is a must for the strongest interpretations of both the BWC and the CWC and it becomes necessary to embrace the biosecurity trinity. If thinking globally does not lead to acting globally, a future as dangerous as the paranoia has conjured might be faced on a global level.Less

Evolution of the BW Prohibition Regime: Assessing Achievements and Weaknesses

in Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race

This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibition regime. The problem with the BWC does not lie in its intended scope but in its ... More

This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibition regime. The problem with the BWC does not lie in its intended scope but in its ineffective implementation. The BWC needed to be strengthened, particularly in the areas of verification, implementation, and an established treaty organization to aid in implementation. The confidence-building measures, the protocol negotiations, the first intersessional process, the Sixth Review Conference, the second intersessional process, and science and technology developments will be able to help against the deficiencies of the BWC. The chapter looks at the evaluation of bioterrorism as the primary bioweapons threat. Looking at the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) shows that an incriminating case against a biological weapons proliferator will be made over time by diligently assembling pieces of evidence.Less

Defence research and genetic engineering: fears and dissociation in the 1970s

Jon Agar and Brian Balmer (eds)

in Scientific Governance in Britain, 1914-79

This chapter examines the implications for British defence research of the discovery of techniques to genetically engineer organisms in the early 1970s. While we argue that there is no evidence that ... More

This chapter examines the implications for British defence research of the discovery of techniques to genetically engineer organisms in the early 1970s. While we argue that there is no evidence that the UK in the 1970s exploited genetic engineering techniques as a source of new weapons or defences, there were two consequences, which we call disassociations. First, the Microbiological Research Establishment, at Porton Down, was divorced from direct military patronage. In doing so, the governance of genetic engineering was influenced. Second, the concerns about the military potential of genetic engineering were subject to publicity management, and were dampened by invoking the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.Less

Conclusion

in Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race

This chapter addresses the offense-defense arms race in the biological arena, as this proves useful in focusing attention on those policy options that need to be conceptualized and should be ... More

This chapter addresses the offense-defense arms race in the biological arena, as this proves useful in focusing attention on those policy options that need to be conceptualized and should be implemented with a view to the 2011 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 2013 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conferences. It is clear that there are no easy technical solutions to biodefense. Increasing transparency in biodefense is a problem that will not be quickly resolved. Moreover, the data does not mean that the CWC-BWC (mid-spectrum agent) gap cannot be closed to a significant degree by further development of the other chemical production facility (OCPF) verification regime, but States Parties and civil society need to give considerably more attention to how this can be accomplished than they have done to date. The most important long-term problem facing the States Parties to the BWC is how to enhance greatly the means of assuring compliance.Less

Anthrax: Accursed Fire and Biological Weapon

Jeanne Guillemin

in Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak

Anthrax predates back to the start of civilization and is a disease that kills livestock and affects humans with black spots. This chapter introduces a research team—including the author—which is ... More

Anthrax predates back to the start of civilization and is a disease that kills livestock and affects humans with black spots. This chapter introduces a research team—including the author—which is sent to Sverdlovsk, Moscow, the location of the worst anthrax epidemic that has been recorded in a modern industrial nation, and explains how an anthrax infection starts and how humans can contract the disease. It then focuses on the possibility to use anthrax as a biological weapon, and introduces the Biological Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling, and retaining of biological agents or toxins.Less

Conclusion: Towards a Research Agenda on Non-Great Power Institutions

Adam Bower

in Norms Without the Great Powers: International Law and Changing Social Standards in World Politics

This final chapter returns to the study’s original motivation: understanding whether, and when, multilateral treaties can serve as an effective means of generating international change under ... More

This final chapter returns to the study’s original motivation: understanding whether, and when, multilateral treaties can serve as an effective means of generating international change under conditions of great power ambivalence. It places the core case studies in their wider context by applying the hypothesized factors developed in Chapter 8 to examples of (a) other non-great power treaties; (b) concessions to great powers in order to secure their participation; and (c) the abandonment of binding agreements in the face of opposition in favour of informal arrangements or none at all. The preceding study has validated the initial interest in non-great power multilateralism, and has offered impetus for further detailed research to help scholars and policymakers alike better understand the promise and perils of this strategy. The chapter—and book—therefore concludes by proposing an agenda for academic research on non-great power institutions more generally.Less