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Before the 1960s crime wave, American police officers were little trained and spent much of their time responding to citizen calls about crime. A Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) in the 1970s began to upgrade police education. A round of studies questioned the effectiveness of police patrol tactics. Analysts advocated more sophisticated methods, called ‘problem‐oriented policing’ and later the more general ‘community policing.’ New York lawyer Adam Walinsky promoted a concept called the Police Corps that would encourage more college‐educated officers. The reform ideas coalesced in the presidency of Bill Clinton, who successfully argued for federal funding for an additional 100,000 community‐oriented local officers, an idea that Walinsky complained was a watered‐down form of his concept (which still was instituted on a smaller scale). Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, was initially skeptical of the massive federal program called ‘Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS), but she eventually backed it. It was not certain how many officers were hired and permanently funded—it may have been closer to 50,000—but the program did have a significant impact on police hiring in the nation. Less clear was the effect of COPS on the crime rate. The program's supporters asserted success, but other factors like the economy, demographics and alternate policing methods might have been just as important.

The high crime rates of the early 1990s and a string of sensational crimes from coast to coast set the stage in 1994 for the most extensive and costly federal anticrime bill ever. Bill Clinton had made crime fighting a top priority, particularly after his health care reform bill had faltered. Congress had taken the initiative, led by Democrats Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware and Representative Charles Schumer of New York. The Democrats came up with a way to put $30 billion for anticrime programs into a ‘trust fund’ created by a reduction in the federal bureaucracy. Soon it seemed that Clinton's 100,000 community police officers, a Republican demand for more prisons, and various other programs to combat violence against women and other crime problems all could be funded. Republicans backed off support of big allocations for crime prevention ideas like ‘midnight basketball’ for teens, and the National Rifle Association fought against a proposed ban on assault‐style weapons. The result was a donnybrook that kept Congress in session through most of the summer. Republicans eventually won a series of concessions on funding, although the assault weapon provision survived and the law was passed. In the process, Democratic leadership on Capitol Hill was seen as so flawed that the crime law played a significant part in the Republicans’ seizing control of the House of Representatives in the 1994 elections. Five years later, the crime law's impact on crime rates was uncertain; in fact, crime had begun to fall long before many of its provisions could have had much effect.

This chapter evaluates the dispositional theory against the crisis decision making of President Bill Clinton. Of all the presidents studied in this book, Clinton comes closest to an ideal-type high self-monitor. A review of both quantitative and qualitative indicators of military assertiveness from before and during his presidency indicates that his beliefs about the efficacy of military force leaned toward the dovish side of the military assertiveness scale. Taken together, one should expect Clinton's crisis behavior to be consistent with that of a reputation believer. Because of his more dovish tendencies, Clinton did not seek out opportunities to show resolve and was at first reluctant to use force to demonstrate resolve; but once he sensed a loss of reputation, he was prepared to escalate with military force as the theory predicts.

This chapter explores a particular application of the well-accepted view that effective leaders both understand and help shape their institution’s culture. Language and religious symbols make a vital difference in developing a vision of society. This chapter analyzes three cases in which leaders acted to transform public culture towards inclusion vis-à-vis America’s religious diversity: William and Mary President Gene Nichol and his decision about the Wren cross; Keith Ellison, a U.S. Muslim congressman, and his swearing-in using a Quran; and former U.S. President Bill Clinton and his statements on religion in public schools and on religion in the federal workplace. These cases suggest that good leadership requires facing the dilemmas that religious symbols can create, and then transforming them into opportunities to expand American public culture. Each case sheds light on what leaders should and should not do to shape the culture.

Much of the increase in crime that hit the US in the 1980s and 1990s was blamed on habitual offenders. For many years, prison wardens and parole boards had decided when most inmates would be released. Legislators came to believe that this system was too lenient and enacted tougher penalties. When even these extended terms behind bars did not seem to work, activists came up with a new formulation, “three strikes and you’re out,” meaning that a third serious crime would bring a life term. Commentator John Carlson started a campaign for such a scheme in Washington State in the 1980s; it was enacted in 1993, the height of modern‐day crime totals. The concept quickly spread in California after the infamous kidnapping and killing of 12‐year‐old Polly Klaas that same year. President Bill Clinton embraced the idea for federal crimes, and at least two dozen states adopted some form of it. Experts disputed how much three strikes or any other tough sentencing laws affected the crime declines of the 1990s. Still, prison building continued at a high rate during the 1990s, with the combined population in prisons and jails approaching 2 million. Critics argued that three strikes and ‘mandatory minimum’ prison term laws were incarcerating far too many low‐level offenders who would end up back on the streets committing more crimes after years of imprisonment with little vocational or educational training. As the costs of running prisons mounted, some policymakers were seriously rethinking the punitive practices of the late 20^th century, but no dramatic turnaround was in sight.

This chapter looks at Bill Clinton's role in the 2008 campaign and his special relationship to Black voters. As he left office in 2001, Clinton's positive legacy of social and economic inclusiveness was very much intact in the African American community. Moreover, his relationship with and treatment of African Americans stood as a shining part of what would become the Clinton legacy. However, when President Clinton waged war on behalf of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton for the Democratic nomination during 2008 presidential campaign season, he found that the political landscape had changed. He appeared to make little accommodation in his combative campaign style for the fact that Obama was being treated like the crown prince by American journalists and the Democratic Party. As a result, Clinton found himself explaining incidents of political sparring between the Clinton camp and the Obama camp that needed no explanation against other opponents. He also made gross miscalculations about the nature and strength of the Clintons' support among African Americans.

This chapter assesses the claim that evangelical pressure forced Bush to recast his position on Israel’s incursion into the West Bank in the spring of 2002. People who know and admire Bush consider that ludicrous. David Frum says that Bush initially left Israel to the State Department. After 9/11, though, the Middle East was far more urgent to Bush. When he abruptly stopped demanding that Israel withdraw, says Frum, he was breaking away from traditional American policy. By the summer of 2002, Bush had charted an entirely new course. The chapter addresses various theories about why Bush allied with Israel so firmly. Some observers attribute it to his personal relationship with Sharon. Another perspective is that the Bush administration maintained a hands-off policy because of Bill Clinton’s failure to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. Another issue was a debate in the administration about whether to act first on Iraq. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that Bush’s policy was influenced by a powerful but loosely defined Jewish Lobby. In the summer of 2007, the Bush administration sought to prop up the Fatah-led government in the West Bank and to sponsor Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Christian Zionists denounced the new peace initiative.

Over the years, Congress has consistently increased the jurisdiction of federal courts over crime, from 17 specified offenses when the nation was founded to several thousand now. More than 40% of federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have appeared since 1970. The most dramatic growth was in drug cases, which composed 5% of the federal caseload in 1947 but amounted to 36 percent just 50 years later. An Armed Career Criminal Act in 1984 allowed federal prosecutors to charge suspects who had three local felony convictions. Later laws made carjacking a federal crime and gave the FBI authority over “deadbeat dads” who cross state lines and terrorism involving abortion clinics. A few measures were struck down by the Supreme Court, including one involving use of firearms at schools and another allowing federal civil cases by sexual‐assault victims. In the executive branch, the administration of President George H. W. Bush created a program called ‘Operation Triggerlock’ to pursue firearms cases, and both Bush and successor Bill Clinton directed the FBI to put more emphasis on investigating local violent crime. By 2001, the federal government had taken a prominent role in many categories of crime prosecution that once were the province of states and localities.

This chapter discusses the possible new conception of foreign policy by the administration of Bill Clinton during the late 1990s. The approach worked well in certain instances, but during the next four years the liabilities of a nuanced strategy were exposed. The discussion highlights the four basic problems with Clinton's vision of foreign policy, which illustrated the dangers of a flexible approach to foreign policy.

Analyses the reception given by the government of the US to the idea of sustainable development. It argues that the US has basically remained aloof from the sustainable development agenda. While there was some attempt to engage with sustainable development by the Clinton presidency, the concept has not been taken up actively by US political and administrative institutions at the federal level. In the main, sustainable development continues to be seen as a problem for developing countries.

This chapter describes two key moments that signaled the rise of a new religious politics in America: the presidential nomination acceptance addresses of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Bill Clinton in 1992. It then briefly identifies a series of changes that have taken place over the past several decades, all of which point to an increasingly close relationship between religion and politics. Political leaders have taken advantage of and contributed to these changes by employing the God strategy, in which they carefully craft their public communications to appeal to people of faith.

This chapter discusses the attempts that Bill Clinton, George W. Bush's successor, conducted to meet the challenge of shaping foreign policy in a post-Cold War world. Clinton's strategy, which was cast in ideals that appealed to Americans on an emotional and intuitive level, appeared to be promising in terms of sustaining public support for foreign policy. Clinton called his strategy “enlargement”, and it also seemed to be calculated to meet the exigencies of post-Cold War affairs.

This chapter discusses the possible replacement for containment. Even as enlargement crumbled, other developments in Bill Clinton's on-the-job education in foreign policy cast doubt on the administration's earlier insistence on crafting a fully cohesive strategy. A new discussion regarding the imperatives of a post-Cold War grand strategy occurred, and many wondered if coherence had become irrelevant.

This chapter considers the moral hazard stage of the relationship between Congress and the IMF and World Bank. The chief exogenous shocks came from the 1995 Mexican peso crisis and 1997 Asian financial crisis, which caused many to reevaluate the role of the IMF in preventing financial instability. The chief endogenous change came with Republican control of the House during the Bill Clinton administration, ushering in an era of divided government in reverse. The chapter argues that the Republicans had connected party ideology to a very specific legislative agenda during the election, tying committee chairs more tightly to the majority party. Congressional advocacy developed with the growing use of appropriations bills to alter the course of public policy. As the constituencies for the Bretton Woods institutions fractured or disintegrated, the results were extended funding delays and additional policy demands in the form of the Meltzer Commission, debt relief, shift in the use of concessional loans to grants, and debt relief. By the end of the stage when the Argentine crisis occurred, the IMF searched openly for a mission and the World Bank’s role appeared to be obsolete, given the volume and sophistication of disintermediated capital flows.

The faith of Bill Clinton is difficult to decipher. He professed to have been “born again” as a youth, frequently testified that his faith was important to him, attended church regularly as president, had an impressive knowledge of the Bible, and often quoted Scripture. Clinton’s beliefs influenced his policies on numerous matters including racial reconciliation and international peacemaking. Despite his public displays of religiosity, Clinton engaged in tawdry actions that violated biblical moral standards, most notably the Whitewater affair, the state trooper flap, the Paula Jones case, Filegate, and the Monica Lewinsky scandal, which contributed to his impeachment. His personal behavior, especially his sexual affairs and lying, contravened traditional moral norms, leading many to question the genuineness of Clinton’s Christian profession. Three issues especially display the influence Clinton’s faith had on his presidential policies: his efforts to promote religious liberty, welfare reform, and reconciliation between nations.

Clinton’s election in 1992 brought a Democrat back to the White House. Clinton had pledged to involve the United States in the Northern Ireland peace process more significantly than any previous administration, and immediately set about exploring issues such as a visitor's visa for Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams and the creation of a Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, duly following through on both pledges despite resistance from Ulster unionists. This chapter utilizes a range of state and personal papers to examine the ways in which Clinton was engaged and advised by a small group of Irish-American supporters, led by a former college friend and former Congressman, Bruce Morrison. The chapter also examines the three visits that Clinton made to Northern Ireland, focusing on his historic 1995 visit. In particular, the chapter considers the role of the US government in the achievement of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the associated paramilitary ceasefires that preceded it.

This chapter discusses in detail Bill Clinton's “enlargement” strategy. It looks at how this strategy slowly unraveled a year after it reached its high point in September 1993. It also discusses the possible causes of the failure of enlargement and the practical shortcomings of the strategy, such as the unwillingness of the president to pursue his goals in the face of serious domestic resistance.

This chapter discusses the question of whether the lack of a rhetorical paradigm in foreign policy might complicate the attempts of the administration to justify its individual diplomatic initiatives. Strobe Talbott acknowledged the fact that if they were not motivated by a clear threat or a compelling goal, Americans tended to lose interest in foreign affairs. This discussion shows that the rhetorical shortcomings of Bill Clinton's strategy brought about a significant diminution of his power in foreign affairs. It also states that Clinton's inability to maintain control of U.S. policy indicated a failure to overcome the post-Cold War dilemma that he had inherited.