Daniel Harrington
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813136134
- eISBN:
- 9780813136837
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136134.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign ...
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No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1949. Tracing the blockade’s origins, it explains why British and American planners during the Second World War neglected Western access to postwar Berlin and why Western officials did little to reduce Berlin’s vulnerability as Cold War tensions increased. Standard accounts mistakenly emphasize an early decision to rely on an airlift to defeat the blockade. Leaders did not sit down, weigh alternatives, and choose “airlift” as the course of action that would resolve the crisis on their terms. No one at first believed the airlift could defeat the blockade; its inevitable failure would confront the Western powers with a choice between withdrawing from Berlin and starting a war. The airlift’s unexpected success transformed the crisis, confronting the Soviets with the choice between war and retreat. The Western powers found it harder to concert policy during the crisis than standard accounts acknowledge. The study traces diplomatic negotiations at all levels, from Berlin to the United Nations, examines the crisis’s effects on the 1948 US presidential election, and traces how the blockade affected US debates over the custody and use of atomic weapons.Less
No place symbolizes the Cold War more than Berlin. This book examines the “Berlin question” from its origin in wartime plans for the occupation of Germany through the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1949. Tracing the blockade’s origins, it explains why British and American planners during the Second World War neglected Western access to postwar Berlin and why Western officials did little to reduce Berlin’s vulnerability as Cold War tensions increased. Standard accounts mistakenly emphasize an early decision to rely on an airlift to defeat the blockade. Leaders did not sit down, weigh alternatives, and choose “airlift” as the course of action that would resolve the crisis on their terms. No one at first believed the airlift could defeat the blockade; its inevitable failure would confront the Western powers with a choice between withdrawing from Berlin and starting a war. The airlift’s unexpected success transformed the crisis, confronting the Soviets with the choice between war and retreat. The Western powers found it harder to concert policy during the crisis than standard accounts acknowledge. The study traces diplomatic negotiations at all levels, from Berlin to the United Nations, examines the crisis’s effects on the 1948 US presidential election, and traces how the blockade affected US debates over the custody and use of atomic weapons.
Paul C. Avey
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501740381
- eISBN:
- 9781501740398
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501740381.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Why would countries without nuclear weapons even think about fighting nuclear-armed opponents? A simple answer is that no one believes nuclear weapons will be used. But that answer fails to consider ...
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Why would countries without nuclear weapons even think about fighting nuclear-armed opponents? A simple answer is that no one believes nuclear weapons will be used. But that answer fails to consider why nonnuclear state leaders would believe that in the first place. This book argues that the costs and benefits of using nuclear weapons create openings that weak nonnuclear actors can exploit. It uses four case studies to show the key strategies available to nonnuclear states: Iraqi decision-making under Saddam Hussein in confrontations with the United States; Egyptian leaders' thinking about the Israeli nuclear arsenal during wars in 1969–70 and 1973; Chinese confrontations with the United States in 1950, 1954, and 1958; and a dispute that never escalated to war, the Soviet–United States tensions between 1946 and 1948 that culminated in the Berlin Blockade. Those strategies include limiting the scope of the conflict, holding chemical and biological weapons in reserve, seeking outside support, and leveraging international non-use norms. Counterintuitively, conventionally weak nonnuclear states are better positioned to pursue these strategies than strong ones, so that wars are unlikely when the nonnuclear state is powerful relative to its nuclear opponent. The book demonstrates clearly that nuclear weapons cast a definite but limited shadow, and while the world continues to face various nuclear challenges, understanding conflict in nuclear monopoly will remain a pressing concern for analysts and policymakers.Less
Why would countries without nuclear weapons even think about fighting nuclear-armed opponents? A simple answer is that no one believes nuclear weapons will be used. But that answer fails to consider why nonnuclear state leaders would believe that in the first place. This book argues that the costs and benefits of using nuclear weapons create openings that weak nonnuclear actors can exploit. It uses four case studies to show the key strategies available to nonnuclear states: Iraqi decision-making under Saddam Hussein in confrontations with the United States; Egyptian leaders' thinking about the Israeli nuclear arsenal during wars in 1969–70 and 1973; Chinese confrontations with the United States in 1950, 1954, and 1958; and a dispute that never escalated to war, the Soviet–United States tensions between 1946 and 1948 that culminated in the Berlin Blockade. Those strategies include limiting the scope of the conflict, holding chemical and biological weapons in reserve, seeking outside support, and leveraging international non-use norms. Counterintuitively, conventionally weak nonnuclear states are better positioned to pursue these strategies than strong ones, so that wars are unlikely when the nonnuclear state is powerful relative to its nuclear opponent. The book demonstrates clearly that nuclear weapons cast a definite but limited shadow, and while the world continues to face various nuclear challenges, understanding conflict in nuclear monopoly will remain a pressing concern for analysts and policymakers.
Daniel F. Harrington
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780813136134
- eISBN:
- 9780813136837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136134.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The introduction outlines differences between standard accounts of the Berlin blockade and the interpretation offered here. Earlier accounts fail to explain why wartime planners created Western ...
More
The introduction outlines differences between standard accounts of the Berlin blockade and the interpretation offered here. Earlier accounts fail to explain why wartime planners created Western sectors in Berlin, surrounded by the Soviet zone, without well-defined access rights to them, or why the Western powers failed to deter Soviet pressure on the city. Most accounts contend that the West quickly settled on an airlift to counter the blockade, while noting that leaders believed Berlin could not be supplied by air. In other words, governments chose the airlift as their response expecting it would fail. That does not make sense. Depictions of life in the city tend to be undifferentiated, while accounts of Western diplomacy ignore serious disagreements over tactics. Stalin’s decision to lift the blockade probably came later that traditional accounts suggest.Less
The introduction outlines differences between standard accounts of the Berlin blockade and the interpretation offered here. Earlier accounts fail to explain why wartime planners created Western sectors in Berlin, surrounded by the Soviet zone, without well-defined access rights to them, or why the Western powers failed to deter Soviet pressure on the city. Most accounts contend that the West quickly settled on an airlift to counter the blockade, while noting that leaders believed Berlin could not be supplied by air. In other words, governments chose the airlift as their response expecting it would fail. That does not make sense. Depictions of life in the city tend to be undifferentiated, while accounts of Western diplomacy ignore serious disagreements over tactics. Stalin’s decision to lift the blockade probably came later that traditional accounts suggest.
